This analysis of the concept of a human action takes its point of departure in the fact that actions are things done by persons. But people do many things which do not qualify as actions. A necessary condition for calling something done an action, is that the agent intends or means something by it, in the sense that the agent has some specific end in mind. Thus an action may be said to be the externalization, realization, or expression of the (...) agent's meaning. But what precisely are such meanings or intentions that are given expression in actions? How are they to be distinguished from other mental contents ? The author tries to answer these questions by distinguishing them, on the one hand, from experiences, sensations, feelings, and, on the other hand, from other thoughts and meanings that do not find expression in the action. It is claimed that this account of action explains many characteristics of actions: that actions are appraised, not described (because meanings are evaluated), that an action is regarded as a unity (because the meaning is a unity), that the intention and the performance are not causally related, but related as are the content and expression of linguistic utterances, etc. (shrink)

Justus Hartnack, Wittgenstein og den moderneJilosqfi (Wittgenstein'and Modem Phüosophy). Copenhagen 1960, Gyldendal. 154 pp.

The main purpose of the paper is to find illuminating and fruitful definitions of ?standard use?, ?misuse?, ?misleading use?, etc., as applied to our speech. The author first sets up two fundamental conditions for successful standard use of language: (1) that the statement should be given in the right circumstances, including the speaker's having a status such that he can make a statement of the kind in question; (2) that the speaker should mean what he says, in the sense that (...) what he says is an unfeigned, genuine expression of his mind. If either of these conditions is not satisfied, the statement is to be classified as non?standard in some sense. But depending on whether or not the person addressed is aware of the fact that the condition is not satisfied, the statement will be classified in different ways. Thus, if condition 1 is not satisfied and the person addressed is aware of it, he should call it simply ?odd? use, sometimes ?nonsense?. However, if the person addressed is unaware of this fact, we should talk about ?misleading? use (e.g. if someone who is not in command gives a command; if someone who was not there tells about the event as if he were present). If condition 2 is not satisfied and the person addressed is aware of it, we get ?secondary? use (e.g. jokes, irony, quotation, politeness, flattery as an accepted part of the social game). However, if the person addressed is not aware of this fact, we get ?misuse? or ?parasitic? use (e.g. lying, boasting, bluffing, cajoling). (shrink)

Abstract On the basis of Professor Ayer's The Problem of Knowledge, Mr. Stigen criticizes Ayer for defending a position which the sceptic does not attack. Ayer's ?descriptive analysis?, which is his answer to the sceptic, consists in an analysis of statements about, e.g. material objects or other minds into verifiable propositions. In other words, Ayer points to the fact that our statements are shown to be true by verification. However, according to Stigen, this analysis does not remove the sceptic's doubts, (...) for the sceptic does not doubt that our statements are true; his attack is directed against the validity of those of my present beliefs for which I claim knowledge?status. The sceptic asks me to justify my claim that the statement is not only true, but that I have also good grounds now for being sure of it, i.e. that my present belief amounts to knowledge in virtue of its credibility. On this point, according to Stigen, Ayer offers no satisfactory solution. (shrink)

Referring to Professor Tennessen's article “What Should We Say?”; (Inquiry, vol. 2 (1959), pp. 265-90), Mr. Stigen argues that Tennessen fails to distinguish between the speech situation of the speaker and that of the interpreter. He therefore, according to Stigen, confuses the problems relevant to each of them and frequently treats problems of “What should I say?”; with considerations relevant only to interpreters, whose proper question is “What does he mean?”;, and vice versa. Among other mistakes, according to Stigen, this (...) failure to distinguish the problems leads Tennessen to recommend a Humpty Dumpty attitude for speakers, although it is appropriate only to interpreters. The paper closes with some remarks on the use of modifying expressions. (shrink)