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Andrew Eshleman
University of Portland
  1. Can an Atheist Believe in God?Andrew S. Eshleman - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (2):183 - 199.
    Some have proposed that it is reasonable for an atheist to pursue a form of life shaped by engagement with theistic religious language and practice, once language and belief in God are interpreted in the appropriate non-realist manner. My aim is to defend this proposal in the face of several objections that have been raised against it. First, I engage in some conceptual spadework to distinguish more clearly some varieties of religious non-realism. Then, in response to two central objections, I (...)
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  2. Worthy of Praise: Better-Than-Minimally-Decent Agency.Andrew Eshleman & Andrew S. Eshleman - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility 2:216-241.
    Much recent work on moral responsibility has focused on responsibility as accountability—a type of responsibility associated with the blame-oriented reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. The preoccupation with this admittedly important form of responsibility fosters a truncated portrait of our moral lives by largely ignoring responsibility for actions that merit praise and emulation. Through an examination of what is presupposed in the attitudes of gratitude and esteem, this essay argues that praiseworthiness is not best understood as the mirror image (...)
     
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  3. Being is Not Believing: Fischer and Ravizza on Taking Responsibility.Andrew Eshleman & Andrew S. Eshleman - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 4 (79):479-490.
    In recent discussions of moral responsibility, two claims have generated considerable attention: 1) a complete account of responsibility cannot ignore the agent’s personal history prior to the time of action; and 2) an agent’s responsibility is not determined solely by whether certain objective facts about the agent obtain (e.g., whether he/she was free of physical coercion) but also by whether, subjectively, the agent views him/herself in a particular way. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza defend these claims and combine them (...)
     
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    Responsibility and Moral Bricolage.Andrew S. Eshleman - 2013 - Dissertatio 38:157-179.
    Na longa disputa sobre o tipo de liberdade requerida para a responsabilidade, os participantes tenderam a assumir que estavam concernidos com um conceito de responsabilidade moral compartilhado. Esta assunção foi questionada recentemente. Uma visível divisão entre ‘Lumpers’ e ‘Splitters’ surgiu. Os Lumpers defendem a suposição tradicional que há um conceito unificado de responsabilidade, enquanto os Splitters sustentam que há dois ou mais conceitos de responsabilidade moral. Aqui, eu ofereço um argumento em nome dos Splitters que conecta um tipo de pluralismo (...)
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