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  1.  87
    Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and the Unity of Space and Time.Andrew F. Roche - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (1):41-64.
    On one reading of Kant’s account of our original representations of space and time, they are, in part, products of the understanding or imagination. On another, they are brute, sensible givens, entirely independent of the understanding. In this article, while I agree with the latter interpretation, I argue for a version of it that does more justice to the insights of the former than others currently available. I claim that Kant’s Transcendental Deduction turns on the representations of space and time (...)
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    Allais on Transcendental Idealism.Andrew F. Roche - 2011 - Kantian Review 16 (3):351-374.
    Lucy Allais argues that we can better understand Kant's transcendental idealism by taking seriously the analogy of appearances to secondary qualities that Kant offers in theProlegomena. A proper appreciation of this analogy, Allais claims, yields a reading of transcendental idealism according to which all properties that can appear to us in experience are mind-dependent relational properties that inhere in mind-independent objects. In section 1 of my paper, I articulate Allais's position and its benefits, not least of which is its elegant (...)
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    Kant’s Theory of Perception.Andrew F. Roche - 2013 - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 345-356.
  4. Transcendental Idealism: A Proposal.Andrew F. Roche - 2013 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (4):589-615.
    There May Be No Succinct Way to articulate Kant’s doctrine of transcendental idealism without begging certain interpretive questions. Roughly, however, it is the tripartite doctrine that The objects of outer sense, along with those of inner sense, are mere appearances, not things in themselves. Space and time are merely forms of these appearances, and thus things in themselves are neither spatial nor temporal. We can have no cognition (Erkenntnis) of things in themselves. One’s understanding of these claims turns mostly on (...)
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