Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 436-458, Winter 2021.

Federal political orders often exhibit a conflict between the ideals of equality and political autonomy, since individuals in different subunits often enjoy systematically different standards of living conditions. While federal arrangements may be theoretically attractive to avoid despotism, such federal inequality would appear to conflict with the principles of egalitarian cosmopolitanism. The paper argues that individuals' interest in equal shares of income and wealth may legitimately be weighed against their interest in political control enjoyed by their subunit, as long as (...) the inequalities do not engender misery, domination, or unfair procedures. The reasons for subunit autonomy include reducing the risk of domination, increasing the responsiveness to local preferences, and reducing the burdens of decision making. These arguments also suggest that states may not always be the appropriate subunits in legitimate federal orders. (shrink)

The impact of Rawls's work in the Nordic countries has been wider than expected. The first section identifies some legal, political, and cultural features that would lead us to expect little interest in Rawls's work: Scandinavian legal realism, the social democratic welfare state regimes, and pervasive ethnic and cultural homogeneity. The second section gives an overview of the reception of Rawls's work, both in the academy and in public fora, on the basis of extensive but not exhaustive searches. The third (...) section offers some conclusions and speculates that Rawlsian contributions - and political philosophy in general - will increase, largely due to Europeanization. Appendix 1 provides bibliographical information about first translations and presentations of Rawls's work starting with the 1955 article `Two Concepts of Rules'. Appendix 2 lists appeals to Rawls's work in the academy and the public sphere, ranging from the substantive principles of Justice as Fairness stated in 1971 through the Law of Peoples (1999). Neither appendix claims to give exhaustive accounts. (shrink)

Abstract: Would a global commitment to international human rights norms provide enough of a sense of community to sustain a legitimate and sufficiently democratic global order? Sceptics worry that human rights cannot help maintain the mutual trust among citizens required for a legitimate political order, since such rights are now too broadly shared. Thus prominent contributors to democratic theory insist that the members of the citizenry must share some features unique to them, to the exclusion of others—be it a European (...) identity ( Habermas and Derrida 2003 ) or a national public culture generally shared only by the members ( Miller 1995, 2000 ). This essay considers and rejects these arguments. While stable, democratic redistributive arrangements do require trust and institutionalised means of trustworthiness; they need not rely on norms or values that distinguish members from non-members: such exclusion is not required. Thus human rights may be part of a common political identity. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Sense of Community and the Need for Trust Components of Common Identity Objections Considered Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Journal of Social Philosophy, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 430-435, Winter 2021.