This paper explores the scope of the theses presented in _Theaetetus_ 184-6 concerning the epistemic capacity of _aisthēsis_. I develop two main arguments in this analysis. First, I situate the passage within the broader context of 151-183 and propose that the argument in 184-6 stands independently of the analysis of the Protagorean theses conducted in 151-183. Then, I analyze the traditional reading of 184-6, which holds that _aisthēsis_ lacks cognition, and contrast this perspective with that of those who argue that (...) Plato allows for some judicative content at the sensory level. I demonstrate that both readings exaggerate the importance of Plato’s defended position in 184-6, particularly regarding the epistemic limits of perception. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to make some remarks about the Digression of the Theaetetus. I shall argue that one central aim of the Digression is to show that there is a conflict between two ways of life: the life of the philosopher and the life of people get involved in politics. In the first part of this paper I make some considerations on the relationship between the Prologue and the trial of Socrates. In the second part I examine (...) the moral of the Digression from the perspective of Socrates‟ account of Protagoras‟ epistemology. (shrink)

Review of the book "Platão", que é uma tradução feita a partir do original: “A Companion do Plato”, publicado pela Blackwell e organizado Hugh H. Benson.

The aim of this paper is to make a brief discussion about three aspects that characterize the Socrates's Dream in the Theaetetus . First, I comment the function of the Dream in the context of the third definition of knowledge. Them I move on the text and examine some questions concerning the notion of logos in 201 d -202 c . In the last section I discuss the problem of perception of the stoicheia . At this point I refuse the (...) thesis, defended by some interpreters, that Plato puts the stoicheia in the same perceptual condition of the sensibles as they are described in the Theaetetus 184-6.  . (shrink)

Há muita discussão sobre como interpretar o papel do argumento ‘Saber ou não Saber’ em Teeteto 188a-c. Alguns intérpretes supõem que esse papel é dialético e Platão não está comprometido com sua verdade. Outros pensam que o argumento revela a confusão de Platão sobre o tema da opinião falsa à época do Teeteto. Em minha análise, há uma terceira via que faz mais justiça ao que Platão está desenvolvendo em 188a-c. Penso que em 188a-c temos uma versão do princípio platônico (...) da infalibilidade. (shrink)