A critical survey of Quine's arguments against the analytic/synthetic distinction.

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analytic-synthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic (...) distinction within the same conception of scientific rationality, that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio ex principiis . But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

Once a standard tool in the epistemologist’s kit, the analytic/synthetic distinction was challenged by Quine and others in the mid-twentieth century and remains controversial today. But although the work of a lot contemporary philosophers touches on this distinction – in the sense that it either has consequences for it, or it assumes results about it – few have really focussed on it recently. This has the consequence that a lot has happened that should affect our view (...) of the analytic/synthetic distinction, while little has been done to work out exactly what the effects are. All these features together make the topic ideal for either a survey or research seminar at the graduate level: it can provide an organising theme which justifies a spectrum of classic readings from Locke to Williamson, passing though Kant, Frege, Carnap, Quine and Kripke on the way, but it could also provide an excuse for a much more narrowly construed research seminar which studies the consequences of really contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics for the distinction. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on some aspects of the history of the analyticsynthetic distinction from Kant to Bolzano and Frege. This history evinces considerable continuity but also some important discontinuities. The analytic-synthetic distinction has to be seen in the first place in relation to a science, i.e. an ordered system of cognition. Looking especially to the place and role of logic it will be argued that Kant, Bolzano and Frege each developed the analytic-synthetic distinction (...) within the same conception of scientific rationality, that is, within the Classical Model of Science: scientific knowledge as cognitio exprincipiis. But as we will see, the way the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments or propositions functions within this model turns out to differ considerably between them. (shrink)

Within philosophy of medicine it has been a widespread view that there are important theoretical and practical reasons for clarifying the nature of basic health concepts like disease, illness and sickness. Many theorists have attempted to give definitions that can function as general standards, but as more and more definitions have been rejected as inadequate, pessimism about the possibility of formulating plausible definitions has become increasingly widespread. However, the belief that no definitions will succeed since no definitions have succeeded is (...) an inductive objection, open to realist responses. The article argues that an influential argument from philosophy of language constitutes a more fundamental objection. I use disease as an example and show that this argument implies that if a common understanding of disease can be analysed into a definition, then this is a non-trivial definition. But any non-trivial analysis must be viciously circular: the analysis must presuppose that disease can be defined, but this is what the analysis is supposed to yield as a result. This means, the article concludes, that disease and other controversial health concepts do not have analyses grounded in a common language. Stipulative and contextual definitions can have local significance, but the normative roles of such definitions are at the same time limited. (shrink)

First truths, by G.W. von Leibniz.--Necessary and contingent truths, by G.W. Leibniz.--Of proposition, by T. Hobbes.--Introduction to the critique of pure reason, by I. Kant.--Kant, by A. Pap.--Of demonstration, and necessary truths, by J.S. Mill.--Views of some writers on the nature of arithmetical propositions, by G. Frege.--What is an empirical science, by B. Russell.--Two dogmas of empiricism, by W.V.O. Quine.--The meaning of a word, by J. Austin.--In defense of a dogma, by H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson.

An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".

In this paper, I argue, first, that Hegel defended a version of the analytic/synthetic distinction—that, indeed, his version of the distinction deserves to be called Kantian. For both Kant and Hegel, the analytic/synthetic distinction can be explained in terms of the discursive character of cognition: insofar as our cognition is discursive, its most basic form can be articulated in terms of a genus/species tree. The structure of that tree elucidates the distinction between (...) analytic and synthetic judgments. Second, I argue that Hegel has an interesting and so far unexplored argument for the analytic/synthetic distinction: Hegel argues that the systematic relationship between concepts expressed in a genus/species tree can only be expressed through synthetic judgments. Third and finally, I explore some of the implications that the arguments in the first two parts of the essay have for understanding the way in which Hegel differs from Kant. I argue that Hegel accepts Kant's point that discursive cognition cannot be used to cognize the absolute. However, Hegel thinks that we can, nevertheless, cognize the absolute. I explore the character of this non-discursive cognition and argue that we can understand Hegel's glosses on this form of cognition—as simultaneously analytic and synthetic and as having a circular structure—through contrasting it with his account of discursive cognition. As a consequence, I argue that we must give up on attempts to understand ‘the dialectical method’ and ‘speculative cognition’ on the model of discursive cognition. (shrink)

Hare shares with other critics an objection to the use of moral judgments in the method of reflective equilibrium. However, the reasoning behind his criticismdistinguishes it from the more common criticisms that the use of moral judgments is unwarranted because of their suspect origin. While these objections challenge the epistemic worth of moral beliefs, Hare’s objection goes beyond to also critique the deeper theoretical commitments of the method. Hare’s acceptance of a strict differentiation between the meaning and applications of words (...) and consequent rejection of holistic justification follow from his acceptance of the analytic/synthetic distinction, while Rawls’s holistic method of theory justification requires a rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In this essay, I explain how Hare’s criticism of the method of reflective equilibrium and his acceptance of the meaning/application distinction result from his acceptance of the analytic/synthetic distinction and draw from this specific discussion more general conclusions regarding the implications of accepting or rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction for the use of moral judgments in moral theory justification. I conclude that an acceptance of the distinction precludes the use of moral judgments, while its rejection leaves open the possibility that they could be used, if the issue of their epistemic status can be successfully resolved. (shrink)

Hare shares with other critics an objection to the use of moral judgments in the method of reflective equilibrium. However, the reasoning behind his criticismdistinguishes it from the more common criticisms that the use of moral judgments is unwarranted because of their suspect origin. While these objections challenge the epistemic worth of moral beliefs, Hare’s objection goes beyond to also critique the deeper theoretical commitments of the method. Hare’s acceptance of a strict differentiation between the meaning and applications of words (...) and consequent rejection of holistic justification follow from his acceptance of the analytic/synthetic distinction, while Rawls’s holistic method of theory justification requires a rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In this essay, I explain how Hare’s criticism of the method of reflective equilibrium and his acceptance of the meaning/application distinction result from his acceptance of the analytic/synthetic distinction and draw from this specific discussion more general conclusions regarding the implications of accepting or rejecting the analytic/synthetic distinction for the use of moral judgments in moral theory justification. I conclude that an acceptance of the distinction precludes the use of moral judgments, while its rejection leaves open the possibility that they could be used, if the issue of their epistemic status can be successfully resolved. (shrink)

It is often assumed that there is a close connection between Quine's criticism of the analytic/synthetic distinction, in 'Two dogmas of empiricism' and onwards, and his thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, in Word and Object and onwards. Often, the claim that the distinction is unsound (in some way or other) is taken to follow from the indeterminacy thesis, and sometimes the indeterminacy thesis is supported by such a claim. However, a careful scrutiny of the indeterminacy (...) thesis as stated by Quine, and the varieties of the analytic/synthetic distinction, reveals that the two claims are mutually independent. Neither does the claim that the distinction is unsound follow from the indeterminacy thesis, nor that thesis from unsoundness claim, under any of the common interpretations of the analytic/synthetic distinction. (shrink)

One of Bolzano’s objections to Kant’s way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction is that it only applies to judgments within a narrow range of syntactic forms, namely, universal affirmative judgments. According to Bolzano, Kant cannot account for judgments of other syntactic forms that, intuitively, are analytic. A recent paper by Ian Proops also attributes to Kant the view that analytic judgments beyond a limited range of syntactic forms are impossible. I argue that, correctly understood, Kant’s (...) conception of analyticity allows for analytic judgments of a wider range of syntactic forms. (shrink)

I argue that Quine’s naturalization of Lewis’s Kantian pragmatism should be understood in terms of Lewis’s attempt to de-psychologize pragmatist epistemology. Lewis wants epistemology to be a priori in order to be distinct from psychology. Quine’s criticisms of Lewis result in a picture that weakens the distinction between epistemology and psychology. Nevertheless, Quine’s naturalized Kantian pragmatism remains far more Kantian than is widely recognized, due to what Quine retains from Lewis.

This paper propounds and defends a distinction between analytic and synthetic truth that is suggested by some well-Known remarks by c. S. Peirce. Important objections by quine and others to the usual distinction are discussed, And a definition of cognitive synonymy for predicates is offered. It is argued that the determinateness of a predicate's sense requires an analytic-Synthetic distinction for a large class of statements including that predicate. It is conceded that the predicates (...) of everyday language probably do not possess a fully determinate meaning, But at best this shows, It is argued, That a satisfactory analytic-Synthetic distinction has the character of a conceptual ideal. (shrink)

W.V.O. tried to prove that no statement is necessarily true. In this work, Quine's argument is stated, analyzed, and shown to be a broken argument for a false conclusion. It is shown that necessary truths are as important as empirical truths to the empirical sciences, the reason being that, without necessary truths, there is no way to organize or interpret data. It comes to light that, in addition to being false, every form of extreme empiricism (e.g. Dewey's pragmatism, Wittgenstein's verificationism, (...) Comte's positivism) is so incoherent that it cannot be clearly stated without thereby being refuted. (shrink)

W. V. O. Quine’s assault on the analytic/synthetic distinction is one of the most celebrated events in the history of twentieth century philosophy. This paper shines a light on Quine’s own understanding of the history of this distinction. More specifically, this paper argues, contrary to what seems to be the received view, that Quine explicitly recognized a kindred subversive spirit in David Hume.

Quine is usually read as arguing either for a non-factualism about analyticity (1) ... Or, at the very least, for an error thesis about it: (2) ... These attributions — including the stronger non-factualist thesis — seem licensed by many passages, including the famous one which concludes Quine's discussion in "Two Dogmas" ... Nevertheless, Paul Horwich does not wish to read Quine as endorsing either (1) or (2). He certainly does not wish to attribute (1) to him. And he wishes (...) to attribute only a restricted version of (2). What this restriction is and why Paul wants to make it are matters I'll come to in just a moment. (shrink)

Two of Quine's most familiar doctrines are: that there is a distinction between underdetermination and indeterminacy; and that there is no distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. An argument is given that these two doctrines are incompatible. In terms wholly acceptable to Quine and based on the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, an exhaustive and exclusive distinction is drawn between two kinds of true sentences, which, it is argued, corresponds to the traditional analytic/synthetic distinction. (...) An appendix is used to develop one aspect of the underdetermination/indeterminacy distinction, as construed here, and to discuss, in passing, some of Quine’s more general views on truth. (shrink)

R. Lanier Anderson presents a new account of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, and provides it with a clear basis within traditional logic. He reconstructs compelling claims about the syntheticity of elementary mathematics, and re-animates Kant's arguments against traditional metaphysics in the Critique of Pure Reason.

Readings, topics, and suggestions for a course on the analytic/synthetic distinction.

This is a critical discussion of Jerry Fodor and Ernie Lepore's "Holism". The paper questions the existence of a slippery slope from some inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning' to all inferential liaisons are constitutive of meaning'. "Interalia", it defends the existence of an analytic/synthetic distinction.

Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (KrV) presents a priori knowledge of synthetic truths as posing a philosophical problem of great import whose only possible solution vindicates the system of transcendental idealism. The work does not accord any such significance to a priori knowledge of analytic truths. The intelligibility of the contrast rests on the well-foundedness of Kant’s analytic–synthetic distinction and on his claim to objectively or correctly classify key judgments with respect to it. Though the (...) correctness of Kant’s classification is vital to his philosophical project, it has been vigorously challenged since he introduced his famous distinction of judgments. The aim of this essay is to explore several metaphysical motives contributing to Kant’s objective classification claim that have been underemphasized and in part overlooked in the large literature on the topic. (shrink)

In the first Critique Kant introduced the analytic/synthetic distinction and illustrated it with theoretical propositions. As his main aim in that work was to justify synthetic a priori propositions, Kant was able to bring his central questions into relief and discuss the methodology of their solution by contrasting synthetic propositions, such as: “Every event has a cause” with analytic propositions, such as: “Every effect has a cause.” Consequently, few commentators have any difficulty in stating (...) as propositions the propositions Kant is justifying in the first Critique or in pointing out the difficulty of justifying such propositions. (shrink)

Paul Horwich; V*—Chomsky versus Quine on the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 95–.

Munsat’s objective in collecting eleven selections on the analytic-synthetic distinction is to acquaint the beginning or intermediate student with the major aspects of the issue. The selections are presented in historical sequence and Munsat has effectively edited the works such that one can easily follow the development of the distinction without having to contend with excessive peripheral material. The editor provides a short introduction to the varieties of truth as well as prefatory notes to each selection. (...) Beginning with brief selections from Leibniz and Hobbes, the treatment of necessary and contingent truths is traced through Kant and Mill. The Mill selection, "Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths," deals with the inductive foundations of the deductive sciences and mathematics. This line of investigation reaches its climax in the Frege passages on the nature of arithmetical propositions and Russell’s "What is an Empirical Science?" Of particular importance are portions of three classic contributions to the analytic-synthetic distinction: Kant’s Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason, W. V. Quine’s critical "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and the rebuttal to Quine’s attack by Grice and Strawson, "In Defense of a Dogma." Finally, the segment of J. L. Austin’s "The Meaning of a Word" could just as well have been excluded in the interest of continuity and in deference to some more appropriate selection. Munsat has included a useful nineteen-page bibliography.—B. G. H. (shrink)

The aim of Nordenstam’s capable but compact book is to examine the analytic-synthetic distinction and its relationship to empiricism in light of the criticisms expressed by W. V. Quine’s "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," M. G. White’s "The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism," and N. Goodman’s "On Likeness of Meaning." Nordenstam cites Pasch’s summary of the controversy: "Empiricism presupposes a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. There is no sharp (...) class='Hi'>distinction between analytic and synthetic statements in natural languages but only in artificial languages. But the artificial language approach is incompatible with empiricism. Therefore, empiricism has to be abandoned, or at least it has to be modified." In addressing this argument, Nordenstam begins with an explication of some of the basic concepts: the various interpretations of the principle of analyticity, the gradualist positions of Quine et al., the principle of empiricism, and the relationship between these two principles. From this analysis he concludes that one can legitimately hold the principle of empiricism and still reject the principle of analyticity, thereby denying the first assumption of the above argument. Focusing attention on the opposition to the analytic-synthetic distinction, he introduces a number of criticisms by Quine et al. of some twelve common definitions of "analytic statement" involving the notions of synonymy, state-descriptions, and semantical rules of artificial languages. Here Nordenstam’s suggestion is that the resultant criteria of analyticity and synonymy demanded by Quine et al. are excessively stringent. (shrink)

This book provides an in-depth examination of C.I. Lewis's conceptual pragmatism and its influence on Quine's developing views in epistemology. The author shows how Quine's engagement with problems presented by Lewis, such as analyticity and the empirical given, contribute to the development of his conception of naturalized epistemology.

Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic method is connected to the so-called Aristotelian model of science and has to be interpreted in a (broad) directional sense. With the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments the critical Kant did introduced a new way of using the terms 'analytic'-'synthetic', but one that still lies in line with their directional sense. A careful comparison of the conceptions of the critical Kant with ideas of the precritical (...) Kant as expressed in _Ãœber die Deutlichkeit, leads to the interpretation defended here of Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments within his philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Quine’s references to his “pragmatism” have often been seen as indicating a possible link to the American pragmatism of Peirce, James, and Dewey. In Quine, Conceptual Pragmatism, and the Analytic-Synthetic Distinction, I argue that the influence of pragmatism on Quine’s philosophy is more accurately traced to C.I. Lewis’s conceptual pragmatism. Quine’s epistemology shares many affinities with Lewis’s view, which depicts knowledge as a conceptual system pragmatically revised in light of future experience. This claim is defended through an (...) examination of several key episodes in Quine’s philosophical development, including his graduate work for Lewis, critical transition in the 1940s, midcentury criticisms of analyticity, and later turn to naturalized epistemology. This historical account highlights an underappreciated element of the epistemological background to Quine’s criticism of the analytic–synthetic distinction. It is further argued that Lewis’s view provides the central epistemological framework for understanding the form and content of Quine’s later naturalized epistemology. (shrink)

I want to analyse the Quine-Carnap discussion on analyticity with regard to logical, mathematical and set-theoretical statements. In recent years, the renewed interest in Carnap’s work has shed a new light on the analytic-synthetic debate. If one fully appreciates Carnap’s conventionalism, one sees that there was not a metaphysical debate on whether there is an analytic-synthetic distinction, but rather a controversy on the expedience of drawing such a distinction. However, on this view, there can (...) be no longer a single analytic-synthetic distinction, because several kinds of statements could be regarded as analytic (L-determinate). L-equivalence between extra-logical linguistic predicates has already been heavily debated. The recent consensus states that Quine’s rejection of this analytic-synthetic is pragmatically grounded in his linguistic behaviorism. However, Carnap’s logical frameworks also contain other kinds of statements, and it is worthwhile to compare both Quine and Carnap’s grounds for considering these statements as analytic or not analytic. First, I will discuss logical statements. I will argue that Quine draws a very sharp distinction between first order logic and set theory, which should be regarded as a (pragmatic) analytic-synthetic distinction (as Quine admits in an interview, see Theoria, 40, 1994, p. 199). In fact, Quine’s major worry is whether identity statements are analytic. Second, I will discuss mathematical statements. In Carnap’s Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, it is clear that mathematical statements are analytic. For Quine, all mathematical statements are reducible to set-theoretical statements. Third, I discuss the analyticity of set-theoretical statements. For Quine, the membership predicate should be regarded as an interpreted extra-logical predicate. Quine’s work in set theory and his later philosophy of set theory naturally lead to the view that set-theoretical statements cannot be analytic. A major complication for the Quine-Carnap comparison is that Carnap has no elaborate reflections on set theory, while the influence of set theory on Quine’s views can hardly be underestimated. I conclude with some lessons for the contemporary debate on analyticity. (shrink)

Interessanter Artikel. Ebersole fordert ein extensionales Kriterium für die Unterscheidung, erklärt die Suche aber für aussichtslos. Er betont, dass nur Aussagen analytisch sind, nicht Sätze. Er betont, dass empirische Allsätze weder prinzipiell analytisch noch synthetisch sind, ihr Wahrheitswert ist unbestimmt. Erst, wenn wir alle Gegenstände kennen, die unter den allquantifizierten Begriff fallen, können wir dies sagen. (Hier habe ich Probleme, da ich Allquantifikation über undefinierten Begriffen unzulässig finde.).