Like many intensional logics, William Parry’s logic of analytic implication PAI admits extensions determined by imposing semantic conditions on its account of modality. PAI is unique, however, in its allowing a second dimension—a topic-theoretic dimension—along which extensions can be defined. The recent introduction by Francesco Berto of topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs)—which disagree with PAI on this type of condition—provide further motivations to examine such topic-theoretic extensions. In this paper, we introduce, motivate, and characterize a number of such extensions (...) of PAI, paying special attention to applications to Berto’s framework and to ways in which the modal and topic-theoretic dimensions influence one another. (shrink)

Some ordinary language philosophers, including Stanley Cavell, have attacked certain tendencies of traditional philosophers as follows. E.g., when we say that something looks red to us, we imply that we think it isn't really red. Thus we arc breaking a rule of language when we say that something looks red to us when we know it is red. And thus there is something logically wrong with the traditional attempt, to say that what justifies us in thinking that something is red (...) is its looking red to us. In this article it is maintained that the ?implication? invoked above is a contingent relation having to do with what makes a fact noteworthy, and that the existence of this implication does not show that there is anything logically wrong with the traditional positions being attacked. (shrink)

The logic DAI of demodalised analytic implication has been introduced by J.M. Dunn as a variation on a time-honoured logical system by C.I. Lewis’ student W.T. Parry. The main tenet underlying this logic is that no implication can be valid unless its consequent is “analytically contained” in its antecedent. DAI has been investigated both proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, but no study so far has focussed on DAI from the viewpoint of abstract algebraic logic. We provide several different algebraic (...) semantics for DAI, showing their equivalence with the known semantics by Dunn and Epstein. We also show that DAI is algebraisable and we identify its equivalent quasivariety semantics. This class turns out to be a linguistic and axiomatic expansion of involutive bisemilattices, a subquasivariety of which forms the algebraic counterpart of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. This fact sheds further light on the relationship between containment logics and logics of nonsense. (shrink)

We provide a logical matrix semantics and a Gentzen-style sequent calculus for the first-degree entailments valid in W. T. Parry’s logic of Analytic Implication. We achieve the former by introducing a logical matrix closely related to that inducing paracomplete weak Kleene logic, and the latter by presenting a calculus where the initial sequents and the left and right rules for negation are subject to linguistic constraints.

Although logical settings are typically concerned with tracking alethic considerations, frameworks exist in which topic-theoretic considerations—e.g., tracking subject-matter or topic—are given equal importance. Intuitions about extending topic through a propositional language are generally straightforward for extensional cases. For a number of reasons, arriving at a compelling account of the subject-matter of intensional operators—such as intensional conditionals—is a more difficult task. In particular, the framework of topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs) championed by Francesco Berto and his collaborators leave the topics of intensional (...) formulae undefined, which artificially constricts the expressivity of the theory. This paper proposes an approach to fill in this lacuna, emphasizing an analogous problem in Parry-style containment logics. In this setting, the approach receives a proof-of-concept through the introduction of a natural and general family of subsystems of Parry’s $${\textsf{PAI}}$$ PAI —with sound and complete axiomatizations—that allow a fine degree of control over the topics of intensional conditionals. (shrink)

I raise issues concerning Jones' Seneca analysis, its relationship to analyses of Dravidian-, Crow-, and Omaha-type systems. These affect the convincingness of his kinship study, and thus the wider conclusions that he wants to draw regarding human cognition and language.

In the present research, the authors hypothesized that additive counterfactual thinking mind-sets, activated by adding new antecedent elements to reconstruct reality, promote an expansive processing style that broadens conceptual attention and facilitates performance on creative generation tasks, whereas subtractive counterfactual thinking mind-sets, activated by removing antecedent elements to reconstruct reality, promote a relational processing style that enhances tendencies to consider relationships and associations and facilitates performance on analytical problem-solving tasks. A reanalysis of a published data set suggested that the counterfactual (...) mind-set primes previously used in the literature tend to evoke subtractive counterfactuals. Studies 1 and 2 then demonstrated that subtractive counterfactual mind-sets enhanced performance on analytical problem-solving tasks relative to additive counterfactual mind-sets, whereas Studies 3 and 4 found that additive counterfactual mind-sets enhanced performance on creative generation tasks relative to subtractive counterfactual mind-sets. (shrink)

This article argues that the tradition within the individualism-holism debate of importing arguments from the micro–macro discussion in other disciplines significantly has hampered our understanding of the “individual-social” relationship. While, for example, the “neural-mental” and “atomic-molecular” links represent empirical “gives rise to” relationships, in the social sciences the micro–macro link is a purely analytical “qualifies as” type of relationship. This disanalogy is important, since it has significant implications for the individualism-holism debate: it implies a phenomenally monist social ontology and it (...) disqualifies the notion of social macro causation. (shrink)

The paper contains two concepts of implication that can be called analytic in the sense of Parry [5] or Fine [2]. Contrary to the Parry's approach, these implications do not involve S4 strict implication but the classical one. This fact refers to the similar notion of so-called demodalized analytic implication of Dunn [1] and strong implication of Vanderveken, cf. [4, 6]. The features of analytic classical implications are presented in the form of two (...) propositional logics on the pure implicational language. (shrink)

The author examines the epistemological project of analytic philosophy, which went through stages of transformation marked by the influence of Frege and Russell. The article emphasizes the main points of the first stage of analytic philosophy, during which the sphere of experience merged with language. The next stage defines a new subject - Wittgenstein's "language subject". According to the author, this subject of speech makes decisions about the sense or absurdity of sentences based on logical form and belongs (...) to the transcendental subject of speech in general. But in the end, the epistemological project of analytic philosophy moved to new directions in which questions about experience lost their relevance. (shrink)

Whether Trinitarianism is coherent depends not only on whether some account of the Trinity is coherent, but on which accounts of the Trinity count as "Trinitarian." After all, Arianism and Modalism are both accounts of the Trinity, but neither counts as Trinitarian (which is why defenses of Arianism or Modalism don’t count as defenses of Trinitarianism). This raises the question, if not just any account of the Trinity counts as Trinitarian, which do? Dale Tuggy is one of very few philosophers (...) to give explicit definitions of Trinitarian (versus Unitarian) theology. But they are no mere formalities. They are essential to his central criticisms of both historical and contemporary forms of Trinitarianism. In this paper, I offer my own definitions of Trinitarian and Unitarian theology, contrast them with Tuggy’s, and argue for the superiority of my definitions to Tuggy’s. If Trinitarianism and Unitarianism are what Tuggy says they are, the outlook for Trinitarianism is bleak indeed. If they are what I say they are, Tuggy’s central objection to Trinitarianism fails. To show what is at stake in these pairs of definitions, I examine a doctrine much neglected in Analytic Theology, but central to Nicene Trinitarianism—the Monarchy of the Father. (shrink)

This article uses tagmemic theory as a semiotic framework to analyze symbolic logic. It attends particularly to the issue of context for meaning and the role of personal observer/participants. It focuses on formal languages, which employ no ordinary words and from one point of view have “no meaning.” Attention to the context and the theorists who deploy these languages shows that formal languages have meanings at a higher level, colored by the purposes of the analysts. In fact, there is an (...) indefinitely ascending hierarchy of theories of theories, each of which analyzes and evaluates the theories at a lower level. By analogy with Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theory, no level of the hierarchy can capture within formalism everything in a sufficiently complex system. The personal analysts always have to make judgments about how a formalized system is analogous to the world outside the system. Arguments in analytic philosophy can be useful in clarification, but neither clarification of terms nor clarification of the structure of arguments can eliminate the need for personal judgment. (shrink)

This paper has its genesis in concerns about the return to “the real” in social and political theory and analysis. This trend is linked to a reaction against the “linguistic turn”, on the grounds that an exclusive focus on language undercuts political analysis by refusing to engage with “material reality”. Foucault and “discourse” are common targets of this critique. Against this interpretation, the authors direct attention to the analytic and political usefulness of Foucault’s concept of “discursive practices”, which, it (...) argues, has been much misunderstood. Discursive practices, as developed by Foucault, refers to the practices of discourses, meaning knowledge formations, not to linguistic practices or language use. The focus is on how knowledge is produced through plural and contingent practices across different sites. Such an approach bridges a symbolic-material distinction and signals the always political nature of “the real”. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's treatment of private language is the dissolution of some of the major problems in traditional philosophy. Philosophical problems, for Wittgenstein, are the conceptual confusion arising due to the abuse of language. They can be fully dispensed with by commanding a clear view of language. Language, for Wittgenstein, is on the one hand, the source of philosophical problems while, on the other hand, it is a means to dispense with them. Private language is one such issue which is ultimately rooted (...) I a mistaken conception of language and is the sources of various philosophical problems/ puzzles. (shrink)

Grace A. de Laguna was an American philosopher of exceptional originality. Many of the arguments and positions she developed during the early decades of the twentieth century later came to be central to analytic philosophy. These arguments and positions included, even before 1930, a critique of the analytic-synthetic distinction, a private language argument, a critique of type physicalism, a functionalist theory of mind, a critique of scientific reductionism, a methodology of research programs in science and more. Nevertheless, de (...) Laguna identified herself as a defender of the speculative vision of philosophy, a vision which, in her words, “analytic philosophy condemns.” I outline her speculative vision of philosophy as well as what is, in effect, an argument she offers against analytic philosophy. This is an argument against the view that key parts of established opinion, e.g., our best theoretical physics or most certain common sense, should be assumed to be true in order to answer philosophical questions. I go on to bring out the implications of her argument for the approaches to philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Willard V. Quine and David Lewis, and I also compare the argument to recent, related arguments against analytic philosophy. I will suggest that de Laguna offers a viable critique of analytic philosophy and an alternative approach to philosophy that meets this critique. (shrink)

By now “continental” philosophy has long since ceased to be a geographical term; there are “continental” philosophers in the Midwestern United States. Likewise, “analytical” philosophy is now widely practiced in most areas where academic philosophy is practiced. Moreover, many of the old jabs at each side have lost much of their force. The idea of a pox on both their houses—that analytical philosophers are a bunch of small-minded logic choppers, and continental philosophers are a bunch of wooly minded gasbags—has long (...) since failed to carry the punch it once did. What I want to suggest here is that they are both the same type of philosophy in one crucial, determining aspect: That one of the key experiences of modern philosophy, maybe even the great motivating experience of modern philosophy, is that of a certain type of skepticism, the idea that “we” both collectively and individually are prone to fool ourselves, be misled by conclusions that are attractive but unsupportable, or be misled even by our own experience and ways of thought to come to conclusions that turn out later to be insupportable. Certainly something like this underwrites the motivational power in those parts of contemporary philosophy that can be called “analytic” or are at least inspired by the analytical philosophers of the first two thirds of the twentieth century. Why else the careful attention to argument, the constant recasting of theses so that their implications can be better viewed, the deep ethos of attacking papers given by colleagues with a barrage of counter-examples, and of subjecting our colleagues to ruthless, sometimes unforgiving examination? What often seems perhaps petty to those more irritated than enlightened by analytic philosophy—that it is only tedious logic-chopping or “academic in the worst sense” niggling—is inspired by a brooding sense of skepticism, a sense that without such very intensely rigorous policing of our arguments and our explications, we are simply too prone to slide off into assertions that feel good, that may even seem to some of us like really very deep matters, but which, alas, may on closer inspection or in the light of later hindsight just turn out to be dreadfully false. Better to jump on the arguments now than to be embarrassed by them later. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: It is a familiar story that Kant’s defence of our synthetic a priori cognition in the Critique of Pure Reason suffered sharp criticism throughout the extended philosophical revolutions that established analytic philosophy, the pragmatist tradition, and the phenomenological tradition as dominant philosophical movements in the first half of the twentieth century. One of the most important positive adaptations of Kant’s outlook, however, was the combined analytic and pragmatist conceptions of the a priori that were developed by the (...) American philosophers C. I. Lewis (1883–1964) and Wilfrid Sellars (1912–1989), most notably in Lewis’s 1929 classic, Mind and the World Order, followed by Sellars’ critical reworking of Lewis’s outlook in ‘Is There a Synthetic A Priori?’ (1953) and other mid-century articles. Both Lewis and Sellars defended central aspects of Kant’s analysis of our a priori knowledge of mind-independent physical objects and necessary causal connections. But both also radically transformed Kant’s view by defending the idea that there are alternative a priori conceptual frameworks that are subject to an ongoing process of reassessment and replacement on overall pragmatic and explanatory grounds. Furthermore, while Sellars’ answer to his question, ‘Is There a Synthetic A Priori?’ thus represented a partial endorsement of Lewis’s pragmatic relativization of the a priori, I argue that Sellars’ account of meaning diverged from Lewis in ways that constituted a significant improvement upon the previous ‘analytic’ defenses of the a priori, not only in Lewis but in general. This arguably has implications for wider disputes concerning the nature and possibility of a priori knowledge in non-formal domains. (shrink)

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of the literature on Analytical Marxism (AM) and analyses its relevance for social theory. AM is precisely defined and distinguished from Rational Choice Marxism (RCM). The different substantive implications of the two approaches are discussed: according to RCM, the role of Marxism in the social sciences is exhausted, whereas AM has reconstructed a set of propositions that aim to provide the foundations of a distinctive approach in social theory. The methodological debate around and within (...) AM is analysed and the shortcomings of methodological individualism and rational choice theory are stressed, raising doubts on the claim that RCM is the only scientific approach to Marx's theory. Yet, wholesale rejections on a priori methodological or exegetical grounds are questioned. A focused, immanent critique of RCM is developed, which emphasizes the lack of an adequate analysis of structural constraints and endogenous preferences in RCM models. It is argued that the analysis of endogenous preferences and structural constraints is consistent with an anti-reductionist AM approach and it may provide the outline of a fertile, distinctive research programme in explanatory social theory that builds on the core of Marxism identified by AM. (shrink)

In 1977, R. B. Angell presented a logic for analytic containment, a notion of relevant implication stronger than Anderson and Belnap's entailment. In this paper I provide for the first time the logic of first degree analytic containment, as presented in [2] and [3], with a semantical characterization—leaving higher degree systems for future investigations. The semantical framework I introduce for this purpose involves a special sort of truth-predicates, which apply to pairs of collections of formulas instead of (...) individual formulas, and which behave in some respects like Gentzen's sequents. This semantics captures very general properties of the truth-functional connectives, and for that reason it may be used to model a vast range of logics. I briefly illustrate the point with classical consequence and Anderson and Belnap's tautological entailments. (shrink)

I present the text at Posterior Analytics II.11, 94b8-26, offer a tentative translation, discuss the main construals offered in the literature, and argue for my own interpretation. Some of the general questions I discuss are the following: 1. What is the nature of the explanatory syllogisms offered as examples, especially in the case of the moving and the final cause? Are they scientific demonstrative explanations? In the case of the final cause, are they practical syllogisms? Are they productive? 2. Are (...) we to read into such examples Aristotle’s requirements from APo I.4-6 that demonstrative premisses and conclusions are universal, per se, and necessary? If so, in what way? If such requirements do not apply here, what are the implications for question 1? 3. What, if any, is the advantage of one type of causal explanation over another in cases in which there is causal competition between complementary explanations? 4. What is the relation between the thesis of this chapter, especially the section dedicated to the final cause, and the argument of II.8-10? How is essence related to causes? How is explanation/demonstration-based definition related to causal explanation in terms of the four causes? (shrink)

Tableau formulations are given for the relevance logics E (Entailment), R (Relevant implication) and RM (Mingle). Proofs of equivalence to modus-ponens-based formulations are vialeft-handed Gentzen sequenzen-kalküle. The tableau formulations depend on a detailed analysis of the structure of tableau rules, leading to certain global requirements. Relevance is caught by the requirement that each node must be used; modality is caught by the requirement that only certain rules can cross a barrier. Open problems are discussed.

This paper studies the implication of channel discrepancy between the retail and direct channels in a dual-channel supply chain consisting of one common retailer and two manufacturers in which the manufacturers may have different market powers. Each manufacturer provides a substitutable product and opens an online channel to customers directly. We develop an analytical model to derive the optimal pricing strategies by using game theory and the backward induction method, and we examine related properties under three market power structures (...) while considering channel discrepancy, including the Nash equilibrium, the Manufacturers leader Stackelberg, and the M1 leader Stackelberg models. Numerical simulations are examined to reveal and verify the effect of channel discrepancy on optimal prices, demands, and profits. We find that a higher level of channel discrepancy induces higher prices, demands, and profits for each member in both channels, while this kind of stimulating impact for the leader manufacturer who obtains a higher level of channel discrepancy will be more significant than it is for the other members in the three models. In addition, the profit of the supply chain in the N model is always higher than it is in the MS model, while it may be higher or lower than it is in the M1S model depending on the level of channel discrepancy. (shrink)

William Parry conceived in the early thirties a theory of entail-
ment, the theory of analytic implication, intended to give a formal expression to the idea that the content of the conclusion of a valid argument must be included in the content of its premises. This paper introduces a system of analytic, paraconsistent and quasi-classical propositional logic that does not validate the paradoxes of Parry’s analytic implication. The interpretation of the expressions of this logic will be (...) given in terms of a four-valued semantics,and its proof theory will be provided by a system of signed semantic tableaux that incorporates the techniques developed to improve the efficiency of the tableaux method for many-valued logics.
1. Introduction. (shrink)

Attention to big data analytics is ubiquitous and growing given the online shopping revolution and its potential to generate individual-specific actionable datasets which were previously unavailable or cumbersome to cultivate. However, the food industry has not drawn much attention to discussions of individualized pricing strategies using online grocery datasets. Considering growth of the online grocery market and consumers data abundance to grocers, this brief viewpoint article focuses on potentials of incorporating big data analytics into pricing strategies in online grocery markets. (...) This discussion informs of various practices of big data analytics and ultimately calls to attention the potential for personalized pricing in online food markets. This article proposes the need for empirical analysis and developing research agendas investigating impacts of personalized pricing on market efficiencies, which is not as unambiguous in practices as it is theoretically. In addition, the status of online groceries, concepts of price differentiation, societal, economic, and regulatory implications of personalized pricing are discussed. (shrink)

This essay is an interreligious study of spirituality of work and its implications for business ethics. It considers the normative / doctrinal teachings on human work in Bhagavadgita (BG) and Catholic Social Teaching (CST). In as much as the focus of this study is spirituality of work, it does not present an in-depth and comprehensive comparison of Hindu and Catholic religions. Similarities and differences between the texts under consideration will be examined, but such examination will be limited to the most (...) critical and relevant points. It will begin by exploring a Hindu spirituality of work based on BG. The paper will analyze salient ideas and relevant passages in the text that tackle the religio-spiritual significance of our daily engagement in the world through paid work from a Hindu perspective. A discussion on major themes in CST that resonate with BG’s teachings on work will follow. These themes will serve as analytical elements that will frame an interreligious spirituality of work from the two points of view. The interreligious analysis will demonstrate that as far as BG and CST are concerned, spirituality of work can be a unifying force, a locus for cross-cultural dialogue, and a bridge between different beliefs. Next, the essay will tackle the implications of a Hindu-Catholic spirituality of work for business ethics. It will explain how the two textual traditions deepen our understanding of work by providing answers to the questions why must we work, what is the right attitude to work, and how our work connects us with other beings and with our ultimate end. Finally, the conclusion will demonstrate how the findings of this study relate and enhance the outcomes of current research in spirituality of work. Finding common grounds on how different religions regard work would enable business professionals and managers to truly value diversity and inclusiveness and respond ethically to the expression of religions in an increasingly pluralistic workplace. (shrink)

Analytical descriptivism purports to identify the meaning of ethical sentences with that of the descriptive sentences that capture the clauses of mature folk morality. The paper questions the plausibility of analytical descriptivism by examining its implications for the semantics, epistemology and metaphysics of morals. The discussion identifies some of the reasons why the analytical descriptivist fails to deliver a reductionist account of normativity.

Analytic philosophy is roughly a hundred years old, and it is now the dominant force within Western philosophy. Interest in its historical development is increasing, but there has hitherto been no sustained attempt to elucidate what it currently amounts to, and how it differs from so-called 'continental' philosophy. In this rich and wide-ranging book, Hans Johann Glock argues that analytic philosophy is a loose movement held together both by ties of influence and by various 'family resemblances'. He considers (...) the pros and cons of various definitions of analytic philosophy, and tackles the methodological, historiographical and philosophical issues raised by such definitions. Finally, he explores the wider intellectual and cultural implications of the notorious divide between analytic and continental philosophy. His book is an invaluable guide for anyone seeking to understand analytic philosophy and how it is practised. (shrink)

This work sought to examine the epistemic implications of St. Thomas Aquinas’ just war theory on global peace. The intersection of war and peace is a recurring decimal in the history of philosophy. Hence, Thomas Aquinas’ just war theory emanates to address the ethical issue revolving around war and peace. This work makes use of analytic and critical methods. The work posits that Thomas Aquinas’ just war theory deals with the principle of jus ad bellum. Secondly, his just war (...) theory is intended or aimed at lasting peace which has connection with the postulation of jus in bello. Hence, Thomas Aquinas notion of lasting peace as the ultimate goal of war has to do with another important principle of just war theory—the jus post bellum. Finally, this work conceives that peace building or reconciliation ought to be extended beyond the confines of international or internal conflicts to promote global or international peace. Global peace is not a natural attainment rather it is something that needs to be constructed. There is the need for building and rebuilding of the global world on the principles of justice and peace by ending violence. (shrink)

This article begins with an overview of the fourfold epistemological framework that arises out of Kant’s distinctions between analyticity and syntheticity and between apriority and aposteriority. I challenge Kant’s claim that the fourth classification, analytic aposteriority, is empty. In reviewing three articles written during the third quarter of the twentieth century that also defend analytic aposteriority, I identify promising insights suggested by Benardete (1958). I then present overviews of two 1987 articles wherein I defend analytic aposteriority, first (...) as a classification highlighting the epistemological status of several crucial (and easily misunderstood) features of Kant’s own philosophy, and second as a way of expressing some of Kripke’s claims about naming in more authentically Kantian terminology. The paper concludes with suggestions of several other important philosophical developments that also make advances precisely insofar as they expound the nature and implications of the epistemological classification that Kant assumed to be empty. (shrink)

Therapeutic practice is based on theories displaying different profiles, which imply philosophical traits. My main concern is to discover these traits, in my eyes a neglected issue. The question of what sort of psychology helps for enhancement also depends on the inherent philosophical approach, including an idea about human nature. I try to identify philosophical features in two main psychological concepts: in the empirically founded psychoanalytic one dealing with psychic mechanisms, which could be observed in patients; and the so-called analytical (...) one based on a philosophy of nature, I call an ontological perspective. For characterising these two features, it seems appropriate to me to go back to the founder figures Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung. It is open for discussion and interests which theory both representatives and their followers developed will be used for practice or research. (shrink)

Accounting firms are reporting the use of Artificial Intelligence in their auditing and advisory functions, citing benefits such as time savings, faster data analysis, increased levels of accuracy, more in-depth insight into business processes, and enhanced client service. AI, an emerging technology that aims to mimic the cognitive skills and judgment of humans, promises competitive advantages to the adopter. As a result, all the Big 4 firms are reporting its use and their plans to continue with this innovation in areas (...) such as audit planning risk assessments, tests of transactions, analytics, and the preparation of audit work-papers, among other uses. As the uses and benefits of AI continue to emerge within the auditing profession, there is a gradual awakening to the fact that unintended consequences may also arise. Thus, we heed to the call of numerous researchers to not only explore the benefits of AI but also investigate the ethical implications of the use of this emerging technology. By combining two futuristic ethical frameworks, we forecast the ethical implications of the use of AI in auditing, given its inherent features, nature, and intended functions. We provide a conceptual analysis of the practical ethical and social issues surrounding AI, using past studies as well as our inferences based on the reported use of the technology by auditing firms. Beyond the exploration of these issues, we also discuss the responsibility for the policy and governance of emerging technology. (shrink)