The language of ethics expertise has become particularly important in bioethics in light of efforts to establish the value of the clinical ethics consultation, to specify who is qualified to function as a clinical ethics consultant, and to characterize how one should evaluate whether or not a person is so qualified. Supporters and skeptics about the possibility of ethics expertise use the language of ethics expertise in ways that reflect competing views about what ethics expertise entails. We argue for clarity (...) in understanding the nature of expertise and ethics expertise. To be an ethics expert, we argue, is to be an expert in knowing what ought to be done. Any attempt to articulate expertise with respect to knowing what ought to be done must include an account of ethics that specifies the nature of moral truth and the means by which we access this truth or a theoretical account of ethics such that expertise in another domain is linked to knowing or being better at judging what ought to be done and the standards by which this “knowing” or “being better at judging” is determined. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our analysis for the literature on ethics expertise in CEC. We do think that there are clear domains in which a clinical ethics consultant might be expert but we are skeptical about the possibility that this includes ethics expertise. Clinical ethics consultants should not be referred to as ethics experts. (shrink)
I argue that valid informed consent is ethically required for organ donation from individuals declared dead using neurological criteria. Current policies in the U.S. do not require this and, not surprisingly, current practices inhibit the possibility of informed consent. Relevant information is withheld, opportunities to ensure understanding and appreciation are extremely limited, and the ability to make and communicate a free and voluntary decision is hindered by incomplete disclosure and other practices. Current practices should be revised to facilitate valid informed (...) consent for organ donation. (shrink)
The nature, possibility, and implications of ethics expertise in general and of bioethics expertise in particular has been the focus of extensive debate for over thirty years. What is ethics expertise and what does it enable experts to do? Knowing what ethics expertise is can help answer another important question: What, if anything, makes a claim of expertise legitimate? In other words, how does someone earn the appellation “ethics expert?” There remains deep disagreement on whether ethics expertise is possible, and (...) if so, what constitutes such expertise and what it entails and legitimates. Discussion of bioethics expertise has become particularly important given the growing presence of bioethicists in the clinical setting as well as efforts to professionalize bioethics through codes of ethics and certification efforts. Unlike in the law or in engineering, where there may be a body of knowledge that professional organizations or others have articulated as important for education and training of experts, ethics expertise admits of no such body of knowledge or required experience. Nor is there an entity seen as having the authority to articulate the necessary scope of knowledge. Questions about whether there is such a body of knowledge for particular areas within bioethics have emerged and played a central role in professionalization efforts in recent years, especially in the area of clinical ethics. (shrink)
Decisions regarding clinical procedures or research participation typically require the informed consent of individuals. When individuals are unable to give consent, the informed permission of a legally authorized representative or surrogate is required. Although many proposed procedures are aimed primarily at benefiting the individual, some are not. I argue that, particularly when individuals are asked to assume risks primarily or exclusively for the benefit of others, family members ought to be engaged in the informed consent process. Examples of procedures in (...) which individuals are asked to assume risks primarily or exclusively for the benefit of others include living organ donation and research participation. (shrink)
Bioethical decision-making depends on presuppositions about the function and goal of bioethics. The authors in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy share the assumption that bioethics is about resolving cases, not about moral theory, and that the best method of bioethical decision-making is that which produces useful answers. Because we have no universally agreed upon background moral theory which can serve as the basis for bioethical decision-making, they try to move bioethics away from theory. For them, a (...) good method of bioethical decision-making is one which resolves cases in ways that are justifiable to the parties involved, not necessarily in ways that bring us ‘close’ to the right and the true. The authors consider how the move away from theory and toward actual cases is best accomplished. In particular, the debate in this issue is about specification, specified principlism, and casuistry. (shrink)
In most, if not all, jurisdictions with active organ transplantation programs, there is a persistent desire to increase donation rates because the demand for transplantable organs exceeds the supply. China, in particular, faces an extraordinary gap between the number of organs donated by deceased donors and the number of people seeking one or more transplants. China might look to Western countries with higher donation rates to determine how best to introduce Western practices into the Chinese system. In attempting to increase (...) its organ donation rate, China must not only ensure that its organ donation system reflects different Chinese cultural values, but also that it avoids the ethical problems of the United States and of other Western systems. This article examines four such problems. They concern the family, obtaining permission for organ donation, the definition and diagnosis of “brain death,” and trust. Revisions to the Chinese system should involve a careful look to China and Chinese cultural resources rather than to Western models. (shrink)
Global Health Needs and the Short-Term Medical Volunteer: Ethical Considerations Content Type Journal Article Pages 71-78 DOI 10.1007/s10730-011-9158-5 Authors Michele K. Langowski, Albert Gnaegi Center for Health Care Ethics, Salus Center, Saint Louis University, 3545 Lafayette, 5th Floor, St. Louis, MO 63104-1314, USA Ana S. Iltis, Department of Philosophy and Center for Bioethics, Health and Society, Wake Forest University, P.O. Box 7332, Winston-Salem, NC 27109, USA Journal HEC Forum Online ISSN 1572-8498 Print ISSN 0956-2737 Journal Volume Volume 23 Journal Issue (...) Volume 23, Number 2. (shrink)
Contemporary bioethics is, at least in part, the product of biomedical and sociopolitical changes in the middle to latter part of the 20th century. These changes prompted reflection on deep moral questions at a time when traditional sources of moral guidance no longer were widely respected and, in some cases, were being rejected. In light of this, scholars, policy makers, and clinicians sought to identify a common morality that could be used among persons with different moral commitments to resolve disputes (...) and guide clinical practice and health policy. The concept of the common morality remains important in bioethics. This essay considers the common morality in light of the work of H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. (shrink)
The term ‘culture wars’ has been used to describe deep, apparently intractable, disagreements between groups for many years. In contemporary discourse, it refers to disputes regarding significant moral matters carried out in the public square and for which there appears to be no way to achieve consensus or compromise. One set of battle lines is drawn between those who hold traditional Christian commitments and those who do not. Christian bioethics is nested in a set of moral and metaphysical understandings that (...) collide with those of the dominant secular culture. The result is a gulf between a moral life and an approach to bioethics framed in the face of a transcendent God and a final judgment versus a moral life and an approach to bioethics framed as if the world were without ultimate meaning and as if death were the end of personal existence. These approaches are separated by a moral and metaphysical gulf that sustains incompatible life worlds and incompatible understandings of bioethics. Attempts to bridge the gulf with secular reason are ineffective because there is no shared conception of reason or standard of evidence. Efforts to use the state to enforce a particular set of metaphysical and moral commitments, whether secular or religious, lead to public disputes with a war-like character. (shrink)
BackgroundIn 2004, patient advocate groups were major players in helping pass and implement significant public policy and funding initiatives in stem cells and regenerative medicine. In the following years, advocates were also actively engaged in Washington DC, encouraging policy makers to broaden embryonic stem cell research funding, which was ultimately passed after President Barack Obama came into office. Many advocates did this because they were told stem cell research would lead to cures. After waiting more than 10 years, many of (...) these same patients are now approaching clinics around the world offering experimental stem cell-based interventions instead of waiting for scientists in the US to complete clinical trials. How did the same groups who were once the strongest supporters of stem cell research become stem cell tourists? And how can scientists, clinicians, and regulators work to bring stem cell patients back home to the US and into the clinical trial process?DiscussionIn this paper, we argue that the continued marketing and use of experimental stem cell-based interventions is problematic and unsustainable. Central problems include the lack of patient protection, US liability standards, regulation of clinical sites, and clinician licensing. These interventions have insufficient evidence of safety and efficacy; patients may be wasting money and time, and they may be forgoing other opportunities for an intervention that has not been shown to be safe and effective. Current practices do not contribute to scientific progress because the data from the procedures are unsuitable for follow-up research to measure outcomes. In addition, there is no assurance for patients that they are receiving the interventions promised or of what dosage they are receiving. Furthermore, there is inconsistent or non-existent follow-up care. Public policy should be developed to correct the current situation.ConclusionThe current landscape of stem cell tourism should prompt a re-evaluation of current approaches to study cell-based interventions with respect to the design, initiation, and conduct of US clinical trials. Stakeholders, including scientists, clinicians, regulators and patient advocates, need to work together to find a compromise to keep patients in the US and within the clinical trial process. Using HIV/AIDS and breast cancer advocate cases as examples, we identify key priorities and goals for this policy effort. (shrink)
This article addresses the impact of the potential conflict between the roles of physicians who are both clinicians and researchers on the recruitment of persons into research trials. It has been proposedthat a physician breaches inter-role confidentiality when he or she uses information gathered in his or her clinical role to inform patients about trials for which they may be eligible and that clinician-researchers should adopt a model of preliminary consent to be approached about research prior to commencing a clinical (...) relationship. This article argues that even if we grant the legitimacy of inter-role confidentiality (which is open to question), there are circumstances in which other obligations physicians bear override the obligation of inter-role confidentiality. Moreover, it is argued that the practice of preliminary consent is morally suspect and that such consent cannot be deemed valid. The article concludes with a series of recommendations of ways in which the legitimate concern regarding the conflicting roles of clinician-researchers can be addressed in the recruitment stage of research. (shrink)
The last two decades have witnessed intense debate over the ethical legitimacy of placebo controlled trials. Most of the arguments for and against the use of PCTs turn on one of the following issues: the compatibility of the obligations of clinicians and researchers with PCTs, the scientific merit of PCTs, and the influence of patients' and subjects' perceptions, ability to consent, expectations, and rights on the permissibility of PCTs. I introduce each of these categories and assess the principal arguments in (...) each group. I argue that, although some of the arguments against PCTs have limitations, they do inform the debate in significant ways by pointing to important constraints on PCTs. Those concerning patients' and subjects' perceptions, capacity to consent, expectations, and rights are particularly instructive. They do not, for the most part, sustain an absolute prohibition of PCTs, but they do suggest types of PCTs that are inappropriate and they indicate issues that must be addressed when PCTs are conducted. I argue that we should look to the reasonableness and permissibility of informed refusals of care to evaluate the extent to which a trial is a legitimate PCT ; to determine which potential subjects should be considered eligible to enroll in a PCT ; and to inform the language that should be used in describing the study as part of the informed consent process. (shrink)
This essay examines conceptual difficulties with one of the ways in which justice has been understood and applied the ethical and regulatory review of human research. Justice requires the fair distribution of the benefits and burdens of research. Class membership is seen as justifying inclusion in higher hazard-no benefit research from which members of potentially vulnerable classes, such as children, typically would be excluded. I argue that class membership does not do the justificatory work it is thought to do and (...) that the use of class membership to justify inclusion in higher hazard-no benefit research leads to unjustified discrimination of sick children and offers special protections to healthy children. (shrink)
An Institute of Medicine panel charged with reviewing the system for overseeing research involving children concluded in 2004 that Institutional Review Boards, institutions engaged in research, and study sponsors should “adopt explicit written policies on acceptable and unacceptable types and amounts of payments related to [children’s] research participation.” We previously reported data on practices and policies in the U.S. regarding payments to children who participate in research and their parents. Here, we report additional results from our study and identify some (...) of the decisions that must be made in developing payment plans and on which payment policies will be expected to offer guidance. We conclude that further conceptual analysis and empirical research are necessary before IRBs, institutions, and sponsors can develop specific rules on numerous aspects of payment. Nevertheless, payment policies that promote the ethical treatment of children in research and their parents can be developed. We propose a structure for such policies. (shrink)
Issues in bioethics often turn, at least in part, on the law and regulatory requirements. Consisting of chapters that address particular bioethics topics from the law’s perspective, this fascinating book includes: an introduction to the American legal system papers identifying the principal ways in which the law influences discussions and decisions concerning each of the topics highlighted supplemental papers on certain areas that address the influence and status of the law in countries other than the United States. Covering traditional topics (...) in bioethics, such as determinations of death and health care decisions for vulnerable groups, this study also explores emerging areas such as conflicts of interest in research, genetics, and privacy and confidentiality in the electronic age. Incisive and thought-provoking, this volume provides readers with a rich context for understanding the intersection between the law on bioethics and the central issues in bioethics. (shrink)
What the Doctor Didn’t Say, by Jerry Menikoff and Edward P. Richards, is a courageous and well-written volume that examines some of the fundamental debates pertaining to the ethics of clinical research. The volume deserves a careful reading by anyone with a potential role in clinical research: clinicians who might serve as investigators or refer patients to clinical trials; research staff; Institutional Review Board members and administrators; sponsors who design clinical trials; and the book’s intended audience, namely, potential research participants (...) and their families. A cursory reading of this volume might lead one to think that Menikoff and Richards have declared war on clinical research. They have not. Instead, they offer an in-depth study of the conduct and oversight of clinical research through the lens of law and ethics. They shed light on old issues and initiate discussion of new questions, challenging readers to think critically about the relationship between medical ethics, research ethics, the law, and the conduct of clinical research. (shrink)
Much of the human research conducted in the United States or by U.S. researchers is regulated by the Common Rule. The Common Rule reflects the decision of 17 federal agencies, including the Department of Health and Human Services, to require that investigators follow the same rules for conducting human research., though there is significant overlap with the Common Rule.) Many of the obligations delineated in the Common Rule can be traced back to the work of the National Commission for the (...) Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The National Commission was appointed in 1974 as part of the National Research Act in response to revelations about serious abuses involving human subjects, most notably the Tuskegee/United States Public Health Service Syphilis Study. (shrink)
On Monday, June 25, 2018, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., PhD, MD, co-founder of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, was laid to rest in the beautiful Hill Country of Texas near Comal County. Professor Engelhardt co-founded The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy in 1976 with Dr. Edmund Pellegrino. Engelhardt first served as Associate Editor, and then Editor and Senior Editor from 1976 until 2018. The Journal thrived for more than four decades through his energy, vision, and dedication. One of the (...) intellectual founders of the fields that would become known as bioethics and the philosophy of medicine, Engelhardt’s seminal scholarship has framed the philosophical debates surrounding healthcare policy and medical practice throughout the world. The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy mourns his passing. (shrink)
Medicine in the twenty-first century is increasingly reliant on research to guarantee the safety and efficacy of medical interventions. As a result, the need to understand the ethical issues that research generates is becoming essential. This volume introduces the principal areas of concern in research on human subjects, offering a framework for understanding research ethics, and the relationship between ethics and compliance. Research Ethics brings together leading scholars in bioethics and the topics covered include the unique concerns that arise in (...) specific areas of research such as gene therapy and stem cell research. Individual chapters also address the ethical issues that arise when conducting research with specific populations such as infants or adolescents, and the volume looks at important emerging issues in human subjects research, namely financial conflicts of interest and the interpretation of scientific data. (shrink)