Predatory pricing is one of the forms of the abuse of a dominant position. Judicial institutions of the European Union and Commission during analysis of predatory pricing devote main attention to the relationship between costs and prices of the dominant undertaking. Moreover, attention is paid also to various cost benchmarks: average variable costs, average avoidable costs, average total costs and long run average incremental costs. European judicial institutions should pay less attention to the costs of a dominant undertaking than to (...) evaluation of the effect of the actions of a dominant undertaking to consumers and competition in the market. Moreover, proposition of the Commission to use average avoidable costs in predation cases does not correspond to the practice of the Court of Justice and the General Court. The Commission should stipulate more clearly how average avoidable costs and long-run average incremental costs should be calculated in order to increase legal certainty of the undertakings. Establishment of prices higher than average total costs by the dominant undertaking should not be recognized as predatory pricing. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyse different goals of the competition law, which are established in European Union and Lithuania. EU Commission and the Court of Justice distinguish a number of goals of the competition law. Most commonly, mentioned goals of competition law are the following: the integration of the Internal Market, the protection of consumers, protection of the competitors, freedom of competition and economic efficiency. Different goals of competition law are analysed in this paper and relationship between (...) them is explained. Special attention is given to the analysis of protection of the consumers as one of the main objectives of competition law. While analysing protection of the consumers in competition law, a difference between the concept of consumer in competition law and consumer protection law is explained. The authors express a number of critical thoughts towards practice of the EU Commission and the Court of Justice so far, as there is a lack of consistency in evaluation of the protection of consumers’ rights in the context of the other objectives of competition law. Relevance of the present article is supported by the several facts such as revision of the competition law goals by the EU Commission and adoption of resolution “Concerning priority of the activities of the Lithuanian Competition Council” by the Lithuanian Competition Council that establishes main principles (priorities) applied while implementing competition policy in Lithuania. Setting out the main goals in Lithuanian competition law may have important practical consequences in the everyday activities of the Lithuanian national competition authority. (shrink)

Imposition of sanctions for violations of competition law rules is an important instrument of the European Union (EU) and Lithuanian competition enforcement authorities and is an inevitable part of the EU and Lithuanian competition law policy. The fining policy of the Lithuanian Competition Council for breaches of the Lithuanian and EU competition rules has recently been changed by the new 2012 Government resolution and has been aligned with the 2006 Commission Guidelines on the method of setting fines. The new Lithuanian (...) fining rules set exactly the same basic principles for setting the amount of fines and are very similar to the Commission’s Guidelines, however some peculiarities may and shall be distinguished. The new Lithuanian fining rules in some aspects are even stricter than the EU fining rules established in the Commission’s Guidelines. The aim of the article is to analyse the main changes in the Competition Council’s fining policy and identify the discrepancies in national and EU fining rules, analyse advantages and disadvantages of the new fining policy. (shrink)

The paper deals with the issue of tying (as well as bundling) practices which are applied by dominant undertakings and which, under certain circumstances, can be considered as abuses of a dominant position. The authors describe the concept of tying, indicate its types, and reveal its economic aspects, since all these issues have a certain impact on the legal assessment of tying practices. The authors conclude that the European Commission (the Commission) and the European Community (EC) courts have usually been (...) too formalistic and unreasonably hostile to tying practices and have not paid due attention to the impact of tying on competition and the beneficial features of tying. Thus certain cases have frequently and rather easily been treated as abuses of a dominant position. A more realistic and effect-based approach was taken by the Commission and the courts in the Microsoft case, where certain criteria for the assessment of tying were formulated. Still, the Microsoft case reflects a rather strict attitude towards tying practices, especially in technological tie-ins. (shrink)