Essay on Transcendental Philosophy presents the first English translation of Salomon Maimon's principal work, originally published in Berlin in 1790. In this book, Maimon seeks to further the revolution in philosophy wrought by Kant's Critique of Pure Reason by establishing a new foundation for transcendental philosophy in the idea of difference. Kant judged Maimon to be his most profound critic, and the Essay went on to have a decisive influence on the course of (...) post-Kantian German Idealism. A more recent admirer was Gilles Deleuze who drew on Maimon's Essay in constructing his own philosophy of difference. This long-overdue translation makes Maimon's brilliant analysis and criticism of Kant's philosophy accessible to an English readership for the first time. The text includes a comprehensive introduction, a glossary, translators' notes, a bibliography of writings on Maimon and an index. It also includes translations of correspondence between Maimon and Kant and a letter Maimon wrote to a Berlin journal clarifying the philosophical position of the essay, all of which bring the book's context alive for the modern reader. (shrink)

In the “Age of Information”, we are confronted by a strange paradox: on one hand, we have at our disposal resources for creating that far exceed what any previous generation could have imagined, bu...

In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph “The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments” made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. -/- Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean to derive (...) the functions of judgement, and accordingly the categories, from the principle of apperception. Schulting challenges this standard view and aims to resuscitate the main motivation behind Reich’s project. He argues, in agreement with Reich’s main thesis about the derivability of the functions of judgement, that Kant indeed does mean to derive, in full a priori fashion, the categories from the principle of apperception. -/- Schulting also shows that, given the general assumptions of the Critical philosophy, Kant's derivation is successful and that absent an account of the derivation of the categories from apperception, the B-Deduction cannot really be understood. -/- New edition. First published 2012 as „Kant’s Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories" (Palgrave Macmillan). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School, and: A Buddhist-Christian Logic of the Heart: Nishida's Kyoto School and Lonergan's "Spiritual Genome" as World BridgeAmos YongPhilosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School. By James W. Heisig. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001. xi + 380 pp.A Buddhist-Christian Logic of the Heart: Nishida's Kyoto School and Lonergan's "Spiritual Genome" as World Bridge. By John (...) Raymaker. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2002. x + 214 pp.These are two very different types of books. Heisig, research fellow (since 1978) and former director (1999-2001) of the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture and well known to readers of this journal as author, book editor, and translator extraordinaire, [End Page 271] has produced the definitive exposition of the Kyoto School in the English language with Philosophers of Nothingness. Raymaker, a longtime Roman Catholic missionary to Japan and student of Lonergan's work, attempts in A Buddhist-Christian Logic of the Heart to establish points of contact between Lonergan's transcendental method and Nishida's pure experience. Let me briefly summarize the two volumes before making some comparative observations.Philosophers of Nothingness is divided into five sections: an "Orientation" (introduction) and a "Prospectus" (transitional epilogue) flanking the three sections on Nishida, Tanabe, and Nishitani, each constituting approximately twenty short chapters. In each case, Heisig combines intellectual biography and history of ideas approaches, thus both setting forth the wider social, political, and intellectual contexts of the Kyoto School thinkers and elaborating on their distinctive ideas. Those interested in the latter will not be disappointed. Nishida's "pure experience," "active intuition," "absolutely contradictory self-identity," "logic of locus" (or basho, topos, place), and "historical world," among other themes, are all given special attention within the broader framework of his philosophical project. In the case of Tanabe, unique concepts such as "absolute mediation," "logic of species," and "metanoetic philosophy" (or philosophy of repentance) are illuminated. And, of course, the contributions of Nishitani are fully represented: "nihilism," "the standpoint of emptiness," and the sunyata of time and history.At the same time, those looking for background discussion will also find Heisig's exposition helpful, and that along (at least) the following three lines. First, an attempt is made to take seriously the self-understanding of Kyoto School thinkers of doing philosophy in the world context. This is, of course, a bold undertaking which some in our time might summarily dismiss either as hubris or as ignorance. Yet beginning with Nishida and continuing through Tanabe, Nishitani and others (such as Tanabe's student, Abe Masao), the task was to engage as Japanese philosophers with Western thinkers and ideas. Here, of course, the tension between particularity and universality is most intense, and the Kyoto philosophers proceeded with full awareness of the issues at stake. Now while their endeavors can be criticized from either direction, what cannot be criticized without self-refutation is their motivating belief that they could understand the West and vice versa.Second, and connected with the first, is the social and political twentieth-century context of Japan and its relationship with modernity and with the Western world. Here, Heisig brilliantly negotiates between laying out the facts and locating the passions and failures of the Kyoto philosophers. This requires that he correctly identify their contributions as Japanese thinkers engaging modernity without ignoring their blind spots. As such, longstanding questions concerning Kyoto School philosophy as an ideology for Japanese nationalism are confronted head-on. Heisig shows how political naīvete resulted in political entanglements. At the same time, his discussion illuminates the sociopolitical backdrop that informs and shapes all philosophizing. The result is a balanced presentation that is neither apologetic on the one side nor condemnatory on the other.Finally, the question of religion and its relationship to Kyoto School philosophy [End Page 272] is also taken up. Nishida's practice of zazen is thus shown to inform his philosophizing, if only implicitly (on Nishida's own account), even while Tanabe's experience of metanoia (conversion) as mediated through the "Other-power" matrix of Shinran's religious thought is shown to impact his philosophy explicitly... (shrink)

In his last work, "Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology", Edmund Husserl formulated a radical new approach to phenomenological philosophy. Unlike his previous works, in the "Crisis" Husserl embedded this formulation in an ambitious reflection on the essence and value of the idea of rational thought and culture, a reflection that he considered to be an urgent necessity in light of the political, social, and intellectual crisis of the interwar period. In this book, James Dodd pursues (...) an interpretation of Husserl's text that emphasizes the importance of the problem of the origin of philosophy, as well as advances the thesis that, for Husserl, the "crisis of reason" is not a contingent historical event, but a permanent feature of a life in reason generally. (shrink)

This original translation, by Edward H. Flannery, brings you one of Maritain s most eye-opening studies of Christianity. Although not his most famous work, Maritain s An Essay on Christian Philosophy provides readers with an in-depth analysis and careful philosophical approach to the study of theology and, at the time of original publication, was considered to be the definitive statement of the Thomistic position. Discover his theses for yourself as Maritain considers the nature of philosophy, morality, and (...) their relations to Christianity with clarity and a scholarly attention to detail. Flannery provides English readers with a glossary of terms to bring further understanding to Maritain s original words. Jacques Maritain was a French Catholic philosopher and political thinker. He was born in Paris in 1882, where he spent most of his life. His father was a prominent lawyer and his mother the daughter of a statesman. He attended the Sorbonne to study philosophy and natural science, and after marrying, he and his wife converted to Catholicism. It was after this he became a well-known scholar of St. Thomas Aquinas and Thomistic philosophy. He published widely on philosophical and political thought, and by the 1930s, he was an established thinker in the Catholic community. After the outbreak of WWII, Maritain relocated to the United States, where he taught at Princeton University and Columbia University. Later in life, he and his wife returned to France, where he continued to write and study Catholic scholarship until his death in 1973. (shrink)

Introduction -- Matter, form of cognition, form of sensibility, form of understanding, time and space -- Sensibility, imagination, understanding, pure a priori concepts of the understanding or categories, schemata, answering the question Quid Juris, answering the question Quid Facti, doubts about the latter -- Ideas of the understanding, ideas of reason, etc. -- Subject and predicate. the determinable and the determination -- Thing, possible, necessary, ground, consequence, etc. -- Identity, difference, opposition, reality, logical, and transcendental negation -- Magnitude, alteration, (...) change, etc. -- Truth, subjective, objective, logical, metaphysical -- On the I, materialism, idealism, dualism, etc. -- Short overview of the whole work -- My ontology -- On symbolic cognition and philosophical language. (shrink)

This is a collection of essays about logic and its applications to various philosophical problems. In general, it is argued that logic constitutes an important device of philosophical analysis. Concerning the nature of logic the author defends the thesis that first-order logic is the logic. Among the philosophical problems to which logic is applied in the essays are: truth, consistency, realism, foundations of semantics, psychologism, undetermination of theories by empirical data, modalities, value concepts, identity, vagueness, God's existence, transcendentals, legal reasoning, (...) category mistakes, bivalence, the cognitive relation, and meaningfulness. (shrink)

Although the literature on, and the interest in, the relation of Husserlian phenomenology and Hegelian phenomenology are almost next to nil, the interpretations surrounding this relation are plagued by a number of aporiai. There is too much attention to extraneous matters. There is no adequate attempt to work out and explicate their respective theories of phenomenology and the coherency of the theories. There is a failure to spell out the presuppositions involved in the formation of transcendental philosophy which (...) is to be established within their respective phenomenological frameworks. Our approach avoids these pitfalls by focusing on Husserl's phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy within a subjectively dependent framework, and on Hegel's phenomenology as a propadeutic to a concept dependent framework. As a propadeutic, however, Hegelian phenomenology is an immanent critique of philosophical discourse, which is articulated within a subjectively dependent framework, in order for the concept dependent framework to be instituted. The question is raised as to whether Husserlian phenomenology can be encompassed by the immanent critique of the PhS. This would mean that Husserl's phenomenology must be prefigured by a cognitive formation in the PhS. We answer this question in the affirmative. We give individual treatment to Husserl and Hegel concerning the relation of phenomenology to logic. We go into a detailed analysis of what is involved in Husserl's notion of the subjective-logical and its aesthetic orientation, where we develop Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and its relation to world. We show that Husserl's full phenomenological theory of subjective life and world is prefigured by and maintains a family resemblance to the cognitive formation "Religion." We demonstrate finally that the argument of "Absolute Knowing" provides for the elimination of the subjective dependent framework as a viable principle for philosophical discourse. With this result, it becomes possible to claim that Hegel's PhS has encompassed and, hence, negated the subjectively dependent phenomenology of Husserl. (shrink)

This article explores the husserlian and heideggerian positions on intentional analysis in an attempt to understand the implications of each. Husserl, For whom intentionality is one and the same with consciousness, Brackets all worldly phenomena. However, Transcendental ego ("cogito-Sum" intention) is somewhat inadequate as proof that a thinking being must exist. Heidegger, Like husserl, Accentuates intentionality, But extends it beyond cognition. Intention is pre-Cognitive. Heidegger, Whose ontological analysis enables being to manifest itself in actual existence, Thus considers beings as (...) they actually do exist to be of primary importance. (shrink)

The European Legacy, Volume 17, Issue 4, Page 570-571, July 2012.

One of the twentieth century’s greatest philosophers presents the results of his lifetime study of man’s cultural achievements An Essay on Man is an original synthesis of contemporary knowledge, a unique interpretation of the intellectual crisis of our time, and a brilliant vindication of man’s ability to resolve human problems by the courageous use of his mind. In a new introduction Peter E. Gordon situates the book among Cassirer’s greater body of work, and looks at why his “hymn to (...) humanity in an inhuman age” still resonates with readers today. “The best-balanced and most mature expression of [Cassirer’s] thought.”—Journal of Philosophy “No reader of this book can fail to be struck by the grandeur of its program or by the sensitive humanism of the author.”—Ernest Nagel, The Humanist “A rare work of philosophy and a rare work of art.”—Tomorrow. (shrink)

Henry Allison is one of the foremost interpreters of the philosophy of Kant. This new volume collects all his recent essays on Kant's theoretical and practical philosophy. All the essays postdate Allison's two major books on Kant, and together they constitute an attempt to respond to critics and to clarify, develop and apply some of the central theses of those books. Two are published here for the first time. Special features of the collection are: a detailed defence of (...) the author's interpretation of transcendental idealism; a consideration of the Transcendental Deduction and some other recent interpretations thereof; further elaborations of the tensions between various aspects of Kant's conception of freedom and of the complex role of this conception within Kant's moral philosophy. (shrink)

In the paper, I propose a novel approach to Frege’s view on the principle of compositionality, its relation to the propositional holism and the formation of concepts. The main idea is to distinguish three stages of constructing a logically perfect language. At the first stage, only a sentence as a whole expresses a Thought. It is impossible to assign meaning to less complex units. This is the stage of an ordinary language. The second phase concerns the proper level of construction (...) of a logically perfect language. We are forced to discriminate syntactic and semantic parts of sentences to account for the inference relations. We can distinguish senses and references of parts of sentences. Furthermore, it is possible here to choose between different ways of analysing the given Thought. Finally, at the third stage, every expression of the language has an unambiguous sense and this sense determines a unique reference. The logically perfect language is ready. We may view Thoughts as composed from primitive elements. Moreover, the senses of parts of a sentence correspond to the parts of a Thought, so that the structure of the sentence serves as the image of the structure of the Thought. The principle of compositionality is met and we can discern how understanding of the infinite numbers of Thoughts is possible and how languages are learnable. The main advantage of the presented view is that it allows accommodating some aspects of Frege’s philosophy that are often seen as mutually incompatible. Furthermore, I submit extensive textual data in favour of the discussed views and conceptions. (shrink)

What is meant by "the philosophy of librarianship" -- The lack of a coherent philosophy of librarianship -- The nature of librarianship -- The ultimate aims of libraries.

The author demonstrates that certain forms of irrationality - incontinent action and self-deception - which many philosophers have rejected as being logically or psychologically impossible, are indeed possible.

The key word in the title of this book is "essay," for Strawson has not written an introduction to Kant, nor a commentary on the Critique. It would be closer to truth to say that Strawson has attempted to extract and to translate into a contemporary idiom what he takes to be philosophically important in the Critique. Kant's major positive achievement, according to Strawson, is the partial carrying out of a certain program, viz., "that of determining the fundamental general (...) structure of any conception of experience such as we can make intelligible to ourselves." But this program can be dissociated from the Kantian motif that the structure of experience is "imposed by our capacities." Thus Strawson speaks of the "doctrinal fantasies of transcendental idealism." Given Strawson's concern with what he takes to be Kant's positive achievement, he doesn't hesitate to expose the weakness of some of Kant's arguments, to restate many of them in a more convincing way, or even to supply new arguments. But Strawson also exhibits a remarkable sensitivity to many recondite aspects of the Critique, e.g., the role of "pure intuition" in Kant's theory of geometry, and the status of "self-consciousness." The result of Strawson's essay is a philosophically exciting encounter where one can learn as much about Kant as he can about Strawson's own central concerns, and indeed about some of the most central issues of philosophy, both past and present.—R. J. B. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss, in a Heideggerian context, the possibility of de-subjectivizing the notion of the transcendental time-horizon and reinterpreting it as a formally indicated ‘whereto’ of releasement. The structures of the time-horizon depict the way beings unfold in the fullness of time in their alterity, and they orient the subject’s activity of ‘projection.’ What results is a field-oriented (as opposed to self-oriented) transcendental philosophy which would survive Heidegger’s critique of his own transcendental project, and (...) which would avoid mystification. I take three steps. First, I point out that the problematization of ‘transcendental Heidegger’ is based on the subjectivist interpretation of the time-horizon. I problematize a recent account in the subjectivist vein, arguing that it is neither indispensable, nor very plausible, nor the most illuminative of Heidegger’s work. Second, with the help of Dahlstrom, Golob, Engelland, Sheehan, and Vasterling, I gradually dissociate the notion of the horizon from subjectivism, the visual metaphor, and the assumption of an absolute ground. I suggest instead that the horizonality of the horizon be understood temporally, i.e., as an interplay of presencing and absencing where what matter most are the structures, themselves affected by time, which the transcendental field displays when beings unfold themselves within it. Third, I identify three of those structures when performing a de-subjectivizing reading of Heidegger’s interpretation of the threefold synthesis in Kant’s A-Deduction. These structures capture the way every being manifests itself, without themselves being necessarily grounded in the subject’s activity. This gives an example of how transcendental philosophy can clarify what the time-horizon is like while bracketing the question of its provenance. (shrink)

In the opening sections of his Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte argues that mutual recognition is a condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. However, the argument turns on the apparently unconvincing claim that, in the context of transcendental philosophy, conceptions of the subject as an isolated individual give rise to a vicious circle the resolution of which requires the introduction of a second rational being to ‘summon’ the first. In this essay, my aim is to present a (...) revised account of the opening arguments on which they are more convincing. In particular, I argue that the problem of a circle is genuine and may be seen to result from a relation of mutual dependence between agency and cognition which ensures that for an exercise of either capacity to take place, an exercise of the other would have already had to have taken place with the result that neither can occur. Moreover, the solution is successful. The summons prevents us from being driven around the circle once more because it is a ‘synthesis’ that reconciles the constraint to which I am subject as a cognizer of independently given objects and my freedom as a self-determining subject. (shrink)

Contributed articles on Nimbarka Sect and the contribution of Swami Dhanañjayadāsa, Hindu philosopher and scholar belonging to the sect; papers presented at the seminar, held in Uttara Cabbiśa Paragaṇā, India in 2001 and organized by Sukhchar Kathiababa Ashram; centenary commemorative volume in honor of Swami Dhanañjayadāsa.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

An 'Essay on man' is an original synthesis of contemporary knowledge, a unique interpretation of the intellectual crisis of our time, and a brilliant vindication of manís ability to resolve human problems by the courageous use of his mind.

On the denial of traditional thought as philosophy Scholars, including philosophers, tend to squirm a little at the mention of African philosophy, ...

ABSTRACT This essay will explore the constitution of a transcendental theory of space through an examination of the notion of spatial synthesis in the works of Husserl, Paliard, and Deleuze. First, we shall explore the constitution of the sensorial fields in Husserl’s phenomenology. In Husserlian terms, space is not originally an empty form that can eventually be filled with a certain empirical content. Accordingly, the philosopher claims that spatiality is a consequence of the immanent synthesis of sensations. Then, (...) we will move on to Jacques Paliard’s psychology of perception, where we will find both aesthetic and noetic synthesis as transcendental conditions for the perception of space. Lastly, we will explore Deleuze’s theory of intensive space, specifically the concept of depth developed in a dialogue with Paliard. This comparative analysis shows that purely intensive fields of individuation are a transcendental a priori for the perception of an extensive space. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 106 Heft: 1 Seiten: 142-145.

This book addresses the perennial question: What is justice?

That space and time should be integrated into a single entity, spacetime, is the great insight of Einstein's special theory of relativity, and leads us to regard spacetime as a fundamental context in which to make sense of the world around us. But it is not the only one. Causality is equally important and at least as far as the special theory goes, it cannot be subsumed under a fundamentally geometrical form of explanation. In fact, the agent of propagation of (...) causal influence is electromagnetic radiation. In this examination, the authors find support for a rationalist approach to physics, never neglecting experimentation, but rejecting a simple empiricist or positivist view of science. (shrink)

This book says Prior claims: (1) that a sentence never names; (2) what a sentence says cannot be otherwise signified; and (3) that a sentence says what it says whatever the type of its occurrence; (4) and that quantifications binding sentential variables are neither eliminable, substitutional, nor referential. The book develops and defends (1)-(3). It also defends (4) against the sorts of strictures on quantification of such philosophers as Quine and Davidson.

A rich philosophical examination of why it matters to live an autonomous life.

This is the first modern edition of an important work by a previously neglected early 19th century woman philosopher, Mary Shepherd. Shepherd develops a distinctive philosophical system that can be seen as a competitor to Kant's Transcendental Idealism. The edition is aimed at researchers in early modern philosophy and is also intended to be used in graduate and undergraduate courses. It contains a concise introduction as guide for the reader.

Mark Jago presents an original philosophical account of meaningful thought: in particular, how it is meaningful to think about things that are impossible. We think about impossible things all the time. We can think about alchemists trying to turn base metal to gold, and about unfortunate mathematicians trying to square the circle. We may ponder whether God exists; and philosophers frequently debate whether properties, numbers, sets, moral and aesthetic qualities, and qualia exist. In many philosophical or mathematical debates, when one (...) side of the argument gets things wrong, it necessarily gets them wrong. As we consider both sides of one of these philosophical arguments, we will at some point think about something that’s impossible. Yet most philosophical accounts of meaning and content hold that we can’t meaningfully think or reason about the impossible. -/- In The Impossible, Jago argues that we often gain new information, new beliefs, and, sometimes, fresh knowledge through logic, mathematics, and philosophy. That is why logic, mathematics, and philosophy are useful. We therefore require accounts of knowledge and belief, of information and content, and of meaning which allow space for the impossible. Jago’s aim in this book is to provide such accounts. He gives a detailed analysis of the concept of hyperintensionality, whereby logically equivalent contents may be distinct, and develops a theory in terms of possible and impossible worlds. Along the way, he provides a theory of what those worlds are and how they feature in our analysis of normative epistemic concepts: knowledge, belief, information, and content. (shrink)

This book presents an original theory of the nature of pictorial representation. The most influential recent theory of depiction, put forward by Nelson Goodman, holds that the relation between depictions and what they represent is entirely conventional. Flint Schier argues to the contrary that depiction involves resemblance to the things depicted, providing a sophisticated defence of our basic intuitions on the subject. Canvassing an attractive theory of 'generativity' rather than resemblance, Dr Schier provides a detailed account of depiction, showing how (...) it illuminates and resolves many of the enigmas of pictorial representation while remaining true to our basic intuitions on the subject. (shrink)

This volume is not an historical study of the origins and development of medieval approaches to theories of transcendentals. Its point of departure is rather the role that transcendentals played in natural theology and metaphysical theories of the 13th and 14th centuries. Accordingly, the effort of John Duns Scotus (1265/6-1308) to systematize a theory of transcendental concepts provides the central inspiration for this book. The theories in focus are not only linked to metaphysical issues, but come to constitute the (...) understanding of metaphysics as First Philosophy. In the wake of the 13th-century reception of Aristotle, Scotus inaugurates a new beginning for the science of reality as a whole, adumbrating theoretical elements that have exercised a remarkable influence on the history of philosophy and continue to do so today. The essays in this volume evaluate the innovations that his work inspired, and in this sense each of them is itself innovative. They offer a candid evaluation of the extrinsic and intrinsic merits of the Scotist interpretation - that is, they examine just how original the intepretation is within the history of ideas, and assess its internal consistency. In doing so, they take account of earlier philosophical attempts to understand both the interrelationship of transcendentals and the science of metaphysics. They also offer topical and expanded analyses of various elements of Scotus's theory, as well as of its influence and developments within Scotist circles and the Franciscan tradition, as well as within Spanish scholasticism and the philosophical theology of our times. (shrink)

From a phenomenological point of view, others present themselves as unities within my intentional life as a whole, constituted ‘for’ me even while maintaining a certain reserve. This ‘reserve’ is meant to indicate that the consciousness of alter egos involves the consciousness of a breach that does not obtain between consciousness and its other ‘objects’. Indeed, there is an obvious sense in which this very consciousness requires a considerable modification of the phenomenological understanding of the ego itself and the way (...) in which intentional life is constituted. As a means of accounting for intersubjectivity without reducing it to the ego or vice versa, the author of this short, but densely written volume focuses on the body as the place in which the above mentioned breach is constituted and countenanced in tandem with a transformed conception of the ego. The rationale for this strategy is outlined in chapter one, “Alterity and Otherness: The Problem of the Body in the Cartesian Meditations,” where the author observes, to begin with, that “the reduced ownness” cannot be defined as ‘nonalien’ since it is embodied and, as such, includes its “own inescapable otherness... thus indicating that the ‘inside’ of the ‘I’ is ordered in such a way that the experience of alterity is possible.” While providing some important clues, this observation does not explain how alterity in fact is experienced. The beginning of an explanation, Dodd suggests, is to be found in the passive synthesis of my body and another’s and, on the basis of that pairing, the interpretation of the other’s body in analogy with the way the ego mundanely expresses itself in its body. Thus, the most basic answer to the question of how another ego-life can be constituted in its alterity yet in my consciousness is provided by “expression” as a mundane and mutual modification of my life and others, in short, by their encounter, not as transcendental subjects, but as living bodies. The remainder of the book accordingly focuses on the body as “the basic element of the encounter between two lives”, based upon Husserl’s account of the three essential features of a “physical thing”: extendedness, materiality, and temporality. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to establish a relationship between philosophy, myth, and science in reference to a historical perspective. If for methodological reasons we now disregard the above mentioned terminological difficulties and refer to a common-sense view of myth, philosophy, and science, it remains unquestionable that myth existed long before philosophy and modern science began as late as the seventeenth century.Nevertheless, this historical perspective is not introduced to affirm the positivistic view, according to which (...) the history of humanity should be described in terms of three stages: theological (mythical), metaphysical (philosophical), and positive (scientific); nor is it presented to say that the positive one represents the final achievement of the human race. On the contrary, I will attempt to show that by departing from myth and original philosophy, modern men and women have concealed from themselves an intensely rich experience of life. In order to regain the love of wisdom, we need first to look backwards in order to move forward. (shrink)

Warm-up -- Definability -- Neti neti -- Space-time -- The known universe -- The biosphere -- The separation region -- The sociosphere -- The phenomenon of family -- The phenomenon of state -- The phenomenon of religion -- The phenomenon of norms -- Where's the future?

This codification of Locke's theories influenced Bentham, Spencer, & the Mills.