This article concentrates on the later Wittgenstein. The main problem is how we can apply his later philosophical thought to religion and religious belief. The result is that, according to Wittgenstein, religious beliefs are not such as scientific hypotheses and need not being supported by rational arguments and evidence, but they are pictures on which believers arrange and set out their forms of life. So, according to the article, Wittgenstein neither accepts nor rejects language game of religion. He just says (...) that this form of life exists and has its limits and prejudices. Religion, like any other conceptual schemata, logically depends on bounds and frontiers or, in better words, on social or contextual rules. If this language game is to be played and adopted, we’ll have to adopt and follow such limits and rules. (shrink)

Theologians in some cases use the proof of miracle to prove the existence of God. This paper, surveying the relation of miracles to the proofs of the field, has intended to find the degree of miracle proof’s validity for the existence of God in Islamic and Christian theology. The conclusion would not only lead to the clearness of the real place of the proof and its usage but also help commentators to understand real meaning of the verses in the field. (...) In the paper, the nature of miracle is described in a religious approach at first and then, the usage of the proof of miracle in Muslim and Christian theologians’ works is studied. Finally, the usability of the proof and degree of its validity have been critically studied. (shrink)