Scholarship on faculty and student perceptions of plagiarism is plagued by a vast, scattered constellation of perspectives, context, and nuance. Cultural, disciplinary, and institutional subtitles, among others in how plagiarism is defined and perspectives about it tested obfuscate consensus about how students and faculty perceive and understand plagiarism and what can or should be done about those perspectives. However, there is clear consensus that understanding how students and faculty perceive plagiarism is foundational to mitigating and preventing plagiarism. This study takes (...) up the challenge of investigating its own institution’s student and faculty perspectives on plagiarism by testing whether students and instructors differentiate between different kinds or genres of plagiarism, and measuring differences in their perception of seriousness or severity of those genres. Using a device modified from the ‘plagiarism spectrum’ published by Turnitin®, the researchers implemented a campus-wide survey of faculty and student perceptions, and analyzed the data using two different methodologies to ensure results triangulation. This study demonstrates both students and faculty clearly differentiate between kinds of plagiarism, but not on their severity. This study demonstrates both students and faculty clearly differentiate the severity between kinds of plagiarism, but not on the specific rank or order of their severity. Further, this study’s novel methodology is demonstrated as valuable for use by other academic institutions to investigate and understand their cultures of plagiarism. (shrink)

Our beliefs, intentions, desires, regrets, and fears are evaluable for fit—they can succeed or fail to be fitting responses to the objects they are about. Can our headaches and heartrates be evaluable for fit? The common view says ‘no’. This chapter argues: sometimes, yes. First, it claims that when a racing heart accompanies fear it seems to have the typical characteristics of fit-evaluable items. Then, it suggests that suspicion of this initial impression is explained by the assumption that whether an (...) item is ever fit-evaluable is determined by the type of item it is. Fear is the type of thing that can be fit-evaluable, a racing heart is not. The chapter then proposes an alternative whereby the same type of item can be fit-evaluable on one occasion but not on another. What explains the difference, it is argued, is that only in the former occasion the item is explained by the agent’s narrative as an element of a fit-evaluable response. (shrink)

The paper argues against a widely held synchronic view of emotional rationality. I begin by considering recent philosophical literature on various backward‐looking emotions, such as regret, grief, resentment, and anger. I articulate the general problem these accounts grapple with: a certain diminution in backward‐looking emotions seems fitting while the reasons for these emotions seem to persist. The problem, I argue, rests on the assumption that if the facts that give reason for an emotion remain unchanged, the emotion remains fitting. However, (...) I argue there are rationally self‐consuming attitudes: affective attitudes that become less fitting the longer they endure while the facts that give reason for them persist. A widely held synchronic view of fitting affective attitudes denies that fittingness at a time depends on the agent's attitudes at different times and therefore denies that the fittingness of an affective attitude can depend on its duration. Once we reject the synchronic view, we may see that affective attitudes are often fitting due to the fitting processes of which they are part. These fitting processes explain the fitting diminution of backward‐looking emotions as well as other diachronic aspects of the fittingness of emotions. -/- . (shrink)

This is a philological and critical analysis of two crucial philosophical concepts, viz., reaso and experienceâ. The study shows that, though there is no word in Sanskrit which may be taken as equivalent of Western reason and thought, such terms as tarka, yukti, nyaya, anumana, buddhi, etc., clearly capture parts or aspects of what is meant by reason and thought (Denken). Moreover, it is misleading to trans- late sruti as revelation. Construing sruti as revelation surreptitiously imports a Semitic theological concept (...) into the Vedic tradition. The case of experience is more promising because we have such Sanskrit words as anubhava or anubhuti that do translate into experience. However, experience in Western thought has acquired many shades of meaning, and the study determines in what sense the Indian anubhava captures the Western experience. Finally, the book demonstrates that Indian philosophy provides an account of the cognitive process that begins with perception and culminates in wisdom (highest experience). This whole process may be called reason, at both ends of which we can talk of experience, which places experience not in an external opposition to reason, but rather as something that belongs to it internally. Thus, the modern Western opposition between reason and experience collapses and the two toge-ther yield an integrated process of acquisition, validation, and practical application of knowledge. (shrink)

How can we explain the rational diminution of backward-looking emotions without resorting to pragmatic or wrong kind of reason explanations? That is to say, how can the diminution of these emotions not only be rational but fitting? In this paper, I offer an answer to this question by considering the case of anger. In Sect. 1, I examine Pamela Hieronymi’s account of forgiveness as the rational resolution of resentment. I argue that Hieronymi’s account rests on an assumption about the rationality (...) of emotions —namely, that a rational change in emotion entails a change in the fact that constitutes the reason for the emotion. Then, in Sect. 2, I consider Agnes Callard’s recent criticism of accounts like Hieronymi’s as well as Callard’s alternative account of the rational resolution of anger. I argue that Callard offers a promising account but fails to explain how it avoids the criticism she levels against Hieronymi and others. Finally, in Sect. 3, I reject Hieronymi’s assumption and argue that an emotion can cease to be fitting without any change in the fact that constitutes the reason for it. I also explain how my proposal can complement Callard’s account of the rational dissipation of anger. My discussion of anger leads to a solution to the general problem about backward-looking emotions: a fitting backward-looking emotion can fittingly diminish when it is part of a process that is itself a fitting response to the past occurrence. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Some epistemologists hold that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with the agent’s states or attitudes at an individual time [Hedden 2015, 2016; Moss 2015]; others argue that all rational norms are fundamentally concerned with processes [Podgorski 2017]. This distinction is not drawn in discussions of emotional rationality. As a result, a widely held assumption in the literature on emotional rationality has gone unexamined. I employ Abelard Podgorski’s argument from rational delay to argue that many emotional norms are fundamentally (...) concerned with emotional processes. I also claim that the main response available to the synchronist about belief is not available to the synchronist about emotions and, therefore, fundamental process norms are more plausible than epistemologists tend to believe. (shrink)

L'impôt sous son angle colonial en Afrique était perçu comme un instrument de pression, d'oppression et d'appauvrissement du citoyen contribuable par l'impôt dit, de capitation. Ce lourd passé historique pèse encore sur les systèmes fiscaux d'Afrique et d'ailleurs, systèmes au sein desquels les citoyens se sentent encore victimes parce que spoliés de leurs biens par les puissances publiques. Dans cet ouvrage, Docteur Célestin Amané DAGO propose un changement de paradigme du système de la fiscalité à travers la philosophie politique normative (...) et l'éthique économique appliquée du philosophe américain John Rawls, en introduisant une part de volontariat dans l'accomplissement de l'obligation fiscale, afin de changer le rapport du contribuable à l'Etat. L'ouvrage vu sous cet angle, est un appel aux pouvoirs publics pour inscrire le contribuable au coeur du système fiscal afin que, le paiement de l'impôt soit un acte spontané et volontaire. L'acte volontaire, s'entend comme la réponse à la justice et à l'équité fiscales dans la redistribution sociale des richesses nationales. Au commencement était la philosophie en tant que mère de toutes les sciences et, naturellement M. Amané Célestin DAGO, embrassa cette discipline prestigieuse à l'Université de BOUAKE ; mais, cet eudémoniste toujours souriant et généreux, est un monomane de l'application des savoirs, un citoyen rivé au credo selon lequel le bonheur de la cité ne viendra que d'un gouvernement de philosophes. Voilà le principe d'intelligibilité de toutes ses activités théoriques et pratiques. Etonné par la ruée automatique des politiciens négro-africains vers la démocratie comme régime politique idéal, parce que le maître blanc en domination l'a dit, Monsieur DAGO prépara et soutint un mémoire de maîtrise en philosophie politique et sociale sur le thème suivant : Du procès de la démocratie dans la République de PLATON ; à la suite de quoi, un mémoire de DEA de philosophie intégrale intitulé : La République comme médiation de la justice chez PLATON ; puis, voulant être différent du philosophe THALES de Milet, il prépara son second DEA en philosophie politique normative, qui a eu pour thème : La justice et la répartition fiscale dans la philosophie de JOHN RAWLS. Il est admis au Cycle Supérieur de l'Ecole Nationale d'Administration (ENA) où il obtient le Diplôme option Impôts, promotion 2004-2005. Depuis novembre 2011, Monsieur DAGO a été nommé Receveur des Impôts Divers par Arrêté du Ministre en charge de l'Economie et des Finances. Malgré ses nombreuses charges administratives, Monsieur DAGO a su réaliser sa passion en soutenant une thèse unique de Doctorat de philosophie politique normative, option éthique économique appliquée. Cette thèse a été sanctionnée par la mention très honorable à l'unanimité du jury. Ajoutons que Monsieur DAGO est l'actuel Président de la Mutuelle de Développement de HIRE (MUDH), mission de développement qui l'a contraint à écrire le livre blanc de la sous-préfecture de HIRE intitulé : Besoin de développement et Exploitation minière à HIRE. Aujourd'hui, Dr DAGO est Administrateur Principal des Sces Financiers à la Direction Générale des Impôts de Côte d'ivoire. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw attention to various doctrines common to different Vedāntic traditions. In particular, I pay close attention to the doctrine of beginningless _karman_. I also note that this doctrine seems to stand in tension with Leibnizian Cosmological Arguments (LCAs) and Kalām Cosmological Arguments (KCAs). This tension arises because defenders of these arguments argue that an infinite causal regress or an actual infinite cannot be physically instantiated and because the doctrine of beginningless _karman_ seems to imply that such (...) a regress or actual infinite can be physically instantiated. I address this tension by showing that not all interpretations of beginningless _karman_ involve an infinite causal regress or an actual infinite. I close this paper by highlighting a few features that Vedāntic traditions have that make them more resistant to some objections to LCAs and KCAs. (shrink)

Efficient identification of influential nodes is one of the essential aspects in the field of complex networks, which has excellent theoretical and practical significance in the real world. A valuable number of approaches have been developed and deployed in these areas where just a few have used centrality measures along with their concerning deficiencies and limitations in their studies. Therefore, to resolve these challenging issues, we propose a novel effective distance-based centrality algorithm for the identification of influential nodes in concerning (...) networks. EDBC algorithm comprises factors such as the power of K-shell, degree nodes, effective distance, and numerous levels of neighbor’s influence or neighborhood potential. The performance of the proposed algorithm is evaluated on nine real-world networks, where a susceptible infected recovered epidemic model is employed to examine the spreading dynamics of each node. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm outperforms the existing techniques such as eigenvector, betweenness, closeness centralities, hyperlink-induced topic search, H-index, K-shell, page rank, profit leader, and gravity over a valuable margin. (shrink)

This present article explores the effects of cultural value, economic prosperity, and community mental wellbeing through multi-sectoral infrastructure growth projects under the Belt and Road Initiative. The implications of the social exchange theory are applied to observe the support of the local community for the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This study explores the CPEC initiative, it’s direct social, cultural, economic development, and risk of environmental factors that affect residents’ lives and the local community’s wellbeing. CPEC is a multibillion-dollar project to uplift (...) economic growth and free trade between Pakistan, China, and other regional stakeholders. Although CPEC is still in its initial phases with partial startups, policymakers and government officials claim this mega project as a “game-changer” in the region, mainly for Pakistan and China. This gigantic project offers the significant potential to generate business slews and employment opportunities with international outreach. Due to the term’s newness, numerous studies have recently explored the macro and microeconomic benefits of the CPEC initiatives; still, these projects are theoretical. The existing literature insufficiently explored how helpful CPEC would be to a specific group and how residents perceive its advantages. This study fills in the literature gaps and explores the likely advantageous potential of the CPEC for the regional states. The study applied a convenient sampling technique for the data collection process. It used a mixed-method approach to gain scientific results, with a standardized questionnaire survey of 459 people from five major cities of Pakistan. The study results designate that residents believe that CPEC infrastructure projects will significantly improve residents’ life quality through more job openings and community poverty reduction. Still, they raised their concerns regarding environmental protection issues in the region. The findings specified that residents had an optimistic approach to better educational productivity by adopting environment-oriented policies. Policymakers should establish new CPEC study centers in different areas, and investors should be encouraged to participate in the industrial sector. Officials can overwhelm community worries about environmental degradation. Government officials in both countries can utilize the findings to raise public awareness about CPEC’s social, economic, cultural, mental wellbeing, and ecological implications. (shrink)

A joke is amusing if and only if it’s fitting to be amused by it; an act is regrettable if and only if it’s fitting to regret it. Many philosophers accept these biconditionals and hold that analogous ones obtain between a wide range of additional evaluative properties and the fittingness of corresponding responses. Call these the _fit–value biconditionals_. The biconditionals give us a systematic way of recognizing the role of fit in our ethical practices; they also serve as the bedrock (...) of various metaethical projects, such as fitting-attitude analysis of value and the ‘fittingness first’ approach. Yet despite the importance of the biconditionals, there is very little discussion of their proper interpretation. This paper argues that any plausible interpretation of the fit_–_value biconditionals must disarm several kinds of apparent counterexample. For instance, that an achievement is pride-worthy doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to take pride in it because the achievement might not be mine or that of anyone close to me; that a joke is amusing doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to be amused by it for six straight months; and that a person is loveable doesn’t imply it is fitting for me to love him romantically because that person might be my sibling. We consider possible responses to such counterexamples and develop what we consider the most promising interpretation of the biconditionals. The upshot is that certain widespread assumptions about fit and its relation to value and reasons should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Linked with existence of the almighty, the operation of division by zero which is considered as undefined or indeterminate or infinite sometimes, has been a topic of serious altercation among mathematicians and philosophers for so long. History is evident of the various attempts made to clearly define the algebra of zero, including the idea of division by zero. This includes the evolution of the idea of zero division and various insights from mathematicians like Euler, Craig and more. The realm of (...) the paper contains all such significant attempts and it deals with the idea of the history that wishes to explore the evolution of infinity and undefined. The prime aim of this paper is to clearly distinguish the three concepts of Undefined, Indeterminate and Infinity, along with the concept of division by zero. It strives to provide a notation to undefined expressions, along with citing justifications and results with the help of unpretentious examples from key branches. (shrink)

Discussions of ethics within in-service teacher education tend to focus on microethical concerns (e.g., discipline) that deal with decision making at interpersonal levels. Issues concerning educational technology are no exception. Yet, as teachers choose and are expected to integrate technological devices (e.g., laptops) and sociotechnical systems (e.g., learning management systems) into pedagogical practices, their classrooms and schools may become implicated in macroethical issues (e.g., electronic waste) that reach beyond the local consequences of their direct actions. Necessitated by tight couplings of (...) technology and education, this article presents the concept of macroethics for teacher educators by grounding it in three areas of concern: obsolescence, automation, and big data. These three areas offer opportunities to make economic and environmental issues more central to case studies on technology in teacher education. At the same time, teacher educators will need to put emphasis on critical reflection and collective action in units on macroethics since the limited impact of individual decision-making on these issues may put teachers in double binds (i.e., dilemmas with contradictory demands). (shrink)

ABSTRACT The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well‐known and much discussed Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gītā, in the context of the Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the materials published on the Gītā make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the Gītā. The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of the conceptions (...) of duty and virtue in the Gītā. The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty and virtue coexist in the Gītā, and (2) the Gītā accords virtue an important place. (shrink)

Is it possible to found a Heideggerian ethic around the notion of a relationship to being (Bezug zum Seyn)? Going against much of the Western tradition, Gupta considers if the being-relationship could result in a feeling or mystical experience that is the basis of ethics. Along the way, such an affective and embodied approach to ethics brings us into dialogue with a range of thinkers, such as Kant and Schweitzer. Further, it is suggested that an environmental philosophy is consistent (...) with a Heideggerian ethics. Finally, recent research in the neurosciences is marshaled to at least show the plausibility of Heidegger's brand of moral realism as it is developed. (shrink)

Exhaustive study of the philosophy of Rāmāyaṇa, classical Sanskrit work by Vālmīki.

On religious and spiritual life as depicted in Bhāgavatapurāṇa, Hindu mythological text.

This compilation analyzes the differences between the concepts of ‘social responsibility’ and ‘business ethics’, which are often erroneously interpreted to be the same. It explains that social responsibility is a characteristic but just one of the many aspects of the much wider concept of business ethics. The collection includes contributions from experts from diverse fields such as industry, academia, and non-governmental organizations, who present the theoretical underpinning of the concepts, along with real-life case studies dealing with the varied, hands-on experiences (...) of leaders from different industries. (shrink)

Study on Buddhist philosophy and its impact on ancient Indian education system; includes importance of Buddhist philosophy in present education system.

This book unveils the myriad streams of ecocentric thoughts that have been flowing through the human mind - in indigenous communities, in the wisdom of philosophers, in the creative expressions of poets and writers - sometimes latent, but sometimes more explicit. The strength of this book lies in the fact that it attempts to show that ecocentrism had not emerged suddenly as a distinct line of philosophical thought or found its place among the various normative approaches towards nature, but the (...) seeds of ecocentrism had always been running through human societies. Thus, book not only emphasizes the "unity of life", but also reveals the inherent unity of all hues of ecocentrism. The book adopts a multidisciplinary approach, which is essential to dwell on a topic like ecocentrism which permeates the domains of disciplines as disparate as science, philosophy, religion, normative ethics, myths and folklore, poetry, and literature, among others. Despite this eclectic approach, the book attempts to maintain a continuity among the chapters and present these concepts in a simple form that will be easily accessible by readers from all conceivable backgrounds. This book would be useful to the students, researchers, and faculty from the field of ecology and environmental science, philosophy, sociology, religious studies, and literature. It will also be an indispensable companion all nature lovers, activists and general readers interested in the emergence and evolution of environmental thoughts. (shrink)

Samatavilasa, The Radiant Sameness, shows the way of finding our fallen condition itself as redemptive. We are not merely to accept our pain and our mortal condition but to live these and become these. In becoming that pain lies our bliss, in living our mortality immortality. That alone is the highest bliss and absolute, that alone is salvation the final, this our becoming one with our mortal and absolutely tragic lot. That is what the state of samata, sameness, is. Only (...) that man is a mukta, a liberated soul, who can look alike on Maya and Brahman, on reality and appearance, on bondage and liberation, on life and death, on misery and joy. Not that there is an actual state called the state of liberation, an actual bliss that is absolute and highest, for terms like absolute and highest turn out to be relative, and, therefore, mis-leading. Hypostati-zation of samata would not work, for all hypo-statization is rooted in our narcissistic passion. Yet Samatavilasa would not, in actual fact does not, encourage us to look alike on these opposites constitutive of our mortal being as long as we fight a desperate fight against our inevitable and destined fate, fate the mortal; a stern discipline we have to undergo before we can even think of samata, sameness, not to speak of living it. For, not before dying unto himself can a man look alike on these dualities, the stuff our mortal life and being are made of. (shrink)

I propose that shock can be morally significant independently of its consequences but only as part of an ongoing commitment to certain norms, in particular norms that constitute recognizing another as a person. When we witness others in agony, or being severely wronged, or when we ourselves severely wrong or mistreat others, our shock can reflect our recognition of them as persons, a recognition constituted by our commitment to certain moral norms. However, if we do not in fact respond to (...) the suffering or wrong in accordance with these norms—if, for example, we do not act to relieve their suffering or to properly address the wrong done, and do not avoid or prevent its recurrence—then our commitment to the relevant norms is undermined. When we consistently violate the norms whose violation initially shocked us, our lingering shock upon repeated violations gradually loses its significance and becomes a mere impulse—a fossil of a past commitment, so to speak—before it disappears completely. The failure to be shocked in such instances marks the failure of our moral commitments, which is the failure to recognize others as persons. (shrink)

Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive-neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this abstract and yet there is nothing surprising about this fact. We offer a novel theory that explains (...) when and why an unexpected fact is surprising. We distinguish between descriptive and normative notions of what is surprising; clarify the sense in which surprising facts are unexpected; and, finally, develop and defend the significance account of surprise, according to which a fact is surprising to an agent if and to the extent that it is both unexpected and significant to the agent. Since a surprising fact can be significant to an agent in various ways—personal, moral, epistemic, and aesthetic—surprise is not merely or primarily epistemic. Fitting surprise reflects more than a person’s view of what is; it reflects a person’s view of what is significant. (shrink)