In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gainsborough’s WitAmal Asfour and Paul WilliamsonBeginning with their earliest recipients, readers of Gainsborough’s letters have been struck by the vivacity with which he handles the language. William Jackson of Exeter, one of Gainsborough’s closest correspondents, compares his writing style with Sterne’s: “He detested reading; but was so like Sterne in his Letters, that, if it were not for an originality that could be copied from no one, it might (...) be supposed that he had formed his style upon a close imitation of that author.”1 The aptness of Jackson’s comparison should be understood in the broader context of his own summary of contemporary ideas about wit contained in his essay “On Wit.”2 Jackson writes after Locke’s theory of knowledge and Hume’s philosophy of sentiment had transformed an older understanding of wit as a primary creative power.3 Gainsborough’s letters show his affinity with aspects of eighteenth-century wit and reveal his awareness of the [End Page 479] long-running argument about wit and judgment. This is also evident in his paintings. There is an aspect of Gainsborough’s portraiture which may, in an eighteenth-century sense, be termed witty, and developments in Gainsborough’s portrait style register a shift that can be clarified with reference to the main development in ideas about wit that runs from Locke to Hume.Commentators from Addison to Jackson regarded Locke’s separation of wit and judgment and his deprecation of wit as the starting point for the eighteenth-century debate:Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgement, or deepest Reason. For Wit lying most in the assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy: Judgement, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from the other, Ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by Similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion, wherein, for the most part, lies that entertainment and pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore so acceptable to all People; because its Beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought, to examine what Truth or Reason there is in it. The Mind without looking any farther, rests satisfied with the agreeableness of the Picture, and the gayety of the Fancy:4Wit creates pleasing conjunctions, while judgment consists in the careful discriminations that assist reason. According to Locke, wit is a mere ornamental adjunct to the more fundamental action of judgment. Locke’s definition is inimical to the arts in general and to literature in particular. In making wit responsible for figurative language, for example, Locke disparages poetry’s inability to approach the most important truths:we must allow, that all the Art of Rhetorick, besides Order and Clearness, all the artificial and figurative applications of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat.5 [End Page 480]Citing Locke in The Spectator, Addison quietly expunges his disparagement of wit, rescuing its products from Locke’s stern disapproval by introducing the distinction between true and false wit: “true Wit consists in the Resemblance of Ideas, and false Wit in the Resemblance of Words.”6 True wit is true because it works with ideas; false wit, by contrast, plays with the mere forms in which ideas are clothed:Anagrams, Chronograms, Lipograms, and Acrosticks... Ecchos and Doggerel Rhymes... Punns and Quibbles... Nay some carry the Notion of Wit so far, as to ascribe it even to external Mimickry; and to look upon a Man as an ingenious Person, that can resemble the Tone, Posture, or Face of another.7Addison places special emphasis on the element of surprise. Wit lies in surprising juxtapositions: “every Resemblance of Ideas is not that which we call Wit, unless... (shrink)