8 found
  1. Rule-utilitarianism: Merely an illusory alternative?Allan F. Gibbard - 1965 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):211 – 220.
  2.  53
    Social choice and the arrow conditions.Allan F. Gibbard - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):269-284.
    Arrow’s impossibility result stems chiefly from a combination of two requirements: independence and fixity. Independence says that the social choice is independent of individual preferences involving unavailable alternatives. Fixity says that the social choice is fixed by a social preference relation that is independent of what is available. Arrow found that requiring, further, that this relation be transitive yields impossibility. Here it is shown that allowing intransitive social indifference still permits only a vastly unsatisfactory system, a liberum veto oligarchy. Arrow’s (...)
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  3.  65
    Reply to Sinnott-Armstrong.Allan F. Gibbard - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 69 (2-3):315 - 327.
    I conclude that Gibbard fails to solve several of the traditional problems for expressivism. He solves some of these problems, but his solutions to them in effect give up expressivism. Of course, one might respond that it does not really matter whether his theory is expressivist. In some ways, I agree. Gibbard says many fascinating things about morality which have at most indirect connections to his expressivist analysis. I am thinking especially of his later discussions of hyperscepticism, parochialism, and indirect (...)
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  4. Disparate Goods and Rawls' Difference Principle: A Social Choice Theoretic Treatment.Allan F. Gibbard - unknown
    Rawls' Difference Principle asserts that a basic economic structure is just if it makes the worst off people as well off as is feasible. How well off someone is is to be measured by an ‘index’ of ‘primary social goods’. It is this index that gives content to the principle, and Rawls gives no adequate directions for constructing it. In this essay a version of the difference principle is proposed that fits much of what Rawls says, but that makes use (...)
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  5.  52
    Weakly self-ratifying strategies: Comments on McClennen.Allan F. Gibbard - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 65 (1-2):217 - 225.
  6.  87
    Normative explanations: Invoking rationality to explain happenings.Allan F. Gibbard - 2002 - In Jose Luis Bermudez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature. Clarendon Press.
  7.  30
    Arrow's Theorem with a fixed feasible alternative.John A. Weymark, Aanund Hylland & Allan F. Gibbard - unknown
    Arrow's Theorem, in its social choice function formulation, assumes that all nonempty finite subsets of the universal set of alternatives is potentially a feasible set. We demonstrate that the axioms in Arrow's Theorem, with weak Pareto strengthened to strong Pareto, are consistent if it is assumed that there is a prespecified alternative which is in every feasible set. We further show that if the collection of feasible sets consists of all subsets of alternatives containing a prespecified list of alternatives and (...)
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  8.  31
    Preference strength and two kinds of ordinalism.Allan F. Gibbard - 1978 - Philosophia 7 (2):255-264.