At the turn of the 21st century, Susan Leigh Anderson and Michael Anderson conceived and introduced the Machine Ethics research program, that aimed to highlight the requirements under which autonomous artificial intelligence systems could demonstrate ethical behavior guided by moral values, and at the same time to show that these values, as well as ethics in general, can be representable and computable. Today, the interaction between humans and AI entities is already part of our everyday lives; in the near future (...) it is expected to play a key role in scientific research, medical practice, public administration, education and other fields of civic life. In view of this, the debate over the ethical behavior of machines is more crucial than ever and the search for answers, directions and regulations is imperative at an academic, institutional as well as at a technical level. Our discussion with the two inspirers and originators of Machine Ethics highlights the epistemological, metaphysical and ethical questions arising by this project, as well as the realistic and pragmatic demands that dominate artificial intelligence and robotics research programs. Most of all, however, it sheds light upon the contribution of Susan and Michael Anderson regarding the introduction and undertaking of a main objective related to the creation of ethical autonomous agents, that will not be based on the “imperfect” patterns of human behavior, or on preloaded hierarchical laws and human-centric values. (shrink)

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to examine the epistemic habits that agents develop through frequent social media usage. I point out that extensive social media usage is conducive to the development of closed-mindedness and unreflective thinking and accordingly argue that social media act as inadvertent educators of epistemic vices. I contend that understanding social media as generators of epistemic dispositions is of significant import to intellectual character education. It shows the urgency of incorporating in educational curricula pedagogical methods (...) that eliminate the bad epistemic habits that agents acquire through frequent social media usage. I propose character building through problem-solving as an effective educational method for efficiently offsetting such habits. Fostering intellectual virtues through problem-solving safeguards against intellectual vices commonly developed through extensive social media usage. At the same time such an educational approach trains students’ information-seeking abilities. (shrink)

In the Republic, Plato developed an educational program through which he trained young Athenians in desiring truth, without offering them any knowledge-education. This is not because he refused to pass on knowledge but because he considered knowledge of the Good as an ongoing research program. I show this by tracing the steps of the education of the Philosopher-Kings in Plato’s ideal state, to establish that the decades-long educational regime aims at training them in three types of virtue: Moral Virtue; the (...) Cognitive Virtue of Abstraction; the Cognitive Virtue of Debate.Plato’s theory of education has much to teach us about intellectual character education today. The Platonic educational program does not advocate the direct transmission of knowledge from teacher to learner but rather focuses on building the learners’ epistemic dispositions. Building upon the Socratic Method, Plato’s educational program does not ‘spoon-feed’ knowledge to the learners but rather fosters the growth of intellectual virtues through problem-solving.I explain ways in which fostering intellectual virtues through problem-solving could be applied in classrooms today. I conclude that Plato’s rigorous educational program is of definite merit for contemporary virtue education, especially since Aristotle offers us surprisingly little on how to educate for intellectual virtues. (shrink)

Several contemporary virtue scholars trace the origin of the concept of intellectual virtues back to Aristotle. In contrast, my aim in this paper is to highlight the strong indications showing that Plato had already conceived of and had begun developing the concept of intellectual virtues in his discussion of the ideal city-state in the Republic. I argue that the Platonic conception of rational desires satisfies the motivational component of intellectual virtues while his dialectical method satisfies the success component. In addition, (...) I show that Plato considers episteme as the primary intellectual virtue. Episteme, which is quite similar to Pritchard’s The nature and value of knowledge: three investigations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) conception of understanding, is a cognitive achievement that cannot be attained by luck or testimony. The realization that Plato was the first to conceive of and develop the concept of intellectual excellences is not merely of historic significance. I illustrate, through the example of Zagzebski’s virtue theory, how the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues could prove promising in contemporary debates on virtue epistemology theories. (shrink)

In this paper, I highlight and discuss two significant limitations of Zagzebski’s exemplarist moral theory. Although I focus on Zagzebski’s theory, I argue that these limitations are not unique to her approach but also feature in previous versions of moral exemplarism. The first limitation I identify is inspired by MacIntyre’s understanding of the concept of virtue and stems from the realization that the emotion of admiration, through which agents identify exemplars, should not be examined in vacuo. Scholars working on moral (...) exemplarism have failed to note that admiration is substantially influenced by prevailing socio-cultural norms and values. I show that ‘the admirable’ varies across cultures and time; and the employment of one’s own emotion of admiration in order to derive the meaning of terms such as virtue and duty would only result in a culture-specific understanding of morality. The second limitation, inspired by Butler’s social constructivist understanding of gender, rests on the realization that several features and characteristics of the agent influence their perception of moral excellence. I focus on the issue of gender and highlight that exemplarist theories justify a counter-intuitive gender-specific understanding of morality. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to examine whether gossip should be categorized as an epistemically valuable character trait. Gossip satisfies the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for an acquired character trait to be classified as an intellectual virtue under the responsibilist understanding of the concept of virtue. The excellent gossiper is motivated to acquire epistemic goods through gossiping, reliably successful in acquiring epistemic goods through gossiping, competent at the activity of gossiping and good at judging when, with whom (...) and what to gossip. Nonetheless, I show that the excellent gossiper inflicts epistemic wrong on others. The excellent gossiper comes to intentionally acquire another person’s private information without their consent. This leaves virtue responsibilists with three options: resist my argument that gossip qualifies as a responsibilist virtue and/or that excellent gossiping inflicts epistemic wrong, bite the bullet and argue that the intellectually virtuous agent sometimes inflicts epistemic wrong on other agents intentionally, develop a no-wrong principle that disqualifies gossip from being categorized as an intellectual virtue. (shrink)

Tasavvuf erbâbı tabîatleri gereği mâddî unsurlardan ziyâde mânevî değerleri muhafaza etmeye ve geliştirmeye çalışırlar. Fakat tasavvufî çevrelerin sosyal bir yapıya bürünmeleriyle berâber düşüncelerini ve değerlerini sembolize etmek için mâddî bir kısım edevât da kullanmışlardır. Bunların başında keşkül, teber, tahta kılıç, asâ, gül, hırka gibi unsular gelir. Bu çalışmamızda dervîşlerin kullandıkları mâddî edevâttan birisi olan tahta kılıç ve ifâde ettiği mânâlara bakacağız ve örnekler üzerinden tahlîl etmeye çalışacağız. Tasavvuf ehli tahta kılıç ile ilgili bir hadîs-i şerîfden yola çıkarak mânevî bir disiplin, (...) ahlakî bir prensip ve nefsânî bir terbiye metodu ortaya koymuşlardır. Yeri geldiğinde cihâd ve mücâhede için zāhir kılıcının yanı sıra bâtın kılıcını kullanmışlardır. Manevî kılıcı sembolize eden tahta kılıcın kullanımına dâir tespit ettiğimiz ilk örnek sahābe döneminde Muhammed b. Mesleme’ye aittir. Yaygın bir şekilde kullanımı ise 1200’lü yıllarda büyük tarîkatların kurulduğu dönemde yânî Abbâsî hilâfeti döneminde olmuştur. Memlüklü dönemi kaynaklarından okuduğumuz kadarıyla Yûsuf Selahaddîn-i Eyyûbî ve berâberindeki kalabalık dervîş gurubu bu unsuru yaygın olarak kullanmışladır. Yûsuf Selahaddîn Eyyûbî’nin hem Bağdâd’ta iken hem de Mısır’a sefer düzenlerken berâberindeki kalabalık derviş gurubuyla birlikte zikirler eşliğinde tahta kılıçla yürüdükleri kaydedilmiştir. Bektâşî Velâyetnâmelerinde Anadolu Selçukluları döneminde yaşayan Hacı Bektâş-i Velî’nin himmetleriyle Saru Saltuk’un tahta kılıç kullanarak mânevî bir savaş verdiğini görüyoruz. Velâyet-nâmelerde tahta kılıç kullanımına dâir pek çok örnek vardır. 20 yüzyılda da pek çok dergâh ve câmîde bu tür bir kılıcın sembolik olarak kullanıldığını bizzât müşâhede ettik. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Our aim in this paper is to argue that Socrates is an intellectual character builder. We show that the Socratic Method, properly understood, is a tool for developing the intellectual character of students. It motivates agents towards the truth and helps them to develop the cognitive skills to gain knowledge of the truth. We further elucidate this proposal by comparing the Socratic Method, so understood, with the widely held contemporary view that the epistemic aim of education is the development of (...) the intellectual virtues. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to present and discuss a novel understanding of the nature of epistemic vice. I highlight that epistemic vice such as excessive curiosity, gossip and excessive inquisitiveness do not obstruct the acquisition, transmission and retention of knowledge and are not characterized by a deficiency of epistemic desires or vicious epistemic motivations. However, I argue that such traits ought to be classified as epistemic vices because the agent who possesses them causes epistemic harm to other agents (...) through those traits’ characteristic activities.To remedy obstructivism’s inability to account for vices that cause epistemic harm in other ways besides blocking effective epistemic inquiry, I propose an amended version of this theory. I argue that epistemic vices are character traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking that obstruct the acquisition, transmission, and retention of knowledge and/or cause other kinds of epistemic harm. In addition, I propose a modified version of motivationalism that cashes out non-obstructing, excess-motivation vices in terms of motivation simply by acknowledging, and incorporating into theory, excessive epistemic drives and the negative epistemic consequences stemming from them. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Despite the recent growth of studies in virtue epistemology, the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness has been overlooked by scholars working in virtue theory. This is a significant gap in the literature given the import of well-motivated and skillful epistemic collaboration for the flourishing of human societies. This paper engages in an in-depth examination of the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness. It argues that the agent who possesses this acquired character trait is highly motivated to engage in epistemic collaboration, competent (...) at the characteristic activity of epistemic collaborativeness and has good judgement as to when and with whom it is epistemically appropriate to engage in epistemic collaboration. Furthermore, this paper discusses the place of epistemic collaborativeness among the virtues and argues that it is an overarching virtue—i.e. it presupposes certain other intellectual virtues although it remains distinguishable from them. Theoretical and practical merits of this virtue are also presented and considered. The virtue of collaborativeness highlights the social dimension of intellectual virtues and could be of significant value for contemporary virtue-based approaches to education. (shrink)

ABSTRACT My aim in this paper is to challenge the neo-Aristotelian tradition, currently dominant in contemporary theories of virtue education, by proposing the Platonic pedagogical methodology for virtue cultivation as a worthy alternative to the Aristotelian theory of education. I highlight that, in contrast to Aristotle’s limited remarks concerning virtue education, Plato conceptualizes and develops a rigorous educational theory in the Republic that considers many different facets of education – i.e. moral character education, intellectual character education, exemplarism and educational corruption. (...) Given Plato’s immense contribution to virtue education theory, I conclude that his educational program merits more attention. It can serve as inspiration both for improving existing theories of character education and for developing new ones. (shrink)

My main aim in my thesis is to show that, contrary to the commonly held belief according to which Aristotle was the first to conceive and develop intellectual virtues, there are strong indications that Plato had already conceived and had begun developing the concept of intellectual virtues. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the importance of Aristotle’s work on intellectual virtues. Aristotle developed a much fuller account of both, the concept of ‘virtue’ and the concept of ‘intellect’, metaphysically, epistemologically and psychologically. (...) Still, the first conception of intellectual virtues is to be found in the Platonic corpus. Such a realization is not only of historic interest, but most importantly, as I am going to show, the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues could prove promising in contemporary debates on virtue epistemology theories and in virtue-based approaches to education. Plato’s discussion of rational desires is the strongest indication of the presence of the concept of intellectual virtues in Platonic dialogues. Rational desires are constitutive of intellectual virtues: desires are dispositional; rational desires are dispositions to pursue rational goods. Intellectual virtues are such dispositions. Additionally, there is further evidence that Plato had conceived of intellectual virtues. His rigorous educational program in the Republic aims at the development of rational desires, while in the Symposium he discusses the intense rational desire to know the Good. Nevertheless, in order to be intellectually virtuous, one must not only have a desire for knowledge; one must also be systematically and reliably successful in achieving the end of their rational desires. I will show that the success component of Plato’s intellectual virtues can be found in his dialectic method. Plato’s dialectic is both a virtue developer and a reliable method used by philosophers in order to reach the objects of their rational desires. I will argue that episteme is one of Plato’s primary intellectual virtues. Towards this end, I will invoke Pritchard’s recent argument according to which understanding, which is distinct from knowledge, is a form of cognitive achievement and therefore what is finally valuable. I will argue, based on textual evidence from the middle Platonic dialogues and recent discussions in the exegetical literature, that Plato’s episteme, although commonly translated as knowledge, is closer to Pritchard’s conception of understanding. I will also show that Plato’s episteme, similarly to Pritchard’s conception of understanding, is a cognitive achievement that cannot be attained by luck or testimony. The Platonic conception of intellectual virtues has something unique to offer to contemporary virtue epistemology. Plato, unlike Aristotle, does not differentiate between theoretical and practical wisdom. A wise agent, according to Plato, is wise in both practical and theoretical matters. Moreover, Plato, unlike Aristotle does not make a sharp distinction between moral and intellectual virtues. Therefore, the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues, in comparison to the Aristotelian, offers a more suitable starting point for scholars who want to argue that intellectual virtues are but a subpart of moral. Furthermore, I will argue that the Platonic conception of intellectual virtues is also of significant merit for virtue-based approaches to education. Plato questioned whether we can attain knowledge but nevertheless went on to develop his Socratically inspired theory of education according to which we can teach learning without knowing. Socrates proclaimed his ignorance numerous times; nevertheless, he went on to educate the youth of Athens. This is what I will suggest that Plato’s notion of intellectual virtues can contribute to theories of education: we should teach children not by transferring knowledge to them directly but by building dispositions into them to seek and acquire the truth. I will argue that although somewhat ignored by contemporary scholars, Plato’s theory of education has much to teach us about epistemic character education today. The Platonic educational program does not advocate the direct transmission of knowledge from the teacher to the student but rather focuses on building the learners’ epistemic dispositions. Building upon the Socratic method, Plato’s educational program does not “spoon-feed” knowledge to the learners but rather fosters the growth of intellectual virtues through problem-solving. The Platonic decades long educational regime aims at training Philosopher-Kings in three types of virtue: Moral Virtue; the Cognitive Virtue ofion; the Cognitive Virtue of Debate. I will explain ways in which fostering intellectual virtues through problem-solving could be applied in classrooms today and I will argue that Plato’s rigorous education program is of definite merit for contemporary theories of education, especially given the fact that scholars in the field are looking for alternatives to the traditional methods of teaching. I will also dedicate a section to showing that Socrates was not a moral philosopher but rather an epistemic character builder. Socrates trained his students/interlocutors in desiring the truth without offering them any knowledge-education. I will also briefly highlight some of the most significant differences between the Platonic educational program, as described in the Republic, and the Socratic educational method. I will also discuss, before concluding my thesis, two different accounts of educational failure as presented by Plato in the Republic. The first one is the individuals employing the eristic method and the second is the individuals who correspond to the four imperfect societies. I will argue that these two accounts can inform our understanding of what should be avoided when educating for epistemic virtue nowadays. (shrink)

In the current literature, institutional adoption of Corporate Social Responsibility governance standards is mainly understood in a binary sense, and existing research has hitherto focused on inducements as well as on barriers of related organizational change. However, little is known about often invisible internal adoption patterns relating to institutional entrepreneurship in the field of CSR. At the same time, additional information about these processes is relevant in order to systematically assess the outcomes of institutional entrepreneurship and to differentiate between substantive (...) versus symbolic implementation. In this paper, we contribute a comparative intraorganizational differentiation of institutional adoption processes in the field of CSR, and we distinguish between broad and narrow organizational institutional adoption across different management functions relating to institutions of a similar type. Our study is based on a quantitative survey among members of the United Nations Global Compact Network Germany, as well as on qualitative interviews. We analyze different institutional adoption patterns and derive ten theoretical predictors of diverse institutional adoption choices and thereby inform the literatures on institutional entrepreneurship, CSR governance, and Multi-Stakeholder Initiatives. Besides our theoretical contributions, our findings serve as a source of information for practitioners engaged in CSR governance as they provide new insights into the managerial perception and assessment of different CSR standards and initiatives. (shrink)

The authors present their experience and practices of introducing cloud services, as a means to simplify the adoption of ICT in education, using Free/Open Source Software. The solution creates a hybrid cloud infrastructure, in order to provide a pre-installed virtual machine, acting as a server inside the school, providing desktop environment based on the Software as a Service cloud model, where legacy PCs act as stateless devices. Classroom management is accomplished using the application “Epoptes.” To minimize administration tasks, educational software (...) is provided accordingly, either on-line or through repositories to automate software installation. The advantages of the hybrid cloud implementation, include services that are not completely dependent on broadband connections’ state, minimal cost, reusability of obsolete equipment, ease of administration, centralized management, patches and educational software provisioning and, above all, facilitation of the educational procedure. (shrink)

In this article, I consider Alkis Kontos’ and Allan Bäck’s critiques to Suits that his theory of games and good living lack ontological grounds or rests on the wrong foundations. Taking these criti...