Recruiting research participants based on genetic information generated about them in a prior study is a potentially powerful way to study the functional significance of human genetic variation, but it also presents ethical challenges. To inform policy development on this issue, we conducted a survey of U.S. institutional review board chairs concerning the acceptability of recontacting genetic research participants about additional research and their views on the disclosure of individual genetic results as part of recruitment. Our findings suggest there is (...) unlikely to be a “one-size-fits-all” solution, but rather several ethically acceptable approaches to genotype-driven recruitment, depending on context. Disclosures made during the consent process for the original study and the clinical validity of the results are key considerations. Researchers must be prepared to communicate and answer questions in clear lay language about what is known and not known regarding the role of genetics in their proposed area of research. (shrink)

To realize a successful and collaborative interaction between human and robots remains a big challenge. Emotional reactions of the user provide crucial information for a successful interaction. These reactions carry key factors to prevent errors and fatal bidirectional misunderstanding. In cases where human–machine interaction does not proceed as expected, negative emotions, like frustration, can arise. Therefore, it is important to identify frustration in a human–machine interaction and to investigate its impact on other influencing factors such as dominance, sense of control (...) and task performance. This paper presents a study that investigates a close cooperative work situation between human and robot, and explore the influence frustration has on the interaction. The task for the participants was to hand over colored balls to two different robot systems. The robot systems had to throw the balls into appropriate baskets. The coordination between human and robot was controlled by various gestures and words by means of trial and error. Participants were divided into two groups, a frustration- and a no frustration- group. Frustration was induced by the behavior of the robotic systems which made errors during the ball handover. Subjective and objective methods were used. The sample size of participants was N = 30 and the study was conducted in a between-subject design. Results show clear differences in perceived frustration in the two condition groups and different behavioral interactions were shown by the participants. Furthermore, frustration has a negative influence on interaction factors such as dominance and sense of control. The study provides important information concerning the influence of frustration on human–robot interaction for the requirements of a successful, natural, and social HRI. The results are discussed in favor of how a successful und effortless interaction between human and robot can be realized and what relevant factors, like appearance of the robot and influence of frustration on sense of control, have to be regarded. (shrink)

The paper considers the notion of Science Policy from a postcolonial perspective. It examines the theoretical implications of the recent trend to include emerging and developing countries in international Science Policies by way of the case study of Switzerland. This country’s new international science policy instruments and measures have challenged the classical distinction between international scientific cooperation and development cooperation, with consequences on standards and evaluation criteria. The analysis reveals that the underlying assumptions of the concept of Science Policy perpetuate (...) traditional asymmetries in the global political economy of science. The paper suggests that the present legacy of Science Policy institutions and practices needs to be transformed to reflect an increasingly diverse spectrum of scientific purposes and traditions. It offers a revised set of foundational assumptions on Science Policy and, more broadly, proposes a fresh point of entry for the field of Science & Technology Studies to contribute to the Science Policy discourse. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new approach to Augustine’s illumination theory, understanding illumination as resulting from an act of the human being as much as from an action of God. Regardless of God’s ever present light, the human intellect is not constantly and indiscriminately illuminated. In order to explain how the human intellect attains knowledge to different degrees, and how it can resist the divine light without being actually able to deny it, I will make use of two concepts Augustine himself (...) did not employ : the first one is relationship, the second, referring to God, is being-for-others. As being-for-others, God gives the human being not the gift of knowledge, but that of the relationship with Him (as Truth and Wisdom), by means of which the human being can attain knowledge. By placing Himself in relationship with the human being, God grants it the freedom and power to cooperate in divine actions : re-creation after the fall (formatio), illumination and salvation. If passive, the human intellect does not receive knowledge, it is only in its turning towards the ever present light of Truth that it sees the intelligible truths in the divine light, and it is able to do so to the extent of one’s good will, or one’s love (caritas). Augustine sees illumination as a joint action of God and human being, depending on human being no less than on God. The concept of relationship and the understanding of God as being-for-others explain why no illumination will take place without the active role of the human intellect, why the divine light is not coercive, and why Augustine considers the necessity of both human freedom and God’s power in the act of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new approach to Augustine’s illumination theory, understanding illumination as resulting from an act of the human being as much as from an action of God. Regardless of God’s ever present light, the human intellect is not constantly and indiscriminately illuminated. In order to explain how the human intellect attains knowledge to different degrees, and how it can resist the divine light without being actually able to deny it, I will make use of two concepts Augustine himself (...) did not employ : the first one is relationship, the second, referring to God, is being-for-others. As being-for-others, God gives the human being not the gift of knowledge, but that of the relationship with Him (as Truth and Wisdom), by means of which the human being can attain knowledge. By placing Himself in relationship with the human being, God grants it the freedom and power to cooperate in divine actions : re-creation after the fall (formatio), illumination and salvation. If passive, the human intellect does not receive knowledge, it is only in its turning towards the ever present light of Truth that it sees the intelligible truths in the divine light, and it is able to do so to the extent of one’s good will, or one’s love (caritas). Augustine sees illumination as a joint action of God and human being, depending on human being no less than on God. The concept of relationship and the understanding of God as being-for-others explain why no illumination will take place without the active role of the human intellect, why the divine light is not coercive, and why Augustine considers the necessity of both human freedom and God’s power in the act of knowledge. (shrink)

This paper proposes a new approach to Augustine’s illumination theory, understanding illumination as resulting from an act of the human being as much as from an action of God. Regardless of God’s ever present light, the human intellect is not constantly and indiscriminately illuminated. In order to explain how the human intellect attains knowledge to different degrees, and how it can resist the divine light without being actually able to deny it, I will make use of two concepts Augustine himself (...) did not employ : the first one is relationship, the second, referring to God, is being-for-others. As being-for-others, God gives the human being not the gift of knowledge, but that of the relationship with Him , by means of which the human being can attain knowledge. By placing Himself in relationship with the human being, God grants it the freedom and power to cooperate in divine actions : re-creation after the fall , illumination and salvation. If passive, the human intellect does not receive knowledge, it is only in its turning towards the ever present light of Truth that it sees the intelligible truths in the divine light, and it is able to do so to the extent of one’s good will, or one’s love . Augustine sees illumination as a joint action of God and human being, depending on human being no less than on God. The concept of relationship and the understanding of God as being-for-others explain why no illumination will take place without the active role of the human intellect, why the divine light is not coercive, and why Augustine considers the necessity of both human freedom and God’s power in the act of knowledge. (shrink)

Is there any reason to advocate for a new momentum in the “practice turn”? This article argues that the practice turn, already much inspired by pragmatist philosophers, namely Dewey and Mead, could be enhanced by drawing even more upon pragmatism. We begin with the view that focal cooperation activities have been an overriding concern among interactionist scholars. We contend this framework can be broadened by following Dewey’s proposal to shift in vision from interaction to transaction. It helps indeed taking into (...) consideration a wide range of neglected but common situations, joint actions, and temporal processes. In particular, we show how the transactional view can foster the understanding both of the most intimate at work – its ethicizing, its moral network and personal styles –, and of the most public at work – its public images and public perspectives. We end up considering the significance of these moves to explore today’s work dramas and to meet the need to renew our images of work. (shrink)

Drug discovery traditionally has occurred behind closed doors in for-profit corporations hoping to develop best-selling medicines that recoup initial research investment, sustain marketing infrastructures, and pass on healthy returns to shareholders. Only corporate Pharma has the man- and purchasing-power to synthesize the thousands of molecules needed to find a new drug and to conduct the clinical trials that will make the drug legal. Against this view, individual physician-scientists have suggested that the promise of applied genomics work calls for a new (...) form of social organization in order to speed the generation and understanding of new therapeutics. Recent successes in open source drug discovery show it is possible to produce valuable, empirically adequate, and sustainable collective beliefs without secrecy, proprietary attitudes, initial cooperation from Pharma, or outsized monetary incentives. After reviewing and differentiating these successes, I diagnose the source of this healthy new epistemic strategy. (shrink)

A review article of the books "Aristotle: Philosopher, Teacher, and Scientist" by Sharon Katz Cooper; and "Socrates: Ancient Greek in Search of Truth" by Pamela Dell.

A review article of the books "Aristotle: Philosopher, Teacher, and Scientist" by Sharon Katz Cooper; and "Socrates: Ancient Greek in Search of Truth" by Pamela Dell.

As a result of evolution, human babies are born with outstanding abilities for human communication and cooperation. The other side of the coin is their great sensitivity to any clear and durable violation in their relationship with caregivers. Infant sustained social withdrawal behavior was first described in infants who had been separated from their caregivers, as in Spitz's description of “hospitalism” and “anaclitic depression.” Later, ISSWB was pointed to as a major clinical psychological feature in failure-to-thrive infants. Fraiberg also described (...) freezing behavior as one of the earliest modes of infant defense in the face of adverse situations threatening the infant's ability to synchronize with caregivers. We hypothesize that ISSWB behaviors are associated with poor vagal brake functioning and that an impaired social engagement system is induced by an impoverished and/or dangerous environment. Recent research using animal models highlight the neurobiology and the genetics of the social Approach/Withdrawal Behavior in infants. The present paper is therefore a plea for social withdrawal behavior to be attributed a more important role as a major psychological defensive mechanism in infancy, and for research into early development and early intervention to make more practical and theoretical use of this concept, thus decreasing the challenge of translation in social neurosciences. This work presents several situations involving developmental hazards in which assessment of ISSWB by means of the Alarm Distress Baby Scale has proven useful, i.e., malnutrition, effects of major maternal depression and or traumatization, assessing social withdrawal in infants with an chronic organic illness or assessing ISSWB in out of home placed infants during parental visitation. Relationships between ISSWB and other biophysiological behavioral systems are discussed, particularly links with attachment processes and Porges's polyvagal theory. (shrink)

In metaethics, empirical approaches are not just complementary to, but continuous with, traditional approaches to the subject. This chapter addresses traditional and empirical approaches to metaethics. It discusses how empirical approaches have been brought to bear on some central metaethical questions. The chapter illustrates not just the diversity of topics within metaethics itself but also the diversity of empirical methods and approaches that philosophers and psychologists working on these topics are using. The debate between internalists and externalists is a debate (...) concerning the psychology of moral judgment, but also a debate about our concept of moral judgment. As such, it has implications for other metaethical debates. Antirealists such as relativists and noncognitivists often defend internalism, and argue that their views are best equipped to explain the link between moral judgment and motivation. (shrink)

Les approches classiques de l'engagement se sont principalement intéressées à ses déterminants, rapportés à des variables sociodémographiques, des dispositions, des vertus ou des rétributions, comme à autant de motifs déjà constitués en amont et extrinsèques à l'expérience de l'engagement. Or, les intérêts des personnes - et leur puissance d'agir elle-même - peuvent s'analyser comme des produits de l'engagement, pour peu qu'on le saisisse dans sa dimension temporelle, itérative et située. Envisagé comme expérience, il paraît indissociable d'une enquête menée à la (...) fois sur soi et sur le monde, où les personnes interrogent autant leurs propres désirs et possibilités d'agir, que la vie commune qu'elles souhaitent cultiver ou voir advenir. Ce volume rassemble une série de contributions théoriques et empiriques qui explorent des façons d'articuler souci de soi et souci du monde. Elles documentent la façon dont les engagements circulent entre différentes sphères de la vie et entre moments biographiques, en suivant les formes d'expérimentation auxquelles ils donnent lieu. Notre compréhension du rapport au politique s'en trouve enrichie, ressaisie depuis la trame des expériences de la vie commune faites en personne"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

In April 2017, scientists took to the streets in a historically unprecedented Global March for Science. The event was seen as symbolic of a crisis in the relationship of science and society. This book considers the Global March for Science from a postcolonial perspective to inquire into the toolkit that the academic field of Science & Technology Studies (STS) has to offer. It argues that new concepts and analytical approaches are necessary to investigate current global dynamics in science, technology and (...) society, so as to deliver insights that the recent expansion of STS scholars beyond Western Europe and North America alone is unlikely to provide. The book presents a Programme in Science Studies Elsewhere (SSE) to demonstrate the urgent need to carry postcolonial issues right into the centre of STS's intellectual programme. (shrink)

On range généralement la pensée de Malebranche parmi celles qui incarnent ce moment de l'histoire de la philosophie qu'on nomme "rationalisme". En prenant son départ dans l'interprétation que Schelling a produite de la "Vision en Dieu", cet ouvrage se propose de l'aborder plutôt comme un idéalisme issu du dogmatisme et enclin à suspendre l'existence des corps : pour avoir élargi le cercle de la pensée humaine aux dimensions du cercle de l'idée divine, Malebranche ferait dépendre la perception sensible de l'action (...) de Dieu seul, anticipant par-là la pensée de Berkeley. Sans doute une telle lecture dépend-elle de la manière dont Schelling a lui-même renouvelé l'idéalisme ; sans doute est-elle aussi tributaire d'une certaine réception de Malebranche. Pour autant, du point de vue qui fut celui de Malebranche, elle mérite qu'on la mette à l'épreuve de ses textes et de ses intentions. Aussi, après avoir montré comment Schelling se place devant Malebranche, on le fait comparaître devant ce que Malebranche pourrait lui opposer. Il apparaît alors que ce dernier s'attache à desserrer l'étreinte que le cercle de l'idée exerce sur son système : en faisant le pari de prouver l'existence d'un monde résolument distinct du monde intelligible, Malebranche oeuvre en effet pour un idéalisme ouvert au réalisme sans jamais renoncer à la "Vision en Dieu"."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Au tournant des années 1820-1830, Schelling découvre au sein de la philosophie deux grandes tendances à l'oeuvre : une tendance "négative" à rendre intelligible le réel en fonction de la nécessité des lois de la pensée, une tendance "positive" à y voir au contraire le fait d'un acte libre. Scrutant cette différence, il finit par montrer qu'elle implique de scinder la philosophie même en une philosophie qui fait intervenir uniquement la raison et une philosophie où la raison se laisse instruire (...) par l'expérience. Le présent livre propose une interprétation nouvelle de ce moment crucial mais méconnu de la pensée moderne où Schelling accomplit, tout en le dépassant, l'idéalisme allemand. On y montre qu'il suspend l'avenir de la raison à un dédoublement de la philosophie qui implique de confier la réalisation des deux philosophies à un rationalisme et à un empirisme totalement inédits. Dans le rationalisme, la raison opère seule jusqu'à produire l'idée d'un principe absolu libre de poser le monde ; dans l'empirisme, elle prouve l'existence du principe par ses oeuvres effectives que sont successivement les faits de la nature et ceux de la conscience comme conscience religieuse. Ainsi, loin de produire le désespoir de la raison, Schelling montre au contraire que la raison se donne à elle-même un avenir en se différenciant. (shrink)

"L'idée de cet ouvrage prend sa source dans un texte du tout dernier Schelling, extrait de l'Exposé de la philosophie rationnelle pure, professé à Berlin dans les années 1847-1852 et publié ensuite par le fils de Schelling dans un ensemble plus vaste, l'Introduction à la Philosophie de la mythologie."--Prologue, p. [7].

The chapter challenges hyperbolic claims about the centrality of appreciation of beauty to Buddhism. Within the texts, attitudes are more mixed, except for a form of 'inner beauty' - the beauty found in the expression of virtues or wisdom in forms of bodily comportment. Inner beauty is a stable presence throughout Buddhist history, practices, and art.

Arts-Based Thought Experiments is a highly visual offering that engages visual arts, photography, poetry, creative non-fiction, memoir and speculative fiction. In this novel book, the authors lean deeply into concepts of the imaginary, and through artful experiments with thought, trouble the tensions between the human, the posthuman and the more than human. In the Anthropocene, with its intractable challenges and cataclysms, engaging posthuman positions when thinking of learning in socioecological terms is paramount to human survival. In this sense, the arts (...) offer creative and critical thought for the possibilities of a post-Anthropocene earth. Contributors are: Raoul Adam, Marilyn Ahearn, William Boyd, Euan Boyd, Adrienne Brown, Shae L. Brown, Teresa Carapeto, Philemon Chigeza, Amy Cutter-Mackenzie-Knowles, David Ellis, Katie Hotko, Marianne Logan, Ferdousi Khatun, Alexandra Lasczik, Yaw Ofosu-Asare, Maia Osborn, Marie-Laurence Paquette, Jemma Peisker, Ziah Peisker, Adrienne Piscopo, David Rousell, Benjamin Ryan, Billy Ryan, Lisa Siegal, Helen Widdop Quinton, Thilinika Wijesinghe and Tracy Young. (shrink)

The article argues that there are different ways of justifying suspension of judgement. We suspend judgement not only privatively, that is, because we lack evidence, but also positively, that is, because there is evidence that provides reasons for suspending judgement: suspension is more than the rational fallback position in cases of insufficient evidence. The article applies the distinction to recent discussions about the role of suspension for inquiry, Turri's puzzle about withholding, and formal representations of suspension.

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

It is uncontroversial that something goes wrong with the blaming practices of hypocrites. However, it is more difficult to pinpoint exactly what is objectionable about their blaming practices. I contend that, just as epistemologists have recently done with blame, we can constructively treat hypocrisy as admitting of an epistemic species. This paper has two objectives: first, to identify the epistemic fault in epistemically hypocritical blame, and second, to explain why epistemically hypocritical blamers lose their standing to epistemically blame. I tackle (...) the first problem by appealing to an epistemic norm of consistency. I address the second by arguing that the epistemically hypocritical blamer commits to an opting-out of the set of shared epistemic standards that importantly underlies our standing to epistemically blame. I argue further that being epistemically hypocritical undermines a blamer’s standing even to judge epistemically blameworthy. (shrink)

Is there anything wrong with publishing philosophical work which one does not believe (publishing without belief, henceforth referred to as ‘PWB’)? I argue that there is not: the practice isn’t intrinsically wrong, nor is there a compelling consequentialist argument against it. Therefore, the philosophical community should neither proscribe nor sanction it. The paper proceeds as follows. First, I’ll clarify and motivate the problem, using both hypothetical examples and a recent real-world case. Next, I’ll look at arguments that there is something (...) wrong with PWB, and show that none is sound. Then, I’ll give some reasons for thinking a norm against PWB is detrimental to the profession. Do I believe these arguments? If I’m right, it shouldn’t matter. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...) all existing varieties. We argue that we must classify emotions according to four developmental stages: 1. pre-emotions as unfocussed expressive emotion states, 2. basic emotions, 3. primary cognitive emotions, and 4. secondary cognitive emotions. We suggest four types of basic emotions (fear, anger, joy and sadness) which are systematically differentiated into a diversity of more complex emotions during emotional development. The classification distinguishes between basic and non-basic emotions and our multi-factorial account considers cognitive, experiential, physiological and behavioral parameters as relevant for constituting an emotion. However, each emotion type is constituted by a typical pattern according to which some features may be more significant than others. Emotions differ strongly where these patterns of features are concerned, while their essential functional roles are the same. We argue that emotions form a unified ontological category that is coherent and can be well defined by their characteristic functional roles. Our account of emotions is supported by data from developmental psychology, neurobiology, evolutionary biology and sociology. (shrink)

Recent empirical studies have established that disgust plays a role in moral judgment. The normative significance of this discovery remains an object of philosophical contention, however; ‘disgust skeptics’ such as Martha Nussbaum have argued that disgust is a distorting influence on moral judgment and has no legitimate role to play in assessments of moral wrongness. I argue, pace Nussbaum, that disgust’s role in the moral domain parallels its role in the physical domain. Just as physical disgust tracks physical contamination and (...) pollution, so moral disgust tracks social contamination. I begin by examining the arguments for skepticism about disgust and show that these arguments threaten to overgeneralize and lead to a widespread skepticism about the justifiability of our moral judgments. I then look at the positive arguments for according disgust a role in moral judgment, and suggest that disgust tracks invisible social contagions in much the same way as it tracks invisible physical contagions, thereby serving as a defense against the threat of socio-moral contamination. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an account of the wrong that is done to women when everyday people fail to believe allegations of sexual assault made by women. I argue that an everyday person wrongs both the accuser and women causally distant from the accuser when they fail to believe the accuser’s allegation. First, I argue that there are responses that we, as everyday members of society, owe to victims of sexual assault. A condition enabling everyday people to respond in (...) the way owed to victims is that they have an outright belief that the accuser was assaulted. Actively suspending judgement about whether a crime occurred is in tension with the ability to respond to the victim in a way that supports and validates them. When an everyday person fails to have an outright belief in the truth of an allegation, they wrong the accuser because they risk failing to satisfy the conditions enabling them to fulfill their obligation to her. Second, I argue that everyday people wrong women who are causally distant from the accuser because in our social context, women are often treated in particular ways – especially in the sexual domain – because they are women. As a result, when women hear that an everyday person fails to believe a particular allegation, they easily project themselves into the accuser’s position and reasonably worry that if they were to be assaulted, they too would be met with doubt and disbelief by the people in their community. (shrink)

Previous research suggested a role of gaze in preference formation, not merely as an expression of preference, but also as a causal influence. According to the gaze cascade hypothesis, the longer subjects look at an item, the more likely they are to develop a preference for it. However, to date the connection between viewing and liking has been investigated predominately with self-paced viewing conditions in which the subjects were required to select certain items from simultaneously presented stimuli on the basis (...) of perceived visual attractiveness. Such conditions might promote a default, but non-mandatory connection between viewing and liking. To explore whether the connection is separable, we examined the evaluative processing of single naturalistic food images in a 2 x 2 design, conducted completely within subjects, in which we varied both the type of exposure (self-paced versus time-controlled) and the type of evaluation (non-exclusive versus exclusive). In the self-paced exclusive evaluation, longer viewing was associated with a higher likelihood of a positive evaluation. However, in the self-paced non-exclusive evaluation, the trend reversed such that longer viewing durations were associated with lesser ratings. Furthermore, in the time-controlled tasks, both with non-exclusive and exclusive evaluation, there was no significant relationship between the viewing duration and the evaluation. The overall pattern of results was consistent for viewing times measured in terms of exposure duration (i.e., the duration of stimulus presentation on the screen) and in terms of actual gaze duration (i.e., the amount of time the subject effectively gazed at the stimulus on the screen). The data indicated that viewing does not intrinsically lead to a higher evaluation when evaluating single food images; instead, the relationship between viewing duration and evaluation depends on the type of task. We suggest that self-determination of exposure duration may be a prerequisite for any influence from viewing time on evaluative processing, regardless of whether the influence is facilitative. Moreover, the purported facilitative link between viewing and liking appears to be limited to exclusive evaluation, when only a restricted number of items can be included in a chosen set. (shrink)

Empirical studies indicate that business compliance with the UK Modern Slavery Act is disappointing, but they struggle to make sense of this phenomenon. This article offers a novel framework to understand how business organizations construct the meaning of compliance with the UK Modern Slavery Act. Our analysis builds on the endogeneity of law theory developed by Edelman. Empirically, our study is based on the analysis of the modern slavery statements of 10 FTSE 100 (Financial Times Stock Exchange 100 Index) companies (...) in the food and tobacco sector, backed by interviews with business, civil society, and public officers. We offer a dynamic model that draws attention to the role of compliance professionals in framing ambiguous rules and devising a variety of organizational responses to modern slavery law. Contrary to extant research that tends to praise organizations for going “beyond compliance”, our study underlines the risks of managerialization of modern slavery law, whereby merely symbolic structures come to be associated with legal compliance, even when they are ineffective at tackling modern slavery. (shrink)

_Philosophy: The Classic Readings_ provides a comprehensive, single-volume collection of the greatest works of philosophy from ancient to modern times. Draws on both Eastern and Western philosophical traditions Arranged chronologically within parts on Ethics, Epistemology, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Religion, and Political Philosophy Features original readings from more than a hundred of the world's great philosophers - from Lao Tzu, Confucius, the Buddha, Plato, Śamkara, Aquinas, al-Ghazāli, Kant, and Kierkegaard, to Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Sartre, Arendt, and Quine and many others Provides an (...) extensive Timeline of Philosophy for situating historical figures and lines of thought. (shrink)

This paper offers a defense of ‘publishing without belief’ (PWB) – the view that authors are not required to believe what they publish. I address objections to the view ranging from outright denial and advocacy of a belief norm for publication, to a modified version that allows for some cases of PWB but not others. I reject these modifications. In doing so, I offer both an alternative story about the motivations for PWB and a diagnosis of the disagreement over its (...) permissibility. The original defense focused on consequentialist reasons for allowing PWB, offering mostly defensive arguments against potential criticisms. But I argue that once we shift our focus to the reasons why authors might be prone to PWB, we see a difference in two types of motivation: whereas I imagine PWB as arising from underconfident agents, critics point to cagey or nefarious authorial practices, or authors’ failure to clarify their own degrees of belief. Underlying the debate over norms of philosophical publishing, we find two different conceptions of philosophy itself. (shrink)

The philosophical debate over disgust and its role in moral discourse has focused on disgust’s epistemic status: can disgust justify judgments of moral wrongness? Or is it misplaced in the moral domain—irrelevant at best, positively distorting at worst? Correspondingly, empirical research into disgust has focused on its role as a cause or amplifier of moral judgment, seeking to establish how and when disgust either causes us to morally condemn actions, or strengthens our pre-existing tendencies to condemn certain actions. Both of (...) these approaches to disgust are based on a set of assumptions that I call, in what follows, the evidential model of disgust. This paper proposes an alternative model, which I call the response model. Instead of looking at disgust as a cause and justification of judgments of moral wrongness, I will argue that disgust is better understood as a response to wrongness. More precisely, I argue that disgust is a response to norm violations, and that it is a fitting response insofar as norm violations are potentially contagious and therefore pose a threat to the stability and maintenance of norms. (shrink)

Eighteenth-Century Stoic Poetics: Shaftesbury, Akenside, and the Discipline of the Imagination offers a fresh perspective on the eighteenth-century poetics of Lord Shaftesbury and Mark Akenside. This book traces the two authors' debt to Roman Stoic spiritual exercises and early modern conceptions of the care of the self, which informs their view of the poetic imagination as a bundle of techniques designed to manage impressions, cultivate right images in the mind and rectify judgement. Alexandra Bacalu traces the roots of this (...) articulation in early modern writings on the imagination, as well as in Restoration and Augustan debates on wit, exploring the fruitful tension between ideas of imaginative enthusiasm and imaginative regulation that it provokes. (shrink)

Tales of saints, whether told by their adherents or detractors, frequently featured the holy persons dealings with members of other religions or cultures, or the stories themselves were appropriated by different religious or cultural groups. As such narratives moved from one social, cultural, religious or chronological milieu to another, the representation and meaning of the given holy person and the manner of his/her dealing with the religious other also often changed. As basic storylines remained recognizable, the transformations of specific details (...) often provide important clues about shifts in attitudes over time and between communities. This volume provides a varied array of case studies of this process, ranging from early China to various Christian, Muslim and Jewish cultural contexts in the late antique, medieval and early modern periods. (shrink)