In this article, I explore how Schopenhauer's theory of aesthetic experience—independently of his theory of arts—accommodates the possibility of contemplation. The standard reading of his aesthetics is that contemplation becomes possible because of a certain “surplus” of intellect and facilitating external occasions. I argue, however, that the “essential imperfections” of intellect and Schopenhauer's overall metaphysics are inconsistent with the very idea of will‐less cognition and, hence, of a free intellect. An alternative explanation of contemplation better fits with Schopenhauer's philosophy overall (...) by stating that it is driven by the will itself. I analyze two approaches to elaborating such a theory. First, the “metaphysical” account, according to which the will as thing‐in‐itself brings forth the (surplus of) intellect needed for contemplation as a means of self‐cognition. Second, the “physiological” account, which presupposes a quasi‐evolutionary process that has aesthetic cognition as a byproduct of intellect. The two accounts complement each other and in tandem better explain the possibility of contemplation than postulating a will‐less intellect. (shrink)

Schopenhauer is widely held to accommodate no positive aesthetic pleasure. While this may be the case in his mature oeuvre overall, where he insists on the negative character of all gratification, I reconstruct two early accounts of such pleasure in his manuscripts, both of which are a direct result of Schopenhauer’s engagement with Kant’s first and third Critiques. To do so, I analyze his so-called metaphysics of the ‘better consciousness’ and his transition from it to the metaphysics of will (roughly (...) 1811–14). The first account turns out to be an almost literal adoption of Kant’s theory of aesthetic experience as revealing the supersensible character of nature and the cognizing subject. Likewise, Schopenhauer’s second account is a version of the CJ theory of the free interplay of cognitive faculties. These accounts have been underappreciated in Schopenhauer scholarship, but recognizing their importance for the development of his philosophy is essential for gaining a fuller picture of his aesthetics. (shrink)

The ‘Platonic Ideas’ in Schopenhauer’s metaphysics are appearances. On the other hand, as the immediate objecthood of the will, they are the essences of species and the only object of true aesthetic cognition, which leads beyond mere appearance. To explain this apparent incongruence, I offer an analysis of Schopenhauer’s early metaphysics, and its transformation into the metaphysics of will, fleshing out the several and divergent concepts of ‘idea’. Specifically, first, as part of his religious and neo-Platonic early philosophy; second, in (...) the context of his ‘true criticism’ in the spirit of Kantian transcendental philosophy; third, as identical to the thing in itself as part of the metaphysics of will, heavily influenced by Kant’s notion of ideas from CR and CJ. Explaining Schopenhauer’s mature notion of Platonic Ideas genetically as a set of homonymic notions helps us better explain its divergent meanings in WWR. (shrink)