In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Coherence of a Mind: John Locke and the Law of Nature*Alex Tucknessit is almost thirty years since John Dunn’s book, The Political Thought of John Locke, argued that a more coherent understanding of Locke was possible if his religious beliefs were taken to play a crucial role in his political theory.1 Since that time many scholars have expanded our historical knowledge of the role of religion in Locke’s (...) political thought.2 This article will not use a historical methodology, but will rather take the claim that religion is crucial to Locke’s thought as a starting point. When one combines this assumption with a careful reading of the Two Treatises of Government (Two Treatises), The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in Scripture (The Reasonableness), and the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Essay), significant progress in resolving many of the long-standing difficulties in Locke’s theory of natural law is possible.The difficulties are indeed serious. Prior to Locke there was a long standing theological debate about whether the laws of nature were binding because they were the command of God (voluntarism) or binding because of their intrinsic compatibility with reason (“rationalism” or “intellectualism”). There has been much dispute about whether Locke was consistently a voluntarist or not.3 Second, Locke argues in the Essay that the principles of morality are [End Page 73] capable of proof just like principles of geometry, yet Locke never produced a proof of the law of nature. In the Second Treatise the laws of nature are more asserted than defended, as if they were self-evident, yet in The Reasonableness Locke says that it is exceedingly difficult to discover the moral law through reason alone and says that no one has ever discovered the complete law of nature through unaided reason. It appears that Locke “… went on believing the arguments of the Second Treatise were plainly true even after he knew he could not properly ground them in natural law….”4Third, Straussians have been quick to point out that Locke adopted a hedonistic theory of human motivation and of good and evil, a position which seems to sit poorly with a Christian theory of natural law. Locke claimed that men5 were motivated to obey the law of nature by their perception of future pleasure or pain and that divine sanctions in the next life were necessary for the law of nature to be a proper law, yet later in life Locke admitted his inability to prove the existence of an afterlife.6 Fourth, the account of moral knowledge in the Essay seems to sit poorly with Locke’s account of natural law in the Two Treatises; his commitment in the latter to empiricism is questionable and the law of nature is presented with little argument as if it were obvious. Laslett has argued that the difficulties are so severe that Locke the philosopher of knowledge and Locke the political thinker should be kept very separate.7 This article will respond to each of these difficulties in order to show that Locke’s theory of natural law is more coherent than his critics have allowed.1. the ground of natural law: rationalism and voluntarismThe early Essays on the Law of Nature of Locke link morality to conformity with the rule of a superior; it is the will of God which provides the essential binding force of the law of nature. (ELN 183–185)8 In the Essay Concerning Human [End Page 74] Understanding, this theme continues. “I grant the existence of God, is so many ways manifest, and the Obedience we owe him, so congruous to the Light of Reason, that a great part of Mankind give Testimony to the Law of Nature”: But nonetheless many affirm these principles not “admitting the true ground of Morality; which can only be the Will and Law of a God, who sees Men in the dark, has in his Hand Rewards and Punishments, and Power enough to call to account the Proudest Offender” (Essay 1.3.6).There are, however, passages which seem to point to a more rationalist account of morality. When Locke writes in the Two Treatises that... (shrink)

Determining which moral principles should guide political action is a vexing question in political theory. This is especially true when faced with the "toleration paradox": believing that something is morally wrong but also believing that it is wrong to suppress it. In this book, Alex Tuckness argues that John Locke's potential contribution to this debate--what Tuckness terms the "legislative point of view"--has long been obscured by overemphasis on his doctrine of consent. Building on a line of reasoning Locke made explicit (...) in his later writings on religious toleration, Tuckness explores the idea that we should act politically only on those moral principles that a reasonable legislator would endorse; someone, that is, who would avoid enacting measures that could be self-defeating when applied by fallible human beings.Tuckness argues that the legislative point of view has implications that go far beyond the question of religious toleration. Locke suggests an approach to political justification that is a provocative alternative to the utilitarian, contractualist, and perfectionist approaches dominating contemporary liberalism. The legislative point of view is relevant to our thinking about many types of disputed principles, Tuckness writes. He examines claims of moral wrong, invocations of the public good, and contested political roles with emphasis on the roles of legislators and judges. This book is must reading not only for students and scholars of Locke but all those interested in liberalism, toleration, and constitutional theory. (shrink)

The virtue of mercy is widely admired, but is now marginalized in contemporary public life. Yet for centuries it held a secure place in western public discourse without implying a necessary contradiction with justice. Alex Tuckness and John M. Parrish ask how and why this changed. Examining Christian and non-Christian ancient traditions, along with Kantian and utilitarian strains of thought, they offer a persuasive account of how our perception of mercy has been transformed by Enlightenment conceptions of impartiality and equality (...) that place justice and mercy in tension. Understanding the logic of this decline, they argue, will make it possible to promote and defend a more robust role for mercy in public life. Their study ranges from Homer to the late Enlightenment and from ancient tragedies to medieval theologies to contemporary philosophical texts, and will be valuable to readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

Debates over whether the discourse used to justify resistance during the American Revolution was "liberal" or "republican" often obscure the more central question of why and how early American thinkers were able to combine strands of political thought that many modern scholars find contradictory. The arguments the Americans used to justify resistance are better understood as falling into four types that were not understood to be mutually exclusive: Lockean, Biblical, legal/historical, and republican. Locke's ideas often provided an organizing framework within (...) which the other types of argument were used. (shrink)

When citizens and legislators attempt to justify coercive acts, such as fines or imprisonment, they often do so on the basis of controversial justificatory principles. There are at least two ways a principle can be controversial: one may claim that the principle in question is false; or one may claim that the principle, correctly applied, does not actually justify the specific act in question. Thus, suppose the state invokes the principle ‘false beliefs should be censored’ to justify silencing a dissident. (...) The dissident might disagree because she thinks the state should not be in the business of censoring false beliefs, or she might agree with the principle but object to the action because she is quite convinced that her beliefs are not false. (shrink)

John Locke figures prominently in accounts of the development of the principle of religious toleration in liberal societies. Locke's first published essays were on the subject of toleration, specifically on the question of whether the magistrate had the right to regulate the behavior of citizens in ecclesiastical matters about which the Bible does not directly speak, such as whether to use the book of common prayer, the proper physical position for taking communion, the wearing of surplices, and so on. In (...) the Two Tracts, Locke rejected the principal religious reason for religious persecution, that it might help lead people to the true religion. Locke shows a deep concern with the fallibility and partiality of human judgment and sees the magistrate's ability to settle inevitable controversies as crucial to maintaining order and peace. Locke's An Essay Concerning Toleration (ECT) represented the critical change in his practical attitudes toward toleration. (shrink)

'What would happen if everyone acted that way?' This question is often used in everyday moral assessments, but it has a paradoxical quality: it draws not only on Kantian ideas of a universal moral law but also on consequentialist claims that what is right depends on the outcome. In this book, Alex Tuckness examines how the question came to be seen as paradoxical, tracing its history from the theistic approaches of the seventeenth century to the secular accounts of the present. (...) Tuckness shows that the earlier interpretations were hybrid theories that included both consequentialist and non-consequentialist elements, and argues that contemporary uses of this approach will likewise need to combine consequentialist and non-consequentialist commitments. (shrink)

The virtue of mercy is widely admired, but is now marginalized in contemporary public life. Yet for centuries it held a secure place in western public discourse without implying a necessary contradiction with justice. Alex Tuckness and John M. Parrish ask how and why this changed. Examining Christian and non-Christian ancient traditions, along with Kantian and utilitarian strains of thought, they offer a persuasive account of how our perception of mercy has been transformed by Enlightenment conceptions of impartiality and equality (...) that place justice and mercy in tension. Understanding the logic of this decline, they argue, will make it possible to promote and defend a more robust role for mercy in public life. Their study ranges from Homer to the late Enlightenment and from ancient tragedies to medieval theologies to contemporary philosophical texts, and will be valuable to readers in political philosophy, political theory, and the philosophy of law. (shrink)

This is Political Philosophy is an accessible and well-balanced introduction to the main issues in political philosophy written by an author team from the fields of both philosophy and politics. This text connects issues at the core of political philosophy with current, live debates in policy, politics, and law and addresses different ideals of political organization, such as democracy, liberty, equality, justice, and happiness. Written with great clarity, This is Political Philosophy is accessible and engaging to those who have little (...) or no prior knowledge of political philosophy and is supported with supplemental pedagogical and instructor material on the This Is Philosophy series site. (shrink)

Toleration is one possible response to diversity, and it is a defining feature of contemporary liberal democracies. Still, why we should tolerate and what we should tolerate are persistent political questions. This dissertation explores the reasons why citizens should sometimes refrain from embodying in law moral beliefs that they hold to be true. It claims that a neglected aspect of John Locke's writings on religious toleration, the formal relationship between moral principles and law, can instruct political deliberation. Since this portion (...) of Locke's thought is deeply influenced by Christian natural law, the approach is analogical. Locke confronted some political problems analogous to our own and there are alternative secular justifications available for the intermediate principles he employed. These intermediate principles can provide meaningful guidance in contemporary disputes about law and morality. ;Chapter Two explores Locke's most important insight into the formal relationship between law and morality, concerns about the use of "non-neutral principles" in political argument. A non-neutral principle is one that contains the very term under dispute between two contending parties. Neglected arguments in Locke's Third Letter Concerning Toleration provide formal tests for differentiating between non-neutral principles that do and do not justify coercive law. The Lockean criteria assume a "juridical equality" between persons such that at the persons who disagree are moral equals under a common set of public, general, and reasonable rules that determine when they may and may not use force. ;This Lockean insight has broad implications both for political theory and Locke scholarship. Chapter Three explores the relationship between natural law, consent, and the public good and argues that Lockean criteria can help modern readers choose between competing conceptions of the public good. Chapter Four explores the tensions between the Lockean formal criteria and Locke's specific views about which groups the government should tolerate. Chapter Five shows how a Lockean theory can account for institutional reasons for toleration, instances where a person refrains from putting a stop to an action for lack of jurisdiction. Chapter Six shows how both substantive and institutional forms of toleration should guide interpreters of the United States Constitution. (shrink)