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  1.  23
    Communication, Leadership and Coordination Failure.Lu Dong, Maria Montero & Alex Possajennikov - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (4):557-584.
    We investigate the limits of communication and leadership in avoiding coordination failure in minimum effort games. Our environment is challenging, with low benefits of coordination relative to the effort cost. We consider two leader types: cheap-talk leader-communicators who suggest an effort level, and first-mover leaders who lead by example. Both types of leadership have some ability to increase effort in groups with no history, but are insufficient in groups with a history of low effort. Using the strategy method for followers’ (...)
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  2.  12
    Belief Formation in a Signaling Game Without Common Prior: An Experiment.Alex Possajennikov - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (3):483-505.
    Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders’ types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers’ strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is that (...)
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  3.  35
    Two-Speed Evolution of Strategies and Preferences In Symmetric Games.Alex Possajennikov - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (3):227-263.
    Agents in a large population are randomly matched to play a certain game, payoffs in which represent fitness. Agents may have preferences that are different from fitness. They learn strategies according to their preferences, and evolution changes the preference distribution in the population according to fitness. When agents know the preferences of the opponent in a match, only efficient symmetric strategy profiles of the fitness game can be stable. When agents do not know the preferences of the opponent, only Nash (...)
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