Pérez Carballo adopts an epistemic utility theory picture of epistemic norms where epistemic utility functions measure the value of degrees of belief, and rationality consists in maximizing expected epistemic utility. Within this framework he seeks to show that we can make sense of the intuitive idea that some true beliefs—say true beliefs about botany—are more valuable than other true beliefs—say true beliefs about the precise number of plants in North Dakota. To do so, however, Pérez Carballo argues that (...) we must think of the value of epistemic states as consisting in more than simply accuracy. This sheds light on which questions it is most epistemically valuable to pursue. (shrink)

How can expressivists make sense of the practice of communication? If communication is not a joint enterprise aimed at sharing information about the world, why do we engage in communication the way we do? Call this *the problem of communication*. Starting from basic assumptions about the rationality of speakers and the nature of assertion, we argue that speakers engaging in conversation about normative matters must presuppose that there is a unique normative standard on which the attitudes of conversational participants ought (...) to converge. This gives the beginning of a solution to the problem of communication on behalf of expressivists. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that metaethical expressivism requires taking on some substantive commitments in the theory of meaning. Those commitments, however, do not require abandoning orthodox views in compositional semantics. Instead, they should be understood as bearing on one aspect of the metasemantic project, viz. that of interpreting a compositional semantic theory---what I call 'semantic hermeneutics'. I spell out the nature of this project and distinguish it from that of explaining why words have the meanings that they do. I conclude (...) by outlining a hermeneutics for orthodox compositional semantics that does justice to the expressivist's distinctive views in the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

I develop a non-representationalist account of mathematical thought, on which the point of mathematical theorizing is to provide us with the conceptual capacity to structure and articulate information about the physical world in an epistemically useful way. On my view, accepting a mathematical theory is not a matter of having a belief about some subject matter; it is rather a matter of structuring logical space, in a sense to be made precise. This provides an elegant account of the cognitive utility (...) of mathematics. Further, it makes explicit how the brand of non-representationalism I develop is compatible with there being substantive rationality constraints on our mathematical theorizing. (shrink)

It seems natural to think of an unwilling addict as having a pattern of preferences that she does not endorse—preferences that, in some sense, she does not ‘identify’ with. Following Frankfurt (1971), Jeffrey (1974) proposed a way of modeling those features of an agent’s preferences by appealing to preferences among preferences.Th„e addict’s preferences are preferences she does not prefer to have. I argue that this modeling suggestion will not do, for it follows from plausible assumptions that a minimally rational agent (...) must prefer those first-order preferences she actually has. I close by considering two different but related ways to think about the initial phenomenon. (shrink)

Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...) on most plausible attempts at solving the problem of intentionality, ‘no’. (shrink)

Epistemic Utility Theory is often identified with the project of *axiology-first epistemology*—the project of vindicating norms of epistemic rationality purely in terms of epistemic value. One of the central goals of axiology-first epistemology is to provide a justification of the central norm of Bayesian epistemology, Probabilism. The first part of this paper presents a new challenge to axiology first epistemology: I argue that in order to justify Probabilism in purely axiological terms, proponents of axiology first epistemology need to justify a (...) claim about epistemic value—what I label ‘Downwards Propriety’—much stronger than any they have offered justification. The second part of this paper offers an argument that this challenge cannot be met: that there is no hope for providing a purely axiological justification of Downwards Propriety, at least given widely accepted assumptions about epistemic value. (shrink)

Epistemic rationality is typically taken to be immodest at least in this sense: a rational epistemic state should always take itself to be doing at least as well, epistemically and by its own light, than any alternative epistemic state. If epistemic states are probability functions and their alternatives are other probability functions defined over the same collection of proposition, we can capture the relevant sense of immodesty by claiming that epistemic utility functions are (strictly) proper. In this paper I examine (...) what happens if we allow for the alternatives to an epistemic state to include probability functions with different domains. I first prove an impossibility result: on minimal assumptions, I show that there is no way of vindicating strong immodesty principles to the effect that any probability function should take itself to be doing at least as well than any alternative probability function, regardless of its domain. I then consider alternative, weaker generalizations of the traditional immodesty principle and prove some characterization results for some classes of epistemic utility functions satisfying each of the relevant principles. (shrink)

On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in explanations (...) of things that cry out for explanation; that we evaluate not only ‘empirical' concepts, but also mathematical and perhaps moral concepts from an epistemic perspective; and that there is much more complexity to the concept/property relation than the natural thought seems to presuppose. These observations, it is argued, rule out giving a theory of conceptual evaluation that is a corollary of a metaphysical ranking of the relevant properties. -/- conceptual ethics, explanation, naturalness, epistemic value, concept/property, semantic internalism. (shrink)

Intellectual progress involves forming a more accurate picture of the world. But it also figuring out which concepts to use for theorizing about the world. Bayesian epistemology has had much to say about the former aspect of our cognitive lives, but little if at all about the latter. I outline a framework for formulating questions about conceptual change in a broadly Bayesian framework. By enriching the resources of Epistemic Utility Theory with a more expansive conception of epistemic value, I offer (...) a picture of our cognitive economy on which adopting new conceptual tools can sometimes be epistemically rational. (shrink)

Greco wants to understand the difference between knowledge generation and transmission. Doing so, he argues, will show that there are substantively different norms governing the two types of knowledge acquisition. I offer an alternative way of cashing out the difference between transmission and generation in non-normative terms.

Nuestro interés en el contenido mental no-conceptual es, principalmente, la articulación de una versión sustantiva (no-trivial) de esta clase de contenido en la experiencia perceptual. El debate acerca del contenido no-conceptual ha girado, en su mayor parte, alrededor de su existencia; y los argumentos que se han ofrecido en su favor abogan por una versión no sustantiva según la cual el contenido no-conceptual es aquel que no satisface ciertos requisitos conceptuales. Así, para desarrollar una versión sustantiva del contenido mental no-conceptual (...) hemos apelado a la versión de la experiencia perceptual de propiedades espaciales ofrecida por Evans (1982 cap. 6). A partir de esto desarrollamos un nuevo argumento a favor del contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia perceptual que lo vincula a la actividad característica de la experiencia perceptual. Por último, exponemos uno de los ataques de McDowell (1996) a la noción de contenido no-conceptual y presentamos nuestras réplicas a este ataque, mostrando su insuficiencia. Al mostrar que la crítica de McDowell no es exitosa, consideramos que podríamos tener una versión del contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia que es inmune a esta línea de argumentación. (shrink)

Tenemos aquí, un libro sobre Psicología Humanista y Transpersonal. Un libro que indaga e ilumina esta orientación psicológica en Chile. Su historia, sus protagonistas, sus historias, sus planteamientos y testimonios.Se trata de un libro. Hay todo un mundo escrito y descrito. Sin embargo, no es un libro para leer. Y esa es la paradoja de todo lo que está escrito en él. Es un libro para escuchar, para contemplar. Una larga y profunda conversación. Una experiencia acerca de las experiencias de (...) s.. (shrink)

As COVID-19 emerged as a phenomenon of the total environment, and despite the intertwined and complex relationships that make humanity an organic part of the Bio- and Geospheres, the majority of our responses to it have been corrective in character, with few or no consideration for unintended consequences which bring about further vulnerability to unanticipated global events. Tackling COVID-19 entails a systemic and precautionary approach to human-nature relations, which we frame as regaining diversity in the Geo-, Bio-, and Anthropospheres. Its (...) implementation requires nothing short of an overhaul in the way we interact with and build knowledge from natural and social environments. Hence, we discuss the urgency of shifting from current to precautionary approaches to COVID-19 and look, through the lens of diversity, at the anticipated benefits in four systems crucially affecting and affected by the pandemic: health, land, knowledge and innovation. Our reflections offer a glimpse of the sort of changes needed, from pursuing planetary health and creating more harmonious forms of land use to providing a multi-level platform for other ways of knowing/understanding and turning innovation into a source of global public goods. These exemplary initiatives introduce and solidify systemic thinking in policymaking and move priorities from reaction-based strategies to precautionary frameworks. (shrink)

El autor del presente libro, Alejandro Estrella González, es profesor en la Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana de México. El libro que reseñamos es fruto de su trabajo de investigación doctoral, trabajo que realizó en la Universidad de Cádiz. Desde su tesis hasta la publicación de este libro Alejandro Estrella se ha especializado en la temática de la historia intelectual.

Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross-cultural principles of law? In a between-subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also (...) whether there are any such laws. Confirming our preregistered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there are such laws. These results document cross-culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the concept of law which defy people's grasp of how legal systems function in practice. (shrink)

Economic theory has tended to reduce all social bonds and relations to forms of contract, whereas social theory has seen contracts as opposed to, and destructive of, genuine social bonds. Bruni sees these contrapositions as ideological (‘left’ against ‘right’, p. xi). His main goal is to overcome them; to show that three forms of reciprocity, covering the ideological spectrum from left to right, are complementary and simultaneously required in a healthy society. These three forms are, in his words: ‘(1) the (...) reciprocity of contract or ‘cautious’; (2) the reciprocity of friendship or philia and (3) the ‘unconditional’ reciprocity, the one more controversial . . .’ (p. x). (shrink)

Este artículo examina la concepción racionalde Hare sobre los juicios morales.Para ello, critica tajantemente la concepcióne mo t i v i s t a de l o s Po s i t i v i s t a s l ó g i c o s yde St e ve ns on. Tambi é n, s e di s t anc i a de lintuicionismo moral concebido por Moore ensus Principia Ethica de 1903. Para desarrollarel racionalismo moral parte del principio (...) queel lenguaje moral hace parte del lenguaje engeneral, del cual no puede ser desligado puescuando hacemos razonamientos morales estosse encuentran sometidos por las diferentesreglas de la lógica clásica. Por ello, Hare aplicala lógica clásica a su teoría de los imperativosy considera la ética como el estudio lógico dellenguaje moral.También se muestran las semej anzas y lasdiferencias entre la concepción de Austin y deHare, destacando la evolución del pensamientode este último filósofo. Cuando Hare escribiósu obra El Lenguaje de la Moral no estabai nf l uenci ado por l a t r i cot omí a de Aust i nsobre Los actos de habla como: Locucionarios,ilocucionarios y perlocucionarios. Influenciaq u e s e o b s e r v a e n e s c r i t o s p o s t e r i o r e s .Mi e nt r a s Ha r e ubi c a l os j ui c i os mor a l e sen l o l ocuci onari o, Austi n l os ubi ca en l oilocucionario; controversia que nos conducea r e f l e xi ona r s obr e l a i mpor t a nc i a de l apragmática en los juicios morales y a la vezsobre su racionalidad.I n t hi s pa pe r , I e xa mi ne Ha r e ’ s r a t i ona lconception on moral judgements. For this, hecriticizes sharply the emotivist conception ofLogical Positivists and of Stevenson. He alsoaparts himself from Moore’s moral intuitionism,as expounded in Principia Ethica. To developmoral rationalism, Hare starts from the principlethat moral language is apart of the generallanguage, from which it cannot be separatedsince when we do moral reasonings these areruled by the different rules of classical logic.For this reason, Hare applies classical logic tohis theory of imperatives and considers ethicsas the logical study of moral language.I also show the similarities and differencesbetween Austi n’ s and Hare’ s concepti ons,emphasizing the evolution of the thought of thelater. When Hare wrote The language of morals,he was not under the influence of Austin’stricotomic view of speech acts: locutionary,illocutionary and perlocutionary, influence thatwe can see in later works. While Hare locatesmoral judgments in the locutionary, Austin doesit in the illocutionary. This controversy leadsus to think on the importance of pragmatics inmoral judgements as well as on its rationality. (shrink)

The elastic and radiative π + p scattering are studied in the framework of an effective Lagrangian model for the Δ ++ resonance and its interactions. The finite width effects of this spin-3/2 resonance are introduced in the scattering amplitudes through a complex mass scheme to respect electromagnetic gauge invariance. The resonant pole (Δ ++) and background contributions (ρ 0, σ, Δ, and neutron states) are separated according to the principles of the analytic S-matrix theory. The mass and width parameters (...) of the Δ ++ obtained from a fit to experimental data on the total cross section are in agreement with the results of a model-independent analysis based on the analytic S-matrix approach. The magnetic dipole moment determined from the radiative π + p scattering is $\mu _{\Delta ^{ + + } } = (6.14 \pm 0.51)$ nuclear magnetons. (shrink)