This new and expanded edition of The Logic of Real Arguments explains a distinctive method for analysing and evaluating arguments. It discusses many examples, ranging from newspaper articles to extracts from classic texts, and from easy passages to much more difficult ones. It shows students how to use the question 'What argument or evidence would justify me in believing P?', and also how to deal with suppositional arguments beginning with the phrase 'Suppose that X were the case.' It aims to (...) help students to think critically about the kind of sustained, theoretical arguments which they commonly encounter in the course of their studies, including arguments about the natural world, about society, about policy, and about philosophy. It will be valuable for students and their teachers in a wide range of disciplines including philosophy, law and the social sciences. (shrink)

This new and expanded edition of The Logic of Real Arguments explains a distinctive method for analysing and evaluating arguments. It discusses many examples, ranging from newspaper articles to extracts from classic texts, and from easy passages to much more difficult ones. It shows students how to use the question 'What argument or evidence would justify me in believing P?', and also how to deal with suppositional arguments beginning with the phrase 'Suppose that X were the case.' It aims to (...) help students to think critically about the kind of sustained, theoretical arguments which they commonly encounter in the course of their studies, including arguments about the natural world, about society, about policy, and about philosophy. It will be valuable for students and their teachers in a wide range of disciplines including philosophy, law and the social sciences. (shrink)

This new and expanded edition of The Logic of Real Arguments explains a distinctive method for analysing and evaluating arguments. It discusses many examples, ranging from newspaper articles to extracts from classic texts, and from easy passages to much more difficult ones. It shows students how to use the question 'What argument or evidence would justify me in believing P?', and also how to deal with suppositional arguments beginning with the phrase 'Suppose that X were the case.' It aims to (...) help students to think critically about the kind of sustained, theoretical arguments which they commonly encounter in the course of their studies, including arguments about the natural world, about society, about policy, and about philosophy. It will be valuable for students and their teachers in a wide range of disciplines including philosophy, law and the social sciences. (shrink)

"A welcome and fresh addition to a market that has been dominated by rather traditional texts...instructors will enjoy teaching with it in their classrooms" -- Teaching Philosophy, March 1998. This text offers an exceptionally lucid account of how philosophers in the 20th century have challenged the ideas of "modern" philosophers (17th century) on fundamental questions in epistemology (theory of Knowledge). Numerous examples are used to help undergraduates grasp the material. Self-study questions and further readings are included. The book sets out (...) the traditional view that knowledge is justified true belief and then presents Gettier's challenge to this theory. Three alternative accounts of knowledge--the "reliable method" account, the "casual" account, and Nozick's "tracking" account--are examined. Fisher and Everitt argue in favor of attending to justified belief rather than knowledge and present a view which tentatively favors a "casual" theory of justified belief. Next the authors assess and reject "foundationalism," a popular position in modern philosophy. Though foundationalism about empirical beliefs is commonly discussed in textbooks, this book is unique in giving foundationalism about a priori beliefs equal and expert consideration. In the second half of the book the authors present alternatives to modern epistemology, including coherentism, Quine's "naturalized epistemology," and Rorty's critique. These discussions are undertaken with a great deal of sensitivity to the needs of the beginning student of epistemology. (shrink)

The atheist who begins to argue his case by saying, ‘Suppose there is an omniscient Being of the sort in which Christians believe ...’ is employing a very familiar move in argumentation. However, most books on argumentation theory ignore ‘suppositions’ completely. Searle omits suppositions entirely from his taxonomy of speech acts and this appears to lead to a similar omission in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions by van Eemeren and Grootendorst.This paper argues that ‘suppositional argument’ is elegant, powerful and extremely (...) common, that the correct way to understand it is based on Gottlob Frege's distinction between ‘asserted’ and ‘unasserted’ propositions and hence that suppositions are neither assertions nor (and this is more important) assertives. The paper discusses the connections between suppositions and conditionals; it argues that argumentation theory which ignores suppositions is systematically misleading; and it concludes by indicating some possible developments in argumentation theory. (shrink)

A generation before Beardsley, legal scholar John Henry Wigmore invented a scheme for representing arguments in a tree diagram, aimed to help advocates analyze the proof of facts at trial. In this essay, I describe Wigmore's "Chart Method" and trace its origin and influence. Wigmore, I argue, contributes to contemporary theory in two ways. His rhetorical approach to diagramming provides a novel perspective on problems about the theory of reasoning, premise adequacy, and dialectical obligations. Further, he advances a novel solution (...) to the problem of assessing argument quality by representing the strength of argument in meeting objections. (shrink)

I take 'informal logic' to be the (descriptive and normative) study of 'real arguments'-arguments which are or have been used with the aim of convincing others of a point of view. I argue that the informal logic tradition thus conceived (i) lends strong support to something like Quine's view that our beliefs really support one another like the filaments in a spider's web--and thus that the traditional view that implication is an asymmetric relation is false; (ii) suggests that the classic (...) division of arguments into deductive and inductive has distorted our thinking about the evaluation of real arguments; and (iii) implies that naturalised epistemology is on the right track. (shrink)

The various ‘impulses to philosophy’ which are the subject of this series of lectures, include a fascination with the general process of reasoning and argument—with the ‘game of logic’. We are all aware of the importance of reasoning in our lives and how difficult it can be to tell ‘good’ reasoning from ‘bad’.