Dear Jacques Derrider,Today is my birthday. I received a considerable number of messages, almost all written and sent by computer programs. Because most of my contacts have died, or else they are too busy to write me.I'm not bothered by the fact that these letters were written by programs. I am troubled, however, when they remind me of all of those who have died. And especially when I am no longer able to distinguish between the programs that speak for the (...) living and those that speak for the dead.These digital mummies are called necrobots. The archive of conversations of the deceased person serves as a training database for a neural network. Once it is deployed in the email and social network accounts of the... (shrink)

Introduction: religion and politics as human universals -- Catholic integralism and the integralists -- History --Symmetry -- Transition -- Stability -- Justice -- Confucian and Islamic anti-liberalisms -- Epilogue: reconciliation.

It is a commonplace that liberalism and religious belief conflict. Liberalism, its proponents and critics maintain, requires the privatization of religious belief, since liberals often argue that citizens of faith must repress their fundamental commitments when participating in public life. Critics of liberalism complain that privatization is objectionable because it requires citizens of faith to violate their integrity. The liberal political tradition has always sought to carve out social space for individuals to live by their own lights. If liberalism requires (...) citizens to violate their integrity, liberals have cause for concern. I seek to rebut this integrity objection to liberalism. I focus on the dominant form of philosophical liberalism: public reason liberalism. I argue that the integrity objection undermines the mainstream conception of public reason liberalism, but not public reason liberalism itself. The paper opens by outlining the structure of public reason liberalism and the integrity objection (§§2 and 3). It then analyses two versions of the objection and argues that the second version is successful against the mainstream conception of public reason (§4). I argue in response that public reason liberalism need not endorse principles of restraint—the civic restrictions on religious expression typically associated with it. I then sketch a conception of public reason liberalism that eschews principles of restraint (§5). This alternative promises to reconcile public reason liberals and their faith-friendly critics by putting the integrity objection to rest. (shrink)

In response to the intellectual movement of New Atheism, this volume articulates a "New Theist" response that has at its core a desire to engage in productive and depolarizing dialogue. To ensure this book is of interest to atheists and theists alike, a team of experts in the field of philosophy of religion offer an assessment of the strongest New Atheist arguments. The chapters address the most pertinent questions about God, including politics and morality, and each essay shows how a (...) reflective theist might deal with points raised by the New Atheists. This volume is a serious academic engagement with the questions asked by New Atheism. As such, it will be of significant interest to scholars working in the philosophy of religion and theology, as well as those engaged in religious studies generally. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence is rapidly entering our daily lives in the form of driverless cars, automated online assistants and virtual reality experiences. In so doing, AI has already substituted human employment in areas that were previously thought to be uncomputerizable. Based on current trends, the technological displacement of labor is predicted to be significant in the future – if left unchecked this will lead to catastrophic societal unemployment levels. This paper presents a means to mitigate future technological unemployment through the introduction (...) of a Basic Income scheme, accompanied by reforms in school curricula and retraining programs. Our proposal argues that such a scheme can be funded by a special tax on those industries that make use of robotic labour; it includes a practical roadmap that would see a government take this proposal from the conceptual phase and implement it nationwide in the span of one decade. (shrink)

Stimulating discussion of the fundamental concepts we employ in every day consideration of moral questions for the general reader.

Our concern in this essay are the roles of religious conviction in what we call a “publicly justified polity” — one in which the laws conform to the Principle of Public Justification, according to which (in a sense that will become clearer) each citizen must have conclusive reason to accept each law as binding. According to “justificatory liberalism,”1 this public justification requirement follows from the core liberal commitment of respect for the freedom and equality of all citizens.2 To respect each (...) as free and equal requires that no one simply be forced to submit to the judgments of others as to what she must do. Laws must be justified to those subject to them — each must accept grounds that justify the law. As Kant indicated, if such a condition is achieved, each is both subject and legislator: each is subject to the law, yet each legislates the law, and so all our free and equal under the law.3 Now it would appear that if we are to justify laws to each and every person, the reasons for these laws must be “accessible to all.”4 Religious reasons, however, are not shared by everyone, and may be inaccessible to some: they would thereby seem inappropriate in public justification. On the face of it, justificatory liberals seem committed to expunging religious-based reasoning from political justification. Not surprisingly, this apparent commitment of justificatory liberalism is adamantly rejected by many citizens of faith who consider themselves liberals. These citizens embrace the traditional liberal freedoms and rights and, moreover, reject any suggestion that a legitimate polity might seek to establish a religion, much less a theocracy. Yet they.. (shrink)

Short-circuit evaluation denotes the semantics of propositional connectives in which the second argument is evaluated only if the first argument does not suffice to determine the value of the expression. Free short-circuit logic is the equational logic in which compound statements are evaluated from left to right, while atomic evaluations are not memorised throughout the evaluation, i.e. evaluations of distinct occurrences of an atom in a compound statement may yield different truth values. We provide a simple semantics for free short-circuit (...) logic and an independent axiomatisation. Finally, we discuss evaluation strategies, some other SCLs, and side effects. (shrink)

Human emotions guide verbal and non-verbal behaviour during social encounters. During public performances, performers’ emotions can be affected directly by an audience’s attitude. The valence of the emotional state (positive or negative) of a broad range of animal species is known to be associated with a body and visual orientation laterality bias. Here, we evaluated the influence of an audience’s attitude on professional actors’ head orientation and gaze direction during two theatrical performances with controlled observers’ reactions (Hostile vs Friendly audience). (...) First, our speech fluency analysis confirmed that an audience’s attitude influenced actors’ emotions. Second, we found that, whereas actors oriented more their head to the left (i.e. Right Hemisphere Bias) when the audience was hostile, they gazed more straight ahead at Friendly spectators. These results are in accordance with the Valence-Specific Hypothesis that proposes that processing stimuli with negative valences involves the right hemisphere (i.e. left eye) more than the left hemisphere. (shrink)

Human emotions guide verbal and non-verbal behaviour during social encounters. During public performances, performers’ emotions can be affected directly by an audience’s attitude. The valence of the emotional state (positive or negative) of a broad range of animal species is known to be associated with a body and visual orientation laterality bias. Here, we evaluated the influence of an audience’s attitude on professional actors’ head orientation and gaze direction during two theatrical performances with controlled observers’ reactions (Hostile vs Friendly audience). (...) First, our speech fluency analysis confirmed that an audience’s attitude influenced actors’ emotions. Second, we found that, whereas actors oriented more their head to the left (i.e. Right Hemisphere Bias) when the audience was hostile, they gazed more straight ahead at Friendly spectators. These results are in accordance with the Valence-Specific Hypothesis that proposes that processing stimuli with negative valences involves the right hemisphere (i.e. left eye) more than the left hemisphere. (shrink)

IntroductionAlthough the motor signs of Parkinson’s disease are well defined, nonmotor symptoms, including higher-level language deficits, have also been shown to be frequent in patients with PD. In the present study, we used a lexical decision task to find out whether access to the mental lexicon is impaired in patients with PD, and whether task performance is affected by bradykinesia.Materials and MethodsParticipants were 34 nondemented patients with PD, either without medication or under optimum medication. A total of 19 age-matched control (...) volunteers were also recruited. We recorded reaction times to the LDT and a simple RT task. In each task, stimuli were either visual or auditory. Statistical analyses consisted of repeated-measures analyses of variance and Tukey’s HSD post hoc tests.ResultsIn the LDT, participants with PD both off and on medication exhibited intact access to the mental lexicon in both modalities. In the visual modality, patients off medication were just as fast as controls when identifying real words, but slower when identifying pseudowords. In the visual modality of the control task, RTs for pseudowords were significantly longer for PD patients off medication than for controls, revealing an unexpected but significant lexicality effect in patients that was not observed in the auditory modality. Performances of patients on medication did not differ from those of age-matched controls.DiscussionMotor execution was not slowed in patients with PD either off or on medication, in comparison with controls. Regarding lexical access, patients off medication seemed to have difficulty inhibiting a cognitive-linguistic process when it was not required, and exhibit a specific pseudoword processing deficit in the LDT, which may have been related to impaired lateral word inhibition within the mental lexicon. These deficits seemed to be compensated by medication. (shrink)

John Rawls's transition from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism was driven by his rejection of Theory's account of stability. The key to his later account of stability is the idea of public reason. We see Rawls's account of stability as an attempt to solve a mutual assurance problem. We maintain that Rawls's solution fails because his primary assurance mechanism, in the form of public reason, is fragile. His conception of public reason relies on a condition of consensus that (...) we argue is unrealistic in modern, pluralistic democracies. After rejecting Rawls's conception of public reason, we offer an ‘indirect alternative’ that we believe is much more robust. We cite experimental evidence to back up this claim. (shrink)

L ’ histoire du droit de la guerre est marquée par trois temps principaux.Ainsi, de la période antique jusqu ’ au XIX e siècle se déploie la doctrine du justum bellum,visant à moraliser la guerre. Ensuite, au XIX e siècle, l ’ affirmation des souverainetésouvre la porte à la liberté d ’ user de la guerre comme instrument de politique internationale. Enfin, au terme de la Première Guerre mondiale, la volonté d ’ apporter une réponsenormative au recours à la force (...) s ’ est fait jour, donnant naissance au jus ad bellum. Cetteévolution juridique fut accompagnée d ’ une évolution sémantique qui, au XXI e siècle,conduira à une curieuse inversion conceptuelle. (shrink)

Gilbert (2000) examined the issue of collective intentionality in science. Her paper consisted of a conceptual analysis of the negative role of collective belief, consensus, and joint commitment in science, with a brief discussion of a case study investigated by Thagard (1998a, 1998b). I argue that Gilbert's concepts have to be refined to be empirically more relevant. Specifically, I distinguish between different kinds of joint commitments. I base my analysis on a close examination of Thagard's example, the discovery of Helicobacter (...) pylori, and two other historical cases involving the Copenhagen school of quantum mechanics and the Austrian school of economics. I also argue that it is difficult to fulfill the condition of common knowledge, even in Gilbert's weak sense. I conclude by raising serious doubts about the very possibility of a certain type of joint commitment, which I refer to as an implicit joint commitment. (shrink)

In the eyes of many, liberalism requires the aggressive secularization of social institutions, especially public media and public schools. The unfortunate result is that many Americans have become alienated from the liberal tradition because they believe it threatens their most sacred forms of life. This was not always the case: in American history, the relation between liberalism and religion has often been one of mutual respect and support. In Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation , Kevin Vallier attempts (...) to reestablish mutual respect by developing a liberal political theory that avoids the standard liberal hostility to religious voices in public life. He claims that the dominant form of academic liberalism, public reason liberalism, is far friendlier to religious influences in public life than either its proponents or detractors suppose. The best interpretation of public reason, convergence liberalism, rejects the much-derided "privatization" of religious belief, instead viewing religious contributions to politics as a resource for liberal political institutions. Many books reject privatization, Liberal Politics and Public Faith: Beyond Separation is unique in doing so on liberal grounds. (shrink)

The issue of knowing what it means for a group to have collective beliefs is being discussed more and more in contemporary philosophy of the social sciences and philosophy of mind. Margaret Gilbert’s reconsideration of Durkheim’s viewpoint in the framework of the plural subject’s account is one of the most famous. This has implications in the history and the sociology of science—as well asin the history and sociology of philosophy—although Gilbert only outlined them in the former fields and said nothing (...) about the latter. Symmetrically but independently, a historian of science, Mara Beller, has recently challenged Kuhn’s conception of the role of consensus in sciences in a brilliant analysis by carefully studying the history of Copenhagen School of Quantum Mechanics. Not only does she show the role of disagreement and controversies (doubting whether there was any collective belief characteristic in this group of physicists), but she even shakes up the very idea of individual beliefs. Each scientist (Heisenberg, Bohr, etc.) could be seen as divided into several selves. This paper contends that these two conceptions open important new horizons in several domains, especially if they are linked together. The paper assesses this claim in the light of empirical examples like the Vienna Circle, Copenhagen School, and, eventually, Cartesian philosophy. Key Words: plural subject • polyphony • collective briefs • Cartesian argumentation. (shrink)

The issue of knowing what it means for a group to have collective beliefs is being discussed more and more in contemporary philosophy of the social sciences and philosophy of mind. Margaret Gilbert’s reconsideration of Durkheim’s viewpoint in the framework of the plural subject’s account is one of the most famous. This has implications in the history and the sociology of science—as well asin the history and sociology of philosophy—although Gilbert only outlined them in the former fields and said nothing (...) about the latter. Symmetrically but independently, a historian of science, Mara Beller, has recently challenged Kuhn’s conception of the role of consensus in sciences in a brilliant analysis by carefully studying the history of Copenhagen School of Quantum Mechanics. Not only does she show the role of disagreement and controversies (doubting whether there was any collective belief characteristic in this group of physicists), but she even shakes up the very idea of individual beliefs. Each scientist (Heisenberg, Bohr, etc.) could be seen as divided into several selves. This paper contends that these two conceptions open important new horizons in several domains, especially if they are linked together. The paper assesses this claim in the light of empirical examples like the Vienna Circle, Copenhagen School, and, eventually, Cartesian philosophy. (shrink)

Dans cette contribution, j’examine la spécificité d’une perspective d’épistémologie sociale en théorie de l’argumentation en me livrant à une analyse critique de la théorie actuellement dominante dans ce champ, la pragma-dialectique de Franz van Eemeren. Cette perspective, d’inspiration interactionniste gricéenne, se réclame du « rationalisme critique », donc d’une perspective épistémologiquement « préservationniste ». Et pourtant, en faisant des normes du débat argumenté, y compris des normes de la connaissance, de simples règles de « bonne conduite », elle témoigne, de (...) facto, d’une position épistémologiquement « révisionniste ». Cette perspective manifeste, par ailleurs, une forme d’« expansionnisme » sociologique élémentaire, comme tel légitime si l’on considère qu’introduire deux sujets, c’est déjà introduire du social. La pragma-dialectique n’introduit pas de nouveaux sujets de connaissance sui generis, tels que les communautés épistémiques ou les institutions, mais comme il s’agit de rendre compte d’argumentations, elle doit envisager au moins deux interlocuteurs potentiels et donc dépasser le solipsisme épistémologique, une posture explicite chez Descartes et implicite dans la plupart des théories de la connaissance classiques, lesquelles font rarement réellement place à l’intersubjectivité. Malgré ses limites, la pragma-dialectique, par sa recherche de normes de la construction de la connaissance plus proches des processus effectifs ou naturels de la connaissance, pourrait constituer – épistémologiquement redressée – une contribution importante à une épistémologie sociale « naturalisée ». (shrink)

Dans cette contribution, j’examine la spécificité d’une perspective d’épistémologie sociale en théorie de l’argumentation en me livrant à une analyse critique de la théorie actuellement dominante dans ce champ, la pragma-dialectique de Franz van Eemeren. Cette perspective, d’inspiration interactionniste gricéenne, se réclame du « rationalisme critique », donc d’une perspective épistémologiquement « préservationniste » (au sens où elle préserverait l’idée de référence à des normes de la connaissance). Et pourtant, en faisant des normes du débat argumenté, y compris des normes (...) de la connaissance, de simples règles de « bonne conduite », elle témoigne, de facto, d’une position épistémologiquement « révisionniste ». Cette perspective manifeste, par ailleurs, une forme d’« expansionnisme » sociologique élémentaire, comme tel légitime si l’on considère qu’introduire deux sujets, c’est déjà introduire du social. La pragma-dialectique n’introduit pas de nouveaux sujets de connaissance sui generis, tels que les communautés épistémiques ou les institutions (ce qui serait pour Alvin Goldman le critère de l’expansionnisme, un critère à mon sens trop fort), mais comme il s’agit de rendre compte d’argumentations, elle doit envisager au moins deux interlocuteurs potentiels et donc dépasser le solipsisme épistémologique, une posture explicite chez Descartes et implicite dans la plupart des théories de la connaissance classiques, lesquelles font rarement réellement place à l’intersubjectivité. Malgré ses limites, la pragma-dialectique, par sa recherche de normes de la construction de la connaissance plus proches des processus effectifs ou naturels de la connaissance, pourrait constituer – épistémologiquement redressée – une contribution importante à une épistémologie sociale « naturalisée ». (shrink)

Gilbert (2000) examined the issue of collective intentionality in science. Her paper consisted of a conceptual analysis of the negative role of collective belief, consensus, and joint commitment in science, with a brief discussion of a case study investigated by Thagard (1998a, 1998b). I argue that Gilbert's concepts have to be refined to be empirically more relevant. Specifically, I distinguish between different kinds of joint commitments. I base my analysis on a close examination of Thagard's example, the discovery ofHelicobacter pylori, (...) and two other historical cases involving the Copenhagen school of quantum mechanics and the Austrian school of economics. I also argue that it is difficult to fulfill the condition of common knowledge, even in Gilbert's weak sense. I conclude by raising serious doubts about the very possibility of a certain type of joint commitment, which I refer to as an implicit joint commitment. (shrink)

Buddhism and American Thinkers. Ed. by Kenneth K. Inada and Nolan P. Jacobson. State University of New York, Albany 1984. xix, 180pp.

Buddhist Formal Logic. A study of Dignaga's Hetucakra and K'uei-chi's Great Commentary on the Nyayapravesa. R.S.Y. Chi. Royal Asiatic Society, London 1969; revised edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1984. lxxxii + 222 pp. Rs. 100.

Dialogues with Scientists and Sages. The Search for Unity. Renée Weber. Routledge & Kegan Paul. London 1986. 256 pp. £7.95.

Fragments from Dinnaga. H. N. Randle. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1981. xii + 93 pp. Rs. 40.

The Bodymind Experience in Japanese Buddhism: A Phenomenological Study of Kukai and Dogen. David Edward Shaner. State University of New York Press, New York 1985. 250 pp. Cloth $ 34.50, paper $ 10.95.

The Discipline of Freedom. A Kantian View of the Role of Moral Precepts in Zen Practice. Phillip Olson. State University of New York Press, Albany 1993. XX, 217 pp. $14.94.

The Monk and the Philosopher. Jean-François Revel and Matthieu Ricard. Translated by John Canti. Thorsons, London 1998. ix, 310 pp. £16.99. ISBN 0-7225-3649-6.