"Liberalism" is widely used to describe a variety of social and political ideas, but has been an especially difficult concept for historians and political scientists to define. Burckhardt, Mill, and Tocqueville define one type of liberal thought. They share an aristocratic liberalism marked by distaste for the masses and the middle class, opposition to the commercial spirit, fear and contempt of mediocrity, and suspicion of the centralized state. Their fears are combined with an elevated ideal of human personality, an ideal (...) which affirms modernity. All see their ideals threatened in the immediate future, and all hope to save European civilization from barbarism and militarism through some form of education, although all grow more pessimistic towards the end of their lives. Aristocratic Liberalism ignores the national boundaries that so often confine the history of political thought, and uses the perspective thus gained to establish a pan-European type of political thought. Going beyond Burckhardt, Mill, and Tocqueville, Aristocratic Liberalism argues for new ways of looking at nineteenth-century liberalism. It corrects many prevalent misconceptions about liberalism, and suggests new paths for arriving at a better understanding of the leading form of nineteenth-century political thought. The new Afterword by the author presents a novel description of liberal political language as the "discourse of capacity," and suggests that this kind of language is the common denominator of all forms of European liberalism in the nineteenth century. Aristocratic Liberalism will be valuable to students of history, political science, sociology, and political philosophy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Both Constant and Spencer are moralists who want to encourage individual human perfection. But for Constant, politics has moral value even in a laissez-faire state, whereas for Spencer political participation has no moral value in itself. For Constant, from a moral perspective the historical change from an ancient to a modern conception of liberty is not absolute, and he wishes to retain, in a subordinate role, certain aspects of ancient liberty in modern societies. For Spencer, the historical evolution from (...) militant to industrial society involves the complete separation of politics from any positive moral good. In an industrial society, altruism has no connection with politics, and attempt to bring altruism into politics are not only doomed to failure but iare unjust and therefore immoral. Spencer is a leading figure in the separation of classical liberal thought from perfectionist morality that flourishes in the twentieth century. The separation between classical and modern liberalism that takes place in the fin de siècle is not just a matter of economics – as is shown by the fact that both Spencer and Constant are ardent apostles of laissez-faire – it is above all a question of different attitudes to morality. (shrink)

The advent of democracy in nineteenth-century Europe was resisted by a set of thinkers who shared an 'aristocratic vision'. These aristocratic thinkers rejected the view that the greater good of the majority was of greater value than some higher good of a smaller number. It was the noble minority that was the more valuable part of society. This view corresponds in part to the philosophical tradition known as perfectionism. Matthew Arnold and Friedrich Nietzsche, thinkers rarely considered together, represent significant exemplars (...) of the liberal and radical versions of the aristocratic vision, and their similarities and differences are representative of the broad spectrum of aristocratic thought. Their common rejection of philistinism was part of an aristocratic vision of cultural perfection which was, Alexis de Tocqueville suggested, the natural reaction of a minority against the overwhelming materialism of democratic society. (shrink)

Part 1. Plan of This Commentary -- From an Epigram by Filangieri against Improvement in the Art of War -- On Encouragements for Agriculture -- On the Conversion of Rulers to Peace -- On the Salutary Revolution Which Filangieri Foresaw -- On the Union of Politics and Legislation -- On the Influence Which Filangieri Attributes to Legislation -- On the State of Nature, the Formation of Society, and the True Goal of Human Associations -- On Errors in Legislation -- Some (...) Remarks by Filangieri on the Decline of Spain -- On Filangieri's Observations about France -- On the Decline Filangieri Predicted for England -- Part 2. Object of this Second Part -- On the Black Slave Trade -- On Population -- Continuation of the Same Subject -- On Malthus's System Relating to Population -- Some Writers Who Have Exaggerated M. Malthus's System -- On a Contradiction by Filangieri -- On the Division of Properties -- On the Grain Trade -- On Agriculture as a Source of Wealth -- On the Protection Given Industry -- A New Proof of Filangieri's Fundamental Mistake -- On Guilds and Masters -- On Privileges for Industry -- On Taxation -- Part 3. On Criminal Prosecution Confided Exclusively to a Magistrate -- On Secret Indictments -- On Denunciation -- New Thoughts on the Idea of Giving Each Citizen the Right to Prosecute -- New Thoughts on the Idea of Giving Each Citizen the Right to Prosecute -- On the Right to Prosecute Given to Servants, When It Is a Question of Crimes against Society -- That the Prosecuting Magistrate Should Be Responsible, If Not for the Truth, at Least for the Legitimacy of the Accusation -- On Prisons -- On the Shortening of Legal Procedures -- On Defense Witnesses -- On Judgment by Juries -- On the Death Penalty -- On Convict Labor -- On Deportation -- Part 4. On Education -- On Religion -- Of the Growth of Polytheism -- On the Priesthood -- On the Mysteries -- Conclusion. (shrink)

A new history of liberalism which argues that liberalism has been predicated on definite morality and should be viewed as an attempt to encompass both fear and hope. Liberalism, argues Alan Kahan, is the search for a society in which people need not be afraid. Freedom from fear is the most basic freedom. If we are afraid, we are not free. These insights, found in Montesquieu and Judith Shklar, are the foundation of liberalism. What liberals fear has changed over time (...) (revolution, reaction, totalitarianism, religious fanaticism, poverty, and now populism) but the great majority of liberal thinkers have relied on three pillars to ward off their fears and to limit the concentrated power that causes fear: freedom, markets, and morals, or, to put it another way, politics, economics, and religion or morality. Most liberal thinkers emphasize one or two pillars more than another, but it is typical of liberalism down to the Second World War to rely on all three, although there were always minority voices who preferred to stand on only one leg. After WWII, "thin" procedural/market liberals, who wanted to strip any moral or religious basis or purpose from liberalism, dominated "thick" liberal moralists, who thought liberalism needed a moral basis and/or goal. It is the political contention of this book that liberalism is most convincing as program, language, and social analysis when it relies on all three pillars, and that the relative weakness of liberalism at the end of the twentieth century had much to do with neglect of the moral pillar of liberalism. Its historical contention is that for much of the past two centuries it did rely on all three pillars. But Kahan also argues that liberalism is not only a party of fear. It is also a party of hope, or the party of progress. Many of the contradictions typical of liberalism derive from the seemingly contradictory effort to encompass both hope and fear. If in case of conflict fear often trumps hope for liberals (loss aversion applies in politics as much as in economics), and utopia is subject to indefinite postponement, progress in personal autonomy and development has always been at the heart of liberalism. Liberals typically support their hopes on the same three pillars of freedom, markets, and morals which they use to ward off their fears. Nevertheless, in one respect those historians and political theorists who identify liberalism with laissez-faire economics are not wrong. It is characteristic of liberalism then that it bases its hopes not on the state but on civil society, which for liberals is the common source of a free politics, a free market, and of morals. Alan S. Kahan is Professor of History at the Université de Versailles. His previous books include Tocqueville, Democracy, and Religion: Checks and Balances for Democratic Souls (Oxford 2015), Alexis de Tocqueville (Continuum Books) and Mind vs Money: The War Between Intellectuals and Capitalism (Transaction Publishing, 2010). (shrink)

Liberalism has been one of the leading incarnations of political thought for the past two centuries and it was also the first form of political theory to acquire a truly global reach. This volume examines the work of the most pivotal thinkers in the liberal tradition, starting with Montesquieu and proceeding to a wide range of authors from the French Revolution to the present. The book is distinctive in encompassing the wide spectrum of views historically encompassed by liberalism, revealing its (...) geographical as well as intellectual scope by including conceptions of liberalism formed in Latin America, the Middle East and Asia. Twenty-four chapters cover thinkers including Madame de Stael, Alexis de Tocqueville, Abraham Lincoln, John Stuart Mill Ahmad Faris al-Shidyaq, John Dewey, Hu Shih, Hannah Arendt and John Rawls. Each chapter offers a commentary on a short critical passage from the author concerned. Essayists use their chosen passage to explore the meaning and significance of the author's work for both the historical tradition of liberalism and for political thought more generally. The book is organized chronologically, building up a richly detailed overview of the tradition of liberalism and its key writings. The book will be an indispensible companion to courses on liberal thought, on political ideologies and on the history of political thought and will be of interest to students and scholars of politics, philosophy and history. (shrink)

A ground-breaking study of the views of the greatest theorist of democracy writing about one of our most pressing issues. Alan S. Kahan, a leading Tocqueville scholar, shows how Tocqueville's analysis of religion is simultaneously deeply rooted in his thoughts on nineteenth-century France and America and pertinent to us today.

_The Old Regime and the Revolution_ is Alexis de Tocqueville's great meditation on the origins and meanings of the French Revolution. One of the most profound and influential studies of this pivotal event, it remains a relevant and stimulating discussion of the problem of preserving individual and political freedom in the modern world. Alan Kahan's translation provides a faithful, readable rendering of Tocqueville's last masterpiece, and includes notes and variants which reveal Tocqueville's sources and include excerpts from his drafts and (...) revisions. The introduction by France's most eminent scholars of Tocqueville and the French Revolution, Françoise Mélonio and the late François Furet, provides a brilliant analysis of the work. (shrink)

Tocqueville Unveiled: The Historian and His Sources for The Old Regime and the Revolution. By Robert T. Gannett Jr.