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  1. Waging War on Pascal’s Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
    Pascal’s Wager is simply too good to be true—or better, too good to be sound. There must be something wrong with Pascal’s argument that decision-theoretic reasoning shows that one must (resolve to) believe in God, if one is rational. No surprise, then, that critics of the argument are easily found, or that they have attacked it on many fronts. For Pascal has given them no dearth of targets.
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    Waging War on Pascal's Wager.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (1):27-56.
    Pascal’s Wager is simply too good to be true—or better, too good to be sound. There must be something wrong with Pascal’s argument that decision-theoretic reasoning shows that one must believe in God, if one is rational. No surprise, then, that critics of the argument are easily found, or that they have attacked it on many fronts. For Pascal has given them no dearth of targets.
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  3. A Chancy 'Magic Trick'.Alan Hájek - 2014 - In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry. Oxford University Press.
     
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  4. ch. 9. Blaise and Bayes.Alan Hájek - 2012 - In Jake Chandler & Victoria S. Harrison (eds.), Probability in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.
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  5. Hysteresis hypotheses.Alan Hájek - 2021 - In Lee Walters & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. Oxford, England: Oxford University press.
     
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