Free Speech is a philosophical treatment of a topic which is of immense importance to all of us. Writing with great clarity, wit, and genuine concern, Alan Haworth situates the main arguments for free speech by tracing their relationship to contemporary debates in politics and political philosophy, and their historical roots to earlier controversies over religious toleration. Free Speech will appeal to anyone with an interest in philosophy, politics and current affairs.
Free marketeers claim that theirs is the only economic mechanism which respects and furthers human freedom. Socialism, they say, has been thoroughly discredited. Most libertarians treat the state in anything other than its minimal, 'nightwatchman' form as a repressive embodiment of evil. Some reject the state altogether. But is the 'free market idea' a rationally defensible belief? Or do its proponents fail to examine the philosophical roots of their so-called freedom? Anti-libertarianism takes a sceptical look at the conceptual tenets of (...) free market politics. Alan Haworth argues that libertarianism is little more than an unfounded, quasi-religious statement of faith: a market romance. Moreover, libertarianism is exposed as profoundly antithetical to the very freedom which it purports to advance. This controversial book is for anyone interested in the cultural and political impact of free market policies on the modern world. It will be invaluable to students and specialists of political and economic theory, social science and philosophy. (shrink)
Free marketeers claim that theirs is the only economic mechanism which respects and furthers human freedom. Socialism, they say, has been thoroughly discredited. Most libertarians treat the state in anything other than its minimal, 'nightwatchman' form as a repressive embodiment of evil. Some reject the state altogether. But is the 'free market idea' a rationally defensible belief? Or do its proponents fail to examine the philosophical roots of their so-called freedom? _Anti-libertarianism_ takes a sceptical look at the conceptual tenets of (...) free market politics. Alan Haworth argues that libertarianism is little more than an unfounded, quasi-religious statement of faith: a market romance. Moreover, libertarianism is exposed as profoundly antithetical to the very freedom which it purports to advance. This controversial book is for anyone interested in the cultural and political impact of free market policies on the modern world. It will be invaluable to students and specialists of political and economic theory, social science and philosophy. (shrink)
_Free Speech_ is a philosophical treatment of a topic which is of immense importance to all of us. Writing with great clarity, wit, and genuine concern, Alan Haworth situates the main arguments for free speech by tracing their relationship to contemporary debates in politics and political philosophy, and their historical roots to earlier controversies over religious toleration. _Free Speech_ will appeal to anyone with an interest in philosophy, politics and current affairs.
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’. I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and (...) his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit, if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. (shrink)
Those who vote intelligently vote for principles as much as they do for policy. The problem is that bodies of principle tend to be incompatible with each other. In fact, they normally conflict, head-on. Conservatism and socialism are two obvious examples here. My point, therefore, is that, with this type of incompatibility, it is difficult to see how any coalition could be maintained for long without a considerable sacrifice of principle – not to say integrity – by at least one (...) of the parties to it. (shrink)
This absorbing look at political philosophy asks you to climb inside the heads of the major political philosophers. Beginning with Plato and finishing with post-Rawlsian theory, Alan Haworth presents the key ideas and developments with clarity and depth. Each chapter provides an in-depth study of a given thinker or group of thinkers and will constitute broad account of the main arguments in political philosophy. Chapters are arranged historically but the focus of each is very much the analysis of arguments, the (...) way they hang together, the presuppositions on which they are based and the degree to which they succeed in answering the questions they are designed to address. Thinkers addressed include: Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, The Utilitarians, Marx, Rawls, Post-Rawlsian thinkers. This is a fascinating, lively and engaging look at the topic and will be appropriate for any student taking a course in political thought or philosophy. (shrink)
_Understanding the Political Philosophers_ is an absorbing and accessible introduction to the major philosophers and core texts of western political philosophy. Organised historically - beginning with Socrates and Plato, and concluding with post-Rawlsian theory - Alan Haworth presents the key ideas and developments with clarity and depth. Each chapter provides a concentrated study of a given thinker or group of thinkers and together they constitute a broad account of the main arguments in political philosophy. There are chapters on Socrates, Plato, (...) Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, the Utilitarians, Marx, and Rawls’s early work. This revised second edition has been brought fully up-to-date, and includes expanded coverage of the period from the death of Aristotle to the sixteenth century, as well as a new chapter on Rawls’s later philosophy and the direction of post-Rawlsian philosophy. Including a chronology and suggestions for further reading, _Understanding the Political Philosophers_ is an ideal introductory text for students taking courses in political philosophy or political theory. (shrink)
This absorbing study invites you to climb inside the heads of the major political philosophers, as it were, and to see the world through their eyes. Beginning with Socrates and concluding with post-Rawlsian theory, Alan Haworth presents the key ideas and developments with clarity and depth. Each chapter provides a concentrated study of a given thinker or group of thinkers and together they constitute a broad account of the main arguments in political philosophy. There are chapters on Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, (...) Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, the Utilitarians, Marx, Rawls, and post-Rawlsian developments. This is a fascinating, lively and engaging look at the topic and will be appropriate for any student taking a course in political philosophy or political thought. (shrink)
This absorbing study invites you to climb inside the heads of the major political philosophers, as it were, and to see the world through their eyes. Beginning with Socrates and concluding with post-Rawlsian theory, Alan Haworth presents the key ideas and developments with clarity and depth. Each chapter provides a concentrated study of a given thinker or group of thinkers and together they constitute a broad account of the main arguments in political philosophy. There are chapters on Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, (...) Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, the Utilitarians, Marx, Rawls, and post-Rawlsian developments. This is a fascinating, lively and engaging look at the topic and will be appropriate for any student taking a course in political philosophy or political thought. (shrink)
Those who vote intelligently vote for principles as much as they do for policy. The problem is that bodies of principle tend to be incompatible with each other. In fact, they normally conflict, head-on. Conservatism and socialism are two obvious examples here. My point, therefore, is that, with this type of incompatibility, it is difficult to see how any coalition could be maintained for long without a considerable sacrifice of principle – not to say integrity – by at least one (...) of the parties to it. (shrink)
In the following I take issue with the allegation that liberalism must inevitably be guilty of ‘abstract individualism’. I treat Michael Sandel’s well-known claim that there are ‘loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are’ as representative of this widely held view. Specifically, I argue: (i) that Sandel’s account of the manner in which ‘constitutive’ loyalties function as reasons for action presupposes the (...) possibility of there being (what I call) ‘underivable particular obligations’, but that such obligations are, in fact, a logical impossibility; and (ii) that Sandel’s account of the self as necessarily ‘encumbered’ presupposes an account of personal identity which confuses identification with definition, and which is, therefore, fundamentally flawed. (shrink)
One hundred and fifty years is not really such a long time; and the world Mill inhabited, if not exactly our own, is the one from which our own has developed. His is our predecessor culture, and the similarities between then and now are such that we may easily overlook the differences which also exist.
The claim that moral philosophers have something to learn from recent neo-Darwinian theory cannot be sustained – at least, not in the case of the three theses characteristic of the latter on which I concentrate. The first thesis, reductionism, is open to some serious, and familiar, objections. Neo-Darwinism can escape those objections only by weakening its position to a point at which it can no longer be described as distinctively reductionist. The second, atavism, mistakenly attempts to generalise from the apparent (...) persistence of` ‘vestigial’ behaviour patterns. Third, neo-Darwinists are frequently guilty of a number of confusions over the relation between fact and value. In conclusion, I point out that neo-Darwinism derives a certain ideological dynamic from the misleading supposition that patterns of explanation which succeed in one area necessarily apply in others. (shrink)
Those who vote intelligently vote for principles as much as they do for policy. The problem is that bodies of principle tend to be incompatible with each other. In fact, they normally conflict, head-on. Conservatism and socialism are two obvious examples here. My point, therefore, is that, with this type of incompatibility, it is difficult to see how any coalition could be maintained for long without a considerable sacrifice of principle – not to say integrity – by at least one (...) of the parties to it. (shrink)
Macaulay was wrong: The British public in one of its periodic fits of morality may be a ridiculous spectacle but it has at least one rival in the reaction we have recently witnessed to ‘cultural relativism’, ‘postmodernism’, and suchlike phenomena. One good illustration of the point is the argument of Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's Intellectual Impostures (1998: London, Profile Books). Sokal and Bricmont spend the greater part of their time holding various postmodernist writers up to ridicule, and it would (...) be a waste of time to defend it against them. However, their most seriously argued chapter (chapter four) is a critique, not of postmodernism, but of epistemic relativism in the philosophy of science, as mainly exemplified by the work of Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn, and it is important to answer the case they make. There are many reasons for finding that case unconvincing. For example: (i) Sokal and Bricmont repeatedly imply that epistemic relativism is counter-intuitive. Against them it can be objected that some quite ordinary proposition can be both true and, at the same time, only true for beings with certain types of visual apparatus or with a certain cultural history. Nor are they right in claiming that all scientists find epistemic relativism implausible. Some do, but Chomsky doesn't. Neither does Stephen Hawking; (ii) Sokal and Bricmont suppose that there is a single, uniquely correct description of the universe ‘out there’ waiting to be discovered, but all the evidence we have suggests the contrary; (iii) it is not the case that epistemic relativism entails that any description is just as good as any other, so they are wrong to insist that it must endorse all manner of silly superstition; (iv) Sokal and Bricmont frequently insist that “the scientific method is not radically different from the rational attitude in everyday life or in other domains of human knowledge” but this glosses over great differences between the procedures appropriate to different areas of inquiry – science on the one hand, history and/or psychoanalysis on the other. (shrink)
One hundred and fifty years is not really such a long time; and the world Mill inhabited, if not exactly our own, is the one from which our own has developed. His is our predecessor culture, and the similarities between then and now are such that we may easily overlook the differences which also exist.
