This article offers a tentative deconstruction of Heidegger’s account of the “modern,” that is, the “Cartesian,” “subject.” It argues that subjectivity, understood as the idea of some “thing” that is both the owner of certain mental states and the agent of certain activities, is a medieval theological construct, based on two conflicting models of the mind (nous, mens) inherited from ancient philosophy and theology: the Aristotelian and the Augustinian (or perichoretic) one, developed in connection with such problems as that of (...) the two wills in the incarnate Christ. Starting with Nietzsche’s criticism of the “superstition of logicians” (the belief that“the subject I is the condition of the predicate think”) and Peter Strawson’s question in Individuals (“Why are one’s states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all?”), the article discusses Peter Olivi’s and Thomas Aquinas’s treatments of the problem, as well as the principle invoked to resolve it: actiones sunt suppositorum, “actions belong to subjects.” Against this background, the discussion refers to Heidegger’s notion of “subjecticity” and Armstrong’s “attribute-theory” in order to reappraise the Hobbesian and Leibnizian contributions to the history of the Self. (shrink)

We review the history of the philosophy of fondue since Aristotle so as to arrive at the formulation of the paradox of Swiss fondue. Either the wine and the cheese cease to exist (Buridan), but then the fondue is not really a mixture of wine and cheese. Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist. If they do, then either they continue to exist in different places (the chemists), but then a fondue can never be perfectly homogenous (it is (...) a French fondue). Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist in the same place (the Stoïcs), but then wine and cheese have to be, oddly, penetrable and spatially expansible. Aristote attempted to solve this paradox by arguing that the cheese and wine continue to exist, but only potentially in the fondue. We sketch an alternative answer. The wine and the cheese continue to exist, but only non-spatially in the fondue. Wine and cheese, once mixed, become non-spatial constituents of the fondue, a bit like character traits are non-spatial constituents of persons. The wine and the cheese are in the fondue, but only the fondue is there in the fondue pot. (shrink)

Brentano’s relationship to Alexander Bain has so far received little attention. The first part of this paper argues that the basic tenets of the so-called Intentionality thesis should be considered as systematically opposed to a complex of principles borrowed by Brentano from two major works by the scottish philosopher and psychologist: The Senses and the Intellect and the ‘Compendium’ on Mental and Moral Science. Bain’s doctrine is based on two sets of claims: T1 There is only a negative definition of (...) Mind: a definition “by contrast” as the “unextended”; There is a small number of general properties, whose divison under “three heads” is all that can be offered as a positive definition of Mind; those heads are Feeling, Volition, Thought or Cognition. T2 There is no one fact or property that embraces all the three; the three classes of mental phenomena do not imply each other. Brentano’s reply is based on the very opposite claims: *T1 there are several negative definitions of mind, all questionable, but there is a positive definition of Mind, that is well-grounded and not subjected to further criticisms; the division of mental phenomena must be restated on this new positive basis; the new “heads”of the new division are: Presentation, Judgement and Feeling. *T2 there is one common property that does characterize every mental phenomenon : Intentional In-existence; the phenomena of the three fundamental classes are most intimately “intertwined”; “there is no mental act in which all three are not present”. The second part of the paper discusses at length Brentano’s criticism of Bain’s theory of volition as a feeling-prompted activity. (shrink)

Is medieval logic formal? And if yes, in what sense? There are striking affinities between medieval and contemporary theories of language. Authors from the two periods share formal ambitions and maintain complex, and at time uneasy, relations with natural language. However, modern scholars became careful not to overlook the specificities of theories developed more than five hundred years apart, in particular with respect to their 'formal' character. In 1972, Alfonso Maieru noted that the efforts of medieval logicians to identify logical (...) structures in language which are formal enough to become objects of scientific consideration. He also stressed that the language investigated is a historical one, Latin, so that one can legitimately wonder to which extent... one is allowed to speak of 'formal logic' in the middle ages. In other words, medieval logic is characterized by a tension between 'formalist ambitions' and constraints proper to natural language. Today, our knowledge of the field has considerably expanded, calling for a new assessment of the question. (shrink)

Édition du troisième sophisma « Omnis homo de necessitate est animal » du ms. Paris, BnF Lat. 16135. Le texte anonyme, contenu aux f. 99rb-103vb, appartient à la seconde collection de sophismata transmis dans ce codex légué à l’Université de Paris par Étienne de Genève socius du Collège de Sorbonne, après avoir été maître ès arts à Paris dans les années 1270. Il offre un panorama des principales positions soutenues au xiiie siècle par les Antiqui et les Moderni sur la (...) sémantique des termes vides, la distinction entre l’esse essentiae et l’esse existentiae, l’être effectif et l’être logique, le temps et la modalité. (shrink)

Résumé L’article est consacré à l’histoire des chaires de philosophie du Collège entre 1921 et 1951, considérée à partir du double échec subi en 1941 par le médiéviste Etienne Gilson, au moment de repourvoir la chaire de « Philosophie » définie pour Édouard Le Roy en 1921 après le départ de Henri Bergson. Sur la base d’un arbre généalogique de la philosophie au Collège de France depuis 1542, l’article restitue les enjeux des deux phases du duel entre Gilson et son (...) principal opposant Mario Roques : a) le maintien de l’intitulé de Édouard Le Roy contre la proposition gilsonienne : Histoire des idées philosophiques dans la France moderne, b) l’élection du spiritualiste Louis Lavelle contre le philosophe psychologue Maurice Pradines, à la chaire de philosophie. L’article analyse les différents biais, affectant l’affrontement entre philosophie et histoire de la philosophie, lieu commun rhétorique des débats idéologiques depuis 1874. (shrink)