within western philosophy, there is a long and rich tradition of treating the beautiful and the good as closely related and mutually reinforcing.1 Different models of the relation have been proposed. An ‘identity’ model can be seen in Plato’s identification of the beautiful and the good in the Symposium and perhaps in the Greek notion of kalokagathia.2 Yet, according to Plato’s Republic, the form of the good illuminates, and differs from, the forms of beauty and truth: “both knowledge and (...) truth are beautiful things, but the good is other and more beautiful than they,”3 suggesting that beauty is a mode of the good. Likewise, according to Plotinus’s chronologically first treatise, “On... (shrink)

Paul Guyer has proposed that, despite Kant’s apparent avowals that judgements of beauty of things are made without consideration of the purposes that we have for them, purposes do enter into aesthetic judgements of “adherent beauty.” He even attributes to Kant the view that functionality is a necessary condition for the beauty of objects that have certain ends or functions. I consider his claims and propose that, according to Kant, the degree to which an object fulfills (...) its ends may pose a psychological – rather than a logical – factor in its aesthetic appreciation. I agree that judgements of beauty, with regard to many things, certainly are made in relation to the functions that we attribute to those things, but argue that these judgements, as such, are logically independent of whatever judgements are made regarding their functionality, even if in practice their functionality may impinge on our aesthetic judgements. (shrink)

In his recent article, “Beauty and Utility in Kant’s Aesthetics: The Origins of Adherent Beauty,” Robert Clewis aims to offer a fresh perspective on Kant’s views on the relation between beauty and utility. While, admittedly, a fresh approach is hard to come by, given the extensive treatment of the topic, Clewis thinks that a study of its historical context and origins might give us the needed edge. The most interesting and novel aspect of Clewis’s discussion is (...) his detailed treatment of Kant’s changing use of the term “selbstständig” (which in general means “independent,” “self-standing,” “stable,” “lasting,” “self-subsisting”). In the process of tackling the more general question as to what kind of eighteenth-century model of beauty-utility relation Kant proposes, Clewis addresses other issues, such as the seeming inconsistency between Kant’s earlier and later views on free and purpose-based beauty. As noted in the editor’s footnote of the Critique of the Power of Judgment (KU), while Kant uses the term “selbstständig,” in his precritical period to refer to “purpose-based beauty” (what he calls in the KU adherent or dependent beauty), he uses the same term to denote free beauty (independent beauty, that is to say) in the KU.1 Clewis argues that even though Kant uses the same term to refer to both dependent and independent beauty, albeit in different periods of his life, this switch in the application of the term is not caused by a change in the meaning of the term from Kant’s perspective, but a change in Kant’s views concerning the status of free beauty. I agree with Clewis that Kant did not change his mind about the meaning of the term “selbstständig.” Nevertheless, I disagree with the line Clewis pursues.I will argue that Clewis’s mistake lies in thinking that, throughout his career, Kant endorsed what he calls the “blocking-unifi cationist” view on the relation between beauty and utility (“beauty and perfection/utility are distinct concepts yet can be united or unifi ed” (2018, p. 309)). As I will show, this mistake results in an inconsistent story about Kant’s aesthetics as well as an inconsistency within Clewis’ own argument. I will try to articulate a more consistent story about the development of Kant’s ideas on aesthetics in general and his ideas on adherent beauty in particular by proposing that, contra Clewis, earlier Kant subscribed to what Clewis calls the “containment” account (beauty is a form of perfection) while the later Kant changed his mind (having given up on rationalism) and came to defend a version of “blocking-unificationist” view. (shrink)

When Keats identified truth and beauty, he surely intended mere extensionality. I myself have never had much trouble with either half of the equivalence. Others have considerable difficulty. A case in point is the Watson-Allaire-Cummins interpretation of Berkeley's idealism, which I shall refer to henceforth as the inherence account. That account is put forward to answer an extremely perplexing question in the history of philosophy: Why did Berkeley embrace idealism, i.e., why did he hold that esse est percipi, that (...) to be is to be perceived, indeed that what is perceived must be perceived in order to exist? In essence, the IA answers these questions very simply and elegantly: perceived qualities are, for Berkeley, qualities of the mind in the same sense that, in the tradition of substance metaphysics, blue is a quality of a blue flower; just as the blue of the flower is inseparable from it, so the perceived blue is inseparable from the mind that perceives it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Why the Family is Beautiful (Lacan Against Badiou)Eleanor Kaufman (bio)The theory of ethics that can be distilled from the work of Jacques Lacan and Alain Badiou bears no resemblance to many commonly received notions of the ethical, especially any that would link ethics to a system of morality. In fact, ethics is not necessarily the central concept in their work, even in Lacan's The Ethics of Psychoanalysis or Badiou's (...) recent Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil. If anything, it is defined vicariously and in relation to other more central concepts, such as the workings of desire for Lacan and the fidelity to an event—or truth-process—for Badiou. Nonetheless, an examination of the network of concepts held together under the umbrella of the ethical allows for a sharp distinction between the work of Lacan and Badiou, one that Badiou—himself avowedly indebted to Lacan—is hesitant to make. Where Lacan elevates the beautiful over the good in his reading of Sophocles's Antigone, Badiou elevates the truth-process over the evil betrayal of such an event, drawing on examples ranging from National Socialism to the love relation between two people. A truth-process is a situation-specific adherence, or fidelity, to the revolutionary potential of an event that may take place in one of the four realms of politics, art, science, and love. Perhaps Badiou's best example of a truth-process—what I will also refer to as fidelity to an event—is one not described in the text under consideration here: the apostle Paul's proclamation of and fierce loyalty to the event of Christ's resurrection. It is in the particular form in which the ethical fidelity to a truth-process may be hard to distinguish from evil that I will take issue with Badiou, for both his political examples and his evocation of love as one of four conduits to a truth-process reflect a difficult inflexibility in his extraordinarily lucid and provocative system. Lacan, on the other hand, uses Antigone's strange family values to suggest a more flexible model of ethics, one that is focused on the encounter with the inhuman and the fragile boundary between life and death.Lacan's most sustained discussion of ethics occurs in his seminal Seminar Seven from 1959-60, entitled The Ethics of Psychoanalysis.1 Not only does this seminar register a gradual shift from an earlier emphasis on desire to a later focus on the real and the drive, but it is also a crucial articulation of what might seem for some to be an oxymoronic conjunction—psychoanalysis and ethics. Such a conjunction, as opposed to a Sartrean or Levinasian model that would situate ethics in relation to the Other,2 takes as its [End Page 135] touchstone Freud's stinging critique in Civilization and Its Discontents of the biblical injunction to love the neighbor as oneself. Here it is not merely a question of understanding why the neighbor may be equally an object of hatred, but of understanding how contradictory sentiments are also to be found at the heart of the self, and hence why a viable system of ethics must take this into consideration.3 In other words, ethics is not to be thought primarily as a relation to the other so much as a nonrelation to the self.4 Thus, when Lacan opposes the good to the beautiful, it is precisely the relational aspect of the good that he denigrates.Lacan links the good to the dialectic and to the power to deprive others, situating it squarely in the realm of morality. The beautiful, by contrast, marks a space of nonrelation where it is not so much a matter of two distinct selves but rather of a single self whose desire is not its own. In Seminar Six from the previous year, Lacan analyzes Hamlet and suggests that the reason Hamlet does not kill Claudius is that he is traversed by his mother's desire. He emphasizes that Hamlet's desire is "the desire not for his mother, but of his mother."5 Between Seminars Six and Seven, Lacan shifts his focus from desire to ethics, from... (shrink)

While many Western countries do legally permit homebirths under certain conditions, in the Slovak Republic they exist in a legal vacuum – they are neither permitted nor prohibited. In the present study, we aimed to explore how Slovak women who deliberately delivered at home perceive the reason for this decision and the subsequent homebirth itself. We interviewed eight women aged 21 to 36 and analysed the transcripts using the interpretative phenomenological analysis framework. The analysis revealed four major themes – (1) (...) the sacredness of childbirth, (2) the aspiration to be the director of your childbirth, (3) homebirth as an expression of the need for intimacy, and (4) the struggle with one’s social circle. Childbirth is seen as an ultimate act of nature defined by its beauty and purity, but these qualities are tainted by biomedical approach of healthcare providers. The results of this study suggest that women’s needs of autonomy, relatedness, and inclusion are not properly met by Slovak health care and obstetrics. Stricter adherence to the principle of informed consent during hospital births, and legalisation and regulation of homebirths could reduce medical risks during childbirth and improve women’s mental well-being during and after a pivotal moment in their life. (shrink)

In his Aesthetics, Dietrich von Hildebrand analyzes an interesting form of beauty adhering to audible and visible things that he calls second order beauty. In this paper, I will attempt to develop something which von Hildebrand recognizes, but which he himself does not fully develop: the religious significance of second order beauty. In particular, I wish to show that an aesthetic experience of this second order beauty can engender an encounter with God not in the “abstract,” (...) but rather as a concrete, individual, living person. (shrink)

In his Aesthetics, Dietrich von Hildebrand analyzes an interesting form of beauty adhering to audible and visible things that he calls second order beauty. In this paper, I will attempt to develop something which von Hildebrand recognizes, but which he himself does not fully develop: the religious significance of second order beauty. In particular, I wish to show that an aesthetic experience of this second order beauty can engender an encounter with God not in the “abstract,” (...) but rather as a concrete, individual, living person. (shrink)

This paper presents the story of an isiXhosa traditional healer, Nomzi Hlathi, as told to the first author. Nomzi was asked about how she came to be an igqirha and the narrative focuses on those aspects of her life story that she understood as relevant to that developmental process. The material was obtained from a series of semi-structured interviews with Nomzi, with some collateral from her cousin, and synthesised into a chronological narrative presented in Nomzi’s own words. The aim of (...) the study was to examine her account of her unfolding experience within three hermeneutic frames. The first is the isiXhosa traditional account of what it is to become an igqirha, a process initiated by intwaso, an illness understood to be a call from the ancestors, and guided by messages from the ancestors in dreams and other symbolic communications. The second is the perspective of Western Clinical Psychology on the cognitive, emotional and behavioural disturbances that characterise intwaso. The third is the perspective of transpersonal psychology on the nature and development of shamanic healing gifts, as understood from observations of such practices in traditional societies across the world. As the narrative of Nomzi’s story is quite long, this paper presents her narrative as well as the methodology which gave rise to it. The interpretative review of the material from each of the three perspectives is presented in a second paper. (shrink)

Two dominant interpretations of Kant's notion of adherent beauty, the conjunctive view and the incorporation view, provide an account of how to form informed aesthetic assessments concerning artworks. According to both accounts, judgments of perfection play a crucial role in making informed, although impure, judgments of taste. These accounts only examine aesthetic responses to objects that meet or fail to meet the expectations we have regarding what they ought to be. I demonstrate that Kant's works of genius do (...) not fall within either of these categories. The distinguishing features of these works, namely, originality and exemplarity, become unrecognizable on these interpretations because originality and exemplarity lie in the work's ability to exceed one's expectations concerning its form and content. They contribute to artistic beauty through alternative transformation methods distinct from that of abstraction, namely, concept expansion and repudiation. These additional accounts of transformation lead to a rather surprising outcome: works of genius turn out to be paradigm cases where one can and indeed ought to form informed pure judgments of taste. (shrink)

In this, the second of two papers, three interpretative investigations are undertaken of Nomzi’s story of her troubled childhood, her dreams of ancestors calling her to become an igqirha, her training by experienced healers, various rituals that were performed at different stages of her life, and her eventual graduation as an igqirha at the age of 61. The narrative cannot be understood apart from the framework of the isiXhosa traditional understanding of intwaso, the initiatory illness, the role of the ancestors, (...) and the manner in which clairvoyant abilities of divination and healing are developed under their guidance. Nomzi’s account, however, reflects a considerable modification of the tradition, several features of which she does not seem to understand herself. From a clinical psychological perspective, Nomzi’s behavioural disturbances in childhood, as well as her lifelong suspiciousness and paranoia, can be understood as a consequence of an unstable childhood in which there was no secure attachment, nor any adult guidance on emotional regulation of the kind needed to form the basis of a stable adult personality. From the perspective of transpersonal psychology, it seems likely that Nomzi was endowed with a degree of natural clairvoyance, but her development as a healer was impaired by displacement of her paranoid ideation into the role of witch-finder, and her chronic social alienation. (shrink)

Kant calls judgements of adherent beauty impure aesthetic judgements because they presuppose the empirical concept of the object and are thus not determined exclusively by a feeling of pleasure. Glossed over in Kant’s account is what kind of universality these judgements have. This article argues that the subjective universality of pure aesthetic judgements and the objective universality of cognitive judgements do not merge in impure aesthetic judgements and that the tension between them reaches also into Kant’s pure aesthetic (...) judgements with their unstable relations between the pleasure of the a priori harmony of the faculties and the empirical object named beautiful. Pleasure, which for Kant is communicable while nonetheless not being discursive, is always to some extent lost for words. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Is There a Problem about Ethical Criticism? The Sensible Representation of the Moral The Theory of Disinterestedness Coda: The Beautiful as that which is Complete in itself.

I argue that Kant’s aesthetic theory yields a fruitful theory of art criticism and that this theory presents an alternative both to the existing theories of his time and to contemporary theories. In this regard, my dissertation offers an examination of a neglected area in Kant scholarship since it is standardly assumed that a theory of criticism flies in the face of some of Kant’s most central aesthetic tenets, such as his rejection of aesthetic testimony and general objective principles of (...) taste. If art criticism is an enterprise of providing evaluations of artworks supported by reasons, then it is hard to see what the Kantian art critic can do for us. If I cannot defer to the critic’s judgment that she loved Blade Runner and there are no feasible general principles linking the depiction of futuristic cityscapes, or the accompaniment of a haunting minimalist soundtrack to the goodness of a film, then it does not seem to matter whether the critic communicates to me her evaluation of Blade Runner or supports her evaluation with descriptions of Blade Runner scenes. Nevertheless, the assumption that these Kantian tenets preclude the possibility of art criticism is mistaken and it is my aim to show how this can be. The project has two phases. In the first phase I develop a new interpretation of Kant’s theory of artistic beauty. In the second phase I make use of this interpretation to put forward a Kantian account of art criticism. Central to my interpretation is the notion that judgments of perfection, e.g., Blade Runner is an excellent neo-noir science fiction film, inform our aesthetic evaluations and receive support from descriptions of non-aesthetic properties of the film. It is precisely this underappreciated role of judgments of perception that I exploit in making room for Kantian art criticism. (shrink)

According to commentators like Rosalind Krauss, Briony Fer, Caroline Jones, and Michael Fried, Clement Greenberg’s formalist/positivist device of “medium-specificity” debars errant affective aesthetic experiences that are embodied; despite significant differences in how these theorists arrive at this conclusion, one shared point of emphasis is Greenberg’s inheriting Kant’s disinterested conception of pleasure in reflective judgments of beauty. Offering a textualist review of Kant’s Analytic of the Beautiful, I seek to demonstrate that neither Greenberg, nor Greenberg’s critics, are correct in their (...) account of Kant’s judgments of beauty.1 Specifically, I argue that Greenberg conflates Kant’s conception of judgments of free beauty (pulchritudo vaga) with merely adherent beauty (pulchritudo adhaerens). In formulating a rejoinder to Greenberg and the misplacement of Greenberg as a Kantian, and following Diarmuid Costello, I hope to save a path for a Kantian aesthetics of the present, much in the spirit of other broadly Kantian art historians and philosophers of art/aesthetics (e.g., Thierry de Duve, Paul Guyer, Ido Geiger, etc.). (shrink)

At the third section of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” of the Critique of Judgement, Kant establishes the difference between pure judgements of taste and judgements of adherent beauty. The Author contends that the definitions presented there are problematic when one attempts to reconcile them with judgements of artistic beauty. In principle, every work of art supposes certain concepts and contents that determine it as an artistic object, so it would not be possible to formulate pure judgements (...) of taste in their regard. In order to overcome these difficulties, it becomes necessary to articulate the ideas in relation to the nature of artistic production that Kant presents in the sections on Fine Art and the Genius, where the concept of “aesthetic ideas” is introduced. Finally, the debate on landscape and gardening in the 18th century allows us to understand how pure judgements of taste can be made from two different ways of presenting aesthetic ideas in an artistic genre. (shrink)

In 1764, Kant published his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and in 1790 his influential third Critique , the Critique of the Power of Judgment . The latter contains two parts, the 'Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment' and the 'Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment'. They reveal a new principle, namely the a priori principle of purposiveness ( Zweckmäßigkeit ) of our power of judgment, and thereby offer new a priori grounds for (...) beauty and biology within the framework of Kant's transcendental philosophy. They also unite the previous two Critiques , the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason . Besides contributing to general and systematic aspects within his transcendental philosophy, Kant's aesthetics also offers new insights into old problems. It deals with feeling versus experience, subjectivity versus objectivity, disinterested pleasure, aesthetic universality, free and adherent beauty, the sensus communis , genius, aesthetic ideas, beauty as the symbol of morality, beauty of nature versus beauty of art, the sublime, and the supersensible. In this article I will limit myself to this critical aesthetics of Kant. But I will also discuss the ugly and the possibility of beauty in mathematics and see whether Kant's theory can successfully explain or deal with them. I will also compare his theory with philosophical ideas from a very different tradition, namely from Confucius, not only as a challenge to Kant's theory, but also because there is a growing interest from the Chinese side in combining ideas from Confucius and Kant, an interest that might well become influential in both East and West during the 21st century. (shrink)

Noël Carroll proposes a generalist theory of art criticism, which essentially involves evaluations of artworks on the basis of their success value, at the cost of rendering evaluations of reception value irrelevant to criticism. In this article, I argue for a hybrid account of art criticism, which incorporates Carroll's objective model but puts Carroll-type evaluations in the service of evaluations of reception value. I argue that this hybrid model is supported by Kant's theory of taste. Hence, I not only present (...) an alternative theory of metacriticism, which has the merit of reinstating the centrality of reception value in art critics’ evaluations, but also show that, contrary to a common conception, Kant's aesthetic theory can house a fruitful account of art criticism. The benefit of this hybrid account is that, despite being essentially particularist, it should be appealing even to generalists, including Carroll. (shrink)

In 1764, Kant published his Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime and in 1790 his influential third Critique, the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The latter contains two parts, the ‘Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment’ and the ‘Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment’. They reveal a new principle, namely the a priori principle of purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) of our power of judgment, and thereby offer new a priori grounds for beauty and biology (...) within the framework of Kant's transcendental philosophy. They also unite the previous two Critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. Besides contributing to general and systematic aspects within his transcendental philosophy, Kant's aesthetics also offers new insights into old problems. It deals with feeling versus experience, subjectivity versus objectivity, disinterested pleasure, aesthetic universality, free and adherent beauty, the sensus communis, genius, aesthetic ideas, beauty as the symbol of morality, beauty of nature versus beauty of art, the sublime, and the supersensible. In this article I will limit myself to this critical aesthetics of Kant. But I will also discuss the ugly and the possibility of beauty in mathematics and see whether Kant's theory can successfully explain or deal with them. I will also compare his theory with philosophical ideas from a very different tradition, namely from Confucius, not only as a challenge to Kant's theory, but also because there is a growing interest from the Chinese side in combining ideas from Confucius and Kant, an interest that might well become influential in both East and West during the 21st century. (shrink)

Kemal's useful introduction is largely devoted to the first half of Kant's Critique of Judgment. It guides the reader through many of the topics which make up that philosopher's aesthetic theory. Among the matters not dealt with, or dealt with only in passing, are Kant's theory of the sublime, his conception of adherent beauty, and the question whether Kant does or can allow for ugliness, the opposite of beauty.

It could be said that chinese aesthetics merges together three cornerstones of the western tradition. It might be intended as the study of beauty in the Platonic sense, because of the vaste debate on the topic rooted back in chinese’s ancient times; it could match the sense of aesthetics as intended by Baumgarten, because of the long tradition of chinese perceptual studies, and it may also be compared to the Hegelian philosophy of art, given the abundance of chinese artistic (...) manufacts and theories. Chinese aesthetics is distinctive and very different from the western one. While the latter tries to grasp the inner beauty of things by breaking them and accounts for beauty as an object, chinese aesthetics considers beauty as a subject, rather aiming at feeling the beauty of things for what they are. Compared to the occidental tradition, which is rooted in sensation but deviates from sensation to pursue a rational goal, chinese aesthetics originates from the sensation and adheres to it all the time. Therefore, the chinese stance makes for a unique and genuine approach to the discipline. (shrink)

Most environmental ethicists adhere to a standard intellectual history of the field, one that explains and justifies the dominant commitments to nonanthropocentrism, moral dualism, and wilderness/wildlife preservation. Yet this narrative—which finds strong support in the work of first generation environmental historians—is at best incomplete. It has tended to ignore those philosophical projects and thinkers in the American environmental tradition that challenge the received history and the established conceptual categories and arguments of environmental ethics. One such figure is the agrarian thinker, (...) conservationist, and rural reformer, Liberty Hyde Bailey. A writer whose environmental philosophy combined biocentric attitudes toward nature with more humanistic concerns about intergenerational fairness and civic responsibility, Bailey remains an invisible figure in environmental ethics, despite his clear influence on the later work of such conservation luminaries as Aldo Leopold, Wendell Berry, Wes Jackson, and others. We would benefit from a recovery of Bailey’s environmental philosophy, especially his articulation of a pluralistic ethical outlook defined by the melding of anthropocentric moral and civic concerns with biocentric commitments regarding the beauty and resilience of the properly cultivated landscape. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.3 (2003) 108-112 [Access article in PDF] Themes in the Philosophy of Music, by Stephen Davies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, 283 pp., hardcover. Over the last few decades, there has been a remarkable output of several books and articles on the philosophy of music. Stephen Davies is one of the leading contributors to this growing literature in the Philosophy of Music. This (...) important and thought-provoking volume collects fifteen of Davies's essays on various philosophical issues pertaining to music such as ontology, performance, expression, and appreciation. With the exception of two, all of the essays have been published before. There is not enough space here to do justice to all fifteen essays, and thus I focus on those that strike me as most important and where I disagree with Davies.First a word about the book's relevance to aesthetic education and itspotential for use in aesthetic education. Davies's book strikes me as having immense potential for aesthetic education. I can easily see the various essays as being of great value in educating performers, composers, musicologists, and music lovers about various aspects of performance and appreciation especially. Here is a brief list of questions pertinent to aesthetic education that Davies's work raises and addresses: Why is performance on authentic instruments important? What is involved in understanding musical works? Is technical training necessary to appreciate musical works fully? To what degree can the performer create her own interpretation of a work, and how much does the score constrain her?Now on to the essays themselves. The first part of Davies's volume concerns ontology, and the first essay "John Cage's 4'33": Is it Music?" addresses this very famous musical work. Davies argues that 4'33" is not music but rather a theatrical piece about music because it does not exclude anysounds as being ambient noise, as Davies thinks musical works should do. Davies does not deny, however, that this work is an artwork. He thinks instead that the work is not organized sound, as all music must be, for it does not exclude any sonic events during performance as ambient; even sounds made by the performer of this work, claims Davies, are mistakes and not ambient. Thus neither Cage nor the performer organize (select, appropriate) sounds. Davies also suggests that while Cage wants us to have an aesthetic interest in the sonic properties of 4'33," he failed in his intention for we hear the work instead in musico-historical terms.Contrary to Davies's view, one mustwonder if 4'33" just is a theatrical piece about music, not a musical work as such. Unlike theater and theatrical works which are meant to be both seen and heard, Cage's work is only meant to be heard. Davies's view would seem to neglect this important auditory aspect in claiming that the work is just theater not music. Besides, why must all musical works exclude some soundsas ambient, and why might Cage's [End Page 108] work not be an exception to this? Why couldn't 4'33" be a limiting case of music, at one extreme of a range of musical works? As for Davies's claim that any sounds made by the performer who is supposed to be silent are mistakes not ambient noise, one must wonder if Cage intended instead that sounds made by the performer (such as musical tones or coughs) be bracketed by listeners as not part of the work while sounds made by the audience are part of the work, thus undermining the audience-performer distinction. Moreover, against Davies's claim that Cage intended us to have an aesthetic interest in sonic properties, I submit that Cage was Zen-influenced and not committed to such dualisticaesthetic concepts (such as beautiful vs. ugly) or any concepts for that matter, whether musico-historical or not. Instead, Cage intended us to simplylisten, with an open mind and openears, without adhering rigidly to concepts or hearing 4'33" in musico-historical terms, difficult as that may be. Finally, there... (shrink)

This article presents a contextualisation of Belgian philosopher and historian of psychiatry and sexuality, Patrick Vandermeersch’s (1946–), unpublished analysis of French philosopher Michel Foucault’s (1926–1984) interpretation of Methodius of Olympus’ (d.ca.311) views on virginity and chastity, in Histoire de la sexualité 4 ( Les aveux de la chair ), published in February 2018 at Gallimard in Paris under the editorship of Frédéric Gros. The article contributes to the reception and the ongoing analyses of Les aveux de la chair by exploring (...) Foucault’s reading while highlighting both the importance of Vandermeersch’s analysis and the sexological-historiographical significance of his broader oeuvre that spans over four decades. Vandermeersch shows that Foucault, as many other commentators of Methodius, did not substantially engage Methodius’ explicit indebtedness and persistent references to Plato (already evident in the title Symposium but especially regarding the Phaedrus ). Platonic homoeroticism is, according to Vandermeersch, as a consequence often too hastily, and therefore problematically, transposed on contexts of female virginity. Likewise, Foucault, when indicating already at the end of Histoire de la sexualité 2 ( L’usage des plaisirs 1984), the particular relevance of homoeroticism in the development of Western sexuality, seemed to adhere to this transposition. Could ‘beautiful boys’ truly be transposed onto ‘female virgins’ without severe sexual-discursive complications? And could Methodius’ encomium of virginity in any way be understood independent of his understanding of the ‘resurrection of the body’, with the integrity of its (virginised) sexual desire intact? These are among Vandermeersch’s valid and challenging questions to both Foucault and his contemporary readership. Contribution: Foucault’s reading of the church- and desert fathers in Histoire de la sexualité 4 ( Les aveux de la chair ) impacts early Medieval philosophy, early Medieval history, church history, patristics, philosophy of religion, psychology of religion and sociology of religion. Since these proximate disciplines are drawn towards Foucault’s text, they may well note its ongoing examinations. Foucault’s direct impact on these disciplines is illustrated in Vandermeersch’s significant analysis of Foucault’s reading of Methodius in Les aveux de la chair. Vandermeersch’s broader oeuvre in philosophy, theology, psychiatry, psychology, psychology of religion and the history of sexuality is concurrently contextualised as of ongoing contemporary importance for these disciplines. (shrink)

Adam Smith is not an environmentalist, but he articulated an ethical theory that is increasingly recognized as a fruitful source of environmental ethics. In the context of this theory, Smith illustrates in a particularly valuable way the role that anthropocentric, utilitarian metastandards can play in defending nonanthropocentric, nonutilitarian ethical standpoints. There are four roles that an anthropocentricmetastandard can play in defending an ecocentric ethical standpoint such as Aldo Leopold’s land ethic. First, this metastandard helps reconcile ecocentrism with theodicy, either of (...) the religious sort—showing that God is good—or of the evolutionary sort—showing that ecocentrism is consistent with human ethical dispositions as evolved through a process of natural selection. Second, using anthropocentrism as a metastandard helps reconcile our moral interest in human welfare with a thoroughly ecocentric standpoint. Third, defending ecocentrism by appeal to an anthropocentric metastandard provides a way of swaying die-hard anthropocentrists to adopt a more ecocentric perspective without showing disrespect to nature in the process. Finally, the systematic quasi-ecological connection between ecocentrism as an ethical standard and anthropocentrism as a metastandard has a beauty of its own that can provide additional motive to adhere to ecocentric ethical norms. (shrink)

William O. Stephens is to be applauded for the way in which he presents and analyzes some paradigmatic Stoic arguments, and thus defends Stoicism from the misplaced charges of Jim Cheney. Nonetheless, Stephens’ individualist interpretation of what he calls Stoic “logocentrism” obscures key features of the Stoics’ theory of value and their related ethic and metaphysic. Once the Stoics are allowedto speak for themselves, it emerges that they adhered to a holistic axiology, that for them virtue lay in conformity with (...) cosmic nature, and that the standard charges of anthropocentrism and blindness to natural beauty, often wielded by environmental philosophers against them, are misguided. (shrink)

We systematically examined the content of the websites of 46 agencies that buy and sell human eggs to understand how they market themselves to both donors and recipients. We found that these websites use marketing techniques that obscure the realities of egg donation, presenting egg donation as a mutually beneficial and fulfilling experience. Sites emphasize egg donors' emotional fulfillment and address recipients' anxieties by stressing the ability to find the perfect “fit” or “match”, suiting recipients’“preferences”/“desires”, and even designing/customizing a child. (...) Agencies attempt to create a sense of connection between the recipients and donors by reporting donors' personal characteristics — e.g., interests/hobbies, traits, mood/temperament, and self-reported childhood behavior/memories. Sites present donors as caring/generous and smart/successful/beautiful. These data, the first to examine several key aspects of egg donation agency websites, reveal critical aspects of how these companies communicate to prospective donors and recipients, raising several ethical concerns. Websites frame information in ways that may bias consumers, making emotional appeals that may distract from appropriate risk/benefit assessments and obscure the ethical challenges of egg donation. These data highlight needs for improved practices, adherence to guidelines, and consideration of enhanced guidelines or policy. (shrink)

Mirrors for princes, in general, give advices to the rulers about the subtleties of political art. Another aim of these books is to define and explain the administration of the state and the duties of rulers based on experience. In consequence of this they reflect the practical ethics of the period in which they were written. As such, they resemble practical handbooks written for rulers. Another point regarding the mirrors for princes works in which the political understanding of the era (...) can be observed is that they generally use sacred texts in order to prove the political legitimacy or invalidity of the power, as well as the rightfulness or the unlawfulness of the claims to the throne. Evidences from the Qurʾān and the ḥadīth literature was almost always used to support such advocated opinions. In fact, during the Middle Ages when religion and politics were considered coupled, it was unthinkable that religious elements should not be included in the works of state administration. The important point here is that the verses and ḥadīths were sometimes removed from their contexts and interpreted and explained in a way to support the ideology of the author or the ruler whom the author presented his work. In this study, we will try to reveal the subjects in which the verses and ḥadīths used in the mirrors for princes, which is a genre that has emerged within the Islamic culture and civilization. Thus, we aim to prepare a background for the future studies, which will focus on a specific verse or ḥadīth.Summary: The first political splits in Islamic history occurred immediately after the death of prophet Muḥammad. These differences were resolved by the agreement of the majority of Muslims on Abu Bakr's name. Until the second half of the rule of the third caliph ʿUthmān, Muslims came together around the unifying power of the idea of conquest. Nevertheless, substantially as a result of economically based problems the period of tranquility in Islamic society came to an end and was replaced by disputes. Disputes turned into conflict and ultimately seperation fused with the massacre of ʿUthmān in the capital Medina turned into a big fire with the Battles of the Camel and Ṣiffīn, the emergence of Khārijīs, the formation of the Shia and the deepening of the intellectual divisions after the all of these. Islamic history has witnessed a clash of different religious views and beliefs. along with deepening of intellectual disagreements as a result of political debatesIn the Islamic political thought, especially the first two centuries process was formed around the views of the jurists, muḥaddiths and theologians. The first sources used by those who tried to justify their opinion in the differences of opinion experienced during this period were the Qurʾān and ḥadīth literature which Muslims accepted as the determining factor in all their acts. The views based on the Qur'an and the hadiths, which are the two main sources of Islamic religion, had been used to influence the people, legitimize the actions and refute the claims of the opponents. On the other hand the sort who gave direction to political thought changed and political thought adhered a new path with Turks and Persians served as bureaucrats and soldiers and took an active position in the state. Especially Persians carried the culture of advice to Islamic thought, which is the product of both Greek and Hind civilization. Such books had brought in the İslamic society with translation movements began in the Umayyad period and peaked with the Bayt al-Ḥikma in the Abbasid period. Together with these books, the ideas of these civilizations on ideal state administration, politics and morality were recognized by Muslim scholars.These type of works, which are famous in terms of Islamic thought as mirrors for princes, have been written by Muslim scholars since the middle of the eighth century. Mirrors for princes are political, moral and religious content books that gives the rulers practical advice to maintain their power in accordance with the religious orders and prohibitions, and to the consent of Allāh’s who grant them this authority and people which appointed for their administration. Mirrors for princes are mostly theoretical books since they are mostly focused on what should be. In addition, since they are written for names that currently hold power, they are centered on how the rulers can maintain and increase their power and with which practices the state will maintain its existence for a longer period. The basic point of political thought and political interpretation are concepts and definitions. When the concept meaning of a word is mentioned, it is generally considered that there is a general definition. However, the concepts reflect the meaning that the user assigns to him in the context of his thoughts, perceptions, criticisms, explanations and analyzes. Concepts such as fair, honest, brave, hero, beautiful, rich, good and clean express what the person imposes on the meaning. In other words, everyone’s experience determines the content of the concept so far. The meaning of the concepts varies with the age and its user of that concept. Even concepts such as justice, merit and consultation can change meaning in different periods and geographies. The concepts, which are often used to facilitate understanding, are sometimes used to judge, to mold or mislead the interlocutor. In this context, it is imperative to enter the mind of the user in order to make concept analysis.In Islamic civilization, the principles of management are explained with concepts. The idiosyncrasies that Muslims expect from an ideal ruler are defined as justice, consultation, merit, trust and legitimacy and a broad corpus has been written about the concepts related to the administration, especially those mentioned. One type of this corpus is mirrors for princes.In Islamic history, there are many Mirrors for princes who are written in different time periods by names coming from different geographies and different backgrounds. Although the advice given in Mirrors for princes indicate a great similarity to each other, the preferred arguments and examples in the foundation of the counsel are different. While the persons in active politics mostly based their opinions on political arguments, scholars with scientific tradition supported their advices with religious arguments.Verses are the leading religious elements highlighted in Mirrors for princes. While explaining the concepts and emphasizing the importance of the advices, many verses have been exploited. Some verses are used only by one author, while some verses are the subject of their work by many authors. In the same way, ḥadīths and the sentences accepted as ḥadīths were also used to reinforce the emphasis and meaning. At this point, sometimes the context of the verses and ḥadīths were not taken care of. In this study, we aim to address the use of religious elements.In the literature, different opinions have emerged about who is ülü’l-emr and the limits of obedience to ülü’l-emr that used describe the names of senior executives and leaders of society. The reason for the difference is that each sect or religious school provides an interpretation on the basis of grounding its own views in explaining the verse. Justice is the most emphasized concept among the advices given to the rulers in mirrors for princes. Justice, which is shown as the most important feature of a sovereign, has been regarded as extremely important for the state to existences until the Doomsday. In addition, justice has been described as the most important condition for the maintenance of the state/sovereign authority. Consultation was important to make the right decision.Verses and ḥadīths were used in the explanations about the personal characteristics of the sovereign. Some features such as being compassionate, keeping promise, controlling anger, patience, honesty, blessing, extravagance, self-esteem, break a promise, revoke a promise and arrogance have become the subject of politics. When the mirrors for princes are considered as a whole, it is seen that religion and state are considered as inseparable twin brothers, taken one step further the understanding that accepts religion and the world as brothers especially is a product of the old Persian tradition. In this understanding, religion was accepted as the root and was given the duty of its patronage to political authority. It is seen that in the Mirrors for princes verses and ḥadīths hold a significant amount. As the reason for this can be said that along with religion takes place on the basis of morality, the authors of the Mirrors for princes, which put deep meanings on the relationship between religion and the state in the period that we are dealing with, consider both institutions to be complementary and integrative. (shrink)

Tsunesaburo Makiguchi is best known as the founder of Soka Gakkai, the association of lay members of the Nichiren Shoshu sect of Buddhism that has grown to number more than ten million followers throughout the world, including some 200,000 Nichiren Shoshu of America adherents in the United States. But Makiguchi had spent a lifetime as an educator, developing his "value creating" educationai philosophy, before he founded Soka Gakkai. In the 1930s he proposed educational reforms that were fully as revolutionary as (...) those advanced by his American counterpart John Dewey. He is one of Japan's most significant yet perhaps least recognized educators. Makiguchi said that Japan's educational system was haphazard, unplanned, fragmented, and useless. Convinced that the pursuit and creation of values are the ultimate purpose of life, he proposed a "value creating" educational system. Defining the three greatest values in life as goodness, beauty, and gain, Makiguchi held that through education people should increase their ability to create values and thus find happiness. (shrink)

Art and philosophy are the two major elements of the human world. The existence of art and philosophy can expand the spiritual world of human beings to a greater extent and enrich their spiritual life, thus supporting the construction of the material world. And music, as an aural art, has also been given a philosophical meaning in the evolution of history because of its birth and development. Therefore, when studying music, one should first study the history of music. The philosophy (...) of music history education is not only profound and contains world culture and philosophy, but also carries history and economy. Music history education is also a vivid art form of philosophy, where teachers create an artistic beauty to attract students and achieve the purpose of imparting knowledge by optimizing their educational philosophy. To develop the philosophy of education to its fullest extent, teachers must adhere to the concepts associated with the philosophy of art. To explain this process in greater depth, this paper provides a brief review of the aesthetic philosophy and historical evolution of Chinese. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Timothy Clark HEIDEGGER, DERRIDA, AND THE GREEK LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY The question "What is philosophy?" is not simply one question among others. Its status involves the questioner at once in a series of peculiar problems. The question "What is chemistry?" (for instance) would surely seem to admit of an answer. Even if there were a dispute about the wording of a definition, the general region to which the question (...) directs us seems relatively secure. "What is chemistry?" asks about the essence of a physical science and, as a consequence, the questioner will be situated in the realm of the philosophy of science. "What is philosophy?" however, can make no such leap. A "philosophy of philosophy " is simply tantamount to more philosophy. The question of philosophy 's essence can only be posed within philosophy. Moreover, would not this very question of an essence ofphilosophy be determined in advance by an understanding of "essence" by philosophy, which thus seems remorselessly to encompass the borders of that which might try to enclose it? The mode of questioning on the (impossible?) borders of philosophical discourse is the site of Martin Heidegger's so-called overcoming of Western Metaphysics. More recently, Jacques Derrida has intensified the mode of borderline questioning, engaging himself in both a radicalization and displacement of Heideggerian questions. Derrida writes, in "Violence and Metaphysics" (1964), "The entirety of philosophy is conceived on the basis of its Greek source. As is well known, this amounts neither to an occidentalism, nor a historicism. It is simply that the founding concepts of philosophy are primarily Greek, and it would not be possible to philosophize, or to speak philosophically, outside this medium."1 Derrida continues to discuss Husserlian phenomenology and the thought of Heidegger in terms of their insistence on 75 76Philosophy and Literature conceiving philosophy according to its Greek impetus. If something is to transpire in the traditions of philosophy, its origin "will have to be summoned forth and adhered to as rigorously as possible" (p. 81). The specific "event" to be attended to will be what Derrida, after Heidegger, describes as the determination ofbeing as presence. This, it is argued, is constitutive in respect of philosophy and all the regional disciplines it governs. Needless to say "the determination of being as presence" demands considerable explication. The Greek nature of philosophy is discussed by Heidegger in the lecture, "What is Philosophy?"2 The question raises the problem of philosophy 's relation to its limits. Tb ask the question "What is Philosophy?" is not to step outside thought to some "metaphilosophical" realm. It is to be already standing in Greece. What is specifically Greek and decisive, in fact, is the very mode of the question ''What is XT' itself: "But not only what is in question —philosophy— is Greek in origin, but how we question, the manner in which we question even today, is Greek. We ask, "what is that—" (p. 35). The Greek mode of questioning something as to its whatness {ti estin?, "what is it?") has now become thoroughly familiar. Its novelty and Greek source have become obscured: "It is this form of questioning which Socrates, Plato, and Aristode developed. They ask, for example, What is the beautiful? What is knowledge?'..." (p. 37). Heidegger's characterization of the question, ti estin?, as decisively Greek must be distinguished from Edmund Husserl's apparently similar description of the fundamentally Greek nature of philosophy. Husserl characterized the theoretical relation to the world as a legacy which has largely determined Western Europe and, indeed, the modern world itself, a determination most palpable in the proliferation of the various sciences. The theoretical attitude is one of pure curiosity towards entities : "man becomes the disinterested spectator, overseer of the world, he becomes a philosopher."3 Moreover, the devotion to pure theoria builds up a body of disinterested knowledge in which others may participate and to which they may add. A universal culture, a project traversing individual and national difference, comes into being. The Greek philosopher embodied, for the first time, a type ofhumanity and culture to which the European world still belongs. Husserl thus underlines the huge stakes in so little a question as the "What is it?"//i estin... (shrink)

To write a history “from antiquity to the present” of classical art or literature (or, worst of all, classicism) is the ultimate nightmare aspiration for a scholar whose colleagues are attentive methodologists. The product, when there is one (which I add because the aspiration can yield paralysis), is always in part an apologetic treatise on historical method. Professor Vout—of Christ's College, Cambridge—apologizes with the first word of her subtitle, A, which stresses that many differing histories may be as valid as (...) her own. The next two words, Life History, imply that her study is unauthorized, conjectural, a bit personal or informal, and reliant to an extent on unconfirmable stories. Her book, she tells readers, is of necessity an arrangement of “fragments” and “a mapping not of facts, but of ways in which Greek and Roman artifacts experience history.” She sets down, moreover, as a rule that “classical” is not “a self-standing category: it is always relational” (which historians of the novel have been telling us for many decades about “realism”).We might expect the result of Vout's axioms to be evenhanded diffidence when treating definitions of the classical, and indeed she entertains even the idea of Jeff Koons—maker of Balloon Venus (Orange) and Gazing Ball (Barberini Faun)—as a classical sculptor. There is, however, one approach that she dismisses out of hand: the obsession of classical humanism with authenticity and its renascence. She objects especially to research into the original conditions of objects and to the application of increasingly intrusive methods of restoring them. As she writes, “ ‘Real knowledge’ comes not from antiquities that have been ripped from their original context, cleaned and reconstituted for display in galleries and glass cabinets. ‘Real knowledge’ comes from antiquities that carry their dirt with them.”What Vout, as a critic of humanism, means by dirt is patina—the residue, interesting and sometimes beautiful in itself, of the use and misuse of objects. Dirt is a word that would occur to a humanist art historian when examining the patina of a Greek or Roman object. Vout's use of the word is a parodic expression of reverse snobbery. When studying changes, whether mistakes or enhancements, in a Greek or Roman document, a humanist literary historian would speak of corruption and edit the corrupt text by means of processes that humanist editors invented and perfected. Despite the humanists’ devotion to the recovery of classical learning, however, once a Renaissance edition of a manuscript was in print, the original, however rare, was often destroyed or lost. In effect, the work was reborn, better than new. Rebirth is not the same as preservation: though both are perhaps conservative (or better, in Ulysses's words, “rere regardant”), a renascence or a resurrection is cataclysmic.The humanist approach to the past can appear unlovable and is certainly arrogant, but it can also inspire awe and gratitude. The work of Michelangelo depended on it, and so (more to the point) did Martin Luther's. Vout's attitude toward dirt (patina, corruption, misprision, insertions, recontextualizations, bowdlerizations, misappropriations, translocations) resembles that of Catholic theologians to the depositum fidei. Restoring the original conditions of the Christian church involved methods of research learned from Renaissance humanists and the removal, often destructive, of the “deposit” or residue or patina that adhered to, distorted, discolored, and obscured the conditions of the “primitive church.” A Roman Catholic may well dislike the processes that Luther set in motion, but imagine a scholarly history of Christianity that mentioned Protestantism only to regret its existence.Still, Vout's reasoning, it seems to me, is more sophisticated in its defense of dirt and in its criticism of restoration than any offered against the Protestants’ reasoning during the Counter-Reformation. Consider, for instance, this inspiring passage: “When the curators at the Munich Glyptothek removed Thorwaldsen's restorations from the Aegina pediments, they did not so much take them back to a pristine state as out of the feedback loop, rendering them damaged goods. It was not a restriction of avenues or a change of direction that was being enacted here, but a refusal to speak the language, or rather an insistence that the only language worth speaking was an academic [humanist, restorationist] one.... In 2011, the Glyptothek marked the two hundredth year of the pediments’ discovery by putting new versions of Thorvaldsen's restored figures on display. They had relearned the lingo. For art to be ‘classical,’ it has to know its place in the discourse.” May lingo and feedback loop have successful careers in the lexicon of classical scholarship. “Far from producing a nostalgic narrative,” as Vout informs us, “the lessons learned from looking back ensure that we keep traveling.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 183-186 [Access article in PDF] Zen Gifts to Christians. By Robert Kennedy. New York: Continuum, 2000. 131 pp. Though Robert Kennedy's recent book Zen Gifts to Christians (2000) is intended for Christian readers who may be "temperamentally inclined" (i) to learn about Zen to spiritually augment their lives, it also succeeds as a work that defines the Western Buddhist community and as an introductory text (...) for those interested in Zen Buddhism. Drawing on his experiences as a Catholic priest and Zen master, Kennedy's work contributes much to the ideals expressed in the Second Vatican Council's conciliar decree Nostra Aetate (as well as the Thirty-fourth General Congregation of the Society of Jesus): to preserve and promote those universal elements of truth that manifest themselves in different cultures and societies, through dialogue and collaboration with followers of other religions. Kennedy achieves this monumental goal by organizing the book around the ten ox-herding pictures of Zen Buddhism (also known as the ten bulls) so as to better illustrate to Christians what Zen Buddhism has to offer through the narrative of spiritual growth common to all Zen Buddhists. Each ox-herding picture (or "bull") is elegantly expanded into a chapter detailing each step in the path of the spiritual quest. Kennedy richly supplements the lessons and ideas contained in each bull with references to Western poetry and prose, making the bulls more accessible to the reader by presenting the information in different ways.For both Christian and non-Christian readers, Kennedy's introduction to Zen may come as somewhat of a surprise, because he begins with the lived components of Zen Buddhism: discipline and practice. Though Zen does have speculative features and theories (as evidenced by koans), it is primarily concrete in its approach. Unlike Christianity, Zen is also a physical skill: it must be attentively practiced for enlightenment to occur. As Kennedy notes, if it is practiced sporadically or by rote, the student cannot make any spiritual progress, thus destroying the goal of the exercise. Moreover, Kennedy indirectly echoes a Platonic critique when he warns the [End Page 183] prospective student that time alone will not produce results, let alone Enlightenment! As with the perfection of any skill, discipline requires that the student give up strengths to concentrate on weaknesses. Kennedy's anecdotes and citations beautifully illustrate the points he wishes to make. However, he is cognizant of the fact that failure is part of any spiritual growth (in fact, it is the hallmark of discipline!) and is careful not to paint Zen in overly rosy colors.While the first chapter (Kennedy's commentary and explanation of the first bull) introduces readers to the concrete aspects of Zen, the second chapter on "not-knowing" explores the application of the abstract or mental component of Zen in one's attitude toward daily circumstances. Kennedy skillfully builds on the lessons he presented in the first chapter to express several ideas, many with implications for Christianity today.Two of these ideas are "letting go" and "the loss of God."Though Zen Gifts to Christians was written well before September 2001, these twin themes have become applicable to the contemporary situation for Christians and Buddhists alike. The theme of"letting go" allows Kennedy to subtly explore how old habits (characteristic of rigidness and inflexibility) not only prevent students from realizing their Buddha-nature, but also destroy the possibility for spiritual growth and progress of any sort. This serves to highlight the second theme: the loss of God. Though the book is open and inclusive, the reader is reminded anew that Kennedy wrote the book with a Christian audience in mind. While Kennedy holds that the experience of "losing" God is common to fervent Christians (30), the student, rather than focusing on how distressing that can be, should take it as a reminder of the most primal Christian belief—namely, that a person need not adhere to any single doctrine to be able to accept God. Moreover, such an experience should jar students out of their complacency and allow them to grow further.This point... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 183-186 [Access article in PDF] Zen Gifts to Christians. By Robert Kennedy. New York: Continuum, 2000. 131 pp. Though Robert Kennedy's recent book Zen Gifts to Christians (2000) is intended for Christian readers who may be "temperamentally inclined" (i) to learn about Zen to spiritually augment their lives, it also succeeds as a work that defines the Western Buddhist community and as an introductory text (...) for those interested in Zen Buddhism. Drawing on his experiences as a Catholic priest and Zen master, Kennedy's work contributes much to the ideals expressed in the Second Vatican Council's conciliar decree Nostra Aetate (as well as the Thirty-fourth General Congregation of the Society of Jesus): to preserve and promote those universal elements of truth that manifest themselves in different cultures and societies, through dialogue and collaboration with followers of other religions. Kennedy achieves this monumental goal by organizing the book around the ten ox-herding pictures of Zen Buddhism (also known as the ten bulls) so as to better illustrate to Christians what Zen Buddhism has to offer through the narrative of spiritual growth common to all Zen Buddhists. Each ox-herding picture (or "bull") is elegantly expanded into a chapter detailing each step in the path of the spiritual quest. Kennedy richly supplements the lessons and ideas contained in each bull with references to Western poetry and prose, making the bulls more accessible to the reader by presenting the information in different ways.For both Christian and non-Christian readers, Kennedy's introduction to Zen may come as somewhat of a surprise, because he begins with the lived components of Zen Buddhism: discipline and practice. Though Zen does have speculative features and theories (as evidenced by koans), it is primarily concrete in its approach. Unlike Christianity, Zen is also a physical skill: it must be attentively practiced for enlightenment to occur. As Kennedy notes, if it is practiced sporadically or by rote, the student cannot make any spiritual progress, thus destroying the goal of the exercise. Moreover, Kennedy indirectly echoes a Platonic critique when he warns the [End Page 183] prospective student that time alone will not produce results, let alone Enlightenment! As with the perfection of any skill, discipline requires that the student give up strengths to concentrate on weaknesses. Kennedy's anecdotes and citations beautifully illustrate the points he wishes to make. However, he is cognizant of the fact that failure is part of any spiritual growth (in fact, it is the hallmark of discipline!) and is careful not to paint Zen in overly rosy colors.While the first chapter (Kennedy's commentary and explanation of the first bull) introduces readers to the concrete aspects of Zen, the second chapter on "not-knowing" explores the application of the abstract or mental component of Zen in one's attitude toward daily circumstances. Kennedy skillfully builds on the lessons he presented in the first chapter to express several ideas, many with implications for Christianity today.Two of these ideas are "letting go" and "the loss of God."Though Zen Gifts to Christians was written well before September 2001, these twin themes have become applicable to the contemporary situation for Christians and Buddhists alike. The theme of"letting go" allows Kennedy to subtly explore how old habits (characteristic of rigidness and inflexibility) not only prevent students from realizing their Buddha-nature, but also destroy the possibility for spiritual growth and progress of any sort. This serves to highlight the second theme: the loss of God. Though the book is open and inclusive, the reader is reminded anew that Kennedy wrote the book with a Christian audience in mind. While Kennedy holds that the experience of "losing" God is common to fervent Christians (30), the student, rather than focusing on how distressing that can be, should take it as a reminder of the most primal Christian belief—namely, that a person need not adhere to any single doctrine to be able to accept God. Moreover, such an experience should jar students out of their complacency and allow them to grow further.This point... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 77 as indicated, makes a highly convincing case, if not for his thesis, at least for his approach. We need more such research. The history of philosophy must be more than the history of philosophies. But is a method which excludes subjective elements and treats ideologies only in function of material factors really total? Refusing to admit the "idealistic" notion of a kind of freedom, of (...) human self-possession, independent not of history (of which it is a part) but of historical determinism, the materialist is driven into rationalizations as baroque as those of the idealist he fights. The substantial uses of the materialist approach, which S~ve makes clear, have been too much ignored; and ideological interpretations tend, as he says, to confuse issues too uncomfortable to face. But materialism too has its ideological confusions which cannot be discerned by autocriticism alone. For who is to see whether the tree continues to be when there's no one about in the quad? EUGEN WEBER University of California, Los Angeles THE PHILOSOPHYOF CHARLES SECRETAN 1815.1895 The philosophy of Seer&an is still important. It best illustrates the nature of the thought of Romanic French-speaking Switzerland in its perpetual attempt to keep up-to-date and to combine science (as exact knowledge) with religion (that is, Christianity). To this day Romanic Swiss thought is a strange mixture of science, speculation, civics, democracy, pedagogics, and traditional Christianity. We find all these elements in Charles Secr6tan, but his thought is also important when taken by itself. Moreover, it illustrates what some scholars call the spiritual greatness of the nineteenth century. Charles Secr6tan was born in 1815 at Lausanne. As a child he was precocious. At the age of four he read short stories fluently. In his youth he was fond of books and had a vivid sense of the beauty of nature. His father was a magistrate tending to Voltairian skepticism. His mother was a devout woman but very reserved and of few words. Charles studied law at the Academy (University) of his city. He came to accept the political liberalism of that day but also underwent the influence of the current religious Rdveil. This was an individualistic awakening of personal Christianity in opposition to the dead orthodoxy and church-conformity of the previous century. In other words, Secrdtan came to believe that adherence to a religion should involve something personally felt, rather than a mere following of the mores of the community. Between 1835 and 1840, he spent some semesters in Munich, studying under Schelling. Later he was to insist upon the originality of his philosophy and its independence of that of his early teacher. In 1837, Seer&an founded the Swiss Review. The next year he was called to teach 78 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Philosophy at the Lausanne Academy. He was suspended by the radical revolution (a sort of demagogery) of 1845. In 1850 he was called to Neuch~ttel and in 1866 recalled to Lausanne where he died in 1895--exactly eighty years old. In the Lausanne Academy, Secr6tan had as a colleague his old friend Alexander Vinet (1797-1847). He found in Vinet a religious force which uplifted his spirit. Vinet was a literary critic, a poet and a professor of the art of preaching, while Secr6tan was a philosopher. Yet Secr6tan owed to Vinet the conviction that no religious doctrine is worthy of acceptance unless it possesses a moral value in itself and in relation to man. The philosophical career of Secr6tan is characterized by three distinct stages (metaphysical, ethical, and sociological) each of which finds expression in an important work: La Philosophie de la Libertd (1849), Le Principe de la Morale (1883), and La Civilisation et la Croyance (1887). We shall therefore consider most briefly Secr~tan's metaphysics, ethics, and sociology. Metaphysics. The starting point of Secr~tan is his contrast of the domain of the conscience (wherein we find being) with the domain of external experience (phenomena). "All our ideas of being come from the fact that [when we affirm something to be] we mean that this something [which is] is analogous to that which we think of when we say 'I am' " (Philosophie de... (shrink)

Much has been written about Schopenhauer’s use of Kant’s aesthetics as well as Schopenhauer’s adherence to and departures from Kant’s theoretical philosophy, not least by Schopenhauer himself. The hypothesis I propose in this paper combines these two research trajectories in a novel way: I wish to argue that Schopenhauer’s main theoretical innovation, the doctrine of the will, can be regarded as the development of an aspect of Kant’s aesthetic theory, specifically that the intransitive, goalless striving of the will in Schopenhauer (...) is the intellectual air to Kant's understanding of the mental processes required for the appreciation of beauty as 'conforming to law without a law'. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Seventeenth-Century Catholic Polemic and the Rise of Cultural Rationalism: An Example from the EmpireSusan RosaIn Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems Sagre-do, an intelligent, cultivated, and well-traveled young man who is persuaded of the truth of arguments in favor of the Copernican opinion presented by the philosopher Salviati, dismisses the counter-arguments of the Aristotelian Simplicio with sympathetic condescension: “I pity him,” he proclaims,no less than I should (...) some fine gentleman who, having built a magnificent palace at great trouble and expense, employing hundreds and hundreds of artisans, and then beholding it threatened with ruin because of poor foundations, should attempt, in order to avoid the grief of seeing the walls destroyed, adorned as they are with so many lovely murals; or the columns fall, which sustain the superb galleries, or the gilded beams, or the doors spoiled, or the pediments and the marble cornices, brought in at so much cost—should attempt, I say, to prevent the collapse with chains, props, iron buttresses, and shores. 1 [End Page 87]This elegant simile, which suggests that the fine gentleman can only preserve his palace by destroying its beauty, is meant to evoke the dilemma of the scholastic philosopher who is confronted by the evident disintegration of his intellectual home. Like the desperate owner who seeks to shore up his real palace, he must rebuild a philosophical edifice whose apparent beauty and coherence have been achieved at the expense of substance and can only be preserved by recourse to means so ugly and inadequate that they destroy even the illusion of credibility.Such a dilemma, I would argue, was the legacy bequeathed to many defenders of traditional religion in the seventeenth century by more than one hundred years of confessional rivalry. To simplify a complex process, this lengthy period of controversy and apologetic, to say nothing of warfare and mutual persecution, had generated a discourse which objectified and prob-lematized religion, making it something to think about rather than to think with. 2 In other words, the formal statements of conviction issued in the wake of the Reformation by competing denominations within Christendom, like the Catechism of the Council of Trent, the Augsburg Confession, the Genevan Confession, or the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England had encouraged the development of the notion of religion as adherence to a set of propositions. As Peter Harrison has explained, this creation of a propositional religion in turnenabled discussion of the merits of other “religions” conceived to exist similarly as sets of beliefs. The truth or falsity of a religion had become a function of the truth or falsity of the propositions which constituted it. True religion... [had become]... a body of certain knowledge. 3Harrison’s remarks are significant because they suggest that the origins of rationalized discourse about religion and its consequent transformation from a way of thinking to an object of thought are to be found squarely within orthodoxy itself. 4To be specific, the competing content of official doctrinal pronouncements led not only to the comparison of the religions but implicitly to their emergence as subjects of a discourse which proposed reason as the norm, a [End Page 88] development clearly reflected in the wave of pamphlets, broadsides, printed disputations, and formal polemical treatises written in both Latin and the vernacular languages which poured from the presses of Catholic and mainstream Protestant denominations in England and on the continent throughout the seventeenth century. In this literature, Protestants accused Catholics of “superstition” and “idolatry,” while Catholics urged potential converts to compare the religions with a view to discovering their “marks of truth,” argued for the compatibility of Catholic faith and “natural light,” and identified heresy, on the contrary, with unreason, passion, lust, and self-contradiction. On both sides of the confessional fence, polemicists frequently insisted that religious discussion conform to the rules of logic, accusing one another of failing to argue from incontrovertible first principles, and of succumbing to the fatal dangers of petitio principii and circular reasoning. In other words, they claimed that in religious matters poor argumentation is a sure sign of error, and it would not be... (shrink)

Collected here for the first time is a history of images of Oman, one of the most developed and stable countries in the Arab world and among the earliest adherents to Islam. A sultanate, the country sits along the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula. From early days of world trade through the port of Muscat to contemporary engagement with international diplomacy and the West, Oman has always evoked beauty and mystery in equal measure. This art-house quality volume reveals (...) an intimate picture of the country as its contours emerged over the last 80 years in the eyes of the West, as captured in images by English explorer Wilfred Thesiger in the 1940s and ‘50s, British Army major Charles Butt in the 1960s, and award-winning American documentary photographer Edward Grazda in the first decade of this new century. (shrink)

It is known that the text of the Qur'an is artistic prose that has reached an unprecedented level in terms of its unique style, superiority, and robustness. Likewise, it can be said for hadith texts reach the peak of eloquence and beauty. Scholars have paid attention to the Qur'an and Hadith texts for centuries in their scientific studies. There are also poets among those who care. Inspired by both texts, they tried to use their style in their odes and (...) literary products through quotation, reference, compensation, and similar arts. From this point of view, our research aims to examine the phenomenon of religious intertextuality in African Arabic poetry -on the condition that the study is limited to the West African region- and to explain its places. In addition to learning to what extent the African poet was influenced by the style, language structure, and methods of the Qur'an and hadith texts, it also explores the relationship adopted between his literary references. What gives this study important is that it attempts to apply one of the modern critical theories to Arabic poetry from West Africa, which many researchers do not know about. This research will prove the rooting of the art of Arabic poetry in West Africa through its intertextuality with the ancient Arab heritage, as well as the validity of its use as a scientific material for contemporary theories. During the research, it was determined that various religious intertextuality was used in the poems of African poets. The poets did not adhere to a certain form in their poems, on the contrary, they used different methods at every stage of their poems. This revealed their culture and knowledge of Arabic literature and poets and showed the extent of their devotion to the Qur'an and Sunnah. Likewise, by referring to historical events and religious people with a religious dimension, they revealed creativity in their poems. For this reason, they were able to paint the most beautiful artistic paintings, which impressed both the reader and the listener. (shrink)

It is known that the text of the Qur'an is artistic prose that has reached an unprecedented level in terms of its unique style, superiority, and robustness. Likewise, it can be said for hadith texts reach the peak of eloquence and beauty. Scholars have paid attention to the Qur'an and Hadith texts for centuries in their scientific studies. There are also poets among those who care. Inspired by both texts, they tried to use their style in their odes and (...) literary products through quotation, reference, compensation, and similar arts. From this point of view, our research aims to examine the phenomenon of religious intertextuality in African Arabic poetry -on the condition that the study is limited to the West African region- and to explain its places. In addition to learning to what extent the African poet was influenced by the style, language structure, and methods of the Qur'an and hadith texts, it also explores the relationship adopted between his literary references. What gives this study important is that it attempts to apply one of the modern critical theories (intertextuality) to Arabic poetry from West Africa, which many researchers do not know about. This research will prove the rooting of the art of Arabic poetry in West Africa through its intertextuality with the ancient Arab heritage, as well as the validity of its use as a scientific material for contemporary theories. During the research, it was determined that various religious intertextuality was used in the poems of African poets. The poets did not adhere to a certain form in their poems, on the contrary, they used different methods at every stage of their poems. This revealed their culture and knowledge of Arabic literature and poets and showed the extent of their devotion to the Qur'an and Sunnah. Likewise, by referring to historical events and religious people with a religious dimension, they revealed creativity in their poems. For this reason, they were able to paint the most beautiful artistic paintings, which impressed both the reader and the listener. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.2 (2004) 188-193 [Access article in PDF] Response to June Boyce-Tillman, "Towards an Ecology of Music Education" Mark Garberich Michigan State University June Boyce-Tillman's "Towards an Ecology of Music Education" challenges the foundations of music education philosophy and its application to practice. Beginning with the identification and clarification of what are described as "subjugated ways of knowing," she advocates the restoration and application of (...) these approaches to instruction. She completes the description and definition of the interlocking [End Page 188] areas of musical experience by providing an actual project that exemplifies these tenets. I offer my humble appreciation of the attention she gives to the exploration of alternate approaches to music instruction and to the need for a clearer connection between community and individual and between culture and music education."Toward an Ecology of Music Education" is about values. Values may well be the defining word of this era in Western education and society. Changes in demographics, belief systems, and political dogma have de-stabilized the foundations of social and political frameworks, regardless of their efficacy. So, I would like to elaborate on the values represented in this paper, discussing them in relation to teaching, democracy, and diversity in music education. Values and Teaching Each of us carries our worldview into our work and we cannot deny our philosophical identity. However, the degree to which we allow our worldview to affect our teaching should be limited by the priorities of our instruction. Consider music education as having three broad perspectives: (a) purpose in society, (b) purpose for the individual, and (c) aesthetics (inherent value). The position of the three is not hierarchical and each can be considered apart from the others. We give evidence of our real motivation in music education by the emphasis we place upon each of these three. The aesthetically inclined find appeal in teaching for the inherent value in music. Those who strongly maintain a social agenda may be attracted by the possibilities of improving society as a whole through music education. Plato's view of music education was oriented almost exclusively toward his purposes for society. In his writing, any consideration of effect on the individual was only incidental to his primary concern of its effect on society.The true teacher, however, will always gravitate toward the purpose for the individual. A person is the source of his ideas, and does not the creator stand above his creation? Do music teachers teach music? No, they teach students about music. Though we cannot separate ourselves from our love of beauty of form and expression in music nor can we forget our personal commitments toward improving the world around us, yet we must remember that it is the individual student who is the focus of music instruction. If this is true, we can draw some conclusions about our right to bring about change.Do we have the right to proselytize individual students so that they might become adherents of our worldview? As an evangelical Christian, perhaps even a fundamentalist, I admit that I have observed changes in society over my lifetime with some sadness. It is difficult to see the country I love, which was founded upon Judeo-Christian principles, gradually losing touch with those principles. How will departure from those principles affect the direction and stability of the [End Page 189] nation founded upon them? As a teacher, however, I understand that it is my responsibility to teach students about music and that I have a responsibility to parents, who in a democratic society, hold responsibility not only for the spiritual, moral, and social education of their children, but also for the spiritual, moral, and social direction of a nation. Teachers are obliged to live as moral examples to students and to demonstrate values in their actions, but to consider the wishes of parents when it comes to the advancement of personal agendas. We do not have the right to encroach upon the mentoring relationship between parents and children. We must also be careful lest we... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Puzzle of Fanny PriceJoyce L. JenkinsIt is common to open a work regarding the merits of Mansfield Park by noting that Fanny Price is very difficult to like. Nietzsche might have described her as a "moral tarantula." 1 She sits, making negative moral judgments about the actions of others, while doing nothing herself. Fanny spends most of her time, literally, sitting or lying down. Austen describes her character (...) as "supine." Comparing Fanny with her sister Susan, Austen says that "Susan was only acting on the same truths, and pursuing the same system, which her [Fanny's] own judgment acknowledged, but which her more supine and yielding temper would have shrunk from asserting. Susan tried to be useful, where she could only have gone away and cried" (MP, p. 395). 2 And Fanny cries all of the time. She cries at least thirteen times over the course of the novel. So, there are two questions about the novel that need to be answered. Why did Austen create a heroine who is so clearly distasteful? Why do some critics and philosophers see Fanny as a moral ideal or cultural icon? Some (Alasdair MacIntyre, Gilbert Ryle, Lionel Trilling) argue that Fanny is so unappealing just because Austen wants to be didactic 3 and force us to focus on virtue. According to Lionel Trilling, for example, Mansfield Park has a different moral message from Pride and Prejudice. "Its praise is not for social freedom, but for social stasis. It takes full notice of spiritedness, vivacity, celerity and lightness, but only to reject them as having nothing to do with virtue and happiness, as being, indeed, deterrents to the good life." 4 Others think that the infelicities of the novel and its heroine make it a parody of traditional feminine values and conservative moral thought in general. 5 Here, I shall argue that a path between these two extreme ways of reading the novel is correct. I shall argue, using Alasdair MacIntyre's discussion as a starting [End Page 346] point, that Austen does not cast Fanny as a moral ideal. If Austen is Aristotelian (a common view among philosophers) Fanny cannot be an ideal. And, although I agree with Johnson's view that those who have read the novel as morally conservative are wrong, I do not think that the novel exhibits global skepticism about traditional standards for the beautiful/feminine. Austen condemns the idea that women should be passive dolls who do not think for themselves, but she does not parody the traditional idea that women should be sweet, gentle, and caring. In my view, Fanny's character constitutes a criticism of passivity, and of rigid adherence to moral rules.Alasdair MacIntyre's view is that Austen is an Aristotelian moralist with a Christian slant on the make-up of the virtues. He describes Fanny's character as an ideal of virtue. He argues that Fanny is pretty much lacking in charm just because Austen wanted to focus on the nature of virtue, which charm can obscure and which Fanny is meant to epitomize.For charm is the characteristically modern quality which those who lack or simulate the virtues use to get by in situations of characteristically modern social life... And the charm of an Elizabeth Bennett... may mislead us... Fanny is charmless; she has only the virtues, the genuine virtues to protect her... and when she disobeys her guardian, Sir Thomas Bertram, and refuses marriage to Henry Crawford it can only be because of what constancy requires. In so refusing she places the danger of losing her soul before the reward of gaining what for her would be a whole world. She pursues virtue for the sake of a certain kind of happiness and not for its utility. 6So, MacIntyre thinks that Fanny Price is meant to be a stripped down model of virtue, with constancy being the keystone virtue that she exhibits. "Constancy is crucial in at least two novels, Mansfield Park and Persuasion, in each of which it is a central virtue of the heroine... And without constancy all the other virtues to some degree lose their point" (AV, p. 242).But when constancy is discussed... (shrink)

External reality is not moved by our personal dramas; even when our world is collapsing, the world continues its normal course, as if nothing had happened. Of course we know that the most poignant human suffering will not stop the sun from shining or the world from turning. Yet there are moments when the disharmony between objective reality and our own emotional state is painful and even surprising. It seems as if the world is provocatively uninterested in what is most (...) dear to us.The awareness of this rift is evoked in the first sentence of Borges’ well-known story translated into Dutch under the title De Aleph, "On the harrowing morning in February when Beatriz Viterbo died... I saw that the iron poster boards in the Plaza Constitución were being pasted over with some type of advertising for light cigarettes; this struck me, for I understood that the restless, enormous universe was already withdrawing from her, and that this was the first change in an endless series".What is the theoretical relevance of this experience, often roused by poetry and prose, but seldom discussed by philosophers? Is Borges referring to a purely subjective experience from which no conclusion can be drawn, or does he speak of an experience containing an important theoretical insight? Regardless, our ability to undergo this experience is evidently independent of our favourite philosophical concepts. Even someone who adheres to a theory that accepts a meaningful reality can experience this rift when he observes the sun shining triumphantly on a day of mourning. Similarly, someone having no metaphysical belief in a meaningful reality can remain immune to the type of rift Borges describes.Yet it cannot be denied that this rift experience is strengthened and legitimized by an important development in knowledge. The science has evoked a world view that strictly separates objective facts from subjective values. The reality presented by science, is not an inspired relationship or meaningful construction where humanity finds its place and from which it derives its dignity. Laws discovered by science say nothing of good or evil and contain no message on the meaning of life. Science is a source of trustworthy information not elevating, inspiring or comforting concepts. From a scientific viewpoint, knowledge of objective reality has nothing to do with insights people use to orient their lives.This separation of knowledge and wisdom contrasts sharply with a traditional view where knowledge of the most fundamental characteristics of reality also offers an insight in the meaning of human life. Nietzsche described this contrast as follows: while people have always tended to believe that what concerns them most also lies at the heart of reality, they must now realize that their moral, religious or aesthetic values merely form a superficial world of appearances; what elicits wonder or strong emotion is only a blossom on a reality that, in its deeper roots, is not at all beautiful or moving.The disenchantment brought on by science creates a breach or rift. Everything we experience as mysterious, enchanted or moving, appears also to exist as a reality coldly and neutrally described by science. Science demystified the rainbow that once appeared as a mysterious, divine phenomenon: what had always seemed wondrous can apparently be explained by the same natural laws that regulate the most banal or prosaic phenomena. (shrink)

This article is about experiences of a cemetery landscape: a physical space that was chosen as a depository for human remains, and where different memorial and disposal practices have developed behavioural patterns that together form a cemetery culture. Through qualitative research at St Eskil’s, Eskilstuna, Sweden, encompassing field observations and interviews (N=14) with stakeholders and people from the general public, we aim to describe and discuss the cemetery as a place and environment experienced from a perspective of people of diverse (...) backgrounds. The study reveals important characteristics that facilitate designing, caretaking, developing and using cemeteries more generally. Findings show that most interviewees, independent for example of cultural or religious adherence, describe the cemetery as a beautiful natural or garden-like place. The well-maintained landscape is emphasized as a self-evident or impressive quality. The cemetery is experienced as ‘typically Swedish’ and described in terms of order and sense of care. Diversity in both design and multi-cultural and individual expressions are observed, acknowledged and welcomed. We conclude that nature (including a garden approach), care and diversity are key concepts that should be considered in design and development of future cemeteries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The 1999 Parliament of the World’s ReligionsJim KenneyThe Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions (CPWR) is delighted to announce the convening of the 1999 Parliament of the World’s Religions, December 1–8, 1999, in Cape Town, South Africa. Nestled against Table Mountain and overlooking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, Cape Town is home to many races, religious traditions, and cultural varieties. Religious, spiritual, cultural, and civic leaders, groups, (...) and communities there are working in partnership with CPWR to make the 1999 Parliament an unforgettable gift to the world.In the spring of 1988 the Council for a Parliament of the World’s Religions was formed with the commitment to celebrate the hundredth anniversary of the first Parliament of Religions, held in Chicago in 1893. The 1993 Parliament of the World’s Religions was one of the most extraordinary interreligious events of all time. Almost eight thousand participants came together to celebrate the commonalties and diversities of the world’s religious and spiritual traditions and to explore religious and spiritual responses to the critical issues that face the human community.Part of the legacy of the 1993 Parliament was a widespread conviction on the part of religious and spiritual leaders and participants from the grassroots that what had taken place in Chicago must continue. The parliament testified to a new spirit emerging around the world, characterized by new interreligious encounter, understanding, and cooperation. In the wake of the 1993 event, the council began to shape two initiatives designed to foster interreligious dialogue and shared action in metropolitan Chicago and around the globe. To highlight and punctuate these ongoing efforts, CPWR made a powerful commitment that, beginning in 1999 and every five years thereafter, a new parliament would be convened somewhere in the world.The diversity of the global community has never been more apparent. Today, metropolitan centers like Chicago exhibit an unprecedented variety of cultures. Advanced technology and communications have transformed the world into a global village. As a consequence, awareness of the richness of the human family in its racial, ethnic, cultural, social, religious, and spiritual dimensions is growing worldwide. The beauty and promise of this diversity is that we are mysteries and opportunities to one another. We are strangers who can become neighbors and friends. Simply in sharing who we are with each other, we all can broaden our horizons, deepen our [End Page 201] understandings, and get in touch with new sources of compassion and vision, courage and hope.At a Parliament of the World’s Religions, people from around the world—teachers, scholars, leaders, believers, and practitioners—come together to experience astonishing spiritual and cultural variety, to exchange insights, to share wisdom, to celebrate their unique religious identities; in short, to be amazed, delighted, and inspired. At the same time, participants wrestle with the critical issues facing the global community, learning about the world situation, and seeking the moral and ethical convergence that leads to shared commitment and action.The Parliament experience unfolds as a spectacular opening ceremony welcomes thousands of adherents of the world’s religious and spiritual traditions. In the days that follow, participants eagerly engage in interreligious encounter and education through lectures and workshops, plenary sessions, and performances. In shared observances, meditation, and prayer, persons from all walks of life find inspiration and renewal. And in chance meetings in corridors and on the street, each finds that the world is paradoxically both a smaller and a richer place than she or he ever imagined.In a period of heightened spiritual interest and renewal, the 1999 Parliament of the World’s Religions in Cape Town, South Africa, will offer countless opportunities for discovery and inquiry. Participants will be able to touch their own traditions at deeper levels. They can explore the origins, development, and perspectives of unfamiliar paths. They can compare and contrast beliefs and practices from widely separated places and times. Through lectures, workshops, and plenary sessions, through worship, prayer, or meditation, and through chance meetings with people from around the world, the parliament event will offer everything from occasions for personal spiritual growth and exposure to transformative approaches to social engagement to new friendships and an... (shrink)

Qaside-i Khamriyya (meaning Wine Eulogy) of sufi poet Ibn-i Fārıḍ, in which he explained divine love through the metaphor of wine, attracted great attention in Islamic world and was translated into Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Scholars such as Davud-i Qayseri (d. 751 AH/1350 AD), Kemal Pashazāde (d. 940 AH/1534 AD), Abdulghani an-Nablusi (d. 1143 AH/1731 AD), Ibn Acibe (d. 1224 AH/1809 AD) explained this eulogy in Arabic, while poets such as Ali b. Shihābiddin al-Hamadāni (d. 786 AH/1385 AD), Molla Cāmi (...) (d. 898 AH/1492 AD), Idris-i Bitlisi (d. 926 AH/1520 AD) wrote commentaries in Persian. On the other hand, authors such as Abdussalam b. Numan b. Khalil (d. 1000 AH/1592 AD [?]), Ismail Anqaravi (d. 1041 AH/1631 AD), Abdulmacid-i Sivasi (d. 1049 AH/1639 AD), Qara Musṭafa Khulūsi (d. 1344 AH/1926 AD), Meḥmed Naẓım (d. 1345 AH/1926 AD) and Ṭahir al-Mavlavi (d. 1371 AH/1951 AD) translated the eulogy into Turkish. One of the authors who translators of this eulogy was Mehmed Said Efendi, sheikh of Uskudar Salimiya Takka, who lived in the 19th century. His work named Ṭarab-angiz (meaning Pleasure-provoking) is a condensed commentary with ornate prose of Qaside-i Khamriyya. In previous studies, Ṭarab-angiz was partly examined, and there was no mention about the identity and personality of the author. In the present research, the life and personality of Meḥmed Said Efendi is explained and the text of his work is examined.Summary: In Turkish literature which developed under the influence of Islam, translations and commentaries have important a place along with original texts. Coming within the sphere of Islam in early 10th century, Turks embarked on translating the texts immediately in order to learn their new religion and to perform its practices and continued to do so since then. Because they lived in the same culture and civilization climate, Turks learned Islam from Persians and were influenced by Persian language. However, adherents of this new religion also made direct translations from Arabic texts. The translations initially were made from religious works, but in time social, cultural and literary works, such as Persian classics and major eulogies of Arabic Literature, were also translated into Turkish by Turkish scholars. Qaside-i Burde by Ka‘b b. Zuheyr’in (d. 24 AH/645 AD), Qaside-i Nūniyye by Ebu’l-Fetḥ Busti’nin (d. 400 AH/1010 AD), Qaside-i Ṭanṭarāniyye by Ṭanṭarāni’nin (d. 485 AH/1092 AD), Qaside-i Münferice by Ibnu’n-Naḥvi’nin (d. 513 AH/1119 AD), Qaside-i Emāli by Ali b. Othman al-Ushi’nin (d. 575 AH/1179 AD) and famous eulogy named Qaside-i Bur’e by Muḥammed b. Said al-Buṣiri’nin (d. 695 AH/1296 AD) were among such works.Qaside-i Khamriyya by sufi poet Ibn-i Fārıḍ (d. 632 AH/1235 AD), also called sultan of minstrels, in which he explained divine love through wine attracted great attention in Islamic world and was translated into many languages and many commentaries were written on it. One of the commentary writers about this eulogy is Meḥmed Said Efendi, a 19th century sufi. His work entitled Ṭarab-angiz is a condensed commentary with ornate prose of Qaside-i Khamriyya.Studies conducted so far has partly dealt with the Ṭarab-angiz and identity and personality of Meḥmed Said Efendi have never been mentioned. Ṣarac mentioned, “It is a printed work but its writer, printing date, and the place was not found on the printed work”, while Yıldırım used the expression of “a work whose writer and production date is not known.” In his Ph. D. thesis entitled Translation and Commentary Tradition in Classical Turkish Literature in Anatolia, Ṣadık Yazar noted that the work belongs to Meḥmed Said, which was later cited by Aqdag. The final statement on this issue was made by İnce in his work entitled Arabic, Persian and Turkish commentaries of Qaside-i Khamriyya by Ibnu’l Fārıḍ. He examined a total of 18 commentaries and stated that no information is available about the life of Meḥmed Said although he mentioned Ṭarab-angiz.The birth date and place of Meḥmed Said Efendi are unknown. He is grandchild of Ali Behjet Efendi (d. 1238 AH/1823 AD), one of sheiks in Salimiya Dervish Lodge in Uskudar and son of Meḥmed Hidāyetullah Efendi (d. 1288 AH/1871 AD). Following the death of his father, Meḥmed Said Efendi himself served as the head dervish of this dervish lodge for 25 years and became a famous figure. He died in 1313 AH/1896 AD and was buried in the cemetery of the Salimiya Dervish Lodge.Meḥmed Said Efendi was the sixth sheikh of Salimiya Dervish Lodge. In many sources, he was mentioned as a venerable, righteous, devoutly religious, virtuous, polite and scholarly man. Meḥmed Said Efendi is thought to be a member of Mavlavi lodge of Naqshbandi Ṭariqa. He had successors such as Naqshi sheikh Uskudari Balabani Ḥasan Ḥusnu Efendi (d. 1347 AH/1928 AD) and Ismail Efendi (d. after 1307 AH/1890 AD). The poet had a commentary named Ṭarab-angiz in prose form and had a quatrain within the praising eulogy of Sheikh Ḥāmil Efendi (d. 1322 AH/1904 AD), head sheikh of Beylerbeyi Bedevi Dervish Lodge.It is clear from the expression, “A work by Meḥmed Said, the Imam of Central Dervish Lodge of Sultan Salim III,” at the beginning of Edition no: 450 in Suleymaniye Library, Pertev Pasha Collection and from the record of “Work: Ṭarab-angiz, Author: Ibnu’l-Fārıḍ, Translator and postscript writer: Meḥmed Said” in Edition no: 7350 of Marmara University Faculty of Theology Library that this work belongs to Sheikh Meḥmed Said Efendi. However, exact production date of this printed work is not known. The work consisted of 28 pages and in some editions a two-page correct-false chart was added.As usual, the work starts with an introduction section with expressions of “By the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful,” “Praise be to God,” and “Peace be upon Prophet Moḥammad.” This section also includes a praise for followers of Prophet Moḥammad, “Who made sphere of prophecy an eternal rose garden through the holy light of their enjoyed manners in addition to making the Shari’a candle shined and and converting them to great flowers of service with their strong inspiration torchs.” The commentator then embarked on praising Qaside-i Khamriyya, mentioning that the men of ability became helpless in explaination of beauty, charm and freshness of unique expression richness and refined allegory blossoms of the eulogy and that reaching the shore of rhetoric could be possible through diving into the guided wisdom of sea. In fact, according to commentator, the men of literature should be aware of the difficulty of translating this unique eulogy into Turkish language. However, everyone should dive into the sea of insight as a knowledge diver, collect its share in pearls of utterance and in emeralds of wits, arrange and put them in the string of prose”. Therefore, he wrote the commentary about the eulogy as a service to humanity and as a contribution to his own stock of comfort in the present and afterlife as much as he could, no matter how little it could be, and named it Ṭarab-angiz. Like most commentators of Qaside-i Khamriyya, Meḥmed Said Efendi commented on only about 33 couplets of the eulogy which contained a total of 41 couplets, and did not cover couplets from 23 to 30 in his work. The commentator used couplet-by- couplet translation method and started with praising for Ibn-i Fārıḍ and his couplets. Then, he gives the Arabic originals of the couplets and starts commentary with the expressions such as “couplets of great intuition, imagery couplets, product of couplet, enlightenment of couplet and concept of couplet.” In preface section of the work, the commentator, who usually quoted hadith texts in Arabic and poems, does not use them in his commentary. He only uses some lines of Arabic prayers and a quatrain of Molla Cāmi (d. 898 AH/1492 AD). This is a quatrain rubāi in Persian language meaning that “If you want no sorrow and no grief of the destiny, drink wine in a pub, because swirling of the goblet and worries of the world do not share the same place just as the tune and the sorrow do not coincide.” The lack of touching on the meaning of words, etymological structure and grammar rules in couplets makes it different from others, except the translation of Aḥmed Ṣāfi Bey. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:110 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY History of Aesthetics, Vol. I. Ancient Aesthetics. By Wladyslaw Tatarkiewicz. Ed. J. Harrell. Trans. Adam and Ann Czerniawski. (The Hague-Paris: Mouton and Warszawa: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1970. Pp. vii-352.) History of Aesthetics, Vol. II. Medieval Aesthetics. By WladySlaw Tatarkiewicz. Ed. C. Barrett. Trans. R. M. Montgomery. (The Hague-Paris: Mouton and Warszawa: PWN-Polish Scientific Publishers, 1970. Pp. vii-315.) These two volumes of Tatarkiewicz' monumental history of (...) aesthetics, the third volume (to 1700) of which is now being prepared for press, have been reviewed already in the major aesthetic journals in Europe and America following their publication in Polish. Since Polish is not one of my languages, I can say nothing about the adequacy of the (rather obscured) translators and their work. The editors of both volumes have done their difficult work thoroughly, though the usual inconsistencies of spelling and such creep in. British spellings of judgement, centre, and colour, for example, appear in one part of a volume, while center, color, and judgment appear in another part. These are rare and not at all irksome details. On p. 220 of volume I, Aristotle has become a Stagiryte (sic). If the editors and translators actually re-checked all of those Greek, Polish and English texts--to say nothing of the Latin--they have earned a very large debt indeed. Again, my selective ignorance eliminates me from assessment. Tatarkiewicz' historical writing is surgical and Lacon-like. His major achievement lies in refraining from philosophical animadversions and for sticking strictly to his topic, no matter how tempting the theoretic distractions. Actually one expects a history of aesthetics to find the locus of aesthetic theory in the usual systematic frameworks of outstanding philosophers, but again Tatarkiewicz knows better than to try to provide these settings. His device is to stay exactly with the texts of authors, and to provide as much evidence for his statements as a printed work will allow. His scholarship is truly prodigious, and the work will live as reference for a long time to come. But it is more than a reference. There are some remarkable novelties included that bear mention. First of all, Tatarkiewicz' opening analysis of what must be included in a history of aesthetics is penetrating and convincing. In addition to the major "dualities" of aesthetics (beauty-art, subjective-objective aesthetics, psychological-sociological aesthetics, descriptive-prescriptive aesthetics, etc.) he simply accepts the necessity to find evidence of aesthetic history among statements by artists, among the inexplicit and inarticulate art works, in the vox populi and cultural actions of people. Thus the "evidence" he adduces will often displease the theoretical purist. Next, one is impressed by the great antiquity of some key issues that are being avidly pursued today. What is impressive is not that they are being repeated now, but that modern writers so rarely recognize (or acknowledge) their historical sources---or seem to care to. A careful study of this history might do much to reduce the growing volume in aesthetics----or at least to change the direction of emphasis significantly. One is surprised to note which figures emerge as of first rate importance in the history of aesthetics, important for different reasons. These figures stand out: Democritus, Plotinus, Aristotle, Vitruvius, the Pseudo-Dionysius, Johannes Scotus Erigena, to select only a few. The first Polish philosopher, Vitelo, anticipates much modern psychologizing in advancing the work of Alhazen. Ockham, not so surprising, contributes major advances, as do Augustine and Aquinas. BOOK REVIEWS 111 One fascinating item is the author's extensive account of the most violent and extended controversy in the history of aesthetics---the veneration of images and the disputes between the Iconoclasts and the Iconophiles. This sometimes physical battle raged for over 100 years! The Byzantine society, obviously, took art seriously. Tatarkiewicz' great labor is an object lesson in historiography and bibliographic technique. At one and the same time it demonstrates how much of value remains to be discovered by careful adherence to the detail of scholarship, while it also displays how much fruitful scholarship depends upon a brilliant and profoundly informed mind. Such a work, in short, could only have descended from a fully mature... (shrink)

What is the nature of the concept BEAUTY? Does it differ fundamentally from nearby concepts such as PRETTINESS? It is argued that BEAUTY, but not PRETTINESS, is a dual-character concept. Across a number of contexts, it is proposed that BEAUTY has a descriptive sense that is characterised by, inter alia, having intrinsically pleasing appearances; and a normative sense associated with deeply-held values. This account is supported across two, pre-registered, studies (N=500), and by drawing on analysis of corpus (...) data. It is suggested that this can help to explain why beauty, unlike prettiness, is thought to be deep in both the sense of being important, and in the sense of being less closely tied to sensory surfaces. (shrink)