In order to decide whether a discursive product of human reason corresponds or not to the logical order, one must analyze it in terms of syntactic correctness, consistency, and validity. The first step in logical analysis is formalization, that is, the process by which logical forms of thoughts are represented in different formal languages or logical systems. Although each thought can be properly formalized in different ways, the formalization variants are not equally adequate. The adequacy of formalization seems to (...) depend on several essential features: parsimony, accuracy, transparency, fertility and reliability. Because there is a partial antinomy between these traits, it is impossible to find a perfectly adequate variant of formalization. However, it is possible and preferable to reach a reasonable compromise by choosing the variant of formalization which satisfies all of these fundamental characteristics. (shrink)

The point of formalisation is to model various aspects of natural language. Perhaps the main use to which formalisation is put is to model and explain inferential relations between different sentences. Judged solely by this objective, a formalisation is successful in modelling the inferential network of natural language sentences to the extent that it mirrors this network. There is surprisingly little literature on the criteria of good formalisation, and even less on the question of what it (...) is for a formalisation to mirror the inferential network of a natural language or some fragment of it. This paper takes some exploratory steps towards a quantitative account of the main ingredient in the goodness of a formalisation. We introduce and critically examine a mathematical model of how well a formalisation mirrors natural-language inferential relations. (shrink)

어떤 사람의 인품에 대해 칭찬할 때 그 자질을 가리키는 말에는 여러 가지가 있다. ‘선한’ 사람이라든지 ‘덕스러운’ 사람 같은 표현들은 모두 그런 맥락에서 사용되는 것 같다. 이 표현들은 일정하게는 윤리적으로 혹은 도덕적으로 훌륭한 사람을 지칭하는 공통점이 있다. 그러나 과연 인격적인 훌륭함을 도덕적 차원의 고결성과 동일시하는 것이 가장 적절한 방식으로 인격적인 훌륭함을 표현하는 일인지는 의문이다.BR 이 글은 인격통합성을 인식론적 능력으로 파악하고 있는 셔코스케(G. Scherkoske)의 견해를 살펴보고 그에 대한 반론을 시도한다. 그의 논의는 최근의 여러 이론 가운데서 가장 진화된 방식으로 반 도덕주의적인 성향의 인격통합성 (...) 이론을 제시한다. 인격적인 훌륭함을 오직 도덕성과의 연결선상에서만 이해하고 있는 우리 문화에서는 그가 어떤 방식으로 논의를 펼치는지 자체가 흥미의 대상이 될 수 있다. 필자는 그의 이론이 인격통합성을 개인의 실천의 문제로 본 기존의 이론들과 구별해서 지식 획득의 중요성을 강조한다는 점을 드러내는 한편, 그것이 인격통합성을 규범적 개념으로 이해할 수밖에 없는 실천적 관행을 수용하지 못한다는 점을 주장한다. (shrink)

In the paper, various notions of the logical semiotic sense of linguistic expressions – namely, syntactic and semantic, intensional and extensional – are considered and formalised on the basis of a formal-logical conception of any language L characterised categorially in the spirit of certain Husserl's ideas of pure grammar, Leśniewski-Ajdukiewicz's theory of syntactic/semantic categories and, in accordance with Frege's ontological canons, Bocheński's and some of Suszko's ideas of language adequacy of expressions of L. The adequacy ensures their unambiguous (...) syntactic and semantic senses and mutual, syntactic and semantic correspondence guaranteed by the acceptance of a postulate of categorial compatibility of syntactic and semantic (extensional and intensional) categories of expressions of L. This postulate defines the unification of these three logical senses. There are three principles of compositionality which follow from this postulate: one syntactic and two semantic ones already known to Frege. They are treated as conditions of homomorphism of partial algebra of L into algebraic models of L: syntactic, intensional and extensional. In the paper, they are applied to some expressions with quantifiers. Language adequacy connected with the logical senses described in the logical conception of language L is, obviously, an idealisation. The syntactic and semantic unambiguity of its expressions is not, of course, a feature of natural languages, but every syntactically and semantically ambiguous expression of such languages may be treated as a schema representing all of its interpretations that are unambiguous expressions. (shrink)

Resemblance Nominalism About Perfect Naturalness is the view that perfect naturalness of classes is best defined by a conceptual primitive of resemblance between particulars. The adequacy of RNPN is defended by outlining nominalism as the strictly anti-constitutive view that the particulars’ being the fundamental ways they are is not constituted by anything further, supplying a doubly plural contrastive and graded resemblance predicate that allows for a definition of perfect naturalness on an actualist basis, and proving a representation and a (...) uniqueness theorem on the basis of a formal constraint on resemblance called “the Principle”, thereby revealing that bodies of nominalist resemblance facts are guaranteed to behave as if they were grounded in patterns of universals distributed over particulars. (shrink)

What are the requirements on an adequate genuine modal realist analysis of modal discourse? One is material adequacy: the modal realist must provide for each candidate analysandum an analysans in the language of counterpart theory which by his lights has the same truth value as the candidate analysandum. Must the material biconditional joining these be necessarily true? This is the requirement of strict adequacy. It is not satisfied if Lewis’s 1968 scheme provides the analysis. John Divers puts forward (...) a modification, which identifies cases of ‘advanced modalizing’ in which the modal operator is semantically redundant. Even with this modification modal realist analyses of statements of modal discourse will be strictly inadequate. Strict adequacy can be achieved by extending the redundancy interpretation to all de dicto modal statements. The price is the denial of de dicto contingency. But perhaps material adequacy is enough. If the modal realist has a systematic means of replacing every sentence of quantified modal logic which he considers true by a sentence of counterpart theory that he considers true, perhaps he need do no more. Still, traditionally philosophical analysis aims at strict adequacy so it is as well to know that this is a test the modal realist analysis fails unless he abandons de dicto contingency. (shrink)

In the Periodic Tables the transition from atoms to double-charged cations is accompanied by alterations in the composition of s and p blocks and reciprocal location of blocks, as well as by changes in the composition and length of periods. We have previously described the relationship between the atom properties and the total number of differentiating electrons. This paper demonstrates that, despite the above transition-related alterations, this relationship is also valid for the description of the properties of double-charged cations. This (...) can be exemplified by the dependence of the ionization energy on the total number of p electrons in p block, d electrons in d block, and f electrons in f block. Furthermore, a single periodic equation is sufficient for the description of properties of all of double-charged cations from each block. (shrink)

Genetic research presents ethical challenges to the achievement of valid informed consent, especially in developing countries with areas of low literacy. During the last several years, a number of genetic research proposals involving Omani nationals were submitted to the Department of Research and Studies, Ministry of Health, Oman.The objective of this paper is to report on the results of an internal quality assurance initiative to determine the extent of the information being provided in genetic research informed consent forms. In order (...) to achieve this, we developed checklists to assess the inclusion of basic elements of informed consent as well as elements related to the collection and future storage of biological samples. Three of the authors independently evaluated and reached consensus on seven informed consent forms that were available for review.Of the seven consent forms, four had less than half of the basic elements of informed consent. None contained any information regarding whether genetic information relevant to health would be disclosed, whether participants may share in commercial products, the extent of confidentiality protections, and the inclusion of additional consent forms for future storage and use of tissue samples. Information regarding genetic risks and withdrawal of samples were rarely mentioned (1/7), whereas limits on future use of samples were mentioned in 3 of 7 consent forms.Ultimately, consent forms are not likely to address key issues regarding genetic research that have been recommended by research ethics guidelines. We recommend enhanced educational efforts to increase awareness, on the part of researchers, of information that should be included in consent forms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Anthony Paul Kerby THE ADEQUACY OF SELF-NARRATION: A HERMENEUTICAL APPROACH An important question that arises from the increasing contemporary emphasis on the self as a narrative construct concerns the adequacy or truthfulness of the narrative accounts we give ofourselves. What, for example, stops our self-narrations and self-characterizations from becoming, in many cases, mere flights of fancy or fictions? If, on a fairly radical view, the self is (...) taken to be a product of narrative emplotment, then clearly the above question cannot be answered by a simple appeal to what the narrative is supposed to represent or copyas though the selfwere first given to us external or prior to the narrative. It is not immediately clear, however, just what a narrative account of the human subject could be adequate to, and, if we were to grant some prenarrative status to the human subject, it is also not clear whether the imposition of narrative structures falsifies the "truth" of this latter subject. What we shall examine, then, is precisely this important question of adequacy and various problems that surround it. To bring these problems into focus and offer some solutions, we shall consider both self-narration and the writing of history. These solutions will have a decidedly hermeneutical flavor, and for one principal reason: hermeneutics, especially as represented by Gadamer and Ricoeur, is particularly suited to addressing questions of self-expression while avoiding traditional metaphysical presuppositions about the human subject. Let us begin with a few words on hermeneutics. To offer a hermeneutics of something will presumably commit one to certain philosophical and methodological presuppositions. To see what these presuppositions are we might briefly compare hermeneutics to two of its close neighbors: phenomenology and semiotics. I believe 232 Anthony Paul Kerby233 diät these three positions are all of value and that their central insights must be integrated. Contemporary hermeneutics can be viewed as usefully fulfilling this latter task. On the one hand, a hermeneutic philosophy can accept the phenomenological starting point of immediacy to phenomena. However, it does not delude itself into thinking that there is a privileged mode of access to phenomena that would disconnect the categories of our particular historical and linguistic heritage. On the other hand, while recognizing that our understanding is mediated by language and semiotic systems generally—the signifying networks of exchange and communication—hermeneutics need notlose contactwith the life-experiences of the subjects within this semiotic realm. That is, we not only come to understand the sign systems operative in our world, but also, to some degree, ourselves as we act in and through them. As Ricoeur often stresses, semiotics (and structuralism) have still to take the final step of accounting for the experiencing subjects presupposed by any structural social system. Semiotics would, at its extreme point, remain arbitrary with respect to phenomenological experience, just as phenomenology would remain silent if it were consistendy to avoid the conceptual and cultural biases of our languages. Thus, while presupposing individual human experience (and worldliness ), hermeneutics can still accept that such experience only achieves expression and explicit understandingin the semiotic realm, and further that this expression is not the duplication of a fully formed but preexpressed understanding, for understanding is only first grasped at the level of expression. As Gadamer has written: "Being that can be understood is language," but this is not to deny the existence of some matter at hand, a hermeneutic Sache selbst, that thereby comes to language ; in our case the human subject itself. Hermeneutics is essentially a reflexive philosophy, but one which rejects the absolute starting point of the Cartesian subject. The subject's self-understanding is an interpretive process, where we must recognize interpretation as an integral part of the subject's very being. Charles Taylor sums up this hermeneutic situation by saying that man "cannot be understood simply as an object among objects, for his life incorporates an interpretation, an expression of which cannot exist unexpressed, because the self that is to be interpreted is essentially that of a being who self-interprets." ' This position, which implies a rejection of both subjectivism and die metaphysics of presence, problematizes self-understanding by viewing the self as mediated by its... (shrink)

he notion of linguistic adequacy (the adequacy of sentences to express or describe) is explicated in terms of a set theoretical model of the communication situation. Roughly: a message is adequate to the degree it answers the receiver's questions. Adequacy is distinguished from openness, in such a way that a message can be both completely adequate in a communication event and also “inexhaustibly open”;. Using this explication it is possible to translate and clarify several familiar philosophical theses (...) concerning the adequacy of language. The view that “humanistic”; language differs from scientific language is clarified and criticized. Seven types of empirical test of the explication are discussed. (shrink)

The sentential calculiR, under discussion, are axiomatizable and implication is among their primitive terms. The modus ponens and the rule of substitution are their primitive rules. ByS r is denoted the set of sentences obtained from the formulae of the calculusR by substituting sentences of a given language for all variables. The variablesx, y, z ... represent the elements of the setS r , the variablesX, Y, Z ... represent the subsets ofS R . The formulacxy designates an implication withx (...) as its antecedent andy as its consequent,cxy is always an element ofS R δ(X) means, thatX is closed with respect to the modus ponens rule.A R designates the class of allS R -substitutions of the axioms of the sentential calculusR. (shrink)

: In the analytic tradition of the philosophy of emotions the folk notion of adequacy is understood with regard to – at least four – different questions, viz. a moral question, a prudential question, an epistemic question, and a fittingness question. Usually, the fittingness question is treated as being the central one. I have some doubts concerning this assessment, particularly when it comes to substantial – interpersonal or cultural – controversies about whether a specific emotional response is adequate or (...) whether a specific event deserves the emotional responses it triggers. To approach these matters, I recommend first doing without the established distinctions, for they may prematurely tempt us into assessing the adequacy of emotional responses in terms of one of these categories thereby overlooking other features that deserve attention. Instead, I will start with the folk notion of adequacy and then refine stepwise the conceptual landscape to get closer to what the crucial issues of adequacy are. Keywords: Philosophy of Emotions; Emotional Atmospheres; Existential Feelings; Adequacy of Emotional Responses L’adeguatezza delle emozioni e dei sentimenti esistenziali Riassunto: All’interno della tradizione analitica della filosofia delle emozioni la nozione comune di adeguatezza è presa in considerazione in relazione ad almeno quattro diversi problemi: un primo è di carattere morale ; un secondo riguarda la discrezionalità ; un terzo è di tipo epistemico e un quarto concerne l’ appropriatezza. Di solito, all’appropriatezza viene riservata maggiore importanza. Personalmente nutro diversi dubbi su questa valutazione, in particolare quando si tratta di dirimere questioni sostanziali – interpersonali o culturali –, se una data risposta emotiva è adeguata o se un dato evento merita la risposta emotiva che ha innescato. Per affrontare questi problemi, mi sento in primo luogo di suggerire di fare a meno delle distinzioni maggiormente in uso, poiché possono spiprematuramente a valutare l’adeguatezza delle risposte emotive nei termini una delle categorie già menzionate, trascurando quindi altre proprietà degne di attenzione. Intendo invece partire dalla nozione di adeguatezza propria del senso comune e poi gradualmente raffinare il panorama concettuale, per approssimarmi ai problemi fondamentali dell’adeguatezza. Parole chiave: Filosofia delle emozioni; Atmosfere emotive; Sentimenti esistenziali; Adeguatezza delle risposte emotive. (shrink)

International codes of corporate behavior have been proposed, discussed, negotiated, and promulgated by governments, transnational corporations, and inter-corporate associations over the past few decades. It is not clear that they have been resoundingly as successful in changing corporate behavior – particularly as to corruption and environmental protection – as have national government requirements imposed on foreign enterprises and their own officials. This article arrays the many attempts to structure cooperative action to re-order corporate behavior on several dimensions – restrictive business (...) practices, labor conditions, human rights, environmental production, and corruption. It then assesses the extent to which behavior has been changed and what techniques are more effective in making corporate behavior more ethical. (shrink)

There exists increasing pressure for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, including social reporting. Curiously in this promotional programme of CSR reporting, the only group whose ideas are not sought in this debate are the SME leaders themselves. The present ethnographic field analysis, based on discussions within entrepreneurs' circles, tends to suggest that the argument for expanding formalisation of CSR to SMEs rests upon several fallacies. It implicitly assumes that an apparent solution (...) for large multinationals can be transposed to SMEs, and it underestimates the drawbacks of bureaucracy. Moreover, many SMEs experience inconsistency between the idealistic CSR communication of some large companies and their actions, especially in the supply chain. The author concludes that reports do not constitute the validation for real CSR, nor the proof of superior ethical behaviour. Formalisation can even be counterproductive. Conversely, the absence of social reporting does not imply that SMEs do not behave responsible. CSR in SMEs needs a specific approach, adapted to the informal nature and entrepreneurial character of the small business. The essence of CSR lies in the implementation of responsible business practices. It lies in the right attitudes, in the corporate culture, not in formalisation. (shrink)

There exists increasing pressure for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices, including social reporting. Curiously in this promotional programme of CSR reporting, the only group whose ideas are not sought in this debate are the SME leaders themselves. The present ethnographic field analysis, based on discussions within entrepreneurs' circles, tends to suggest that the argument for expanding formalisation of CSR to SMEs rests upon several fallacies. It implicitly assumes that an apparent solution (...) for large multinationals can be transposed to SMEs, and it underestimates the drawbacks of bureaucracy. Moreover, many SMEs experience inconsistency between the idealistic CSR communication of some large companies and their actions, especially in the supply chain. The author concludes that reports do not constitute the validation for real CSR, nor the proof of superior ethical behaviour. Formalisation can even be counterproductive. Conversely, the absence of social reporting does not imply that SMEs do not behave responsible. CSR in SMEs needs a specific approach, adapted to the informal nature and entrepreneurial character of the small business. The essence of CSR lies in the implementation of responsible business practices. It lies in the right attitudes, in the corporate culture, not in formalisation. (shrink)

Williamson argues for the contention that substructural logics are ‘ill-suited to acting as background logics for science’. That contention, if true, would be very important, but it is refutable, given what is already known about certain substructural logics. Classical Core Logic is a substructural logic, for it eschews the structural rules of Thinning and Cut and has Reflexivity as its only structural rule. Yet it suffices for classical mathematics, and it furnishes all the proofs and disproofs one needs for the (...) hypothetico-deductive method in science. We explain exactly what Classical Core Logic is, why it is a substructural logic par excellence, and what the basic requirements would be for a logic to be ‘suited to acting as [a] background logic for science’. We also explain how Classical Core Logic meets all these requirements. We end by examining Williamson’s argument in order to expose where its error lies. (shrink)

Common philosophical approaches on the adequacy of emotions usually focus on the most objective assessment of the situation. In contrast to this, I claim that this objective stance, generally called “fittingness”, does not satisfy the current needs of emotional evaluation. Given the motivational role of emotions and their influence on social interactions, it is of utmost importance to also evaluate their moral value. Yet, a further development towards such a moral judgment is missing. In this paper, I provide an (...) approach for the moral adequacy of emotional responses in a social context. I aim to show that in today’s social and political culture the link between emotions and moral norms cannot be neglected. Introducing two instances of judging the moral adequacy, I focus on evaluating either the cause or the consequence of an emotional reaction. By assessing the moral value of emotional responses, I think moral growth can be facilitated – not only in individuals but also in whole societies. (shrink)

In view of the complexity of cyberbullying, this paper aims to address the linguistic and legal aspects of cyberbullying from an interdisciplinary perspective. Based on authentic data collected from real cases, we will expound on features, defining properties and legal remedies of cyberbullying in the countries that contribute to this special issue, such as Nigeria, France, Poland and China. Firstly, we will present an overview of cyberbullying and its definition, along with cyberbullying’s attributes. Next, we will cover the various forms (...) of cyberbullying, such as hate speech, harassment and trolling. Each of these forms of cyberbullying result in numerous outcomes, many of which are serious and, in the worst case, can result in a victim’s death. A discussion of such consequences and the legal remedies for cyberbullying will be provided. On a final note, the contributors seek to enrich the forthcoming studies on cyberbullying by offering suggestions towards descriptive adequacy of cyberbullying. (shrink)

Much behavioral welfare economics assumes that expected utility theory does not accurately describe most human choice under risk. A substantial literature instead evaluates welfare consequences by taking cumulative prospect theory as the natural default alternative, at least where description is concerned. We present evidence, based on a review of previous literature and new experimental data, that the most empirically adequate hypothesis about human choice under risk is that it is heterogeneous, and that where EUT does not apply, more choice is (...) characterized by rank-dependent utility models than by CPT. Most of the apparently loss-averse choice behavior results from probability weighting rather than from direct disutility experienced when an outcome is framed as a loss against an idiosyncratic reference point. We then consider implications of this finding for methodological debates about how to model welfare effects of policies, and argue that abandonment of a dogmatic belief in CPT as the correct theory of risk human choice exposes a conceptual error that is widespread in behavioral welfare economics. We provide concluding reflections on second-order, philosophical issues around the grounding of normative commitments in policy-focused economics. (shrink)

In this very issue, Augusto (2022) formulates two requirements upon which to evaluate the adequacy of a foundational ontology. Specifically, the ontological categories: (i) should be understood as the most general kinds of things and (ii) are organized in a non-overlapping finite hierarchy. On the basis of such constraints, he claims that most existing foundational ontologies engineered in the context of Applied Ontology, including the UFO-B ontology, are inadequate. In this article, first we show that his objection against UFO-B (...) can be dissipated by pointing to a trivial terminological confusion. We then argue that his two constraints are not plausible. Then, we show that the disagreement between our point of view and Augusto’s framework is not restricted to those two constraints but extends over the notion of conceptualization of reality. (shrink)

AbstractThe Green Revolution still exerts an important influence on agricultural policy as a technology-centred development strategy. A main policy narrative underpinning the Green Revolution was first expounded in Transforming Traditional Agriculture, a book published in 1964 by Nobel Prize-winning economist Ted Schultz. He famously argued that traditional farmers were ‘poor but efficient’. As farmers responded to economic incentives, technology-driven strategies would transform traditional agriculture into an engine of economic growth. Schultz relied on published ethnographic data and his own calculations to (...) construct this policy narrative. My reanalysis of TTA focuses on its main case study, Panajachel, a village in Guatemala. I follow a narrative approach, evaluating whether Schultz’s story relates a plausible account of agricultural development in Panajachel and its region. I show how Schultz deliberately tried to hide that Mayan farmers in Panajachel were not challenged in technological terms and were able to reach relatively high economic returns. His interpretation of the Guatemalan rural economy ignored ethnic tensions dominating market exchange, a main barrier for agricultural development. I evaluate Schultz’s narrative further by tracing the subsequent evolution of Panajachel and its wider region. High-input strategies had to address ethnic barriers and change agents became embroiled in violent conflict along ethnic lines. Assessing the adequacy of Schultz’s contribution, from a narrative approach, shows how he ‘got the story wrong’ and that the Green Revolution policy narrative has an excessively narrow intellectual basis. New narratives should reserve a much more important place for institutional change in agricultural development. (shrink)

From a logical point of view, identity criteria should mirror the identity relation in being reflexive, symmetrical, and transitive. However, the relation representing the identity condition fails to be transitive in many cases. We consider the proposals given so far to give logical adequacy to inadequate identity conditions. We focus on the most refined proposal and expand its formal framework by taking into account two further aspects that we consider essential in the formal treatment of identity criteria: contexts and (...) granular levels. (shrink)

A continuous objection to virtue ethics has been its alleged inadequacy in providing a distinctive account of right action and determinate action guidance. The virtue ethical criterion “An action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically (i.e., acting in character) do in the circumstances,” has been claimed by some to give wrong results in some cases, and thus doomed to failure. However, I argue that the opponents who raise these objections overlook an important (...) distinction between “action assessment” and “action guidance” in virtue ethics. Once this distinction which is alien to other dominant moral theories is taken into consideration, I show that virtue ethics can supply a distinctive theory of right action and sufficient action guidance. Moreover, I will demonstrate that this distinction allows us to see that virtue ethics has some structural advantages that enable it to provide multiple guidance strategies to different agents with differential cognitive and moral developmental levels. Finally, I will argue that while theories that tell moral agents what to do by providing exact answers might affect moral agency in negative ways by frustrating the development of an integrated moral character, virtue ethics also avoids this effect. (shrink)

Pluralism with respect to the structure of explanations of facts is not uncommon. The pluralism which Salmon and others have defended is compatible with several positions about the exact re-lation between these two types of explanations. We distinguish four such positions, and argue in favour of one of them. We also compare our results with the views of some authors who have recently written on this subject.

The aim of the presented article is to provide an in-depth analysis of the adequacy of designating Penrose as a complex Pythagorean in view of his much more common designation as a Platonist. Firstly, the original doctrine of the Pythagoreans will be briefly surveyed with the special emphasis on the relation between the doctrine of this school and the teachings of the late Platonic School as well as its further modifications. These modifications serve as the prototype of the contemporary (...) claims of the mathematicity of the Universe. Secondly, two lines of Penrose’s arguments in support of his unique position on the ontology of the mathematical structures will be presented: their existence independent of the physical world in the atemporal Platonic realm of pure mathematics and the mathematical structures as the patterns governing the workings of the physical Universe. In the third step, a separate line of arguments will be surveyed that Penrose advances in support of the thesis that the complex numbers seem to suit these patterns with exceptional adequacy. Finally, the appropriateness of designation Penrose as a complex Pythagorean will be assessed with the special emphasis on the suddle threshold between his unique position and that of the adherents of the mathematicity of the Universe. (shrink)

According to van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, the epistemological aim of scientific theories is "to save the phenomena". Theories which achieve this aim are said to be empirically adequate. In an earlier paper a likelihood analysis of the empirical adequacy of simple statistical hypotheses was given. The present paper extends that likelihood analysis of empirical adequacy to composite statistical hypotheses. It is argued that for composite hypotheses the notion of likelihood is ambiguous. This ambiguity leads to a distinction between (...) predictive adequacy, based upon a prior likelihood function, and descriptive adequacy, based upon a posterior likelihood function. (shrink)