16 found
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  1.  78
    The Appeal to Expert Opinion: Quantitative Support for a Bayesian Network Approach.Adam J. L. Harris, Ulrike Hahn, Jens K. Madsen & Anne S. Hsu - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (6):1496-1533.
    The appeal to expert opinion is an argument form that uses the verdict of an expert to support a position or hypothesis. A previous scheme-based treatment of the argument form is formalized within a Bayesian network that is able to capture the critical aspects of the argument form, including the central considerations of the expert's expertise and trustworthiness. We propose this as an appropriate normative framework for the argument form, enabling the development and testing of quantitative predictions as to how (...)
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  2. Argument Content and Argument Source: An Exploration.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Adam Corner - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (4):337-367.
    Argumentation is pervasive in everyday life. Understanding what makes a strong argument is therefore of both theoretical and practical interest. One factor that seems intuitively important to the strength of an argument is the reliability of the source providing it. Whilst traditional approaches to argument evaluation are silent on this issue, the Bayesian approach to argumentation (Hahn & Oaksford, 2007) is able to capture important aspects of source reliability. In particular, the Bayesian approach predicts that argument content and source reliability (...)
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  3.  90
    Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem.Adam J. L. Harris, Anne S. Hsu & Jens K. Madsen - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):311 - 343.
    Bayesian probability has recently been proposed as a normative theory of argumentation. In this article, we provide a Bayesian formalisation of the ad Hitlerum argument, as a special case of the ad hominem argument. Across three experiments, we demonstrate that people's evaluation of the argument is sensitive to probabilistic factors deemed relevant on a Bayesian formalisation. Moreover, we provide the first parameter-free quantitative evidence in favour of the Bayesian approach to argumentation. Quantitative Bayesian prescriptions were derived from participants' stated subjective (...)
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  4.  94
    Public Reception of Climate Science: Coherence, Reliability, and Independence.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Adam Corner - 2016 - Topics in Cognitive Science 8 (1):180-195.
    Possible measures to mitigate climate change require global collective actions whose impacts will be felt by many, if not all. Implementing such actions requires successful communication of the reasons for them, and hence the underlying climate science, to a degree that far exceeds typical scientific issues which do not require large-scale societal response. Empirical studies have identified factors, such as the perceived level of consensus in scientific opinion and the perceived reliability of scientists, that can limit people's trust in science (...)
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  5.  29
    Unrealistic optimism about future life events: A cautionary note.Adam J. L. Harris & Ulrike Hahn - 2011 - Psychological Review 118 (1):135-154.
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  6.  40
    Estimating the probability of negative events.Adam J. L. Harris, Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2009 - Cognition 110 (1):51-64.
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  7.  56
    James is polite and punctual (and useless): A Bayesian formalisation of faint praise.Adam J. L. Harris, Adam Corner & Ulrike Hahn - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):414-429.
  8.  64
    Rational argument, rational inference.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Mike Oaksford - 2012 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):21 - 35.
    (2013). Rational argument, rational inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 21-35. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.689327.
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  9.  40
    Plausibility matters: A challenge to Gilbert's “Spinozan” account of belief formation.Marion Vorms, Adam J. L. Harris, Sabine Topf & Ulrike Hahn - 2022 - Cognition 220 (C):104990.
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  10.  31
    Maintaining credibility when communicating uncertainty: the role of directionality.Sarah C. Jenkins & Adam J. L. Harris - 2020 - Thinking and Reasoning 27 (1):97-123.
    Risk communicators often need to communicate probabilistic predictions. On occasion, an event with 10% likelihood will occur, or one with 90% likelihood will not – a probabilistically unexpected ou...
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  11.  26
    Understanding the coherence of the severity effect and optimism phenomena: Lessons from attention.Adam J. L. Harris - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 50:30-44.
  12.  75
    How many laypeople holding a popular opinion are needed to counter an expert opinion?Jos Hornikx, Adam J. L. Harris & Jordy Boekema - 2018 - Thinking and Reasoning 24 (1):117-128.
    ABSTRACTIn everyday situations, people regularly receive information from large groups of people and from single experts. Although lay opinions and expert opinions have been studied extensively in isolation, the present study examined the relationship between the two by asking how many laypeople are needed to counter an expert opinion. A Bayesian formalisation allowed the prescription of this quantity. Participants were subsequently asked to assess how many laypeople are needed in different situations. The results demonstrate that people are sensitive to the (...)
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  13.  89
    The illusion of control: A Bayesian perspective.Adam J. L. Harris & Magda Osman - 2012 - Synthese 189 (S1):29-38.
    In the absence of an objective contingency, psychological studies have shown that people nevertheless attribute outcomes to their own actions. Thus, by wrongly inferring control in chance situations people appear to hold false beliefs concerning their agency, and are said to succumb to an illusion of control (IoC). In the current article, we challenge traditional conceptualizations of the illusion by examining the thesis that the IoC reflects rational and adaptive decision making. Firstly, we propose that the IoC is a by-product (...)
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  14.  3
    Subjective Probability Increases Across Communication Chains: Introducing the Probability Escalation Effect.Adam J. L. Harris, Shi-Hui Kau & Alice Liefgreen - 2024 - Cognition 252 (C):105915.
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  15.  12
    Optimism where there is none: Asymmetric belief updating observed with valence-neutral life events.Jason W. Burton, Adam J. L. Harris, Punit Shah & Ulrike Hahn - 2022 - Cognition 218 (C):104939.
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  16.  19
    Testing the adaptability of people's use of attribute frame information.Adam J. L. Harris, Sarah C. Jenkins, Gloria W. S. Ma & Aloysius Oh - 2021 - Cognition 212 (C):104720.
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