Traditionally, conceptual thinking is explored via philosophical analysis or psychological experimentation. We seek to complement these mainstream approaches with the perspective of a first person exploration into pure thinking. To begin with, pure thinking is defined as a process and differentiated from its content, the concepts itself. Pure thinking is an active process and not a series of associative thought-events; we participate in it, we immerse ourselves within its active performance. On the other (...) hand, concepts are also of an experiential nature. And yet, little is known about what is it like to have or produce a thought, a concept, or an idea? Is a concept our own construction, a product of our own activity, or is it something we merely discover instead of producing it? We address these issues in a systematic first person enquiry into pure thinking. (shrink)

Traditionally, conceptual thinking is explored via philosophical analysis or psychological experimentation. We seek to complement these mainstream approaches with the perspective of a first person exploration into pure thinking. To begin with, pure thinking is defined as a process and differentiated from its content, the concepts itself. Pure thinking is an active process and not a series of associative thought-events; we participate in it, we immerse ourselves within its active performance. On the other (...) hand, concepts are also of an experiential nature. And yet, little is known about what is it like to have or produce a thought, a concept, or an idea? Is a concept our own construction, a product of our own activity, or is it something we merely discover instead of producing it? We address these issues in a systematic first person enquiry into pure thinking. (shrink)

I mention the benefits, challenges, and costs of using small group activities to enhance our students’ learning of critical thinking skills in our courses, and then describe ten examples of these groups. Two of these examples are not commonly reported in the literature on small groups, so I describe them in greater detail to facilitate their use in our courses.

One of the most discussed and disputed claims in John McDowell’s Mind and World is the claim that we should not think that in experience, “conceptual capacities are exercised on non-conceptual deliverances of sensibility.” Rather, “Conceptual capacities are already operative in the deliverances of sensibility themselves.” Such capacities are said to be operative, but not in the same way they are operative when the faculty of assertoric judgment is explicitly exercised. This position preserves the passivity and receptivity (...) necessary for McDowell to defend a picture of our thought as constrained by the world. (“The constraints come from outside thinking, but not from outside what is thinkable.”) And it maintains his Sellarsean criticism of the “Myth of the Given,” such that when we trace justification back we do not reach something that, because non-conceptual, could not play any role in such justification. The fact that the deliverances of sensibility are conceptually shaped (I will take this mean “have a conceptual form”) insures that sensibility can indeed play such a justificatory role in perceptual beliefs. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and (...) social/political philosophy. In this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and (...) social/political philosophy. In this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

Conceptual integration—“blending”—is a general cognitive operation on a par with analogy, recursion, mental modeling, conceptual categorization, and framing. It serves a variety of cognitive purposes. It is dynamic, supple, and active in the moment of thinking. It yields products that frequently become entrenched in conceptual structure and grammar, and it often performs new work on its previously entrenched products as inputs. Blending is easy to detect in spectacular cases but it is for the most part (...) a routine, workaday process that escapes detection except on technical analysis. It is not reserved for special purposes, and is not costly.In blending, structure from input mental spaces is projected to a separate, “blended” mental space. The projection is selective. Through completion and elaboration, the blend develops structure not provided by the inputs. Inferences, arguments, and ideas developed in the blend can have effect in cognition, leading us to modify the initial inputs and to change our view of the corresponding situations.Blending operates according to a set of uniform structural and dynamic principles. It additionally observes a set of optimality principles. (shrink)

Conceptual integration—“blending”—is a general cognitive operation on a par with analogy, recursion, mental modeling, conceptual categorization, and framing. It serves a variety of cognitive purposes. It is dynamic, supple, and active in the moment of thinking. It yields products that frequently become entrenched in conceptual structure and grammar, and it often performs new work on its previously entrenched products as inputs. Blending is easy to detect in spectacular cases but it is for the most part (...) a routine, workaday process that escapes detection except on technical analysis. It is not reserved for special purposes, and is not costly.In blending, structure from input mental spaces is projected to a separate, “blended” mental space. The projection is selective. Through completion and elaboration, the blend develops structure not provided by the inputs. Inferences, arguments, and ideas developed in the blend can have effect in cognition, leading us to modify the initial inputs and to change our view of the corresponding situations.Blending operates according to a set of uniform structural and dynamic principles. It additionally observes a set of optimality principles. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and (...) social/political philosophy. In this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call ‘conceptual ethics’. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and (...) social/political philosophy. In this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology. (shrink)

An important aspect of Sellars' philosophy is his attempt to explicate the concept of thought on the "model" of the concept of speech. More specifically, Sellars has argued that the intentionality of "inner" episodes or thoughts is to be understood in terms of the "semantical" characteristics of intelligent linguistic behavior, and not the other way around as the "classical tradition" had supposed.To avoid misunderstanding, it is important to realize that Sellars' claim, as he explains, in Aristotelian terminology, is a claim (...) "in the order of conceiving" as contrasted with "the order of being." That is, Sellars accepts, as an integral part of his theory, the classical claim that meaningful speech is the manifestation or overt causal expression of ''inner" thoughts, but argues that our concept of such thoughts is a derivative concept, a concept which, in the order of theoretical reconstruction, is "modelled on," is an analogical extension of, the concept of meaningful linguistic behavior. (shrink)

Implicit in much of the recent literature on conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics is the assumption that when speakers argue that we should talk or think about a concept in a specific way, they are doing so as inquirers—as speakers who are invested in arriving at the correct or best view of this concept. In this paper I question that assumption and argue that philosophers have been too quick to project idealized versions of themselves into the contexts of (...) conceptual articulation and conceptual dispute. Speakers often engage in this activity to further interests of theirs that have nothing to do with inquiry, instead carrying out what I call ‘conceptual domination’. Speakers are engaged in conceptual domination when they aim to bring about and enforce widespread uptake for a view of a concept by exploiting institutions and institutional authority. They do so because this view best serves interests that are either irrelevant to or actively interfere with inquiry concerning this concept—paradigmatically their material interests. I consider sources of evidence for assessing whether speakers are engaging in conceptual domination, analyze two case studies, and consider how to push back against conceptual dominators. (shrink)

One important activity in conceptual ethics and conceptual engineering involves proposing to associate a new semantics with an existing word. Many philosophers think that one important way to evaluate such a proposal concerns whether it preserves the “topic” picked out by the existing word, and several have offered competing proposals concerning what is required to preserve topic. Our paper is focused on the conceptual ethics question of how conceptual engineers should use the term ‘topic continuity’. We (...) provide and defend a context- sensitive answer to this question. Our answer is motivated by the idea that there are several distinct considerations that we can reasonably care about (and which many conceptual engineers already do care about) in thinking about “topic continuity”, and, moreover, that how best to weigh them against each other can vary from context to context. On our proposal, ‘topic continuity’ can function as a useful representational device that enables coordination by inquirers with respect to these concerns. We conclude by locating our account in a broader way of thinking about topic continuity across a range of inquiries. (shrink)

The ability to be creative is often considered a unique characteristic of conscious beings and many efforts have been directed at demonstrating a relationship between creativity and the personality construct of psychoticism. The present study sought to investigate this link explicitly by focusing on discrete facets of creative cognition, namely the originality/novelty dimension and the practicality/usefulness dimension. Based on Eysenck’s conceptualisation of psychoticism as being characterised by an overinclusive cognitive style, it was expected that higher levels of psychoticism would accompany (...) a greater degree of conceptual expansion and elevated levels of originality in creative imagery, but would be unrelated to the practicality/usefulness of an idea. These hypotheses were confirmed in 80 healthy participants who were contrasted based on their EPQ psychoticism scale scores. Our findings suggest that the link between psychoticism and creativity is based on associative thinking and broader but weak top-down activation patterns rather than on goal-related thinking. (shrink)

Conceptual metaphor theory provides a useful tool with which to think about different philosophical traditions, as it can reveal the deep structure of networks of ideas. Conceptual metaphors are not just linguistic devices, rather they organise whole networks of thought, experience and activity. Paying special attention to the role of the metaphor of sight in certain Indian traditions and that of Dao in Chinese traditions, I explore the idea that different philosophical traditions have developed and matured around particular (...) conceptual metaphors, each giving rise to a distinctive conception of both the practice and the goal of philosophy. I suggest that what it means to practice philosophy in these traditions is governed by the dominant conceptual metaphor in use. I consider the implications of this for the traditional Western conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom. I conclude with some reflections on analytic philosophy, considering to what extent it too can be regarded as a philosophical tradition structured by a dominant conceptual metaphor. (shrink)

Human cognition is extended and enacted. Drawing the boundaries of cognition to include the resources and attributes of the body and materiality allows an examination of how these components interact with the brain as a system, especially over cultural and evolutionary spans of time. Literacy and numeracy provide examples of multigenerational, incremental change in both psychological functioning and material forms. Though we think materiality, its central role in human cognition is often unappreciated, for reasons that include conceptual distribution over (...) multiple material forms, the unconscious transparency of cognitive activity in general, and the different temporalities of metaplastic change in neurons and cultural forms. (shrink)

The theory presented here has implications for philosophy in respect of how concepts and words can be mechanically defined. For neuroscience the paper at least sets out a problem that has received little consideration and offers a possible solution. Also the theory may be relevant to robotics in terms of object manipulation. Concepts need to be separated from each other in the brain in order for an animal to act on one object in isolation. A possible solution is to inhibit (...) common feature neurons that are shared by two concepts. There are some problems with doing so, including the fact that each feature of every concept is shared with some others so all would have to be inhibited. This can be resolved if common feature neurons are only switched off while two concepts are active at the same time. Another problem is that while inhibiting the common features, the two active concepts cannot be related to each other and understood in each other's context. This can be addressed by division of the brain into relational and isolational areas. Associative thinking, proposed to be the only memory mechanism in the right hemisphere, produces poorly defined but well related concepts. In fact all concepts have associations to others and so in a purely associative brain region, everything forms one giant concept. In the left hemisphere it is speculated that differential or oppositional thinking cancels out the common features of live concepts, leaving only the differences, resulting in clear definition but lack of relationships to other concepts. (shrink)

“Crisis” is a key concept in our political lexicon. Since the beginning of the modern age, it has arguably been, as much as anything, the experience of crisis that has calibrated the aims of both politics and political theory. But as central as crisis experiences have been for the shaping of our political imaginary, the concept itself has proven difficult to incorporate into the political theory enterprise. In this article, I argue that we can think politically about crisis by taking (...) up a “pragmatist” perspective that focuses on how we deploy crisis as a conceptual tool for guiding judgments and coordinating actions. I argue that crisis is a fundamentally reflexive concept that bridges our traditional distinctions between objective phenomena and normative experience, and whose very usage implies the active participation of those involved in it. Only by examining these crucial aspects of the crisis concept can we begin to grasp its normative political content, as well as how it may be deployed in the service of political action and social change. (shrink)

When should humans enhance themselves? We try to answer this question by engaging in a conceptual analysis of the nature of different activities. We think that cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible in some practice-oriented activities, such as some educational activities, when it is the case both that cognitive enhancement would negatively affect the point of those activities and that we have good reasons to value that point. We then argue that cognitive enhancement should be allowed in two groups of (...) cases, namely in practice-oriented activities, such as recreational activities on which little moral value or social import hangs, and in some prominently goal-directed activities, such as high-responsibility professions, the goal of which has significant moral or social value. Finally, we argue that the use of efficacious and relatively safe cognitive enhancers may even be obligatory in those high-responsibility professions under certain special circumstances. (shrink)

This paper investigates the Yogācāra notions of “conceptuality”, represented by terms such as vikalpa, on the one hand, and of “non-conceptuality” on the other. The examination of the process of thinking as well as its absence has played a central role in the history of Yogācāra thought. The explanations of this process provided by Yogācāra thinkers in works such as the Yogācārabhūmi, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha appear to be mainly concerned with the contents and the components of thoughts, (...) categorizing them into different classes. These lists are far more than arbitrary collections. Instead they are meant to represent exhaustive summaries of a person’s conceptual experience. The first part of the paper focusses on conceptuality, exploring definitions of the relevant terms and ideas. The second part is mainly an investigation of the question which parts of the Buddhist path to liberation were considered to involve conceptual activity and which were described as non-conceptual. (shrink)

Using the method of Descriptive Experience Sampling, some subjects report experiences of thinking that do not involve words or any other symbols [Hurlburt, R. T., and C. L. Heavey. 2006. Exploring Inner Experience. Amsterdam: John Benjamins; Hurlburt, R. T., and S. A. Akhter. 2008. “Unsymbolized Thinking.” Consciousness and Cognition 17 : 1364–1374]. Even though the possibility of this unsymbolized thinking has consequences for the debate on the phenomenological status of cognitive states, the phenomenon is still insufficiently examined. (...) This paper analyzes the main properties of unsymbolized thinking and advances an explanation of its origin. According to our analysis, unsymbolized thoughts appear as propositional states, that is, they are experienced as compositional conceptual phenomena, with semantic and syntactic features analogous to those of the contents of utterances. Based on this characterization, we hypothesize that UT is continuous with the activity of inner speech, in particular, it i... (shrink)

This intimate account of how ideas get turned into artwork—including dance performance, film, sound installation, sculpture, and painting—looks at how the material thinking that art embodies produces new understandings about individuals, their histories, and the cultures they inhabit. Discussing the philosophy of signs (images, text, and their interaction), the psychology of visual perception, and the overarching notion of mythopoeic place-making, this intellectually wide-ranging and anecdotally narrated primer provides a fresh perspective to the concept of inventing. All active practitioners (...) in the fields of performance, media, film, museum, painting, sculpture, and cultural studies will benefit from this look at how artists participate in the conceptual invention of their world. (shrink)

This paper first re-examines Levinson’s notion of activity type, followed by a review of ethnographic, sociopsychological and ecological studies of the same phenomenon under varied names. The activity type is generally treated as a context in pragmatics. This paper departs from this thinking by proposing that it be treated as the primary object and unit of investigation per se. The role the activity type plays should be that of an interface bridging the langue-parole dichotomy, and the individual-society dichotomy. It (...) is further proposed that the activity type be studied as embodied activities at the token level. It is thus re-conceptualized in term of land-borne situated discourse. (shrink)

This paper examines Robert Fogelin's suggestion that there may be deep disagreements, where no argument can address what is at issue. A number of possible bases for Fogelin's position are considered and rejected: people sometimes do not have enough in common for reasons to count as reasons; doubt is possible only against the background of framework propositions; key premises may be inarguable; argument must occur within a conceptual framework. The paper concludes by reflecting on why it is important to (...) have a point of view when thinking critically about an argument and whether that fact constitutes a limitation as to what can be achieved by critical thinking. (shrink)

In introducing a course on critical thinking or reasoning, many emphasize the philosophical background of the idea of critical thinking, that is, the Socratic motto: “life without examination is not worth living”. It is actually right to do so, because critical thinking is basically the activity of doing philosophy. However, in manyuniversities, the course on critical thinking is taught mainly as a basic course for first year undergraduates who may not go on to major in philosophy. (...) Beside the fact that critical thinking as an activity of doing philosophy provides a good tool for arguing about any subjects, there is a political agenda in making the course a requisite one for non-philosophy students, that is, the ability to think critically is a desirable property for being a “good citizen” in a democratic society. Underlying this idea is the model of rational man in the age of Enlightenment. Putting aside the controversy over the notion of rationality, my question is what exactly is the activity called critical thinking or reasoning, and then on such understanding, what should be the right direction in teaching critical thinking. My answer is that critical thinking is an examination of thoughts because reasoning is rule-governed. However, grasping a thought requires the idea of an agency. Hence, the main aim of teaching critical thinking is not to get just a technician game kids, rather it is to reveal the possibility of being a philosophical mindfulness person. Thepaper consists of three main parts. The first part concerns the idea that critical thinking is an examination of thoughts. Thoughts are inferentially structured and are constrained by truth. This means that thought content are conceptual – reasoning is inherently logical or rule-governed. The second part considers the connection of content of thoughts, truth and thinkers. An individuation of thought content is by object of thoughts. The idea of object of thoughts involves the idea of truth which is perspectival. Therefore, to understand what truth is requires an idea of agency, the one who grasps thoughts. In the last part, I then propose that the rightdirection in teaching critical thinking is to accommodate an independent ability to see the world aright. (shrink)

The article discusses the definition of reflection as an activity and examines the main factors that determine the kinds of reflection. According to the author of the article, reflection as an activity can be defined by the following formula: the direction of attention to EXPERIENCE for the “detection” of its FORMS and their fixation by means of certain SEMIOTIC TOOLS carried out for the sake of achieving some PURPOSE. In this formulation, the terms “experience”, “form”, “semiotic tools”, “purpose” are understood (...) as parameters, the specification of which sets the description of certain kinds of reflection. In addition, the structure of “detection” participates in the formation of reflection, which consists of the languages of description, conceptual and terminological apparatus, knowledge and other conceptual means of the reflecting subject. Variants for specifying the parameters of the definition are considered in the article on the material of various philosophical techniques (mainly domestic tradition) and a number of general cultural reflexive practices. The author correlates his understanding of reflection with a number of ideas of the Moscow Methodological Circle (MMC), in which reflection techniques were given great importance. In particular, the author schematizes his understanding as a special case of an “act of activity”, the idea of which is the development within the MMC of some of K. Marx’s ideas. In connection with the clarification of the temporal structure of reflection (which is not grasped by schematization of reflection as an act of activity), the author introduces the idea of an elementary cycle of reflection and fixes it in the form of a scheme. In conclusion, the author examines the question of the correlation of reflection and thinking and considers the possibilities of correlating his definition of reflection with the typology of reflection set by the scheme of the thinking-communication-activity-system (proposed in MMC in 1983). (shrink)

This is an introduction to a collection of articles on the conceptual history of epigenesis, from Aristotle to Harvey, Cavendish, Kant and Erasmus Darwin, moving into nineteenth-century biology with Wolff, Blumenbach and His, and onto the twentieth century and current issues, with Waddington and epigenetics. The purpose of the topical collection is to emphasize how epigenesis marks the point of intersection of a theory of biological development and a theory of active matter. We also wish to show that (...) the concept of epigenesis existed prior to biological theorization and that it continues to permeate thinking about development in recent biological debates. (shrink)

When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking (...) about legal interpretation, which is less tethered to existing legal practice (or the existing meaning of core pieces of legal terminology). The approach I explore asks questions about legal interpretation in a way that is tethered to what legal (or “legal-ish”) concepts people should deploy, as part of arguments on behalf of engaging in legal (or “legal-ish”) practices different from our current ones. In exploring this approach, I aim to help us better understand the landscape of philosophical issues about legal interpretation, including parts of it that I think have been underexplored. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a new conceptualization of the distinction between realism and anti-realism about beliefs that is based on the division between natural and non-natural properties, as defined by Lewis. It will be argued that although the traditional form of anti-realism about beliefs, namely eliminative materialism, has failed, there is a possibility to reformulate the division in question. The background assumption of the proposal is the framework of deflationism about truth and existence: it will be (...) assumed that beliefs can be said to exist and their attributions can said to be true. The aim is to show that even when we buy into such assumptions we can meaningfully distinguish between the realist and anti-realist approach to belief. According to the proposal, the paradigmatic anti-realist view on beliefs should be seen as a conjunction of three claims: that belief attributions do not track objective similarities, that beliefs are not causally active, and that there is no viable way of naturalizing content. It will be shown that seeing the debate in the proposed way has important advantages as it allows the issue of belief realism to be made non-trivial and tractable, and it introduces theoretical unity into contemporary metaphysics of beliefs. (shrink)

In recent years, David Plunkett and Tim Sundell have published a series of interesting articles that made an original use of resources from linguistics and philosophy of language to reply to arguments for legal antipositivism, the thesis according to which moral or value facts are part of what determines what the law is in a given jurisdiction at a given time. Plunkett and Sundell’s strategy for resisting antipositivism appeals to the notion of a metalinguistic negotiation, which incorporates the notion of (...) a metalinguistic or context disagreement. Sundell 2011 had argued that metalinguistic disagreements are a possible component of disputes about evaluative matters. A further notion deployed is that of conceptual ethics, an essential component of metalinguistic negotiations. This paper approaches a crucial concern about the deployment of both notions against disagreement-based arguments for legal antipositivism. Metalinguistic negotiations displace disagreements from the semantic to the metalinguistic level, but do not eliminate the appeal to moral or other normative reasons from legal disagreements. Conceptual ethics purports to be a normative activity, engaged with prescribing ways one ought to think and talk. On a broad understanding of legal reasoning and practice, metalinguistic negotiations and conceptual ethics are an integral part of it, and hence are consistent with evaluative and normative facts being essential to, and constitutive of, the law. Or so this paper argues. (shrink)

Creativity is an emerging field of research for philosophy. A diachronic cultural value and fundamental human ability, creativity poses a host of questions that challenge us both on a theoretical and practical level. In this paper we explore creativity through the use of problem-solving lateral thinking techniques, as part of the C2Learn European Community research program. Lateral thinking is defined and then classified into three distinct kinds: conceptual, diagrammatic and emotive. Each kind is then explicated and its (...) basic principles examined, in an effort to shed light on the different ways the space of possible solutions is affected by each kind of lateral thought. It is this active engagement with the space of possibilities itself, that separates a mere problem-solver from an actual creator. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Examining the Role of Re-Presentation in Mathematical Problem Solving: An Application of Ernst von Glasersfeld’s Conceptual Analysis” by Victor V. Cifarelli & Volkan Sevim. Upshot: Education researchers often explain student activity in terms of general thinking and learning processes, including those identified by Cifarelli and Sevim. In this commentary, I refocus Cifarelli and Sevim’s discussion in order to hypothesize the organization of mental actions that comprise and support those learning processes.

This book tackles the question of why the brain is so difficult to fully understand. In neuroscience, data are acquired and analyzed with astonishing techniques and accumulate rapidly. Nevertheless, try to explain how a person can think or why there is such a condition as schizophrenia, and it appears that we really know little. To approach these difficulties, the authors first present a number of case studies in which the operation of a neural circuit is worked out in some detail (...) and, at the same time, the functional significance of the operation is also understood. These examples are complicated in their biologic specifics but are conceptually straightforward. The examples are hoped to provoke an appreciation for what neuroscience can accomplish. The authors then develop some thoughts on how these issues can be addressed----instead of considering cognition in general, taking instead a subset of cognition that does lend itself to formal description. (shrink)

Spatial representations have been considered for their high didactical efficacy, as concept maps and mind maps. Graphical and spatial representations may be seen as key elements of knowledge management and may contribute to enhancing spatial knowledge. Even if isomorphisms between the physical and the mental dimension can be controversial in the field of spatial knowledge, it is nevertheless interesting to study the role of spatial interpretation in knowledge management processes. In science education, spatial skills are actually highly required due to (...) the development of new technologies and their highly demanding spatial tasks they often work intertwined with other abilities, such as logical reasoning and verbal skills. Despite spatial knowledge being significative in the overall field of learning management, there is instead little research that shows its complex role in the comprehension of concepts in the humanistic fields, e.g. in philosophical conceptual reasoning. The Elementary Logic Theory—which underlies the philosophical maps of this Atlas—identifies at the basis of complex thinking prototypical knowledge units that may be activated in the possible collaboration between explicit and implicit thinking. In EL Theory, spatiality is considered the most suitable transition format for the hypothesized collaboration between implicit and explicit processing because it shares common aspects with both of them. The focus of EL Theory is to research particularly the role of the implicit in knowledge comprehension through spatial representations. In this Atlas, the role of Elementary Logic Theory is highlighted in shaping philosophical knowledge and comprehension of philosophical concepts and their intertwining. (shrink)

Convinced that critical thinking has value for people in Japan, the author describes his experiences introducing critical thinking to the educational scene there. Finding students to be too uncritical aboutsources of information, he began teaching and promoting it among students and colleagues. Initially, some discouraging responses came from the latter group because of Japanese social norms in largemeetings and organizations. The author has since learned to make use of less explicit approaches to presenting critical thinking to fellow (...) teachers and students. Among students, these include treating itas a collaborative activity and as an intellectual game. It was also necessary to deal explicitly with conceptual barriers, such as student views of friendship and popularity. Generally speaking, encouraging progress has been evident in classes and in the academic community. (shrink)

Human perception has long been a critical subject of design thinking. While various studies have stressed the link between thinking and acting, particularly in spatial experience, the term “design thinking” seems to disconnect conceptual thinking from physical expression or process. Spatial perception is multimodal and fundamentally bound to the body that is not a mere receptor of sensory stimuli but an active agent engaged with the perceivable environment. The body apprehends the experience in which (...) one’s kinesthetic engagement and knowledge play an essential role. Although design disciplines have integrated the abstract, metaphoric, and visual aspects of the body and its movement into conceptual thinking, studies have pointed out that design disciplines have emphasized visuality above the other sensory domains and heavily engaged with the perception of visual configurations, relying on the Gestalt principles. Gestalt psychology must be valued for its attention to a whole. However, the theories of design elements and principles over-empathizing such visuality posit the aesthetics of design mainly as visual value and understate other sensorial and perceptual aspects. Although the visual approach may provide a practical means to represent and communicate ideas, a design process heavily driven by visuality can exhibit weaknesses undermining certain aspects of spatial experience despite the complexity. Grounded in Merleau-Ponty’s notion of multisensory perception, this article discusses the relationship between body awareness and spatial perception and its implication for design disciplines concerning built environments. Special attention is given to the concepts of kinesthetic and synesthetic phenomena known as multisensory and cross-sensory, respectively. This discussion integrates the corporeal and spatiotemporal realms of human experience into the discourse of kinesthetic and synesthetic perceptions. Based on the conceptual, theoretical, and precedent analyses, this article proposes three models for design thinking: Synesthetic Translation, Kinesthetic Resonance, and Kinesthetic Engagement. To discuss the concepts rooted in action-based perception and embodied cognition, this study borrows the neurological interpretation of haptic perception, interoception, and proprioception of space. This article suggests how consideration of the kinesthetic or synesthetic body can deepen and challenge the existing models of the perceptual aspects of environmental psychology adopted in design disciplines. (shrink)

In Practical Philosophy Education, besides the learning of conceptual knowledge and working with an introspective method, students are actively engaged whereby they are played in a new form as a language game. The negative attitudes and the pretending performances were revised from the exercise of answering questions to asking question, and then to continue asking. 1957 Coffee proposes the “cross-questioning” model of using knowledge to play the “game” of philosophy. This playing experience is passed down intellectually in the form (...) of language game, which is to be replayed sentimentally in a theater game. As a pedagogic, the previous philosophical activities are exemplified in the younger generation’s way of learning and “replaying”. As a lifestyle, the historical classical thinking is continued, while the old games of philosophers are played with new and refreshing rules. (shrink)

in the present work we analyze the new concepts and theories related to the activity of Design Management, which focus on the experiences of people and the particular characteristics of each one of them. Specifically, from an Industrial Design perspective, the scope and relationships between these conceptual definitions —now made visible— that always belonged to the field of design of the discipline will be studied, trying to identify how they influence innovation and product development. Finally, it will conclude about (...) its strategic relevance for public and private organizations, and the incorporation to the set of professional activitie. (shrink)

Critical thinking has an important role in the advancement of personal development. Undoubtedly, thanks to critical thinking, individuals can use their abilities better and become active in society. This system of thinking can have positive results on students, especially in the development of cognitive and creative thinking in education. Critical thinking, education as well as philosophy, literature, cinema, history, geography, biology, health, etc. has a relationship with disciplines. Critical thinking plays an important role (...) in understanding disciplines and learning basic concepts. The most basic purpose of critical thinking is to stick to moral attitudes. When criticizing in a discussion environment, it is important to stick to moral principles rather than the subject of the problem being discussed. In this context, the conceptual framework of critical thinking will be discussed. Critical thinking; its relationship with philosophy, education, literature, art, and other sciences will be examined. Finally, the moral dimension of critical thinking and the principles to be followed will be mentioned while criticizing will be mentioned. (shrink)

This dynamic volume is designed to teach readers to become critical thinkers as they explore the influential thinkers and central themes of Philosophy from ancient times to the present. In addition to the conceptual and language subject matter, this presentation ignites readers' sense of wonder through an innovative design, substantive readings, innovative writing assignments and thinking activities that provide readers with the opportunity to learn and practice the conceptual abilities needed to think philosophically. The volume examines (...) class='Hi'>thinking philosophically about life, consciousness, identity and the soul, freedom and determinism, developing enlightened values, exploring ways of being religious, constructing knowledge and discovering truth, developing an integrated view of reality, understanding creative expression and political forms, as well as social justice, and concepts of utopia. For individuals interested in learning to think philosophically. (shrink)

The article that discusses the issue of culturalism as an element of the idea of representation tries to examine a concept, which claims to represent reality through conceptualization, from scratch, or by going to the bottom in a manner of excavation. Foucault's archaeology was chosen as the most suitable method for this excavation activity. Because the archaeological method does not make a historical or meta-historical claim beyond the truth; it does not impose the necessary violence of the method on its (...) object. It grasps its object in its singularity, and most importantly, it thinks and suggests that the truth is no more than an invention. This archaeological study on the concept of culture tries to reveal the difference between the current meaning of the concept and its etymological origin and to grasp it in its singularity. In this way, the problematic relationship between the concepts that man invented and applied while engaging in understanding things that are happening around him will be revealed. Conceptualization is inherent in the idea of truth, which is based on absolutism and is no more than an invention, while ultimately subordinating the particular to the universal. While the article reveals the intolerance of the act of dichotomous thinking, which operates as a product of the effort to represent the truth, as in the nature-culture distinction, it acts according to the approach known as deconstruction in social sciences. In a representative thought, truth is what can actually be represented, presenting itself to the observer as an object of display. The fact that the understanding of truth is based on essentialist principles such as absolute, unchangeable, fixed, universal thanks to Plato makes an idealized representation inevitable. In fact, intellectual endeavors such as conceptualization, abstraction, and generalization mean the idealization of the concrete, singular, and unique by detaching it from its context. It can be said that underlying the idea of representation is the belief that the human mind can grasp the essence of things and therefore can represent them in thought, depending on the idea that truth is rational. As is, it is a thought that tries to keep realism in its hands, blesses it, and strives with all its might to declare its divine absolutism. Ultimately, while the mechanism of representation operates for the stable, it acts with the aim of establishing dominance. The distinction between the representative and the represented is ultimately the product of an anthropocentric perspective. Thanks to this distinction, it is inevitable that everything except the observer subject becomes the object of study. This point of view, believed to be one and universal, requires the fixation of the object of study. It can be said that the idea of representation, which signifies the ideal of absolute truth, underlies today's issues that are based on differences, such as language, religion, race, and gender, that have always been on the world agenda. As the products of representative thought, both binary categorization based on distinction such as nature and culture, and the concept that implies a direct relationship between thought and the outside world, realism is a state of alienation in which whatever is related to the human being ceases to belong to it and is used against it. The reification made possible by the distinction between the representative and the represented is actually nothing but alienation. It can be said that the rooted problem of the world of thought and the peoples of the world since Platonism is that reification and commodification have become so universal that they seem almost like natural, organic entities, and forms. The attempt of representative thought, which confines external reality to the conceptual world, to impose a framework on reality, breaks the connection with reality, and moreover, by being guided by concepts and abstractions, it builds iron cages around the human being. The insistence of Western thought on representation, no matter if it is true or false, no matter it is accepted or not, has led to the radical consequence of the abolition of certainty over reality. Today, the world of thought has evolved from the representation of the truth, which implies the idea that there is a necessary connection between the order of things and the order of words, to the reality of representation, where the boundary between reality and image is abolished, the reality is aestheticized and transformed into images, and society ultimately becomes cultural. With an entry into the cultural turn, everything has become cultural and conventional in the postmodern period. (shrink)

This essay reconceptualizes fanaticism as an activity that does not rely on the condemnation of ‘fanatical’ acts as a priori ‘irrational.’ Rather, it theorizes fanaticism as a method of ethical and political critique against a regime of representation. It also argues that it is crucial to understand fanaticism through an approach that does not set up a dichotomy between affect and reason, disavowing the ‘irrational’ behavior of fanatics. Drawing on affect theory and particularly the entanglement of feeling-thinking, this paper (...) emphasizes that fanaticism is better understood within a framework that takes seriously the role of affects. Such a conceptual framework has important pedagogical implications for how to address fanaticism in education. This essay suggests that it is crucial to invent pedagogical strategies that are rooted in a reconceptualized notion of fanaticism that pays attention to its ethical, political and affective dimensions. (shrink)

Teachers and teacher educators in the US struggle with conflicting needs. They must think critically and adaptively in response to the rapidly changing demographics of their students and adjust to a policy climate that emphasizes standardization, measurement, and disregard for teachers as professionals. Embattled pre-service teacher education programs in institutions of higher education have traditionally sought to develop teacher candidates’ knowledge, skills, and dispositions. The authors argue that in the current climate pre-service teachers also must appropriate conceptual frameworks to (...) support their development as responsive professionals. While dispositions are beliefs and attitudes the origin and teaching of which remain in dispute, concepts like social justice, political-economic equity, and formative assessment are abstract ideas or concepts that inform practice. Conceptual tools, i.e., concepts, theories, and frameworks, guide novice teachers in making decisions in response to the growing and rapidly changing student populations they will teach as well as the policy contexts that constrain their teaching practice. The appropriation of conceptual tools contributes to development of vision and adaptive expertise required by responsive teacher professionals. Using an activity theory framework developed by Wartofsky that draws in particular on the classification of artifacts, or tools, this article frames and critically examines teachers’ need for conceptual tools, the appropriation of those tools, and a mixed methods study of that appropriation. The study demonstrates that teacher candidates do appropriate conceptual tools, but that measurement of that process, though desirable in the current policy context, requires the development of a systematic and replicable methodology. (shrink)

The issue of citizenship has been one of the main topics of political thinking since antiquity, when its origins were significantly shaped by classical philosophers, whose ideas are also important for modern thinking. Gradually, with the intensification of globalization many new conceptualizations of the classical concept of citizenship were formulated to address global challenges. These shift away from the basic view of the interconnectedness of citizenship with a specific territory and give humans a wider, global identity with an (...) associated appeal to global responsibility. One such concept is environmental citizenship. This article is aimed at examining the historical development of citizenship, particularly in its republican and liberal versions, and its conceptualisation in the context of environmental problems that overcome national borders. The demands on citizens must be adapted to this reality. This article highlights the growing potential of environmental citizenship as one of the possible key factors for achieving a more sustainable world, which however requires the active involvement of nation-states. --------------------------- Received: 24/11/2022. Reviewed: 27/03/2023. Accepted: 18/04/2023. (shrink)

Of Aristotle’s core terms, potency (dunamis) and actuality (energeia) are among the most important. But when we attempt to understand what they mean, we face the following problem: their primary meaning is movement, as a source (dunamis) or as movement itself (energeia). We therefore have to understand movement in order to understand them. But the structure of movement is itself articulated using these terms: it is the activity of a potential being, as potent. This paper examines this hermeneutic circle, and (...) works out a strategy for reading Aristotle based on his conception of our epistemological predicament. This hermeneutic approach helps us gain access to the phenomena of movement and its sources (potency, and energeia). The paper closes with a review of the conceptual resources we deploy to think about movement: homogeneity, space and time, impulse, relativity, the blend of sameness and difference, and being and non-being. Showing that Aristotle uses none of these clears the landscape for a fresh inquiry into his account of movement. (shrink)

When the history of life on earth is viewed as a history of cell division, all of life becomes a single cell lineage. The growth and differentiation of this lineage in reciprocal interaction with its environment can be viewed as a developmental process; hence the evolution of life on earth can also be seen as the development of life on earth. Here, in reviewing this field, some potentially fruitful research directions suggested by this change in perspective are highlighted. Variation and (...) selection become, for example, bidirectional information flows between scales, while the notions of “cooperation” and “competition” become scale relative. The language of communication, inference, and information processing becomes more useful than the language of causation to describe the interactions of both homogeneous and heterogeneous living systems at any scale. Emerging scale‐free theoretical frameworks such as predictive coding and active inference provide conceptual tools for reconceptualizing biology as the study of a unified, multiscale dynamical system. (shrink)

The distinction between activity and passivity has a deep and fundamental role in scientific and philosophical conceptual frameworks, going back to ancient Greek thinking about society and nature. I briefly indicate the importance of the activity-passivity distinction in the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, in relation to Husserl. I then advance a transcendental phenomenological argument that the distinction is, however, not as simple or obvious as it might appear, specifically that it cannot be wholly and determinately defined via a purely (...) abstract, conceptual-discursive procedure, since specifying which of two interacting terms is the active one entails (I argue) an implicit reference to pre scientific, affective experience. But, as I argue, specifying this distinction is nonetheless conceptually fundamental for scientific thinking about nature, especially in biology, despite scientific efforts to abstract from it. Together these arguments amplify, within science itself, Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s point that life, as intrinsically involving affect, is a transcendental condition of science. (shrink)

Building critically on anthropology’s “ontological turn,” this article isolates conceptualization as a core concern for anthropological thinking: anthropology as the activity of transfiguring the contingency of ethnographic materials in the formal language of conceptual relations and distinctions. Focusing on works by Mauss and Evans-Pritchard, as well as my own research, the article articulates the morphological character of such a project. While akin also to philosophy, such attention to the “shapes” of conceptual relations is analogous to the practice (...) of art in its concern for the expressive potentials of these acts of conceptual transfiguration. (shrink)

On a cultural level, and for Christian theology as part of a long tradition in the evolution of religion, evolutionary epistemology “sets the stage,” as it were, for understanding the deep evolutionary impact of our ancestral history on the evolution of culture, and eventually on the evolution of disciplinary and interdisciplinary reflection. In the process of the evolution of human knowledge, our interpreted experiences and expectations of the world (and of the ultimate questions we humans typically pose to the world) (...) have a central role to play. What evolutionary epistemology also shows us is that we humans can indeed take on cognitive goals and ideals that cannot be explained or justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage only. Therefore, once the capacities for rational knowledge, moral sensibility, aesthetic appreciation of beauty, and the propensity for religious belief have emerged in our biological history, they cannot be explained only in biological/evolutionary terms. Finally, in this way a door is opened for seeing problem solving as a central activity of our research traditions. As philosophers of science have argued, one of the most important shared rational resources between even widely divergent disciplines is problem solving as the most central and defining activity of all research traditions. As will become clear, the very diverse reasoning strategies of theology and the sciences clearly overlap in their shared quests for intelligible problem solving, including problem solving on an empirical, experiential, and conceptual level. (shrink)