Results for 'Absentee Auction Xxxx'

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  1. Coins Medals Books.Roman Coins, Harmer Rooke Galleries, Absentee Auction Xxxx & Ancient Numismatics - 1991 - Minerva 2:26.
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  2. International, inc the very best in ancient coins.Coins Sold & In Auctions - 1991 - Minerva 2.
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  3.  33
    xxxx.Axel Gosseries & Frédéric Gaspart - 2007 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):193-217.
    In this article, we explore the implications of a Rawlsian theory for intergenerational issues. First, we confront Rawls's way of locating his `just savings' principle in his Theory of Justice with an alternative way of doing so. We argue that both sides of his intergenerational principle, as they apply to the accumulation phase and the steady-state stage, can be dealt with on the bases, respectively, of the principle of equal liberty (and its priority) and of the difference principle. We then (...)
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  4.  56
    Online Auction Fraud: Ethical Perspective.Alex Nikitkov & Darlene Bay - 2008 - Journal of Business Ethics 79 (3):235-244.
    Internet fraud is an issue that increasingly concerns regulators, consumers, firms, and business ethics researchers. In this article, we examine one common form of internet fraud, the practice of shill bidding (when a seller in an auction enters a bid on his or her own item). The significant incidence of shill bidding on eBay (in spite of the fact that it is illegal just as it is in live auctions) exemplifies the current ineffectiveness of regulatory means as well as (...)
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  5.  19
    Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information.Murat Yılmaz - 2015 - Theory and Decision 78 (3):471-500.
    We study a dynamic auction mechanism in the context of private provision of a discrete public good under incomplete information. The bidders have private valuations, and the cost of the public good is common knowledge. No bidder is willing to provide the good on her own. We show that a natural application of open ascending auctions in such environments fails dramatically: The probability of provision is zero in any equilibrium. The mechanism effectively auctions off the ‘right’ to be the (...)
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  6. Modelling Combinatorial Auctions in Linear Logic.Daniele Porello & Ulle Endriss - 2010 - In Daniele Porello & Ulle Endriss (eds.), Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Twelfth International Conference, {KR} 2010, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, May 9-13, 2010.
    We show that linear logic can serve as an expressive framework in which to model a rich variety of combinatorial auction mechanisms. Due to its resource-sensitive nature, linear logic can easily represent bids in combinatorial auctions in which goods may be sold in multiple units, and we show how it naturally generalises several bidding languages familiar from the literature. Moreover, the winner determination problem, i.e., the problem of computing an allocation of goods to bidders producing a certain amount of (...)
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  7.  3
    XXXX. Lesbiaka.Κ Tümpel - 1890 - Philologus: Zeitschrift für Antike Literatur Und Ihre Rezeption 49 (1):707-735.
  8.  51
    Auctions, Rituals and Emotions in the Art Market.Marta Herrero - 2010 - Thesis Eleven 103 (1):97-107.
    This article explores the possibilities offered by Collins’ model of interaction rituals to an understanding of the emotional dynamics of art auctions. It argues that whilst it explains how the art object becomes the focus of attention, and thus the repository of solidarity and emotional energy, it also obliterates some of the institutional aspects of the auction market that can influence such outcomes. It discusses the need to include an examination of the specific practices of auction houses operating (...)
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  9.  14
    The auction sales of the earl of Bute's instruments, 1793.G. L'E. Turner - 1967 - Annals of Science 23 (3):213-242.
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  10.  14
    Double auctions with no-loss constrained traders.Nejat Anbarci & Jaideep Roy - 2018 - Theory and Decision 84 (1):1-9.
    Do hard budget constraints work in favour or against truth telling in double auctions? McAfee constructed a simple double auction mechanism, which is strategyproof and minimally inefficient, but may resort to dual prices, where the difference between prices is channelled as a surplus to the market maker, preventing MDA from achieving a balanced budget. We construct a variant of MDA in which no-loss constraints play a major positive role. Our variant of MDA is also strategyproof, as efficient as MDA (...)
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  11.  63
    Research at the Auction Block: Problems for the Fair Benefits Approach to International Research.Alex John London & Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2010 - Hastings Center Report 40 (4):34-45.
    The “fair benefits” approach to international research is designed to produce results that all can agree are fair without taking a stand on divisive questions of justice. But its appealing veneer of collaboration masks ambiguities at both a conceptual and an operational level. An attempt to put it into practice would look a lot like an auction, leaving little reason to think the outcomes will satisfy even minimal conditions of fairness.
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  12.  80
    Auctions, lotteries, and the punishment of attempts.R. A. Duff - 1990 - Law and Philosophy 9 (1):1 - 37.
  13.  22
    Diffusion auction design.Bin Li, Dong Hao, Hui Gao & Dengji Zhao - 2022 - Artificial Intelligence 303 (C):103631.
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  14. The auction catalogue of Kierkegaard's library.Katalin Nun, Gerhard Schreiber & Jon Stewart (eds.) - 2015 - Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate.
     
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  15.  2
    Optimal auctions revisited.Dov Monderer & Moshe Tennenholtz - 2000 - Artificial Intelligence 120 (1):29-42.
  16.  10
    Bayesian auctions with efficient queries.Jing Chen, Bo Li, Yingkai Li & Pinyan Lu - 2022 - Artificial Intelligence 303 (C):103630.
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  17.  55
    Endogenous entry in auctions with negative externalities.Isabelle Brocas - 2003 - Theory and Decision 54 (2):125-149.
    In this paper, we study the auction to allocate an indivisible good when each potential buyer has a private and independent valuation for the item and suffers a negative externality if a competitor acquires it. In that case, the outside option of each buyer is mechanism-dependent, which implies that participation is endogenous. As several works in the literature have shown, the optimal auction entails strong threats to induce full entry and maximal expected revenue. This results from the full (...)
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  18.  12
    Auction optimization using regression trees and linear models as integer programs.Sicco Verwer, Yingqian Zhang & Qing Chuan Ye - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence 244:368-395.
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  19.  53
    Strategic collusion in auctions with externalities.Omer Biran - 2013 - Theory and Decision 75 (1):117-136.
    We study a first-price auction preceded by a negotiation stage with complete information, during which bidders may form a bidding ring. We prove that in the absence of externalities, the grand cartel forms in equilibrium, allowing ring members to gain the auctioned object for a minimal price. However, identity-dependent externalities may lead to the formation of small rings, as often observed in practice. Potential ring members may condition their participation on high transfer payments as a compensation for their expected (...)
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  20. Progress in economics: Lessons from the spectrum auctions.Anna Alexandrova & Robert Northcott - 2009 - In Harold Kincaid & Don Ross (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford University Press. pp. 306--337.
    The 1994 US spectrum auction is now a paradigmatic case of the successful use of microeconomic theory for policy-making. We use a detailed analysis of it to review standard accounts in philosophy of science of how idealized models are connected to messy reality. We show that in order to understand what made the design of the spectrum auction successful, a new such account is required, and we present it here. Of especial interest is the light this sheds on (...)
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  21.  10
    Robust combinatorial auction protocol against false-name bids.Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sakurai & Shigeo Matsubara - 2001 - Artificial Intelligence 130 (2):167-181.
  22.  3
    Book Auctions: The education of Professor B.Frank Herrmann - 2004 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 15 (3):126-128.
  23.  6
    The world an absentee planter and his slaves made: Sir William Stapleton and his Nevis sugar estate, 1722-1740.Keith Mason - 1993 - Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 75 (1):103-131.
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  24. Dworkin’s auction.Joseph Heath - 2004 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 3 (3):313-335.
    Ronald Dworkin’s argument for resource egalitarianism has as its centerpiece a thought experiment involving a group of shipwreck survivors washed ashore on an uninhabited island, who decide to divide up all of the resources on the island equally using a competitive auction. Unfortunately, Dworkin misunderstands how the auction mechanism works, and so misinterprets its significance for egalitarian political philosophy. First, he makes it seem as though there is a conceptual connection between the ‘envy-freeness’ standard and the auction, (...)
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  25.  60
    Sequential asymmetric auctions with endogenous participation.Flavio M. Menezes & Paulo K. Monteiro - 1997 - Theory and Decision 43 (2):187-202.
    In this paper we suggest a model of sequential auctions with endogenous participation where each bidder conjectures about the number of participants at each round. Then, after learning his value, each bidder decides whether or not to participate in the auction. In the calculation of his expected value, each bidder uses his conjectures about the number of participants for each possible subgroup. In equilibrium, the conjectured probability is compatible with the probability of staying in the auction. In our (...)
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  26. The Dynamics of Auction: Social Interaction and the Sale of Fine Art and Antiques.[author unknown] - 2013
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  27.  12
    Natural History Auctions 1700-1972. A Register of Sales in the British Isles. J. M. Chalmers-Hunt.Don R. Baesel - 1978 - Isis 69 (1):108-108.
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  28.  9
    An Introduction to Auction Theory.Flavio M. Menezes - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    The practical importance of auction theory is widely recognized. Indeed, economists have been recognized for their contribution to the design of several auction-like mechanisms, such as the U. S. Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions, the 3G auctions in Europe and beyond, and the auction markets for electricity markets around the world. This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. The aim is to provide an introductory textbook that will allow students and readers with (...)
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  29.  7
    Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets.Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen & Erel Segal-Halevi - 2021 - Artificial Intelligence 300 (C):103548.
  30.  3
    Tractable combinatorial auctions and b-matching.Moshe Tennenholtz - 2002 - Artificial Intelligence 140 (1-2):231-243.
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  31.  29
    Why a Simple Second-Price Auction Induces Efficient Endogenous Entry.Jingfeng Lu - 2009 - Theory and Decision 66 (2):181-198.
    This article further studies ex ante efficient auctions in the setting of Stegeman (1996 Participation costs and efficient auctions, Journal of Economic Theory 71, 228–259.), where there exist entry costs for bidders who know their valuations. An alternative method is established to address efficient auctions. This method illustrates the intuition why the ex ante efficient allocation is Bayesian implementable through the Stegeman (1996) auction (a second-price auction with a reserve price equal to seller’s valuation and no entry fee). (...)
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  32.  37
    Reputation and Internet Auctions: eBay and Beyond.Chris Snijders & Richard Zijdeman - 2004 - Analyse & Kritik 26 (1):158-184.
    Each day, a countless number of items is sold through online auction sites such as eBay and Ricardo. Though abuse is being reported more and more, transactions seem to be relatively hassle free. A possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the sites’ reputation mechanisms prevent opportunistic behavior. To analyze this issue, we first summarize and extend the mechanisms that affect the probability of sale of an item and its price. We then try to replicate the results as found (...)
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  33.  44
    Organs for Auction.Virginia Abernethy - 1984 - Hastings Center Report 14 (6):49-49.
  34.  55
    Building economic machines: The FCC auctions.Francesco Guala - 2001 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 32 (3):453-477.
    The auctions of the Federal Communication Commission, designed in 1994 to sell spectrum licences, are one of the few widely acclaimed and copied cases of economic engineering to date. This paper includes a detailed narrative of the process of designing, testing and implementing the FCC auctions, focusing in particular on the role played by game theoretical modelling and laboratory experimentation. Some general remarks about the scope, interpretation and use of rational choice models open and conclude the paper.
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  35. Connecting economic models to the real world: Game theory and the fcc spectrum auctions.Anna Alexandrova - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):173-192.
    Can social phenomena be understood by analyzing their parts? Contemporary economic theory often assumes that they can. The methodology of constructing models which trace the behavior of perfectly rational agents in idealized environments rests on the premise that such models, while restricted, help us isolate tendencies, that is, the stable separate effects of economic causes that can be used to explain and predict economic phenomena. In this paper, I question both the claim that models in economics supply claims about tendencies (...)
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  36.  7
    Preference-based English reverse auctions.Marie-Jo Bellosta, Sylvie Kornman & Daniel Vanderpooten - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (7-8):1449-1467.
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  37. Land disputes and auctions: A response to Steiner and Wolff.Paul Bou-Habib & Serena Olsaretti - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):284–287.
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  38.  14
    Land disputes and auctions: a response to Steiner and Wolff.P. Bou-Habib & S. Olsaretti - 2004 - Analysis 64 (3):284-287.
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  39.  33
    Toward an Ethical Understanding of the Controversial Technology of Online Reverse Auctions.Mohamed Hédi Charki, Emmanuel Josserand & Nabila Boukef Charki - 2011 - Journal of Business Ethics 98 (1):17-37.
    B2B online reverse auctions technology (ORAs) emerged as a popular tool for large buying firms in the late 1990s. However, its growing use has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in unethical behaviors to a point that it has been described as the technology that has triggered more ethical concerns in the e-commerce arena than in any other segment of activity. Our findings first indicate that the establishment of formal ethical criteria based on the restrictive interpretation of ethics as honesty (...)
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  40.  36
    On the Ethics Committee: The Expert Member, the Lay Member and the Absentee Ethicist.Nathan Emmerich - 2009 - Research Ethics 5 (1):9-13.
    This paper considers the roles and definitions of expert and lay members of ethics committees, focussing on those given by the National Research Ethics Service which is mandated to review all research conducted in National Health Service settings in the United Kingdom. It questions the absence of a specified position for the ‘professional ethicist’ and suggests that such individuals will often be lay members of ethics committees, their participation being a reflection of their academic interest and expertise. The absence of (...)
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  41.  16
    Bidders Recommender for Public Procurement Auctions Using Machine Learning: Data Analysis, Algorithm, and Case Study with Tenders from Spain.Manuel J. García Rodríguez, Vicente Rodríguez Montequín, Francisco Ortega Fernández & Joaquín M. Villanueva Balsera - 2020 - Complexity 2020:1-20.
    Recommending the identity of bidders in public procurement auctions has a significant impact in many areas of public procurement, but it has not yet been studied in depth. A bidders recommender would be a very beneficial tool because a supplier can search appropriate tenders and, vice versa, a public procurement agency can discover automatically unknown companies which are suitable for its tender. This paper develops a pioneering algorithm to recommend potential bidders using a machine learning method, particularly a random forest (...)
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  42.  48
    Identification of shareholder ethics and responsibilities in online reverse auctions for construction projects.Yilmaz Hatipkarasulu & James H. Gill - 2004 - Science and Engineering Ethics 10 (2):283-288.
    The increasing number of companies providing internet services and auction tools helped popularize the online reverse auction trend for purchasing commodities and services in the last decade. As a result, a number of owners, both public and private, accepted the online reverse auctions as the bidding technique for their construction projects. Owners, while trying to minimize their costs for construction projects, are also required to address their ethical responsibilities to the shareholders. In the case of online reverse auctions (...)
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  43.  46
    Endogenous entry in lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions.Harold Houba, Dinard Laan & Dirk Veldhuizen - 2011 - Theory and Decision 71 (2):269-295.
    Lowest-unique sealed-bid auctions are auctions with endogenous participation, costly bids, and the lowest bid among all unique bids wins. Properties of symmetric NEs are studied. The symmetric NE with the lowest expected gains is the maximin outcome under symmetric strategies, and it is the solution to a mathematical program. Comparative statics for the number of bidders, the value of the item and the bidding cost are derived. The two bidders’ auction is equivalent to the Hawk–Dove game. Simulations of replicator (...)
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  44.  13
    Are Collective Trading Organisations Necessarily Inclusive of Smallholder Farmers?: A Comparative Analysis of Farmer-led Auctions in the Javanese Chilli Market.Dyah Woro Untari & Sietze Vellema - 2022 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 35 (4):1-21.
    Organising smallholder farmers into groups or co-operatives is widely promoted as a strategy to connect farmers to markets and turn them into price makers rather than price takers. This pathway usually combines co-operative organisational models, based on collective ownership and representation in internal governance, with measures to shorten the agri-food chain, shifting the ownership of intermediary sourcing, aggregating and trading functions to the group. The underlying assumption is that this improves smallholder farmers' terms of inclusion in markets. To scrutinise this (...)
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  45.  9
    Duplicates under the hammer: natural-history auctions in Berlin's early nineteenth-century collection landscape.Anne Greenwood MacKinney - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Science 55 (3):319-339.
    The nineteenth-century museum and auction house are seemingly distinct spaces with opposing functions: while the former represents a contemplative space that accumulates objects of art and science, the latter provides a forum for lively sales events that disperse wares to the highest bidders. This contribution blurs the border between museums and marketplaces by studying the Berlin Zoological Museum's duplicate specimen auctions between 1818 and the 1840s. It attends to the operations and tools involved in commodifying specimens as duplicates, particularly (...)
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  46.  8
    Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities.Nicola Gatti, Alessandro Lazaric, Marco Rocco & Francesco Trovò - 2015 - Artificial Intelligence 227 (C):93-139.
  47.  9
    Falling in Love with Horses: The International Thoroughbred Auction.Rebecca Cassidy - 2005 - Society and Animals 13 (1):51-68.
    Based on fieldwork in Newmarket, England, and Kentucky, this paper examines the acts of looking that take place at international thoroughbred horse auctions. Racehorse caretakers employ bloodstock agents to select the yearling thoroughbred who will make the best racehorse as a 2-year-old and, hopefully, successful stallion or broodmare after retiring from the track as a 4- or 5-year old. The paper assesses the criteria used to assess yearlings: pedigree, conformation, and "that something extra."The paper concludes that the ambiguous status of (...)
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  48.  7
    Mafhūmʹpardāzī-i vāqiʻīyat dar jāmiʻahʹshināsī-i tārīkhī: niẓām-i arbāb-i ghāyib dar Īrān = Conceptualization of reality in historical sociology: narrating absentee landlordism in Iran.Ḥamīd ʻAbd Allāhiyān - 2012 - Tihrān: Jāmiʻahʹshināsān.
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  49.  26
    Philosophy of Science or Science and Technology Studies? Economic Methodology and Auction Theory.Ivan A. Boldyrev - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):289-307.
    This article addresses some recent tendencies in economic methodology defined as a philosophy of science for economics. I review the problem of normative/positive distinction in methodology and argue that normativity in its past forms is intolerable today but is, at the same time, indispensable for methodological inquiry. Using recent texts by Mirowski and Nik-Khah and by Alexandrova and Northcott on the applications of auction theory as a case study, I compare in more detail various approaches to economic methodology inspired (...)
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  50.  39
    On the equivalence between descending bid auctions and first price sealed bid auctions.Edi Karni - 1988 - Theory and Decision 25 (3):211-217.
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