Results for 'Aberto Voltolini'

260 found
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  1.  12
    The Nature of Fiction/Al Utterances.Aberto Voltolini - 2016 - Kairos 17 (1):28-55.
    In this paper, first of all, I want to try a new defense of the utterance approach as to the relationship between fictional and nonfictional works on the one hand and between fictional and nonfictional utterances on the other hand, notably the idea that the distinction between fictional and nonfictional works is derivative on the distinction between fictional and nonfictional utterances of the sentences that constitute a text. Moreover, I want to account for the second distinction in minimally contextualist semantic (...)
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  2. a. Blum, P. Frascolla, A. Voltolini.A. Blum, P. Frascolla & A. Voltolini - 1998 - Epistemologia 21 (1):131-142.
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  3.  35
    A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    What is depiction? This is a venerable question that has received many different answers throughout the whole history of philosophy, especially in contemporary times. A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction elaborates a new account on this matter by providing a theory of depiction that tries to combine the merits of the previous theories while dropping their defects. It is argued that a picture is a representation in a pictorial or figurative mode, and its 'figurativity' is given by a special perception, perceiving-in, (...)
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  4. There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
    According to Crane’s schematicity thesis (ST) about intentional objects, intentionalia have no particular metaphysical nature qua thought-of entities; moreover, the real metaphysical nature of intentionalia is various, insofar as it is settled independently of the fact that intentionalia are targets of one’s thought. As I will point out, ST has the ontological consequence that the intentionalia that really belong to the general inventory of what there is, the overall domain, are those that fall under a good metaphysical kind, i.e., a (...)
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  5.  28
    Fiction.Alberto Voltolini & Fred Kroon - 2011 - Rivista di Estetica.
  6. Voltolini's Ficta.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):57-66.
    As the subtitle “A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities” makes clear, Alberto Voltolini intends in this book to argue for a syncretic view of the ontology and the semantics of fiction. In the process, he offers sympathetic and clear presentations of the main contenders in the field, discussing first ontological matters (chapters 1–4) and then semantic questions (chapters 5–6), and concluding with an ‘ontological’ argument for the allegedly syncretic brand of realism about fictional entities he has by then endorsed. (...)
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  7.  11
    Voltolini's Ficta.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):57-66.
    This is a critical review of Alberto Voltolini, How Ficta Follow Fiction. A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities, Springer, Dordrecht, 2006.
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  8. A. Voltolini, How Ficta Follow Fiction.Giuseppe Spolaore - 2007 - Epistemologia 30 (2):377-379.
  9.  20
    Ontological Syncretistic Noneism.Alberto Voltolini - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Logic 15 (2):124-138.
    In this paper I want to claim, first, that despite close similarities, noneism and Crane’s psychological reductionism are different ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished (...)
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  10. Is Liberal Naturalism Possible?Mario de Caro & Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - In Mario de Caro & David Macarthur (eds.), Naturalism and Normativity. Columbia University Press. pp. 69-86.
     
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  11.  61
    How Pretence Can Really Be Metarepresentational.Cristina Meini & Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - Mind and Society 9 (1):31-58.
    Our lives are commonly involved with fictionality, an activity that adults share with children. After providing a brief reconstruction of the most important cognitive theories on pretence, we will argue that pretence has to do with metarepresentations, albeit in a rather weakened sense. In our view, pretending entails being aware that a certain representation does not fit in the very same representational model as another representation. This is a minimal metarepresentationalism, for normally metarepresentationalism on pretense claims that pretending is or (...)
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  12.  1
    O Aberto: O Homem E o Animal de Giorgio Agamben – Uma Tentativa Hipertextual/The Open: The Man and the Animal of Giorgio Agamben - A Hypertext Attempt.Cléber Ranieri Ribas de Almeida - 2014 - Pensando - Revista de Filosofia 4 (7):1.
    O artigo se propõe elaborar uma exegese do livro O Aberto: o Homem e o Animal, de Giorgio Agamben, de maneira a expor o argumento central da obra bem como situar o autor na Filosofia Política contemporânea. Para Agamben, o aberto não se situa unicamente numa analítica fenomenológico-existencial do ser: politicamente, o lugar privilegiado de movimentação desse conceito situa-se especificamente na biofilosofia dos graus do orgânico. A definição desses graus torna-se cada vez mais imprecisa à medida em que (...)
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  13. Reply to Voltolini.François Recanati - unknown
    Response to Voltolini's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop.
     
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  14.  40
    How Ficta Follow Fiction: A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - Springer.
    This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these This This book presents a novel theory of fictional entities which is syncretistic insofar as it integrates the work of previous authors. It puts forward a new metaphysical conception of the nature of these entities, according to which a fictional entity is a compound entity built up from (...)
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  15.  28
    To Think Is to Literally Have Something in One’s Thought.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
    In this paper, we first want to defend the idea that reference intentionality is the relation of constitution holding between an intentional state, a thought, and the object it is about, its intentional object. As such, reference intentionality is for a thought an essential property, whose predication to that thought is true in virtue of the nature of such a thought. We will take this to be one of the main lessons of serious externalism, according to which the intentional object (...)
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  16.  34
    Perceiving Groupings, Experiencing Meanings.Giulia Martina & Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Rivista di Estetica 66:22-46.
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  17. Fiction as a Base of Interpretation Contexts.Alberto Voltolini - 2006 - Synthese 153 (1):23-47.
    In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...)
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  18.  70
    Review of Alberto Voltolini, How Ficta Follow Fiction: A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities[REVIEW]Anthony Everett - 2007 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (11).
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  19.  4
    The Pleasure of Pictures: Pictorial Experience and Aesthetic Appreciation.Jérôme Pelletier & Alberto Voltolini (eds.) - 2018 - Routledge.
    The general aim of this volume is to investigate the nature of the relation between pictorial experience and aesthetic appreciation. In particular, it is concerned with the character and intimacy of this relationship: is there a mere causal connection between pictorial experience and aesthetic appreciation, or are the two relata constitutively associated with one another? The essays in the book's first section investigate important conceptual issues related to the pictorial experience of paintings. In Section II, the essays discuss the notion (...)
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  20.  59
    Why, as Responsible for Figurativity, Seeing-in Can Only Be Inflected Seeing-In.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):651-667.
    In this paper, I want to argue for two main and related points. First, I want to defend Richard Wollheim’s well-known thesis that the twofold mental state of seeing-in is the distinctive pictorial experience that marks figurativity. Figurativity is what makes a representation pictorial, a depiction of its subject. Moreover, I want to show that insofar as it is a mark of figurativity, all seeing-in is inflected. That is to say, every mental state of seeing-in is such that the characterisation (...)
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  21. Against Phenomenal Externalism.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (145):25-48.
    We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal external- ism is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see (...)
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  22.  22
    Different Kinds of Fusion Experiences.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):203-222.
    Some people have stressed that there is a close analogy between meaning experiences, i.e., experiences as of understanding concerning linguistic expressions, and seeing-in experiences, i.e., pictorial experiences of discerning a certain item – what a certain picture presents, viz. the picture’s subject – in another item – the picture’s vehicle, the picture’s physical basis. Both can be seen as fusion experiences, in the minimal sense that they are experiential wholes made up of different aspects. Actually, two important similarities between such (...)
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  23. Against Phenomenal Externalism.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Critica 49 (145):25-48.
    Queremos mostrar que ninguno de los argumentos conocidos a favor del externismo fenoménico es convincente. PE es la tesis de que las propiedades fenoménicas de nuestras experiencias se tienen que individuar en modo amplio en la medida en la que están constituidas por propiedades del mundo. Examinamos los que nos parecen los cinco mejores argumentos a favor de PE. Intentamos mostrar que ninguno de ellos puede establecer el resultado deseado. Mientras no aparezcan argumentos mejores en el debate, no tenemos razón (...)
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  24. Probably the Charterhouse of Parma Does Not Exist, Possibly Not Even That Parma.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - Humana Mente 6 (25):235-261.
    In this paper, I will claim that fictional works apparently about utterly immigrant objects, i.e., real individuals imported in fiction from reality, are instead about fictional individuals that intentionally resemble those real individuals in a significant manner: fictional surrogates of such individuals. Since I also share the realists’ conviction that the remaining fictional works concern native characters, i.e., full-fledged fictional individuals that originate in fiction itself, I will here defend a hyperrealist position according to which fictional works only concern fictional (...)
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  25.  10
    Perception of Faces and Other Progressively Higher-Order Properties.Fabrizio Calzavarini & Alberto Voltolini - forthcoming - Topoi:1-14.
    On the basis of a new criterion for a property to be perceivable–a property is perceivable iff it is not only given immediately and non-volitionally, but also grasped via a holistic form of attention–in this paper we will claim that not only facial properties, but other high-order properties located in a hierarchy of high-order properties, notably gender and racial properties, are perceivable as well. Such claims will be both theoretically and empirically justified.
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  26.  30
    Twofoldness and Three-Layeredness in Pictorial Representation.Alberto Voltolini - 2018 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):89-111.
    In this essay, I defend a Wollheimian account of a twofold picture perception. While I agree with Wollheim’s objectors that a picture involves three layers that qualify a picture in its complexity -- its vehicle, what is seen in it, and its subject --, I argue that the third layer does not involve perception, even indirectly: what is seen in a picture constrains its subject to be a subject of a certain kind, yet it does not force the latter to (...)
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  27.  12
    Review of Alberto Voltolini's "A Syncretistic Theory of Depiction". [REVIEW]Elisa Caldarola - 2016 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 226.
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  28. The Mark of the Mental.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - Phenomenology and Mind 4:124-136.
    In this paper, I want to show that the so-called intentionalist programme, according to which the qualitative aspects of the mental have to be brought back to its intentional features, is doomed to fail. For, pace Brentano, the property that constitutes the main part of such intentional features, i.e., intentionality, is not the mark of the mental, neither in the proper Brentanian sense, according to which intentionality is the both necessary and sufficient condition of the mental, nor in its ‘watered (...)
     
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  29. Recensioni/Reviews-Passioni, emozioni, affetti.C. Bazzanella, P. Kobau & A. Voltolini - 2004 - Epistemologia 27 (1):170-172.
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  30.  6
    Wittgenstein: Mind, Meaning and Metaphilosophy.Pasquale Frascolla, Diego Marconi & Alberto Voltolini (eds.) - 2010 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Leading scholars discuss whether some of the main tenets or theses that are currently or traditionally ascribed to Wittgenstein are still both theoretically and exegetically viable, by focusing on three well-established Wittgensteinian themes: mind, meaning, and metaphilosophy.
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  31. Introduzione.Marilena Andronico, Alfredo Paternoster & Alberto Voltolini - 2007 - Rivista di Estetica 47 (1).
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  32.  1
    Twofoldness and Three-Layeredness in Pictorial Representation.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):89.
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  33.  10
    What We Can Learn From Literary Authors.Alberto Voltolini - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):479-499.
    That we can learn something from literature, as cognitivists claim, seems to be a commonplace. However, when one considers matters more deeply, it turns out to be a problematic claim. In this paper, by focusing on general revelatory facts about the world and the human spirit, I hold that the cognitivist claim can be vindicated if one takes it as follows. We do not learn such facts from literature, if by “literature” one means the truth-conditional contents that one may ascribe (...)
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  34. Should Pride of Place Be Given to the Norms? Intentionality and Normativity.Clotilde Calabi & Alberto Voltolini - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):85-98.
    Reasons motivate our intentions and thus our actions, justify our beliefs, ground our hopes and connect our feelings of shame and pride to our thoughts. Given that intentions, beliefs and emotions are intentional states, intentionality is strongly connected with normativity. Yet what is more precisely their relationship? Some philosophers, notably Brandom and McDowell, contend at places that intentionality is intrinsically normative. In this paper, we discuss Brandom and McDowell’s thesis and the arguments they provide for its defence. In contrast to (...)
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  35. What's in a (Mental) Picture.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - In A. Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer. pp. 389-406.
    In this paper, I will present several interpretations of Brentano’s notion of the intentional inexistence of a mental state’s intentional object, i.e., what that state is about. I will moreover hold that, while all the interpretations from Section 1 to Section 4 are wrong, the penultimate interpretation that I focus in Section 5, the one according to which intentional inexistence amounts to the individuation of a mental state by means of its intentional object, is correct provided that it is nested (...)
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  36.  57
    Against Against Fictional Realism.Alberto Voltolini - 2010 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):47-63.
    In a recent paper, Anthony Everett has mounted a very serious attack against realism with respect to fictional entities. According to Everett, ficta raise deep logico-ontological worries, for they violate some basic logical laws and are problematically indeterminate with respect to both their existence and identity. Since an antirealist account for sentences apparently committing us to ficta is available, no such committment is really needed. In this paper I will try to show, first, that the antirealist account Everett proposes for (...)
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  37. All the Existences That There Are.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Disputatio 4 (32):361-383.
    In this paper, I will defend the claim that there are three existence properties: the second-order property of being instantiated, a substantive first-order property (or better a group of such properties) and a formal, hence universal, first-order property. I will first try to show what these properties are and why we need all of them for ontological purposes. Moreover, I will try to show why a Meinong-like option that positively endorses both the former and the latter first-order property is the (...)
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  38. Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4):561-576.
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which fictional characters arise (...)
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  39. Towards a Syncretistic Theory of Depiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - In C. Calabi (ed.), Perceptual Illusions. Philosophical and Psychological Essays. Palgrave.
    In this paper I argue for a syncretistic theory of depiction, which combines the merits of the main paradigms which have hitherto faced themselves on this issue, namely the perceptualist and semioticist approaches. The syncretistic theory indeed takes from the former its stress on experiential factors and from the latter its stress on conventional factors. But the theory is even more syncretistic than this, for the way it accounts for the experiential factor vindicates several claims defended by different perceptualist theories. (...)
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  40. Fiction and Indexinames.Alberto Voltolini - 2014 - Journal of Literary Theory 8 (2):293–322.
    In this paper, I will first of all claim that once one takes proper names as indexicals of a particular sort, indexinames for short, one may account for some tensions that affect our desiderata regarding the use of such names in sentences directly or indirectly involving fiction. According to my proposal, a proper name “N.N.” is an indexical whose character is roughly expressed by the description “the individual called ‘N.N.’ (in context)”, where this description means “the individual one’s interlocutor’s attention (...)
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  41.  27
    Discussione su "Storia della filosofia analitica" di Franca D'Agostini e Nicla Vassallo.Diego Marconi, Kevin Mulligan & Alberto Voltolini - 2003 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica 16 (3):625-642.
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  42. To Think is to Have Something in One’s Thought.Alberto Voltolini & Elisabetta Sacchi - 2012 - Quaestio 12:395-422.
    Along with a well-honoured tradition, we will accept that intentionality is at least a property a thought holds necessarily, i.e., in all possible worlds that contain it; more specifically, a necessary relation, namely the relation of existential dependence of the thought on its intentional object. Yet we will first of all try to show that intentionality is more than that. For we will claim that intentionality is an essential property of the thought, namely a property whose predication to the thought (...)
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  43. (Mock-)Thinking About the Same.Alberto Voltolini - 2017 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24:282-307.
    In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are (...)
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  44.  22
    I See Not Only a Madonna, but Also a Hole, in the Picture.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):224-239.
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  45. The Seven Consequences of Creationism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (1):27-48.
    Creationism with respect to fictional entities, i.e., the position according to which ficta are creations of human practices, has recently become the most popular realist account of fictional entities. For it allows one to hold that there are fictional entities while simultaneously giving such entities a respectable metaphysical status, that of abstract artifacts. In this paper, I will draw what are the ontological and semantical consequences of this position, or at least of all its forms that are genuinely creationist. For (...)
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  46.  10
    Cognitive Penetrability and Late Vision.Alberto Voltolini - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (3):363-371.
    : In Cognitive penetrability and the epistemic role of perception Athanasios Raftopoulos provides a new defense of the thesis that, unlike early vision, late vision is cognitively penetrable, in accordance with a new definition of cognitive penetrability that is centered on the ideas of direct influence of cognition upon perception and of the epistemic role of perception. This new definition allows him to maintain that late vision is a genuinely perceptive stage of the perceptual process. In this paper, I try (...)
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  47.  98
    Consequences of Schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
    In his (2001a) and in some related papers, Tim Crane has maintained that intentional objects are schematic entities, in the sense that, insofar as being an intentional object is not a genuine metaphysical category, qua objects of thought intentional objects have no particular nature. This approach to intentionalia is the metaphysical counterpart of the later Husserl's ontological approach to the same entities, according to which qua objects of thought intentionalia are indifferent to existence. But to buy a metaphysically deflationary approach (...)
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  48. From Fictionalism to Realism.C. Barbero, M. Ferraris & A. Voltolini (eds.) - 2013 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
     
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  49.  45
    Troubles with Phenomenal Intentionality.Alberto Voltolini - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (1):237-256.
    As far as I can see, there are two basic ways of cashing out the claim that intentionality is ultimately phenomenal: an indirect one, according to which the intentional content of an experiential intentional mental state is determined by the phenomenal character that state already possesses, so that intentionality is so determined only indirectly; a direct one, which centers on the very property of intentionality itself and can further be construed in two manners: either that very property is determined by (...)
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  50.  26
    Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology.Elisabetta Sacchi & Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 7 (2):256-263.
    __: In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cognitive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenomenology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also intended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his (...)
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