A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

A. D. M. Walker; III*—Gratefulness and Gratitude, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 81, Issue 1, 1 June 1981, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093.

Moral theories which, like those of Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas, give a central place to the virtues, tend to assume that as traits of character the virtues are mutually compatible so that it is possible for one and the same person to possess them all. This assumption—let us call it the compatibility thesis—does not deny the existence of painful moral dilemmas: it allows that the virtues may conflict in particular situations when considerations associated with different virtues favour incompatible courses of (...) action, but holds that these conflicts occur only at the level of individual actions. Thus while it may not always be possible to do both what would be just and what would be kind or to act both loyally and honestly, it is possible to be both a kind and a just person and to have both the virtue of loyalty and the virtue of honesty. (shrink)

ANDREA: sincerity, conceptual review, philosophy.

The paper examines a single, apparently simple argument for the existence of incompatibilities between the virtues as traits of character. This argument appeals not to empirical truths about human psychology or human nature but to the possibility of conflict between the exercise of different virtues in action. There are, for example, situations in which we can exercise the virtue of truthfulness only at the expense of not exercising the virtue of tact, as when we are asked a question to which (...) the straightforward answer will pain our questioner. The person who in these situations would give a straightforward answer possesses the virtue of truthfulness to a higher degree than the person who would respond more evasively, whereas the latter person possesses the virtue of tact to a higher degree than the former. But since the two responses are mutually exclusive, it follows that the degree to which we possess the virtue of truthfulness must, at least in some measure, correlate inversely with the degree to which we possess the virtue of tact. And similarly for many other pairs of virtues. My paper focusses on the two cardinal assumptions of this argument, viz., (i) that sometimes the exercise of one virtue can conflict with the exercise of another, and (ii) that the degree to which a person possesses a virtue correlates directly with the extent of its exercise, and defends both assumptions against a variety of objections which allege that, in different ways, they are insensitive to the complexity of the virtues. (shrink)

Dr Casey argues that the classical virtues of courage, temperance, practical wisdom and justice, which are largely ignored in modern moral philosophy, centrally define the good for Man. Success, pride and worldliness remain part of our moral thinking. The conflict between these values leads to contradictions in our understanding of the moral life.

First published in 1991. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The emergence of virtue ethics as a third type of moral theory to rival Utilitarianism and Kantianism is one of the most significant recent developments in moral philosophy in the English-speaking world. Yet despite the vast amount of work in this field over the last three decades there is still something unsatisfactory about virtue theory as exemplified in the contemporary literature. For one thing, as Rosalind Hursthouse points out, there have been scarcely any books 'which explore virtue ethics systematically and (...) at length' (p. 5), almost all contemporary work having been in the form of articles which often stress the tentative and exploratory nature of their authors' investigations. Virtue ethics is still, as it were, in its adolescence, relatively unformed and without character. Hursthouse believes it is time for virtue ethics to 'grow up', and intends On Virtue Ethics as a contribution to this process. (shrink)