A biologist attempts to solve "the problem of knowledge" by exposing the Great Illusion of Philosophy: confusing seeing with the seen. --A. T. T.

The development of Plato's dialectical method is traced through a number of dialogues. Beginning with the Meno, the evolution of a "pre-critical" dialectic ending with the Phaedo is considered. This first dialectic is described as an ascending or inductive movement from sensible things, through which the Forms are apprehended intuitively and independently. The problem of the mutual participation of the Forms, and of sensible things in them, occasions a growing crisis which comes to a head in the first part of (...) the Parmenides, where, according to Montes, the inadequacy of such a dialectic is established. The second part of that dialogue is then interpreted as an exercise in a new "critical dialectic," which is to be applied later in the Sophist to a rational deduction of the Forms in which the problems of participation are overcome. As might be expected of a work originally in thesis form, the book is heavy with footnotes, references, and Greek quotations, making for cumbersome reading.--A. T. (shrink)

Shaffer takes a tour of some perennial questions in this lucid and simply written primer. How do I know I am not dreaming? How does reality differ from a dream? How can we be certain of our knowledge? Varying viewpoints are briefly summarized. The fallibilist view that even a priori mathematical truths and first person reports of feelings and perceptions are subject to error is examined, as is the anti-fallibilist reply that the theoretical possibility of error, without actual evidence, is (...) not sufficient to disturb the certainty of certain kinds of knowledge. Our knowledge of the external world is questioned by Berkeleyan idealism, which treats matter as nothing but a perception of our minds, and by phenomenalism, which treats material objects as nothing but collections of sense data. Opposed to these views are causal theories, which view physical objects as existing independently of observers, and sense data as the result of the causal interaction of material objects and particular bodies. It should be noted that the book's format requires such drastic foreshortening of Descartes' and Berkeley's views that its characterization of the former's system as "one of the great achievements in man's intellectual history" is in no way confirmed by the textual references. Other questions discussed in lively fashion are the self ; identity theory ; epiphenomenalism ; and interactionism. Is the mind best defined as the collection of mental events one has during a lifetime? If these events are all connected with the same body, the mind seemingly cannot survive the death of the body. Finally, theistic and atheistic views about the meaning of life are compared, with the Aristotelian view of teleological causation as the common denominator. The book asks many questions, provides few answers, but serves as an enticement to further exploration.--A. T. (shrink)

The author sets himself the problem of justifying the moral ought. Moral theorists since Hume have argued that an ought can only be derived from another ought. Utilitarians say we ought to maximize the good, but cannot say why. Intuitionists claim the ought is self evident, but cannot deal satisfactorily with differing intuitions. The failure of the major traditions of Western moral philosophy to successfully explain why we ought to act in certain ways has led to ethical skepticism and moral (...) cynicism. Johnson aims to prove that a self-justifying ought is meaningful and does exist, and that a moral ought can be derived from it. The basis of his proof is the self-justifying nature of the obligation to be rational, which is absolute because no rational argument can be made for irrationality. From this rational ought he develops a moral ought containing the obligation to treat everyone impartially and to promote the happiness of others to the same extent as our own. Thus the question "Why ought I to be moral?" is subsumed under "Why ought I to be rational?", which in turn answers itself. Everyone has an equal right to happiness, and thus an equal claim to be treated impartially, but may waive the claim in particular circumstances. The most common reason for such a waiver is the belief that we can promote our own happiness more effectively in the long run by frequently waiving our claim to equal treatment than by always insisting on it. The author's ultimate conclusion--to maximize happiness and divide it equally among everyone affected by one's actions--is hardly distinguishable from Mill's utilitarianism, but it is reached by severely logical rather than empirical reasoning. The work is a closely argued but ultimately unconvincing effort to provide a theoretical basis for morality.--A. T. (shrink)

Singer's study of the technical problems of Santayana's systematic thought will not satisfy his friends nor his detractors. Her reduction of Santayana's Lucretian materialism to epiphenomenalism will seem inadequate to the former. The latter may see Santayana as merely technically inept. While Singer does not claim to offer a comprehensive study of Santayana's thought, her theses " that Santayana was a naturalist and a materialist in the same sense and on the same grounds throughout; that despite even radical changes in (...) terminology his 'later' ontology is a development of, and not inconsistent with, his 'earlier' philosophy; and that, nevertheless, from the start his materialism was touched with ambiguity", do need a comprehensive understanding of Santayana's materialism. The "ambiguities" of his materialism and his social theory in Dominations and Powers derive from the ontological complexities of his realms of Being. Santayana plays with the perspectives possible from each realm and Singer sometimes misses his viewpoint. Santayana's challenge to the liberalism of democracy is indeed based on his a-teleological materialism. Singer's study does draw attention to the analogy of the individual to the state implicit in Santayana's philosophy; she offers refutations of M. K. Munitz's theory of "early and "late" Santayana and W. K. Dennes' interpretation of Santayana's materialism.--A. T. (shrink)