Problem: Is Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems based on a constructivist or on a realist epistemology? Luhmann’s own elaborations seem to oscillate between both standpoints. Method: The argumentation provided in this article starts with a detailed reconstruction of Luhmann’s epistemology and of Luhmann’s criticism towards radical constructivism and then examines the consequences for a comparison of systems theory and (radical) constructivism. Results: Although Luhmann’s operative constructivism can be distinguished from radical constructivism, the differences are not considered fundamental. Luhmann’s epistemology (...) is clearly nearer to constructivism than to realism and it shares most of constructivism’s key concepts, such as self-referential logic, a strict relation between observer and observed, and the relativism of reality construction. Implications: Luhmann’s criticism of radical constructivism must be understood in the context of his sociological background. Most of his arguments against radical constructivism can be considered apprehensions of misleading interpretations of radical constructivism rather than of substantial criticism. They may help to clarify a radical constructivist epistemology. Constructivist content: The paper attempts to check whether Luhmann’s theory of social theory is based on (radical) constructivist epistemology. (shrink)

Context: Niklas Luhmann is considered to be a major proponent of the constructivist movement who based his highly complex sociological theory on constructivist concepts such as Maturana’s autopoiesis and Spencer Brown’s distinction. Problem: Despite heavily borrowing from constructivism, there are doubts as to whether his epistemological standpoint was properly constructivist. Method: In six papers and 14 Open Peer Commentaries, Luhmann’s epistemological understanding, understanding of science, and use and development of constructivist concepts is examined. Results: The authors’ papers and commentaries cover (...) a broad range of topics including the concepts of the observer, meaning, environment, and structural coupling. (shrink)

Algorithms play an increasing role within the process of digitalization of society. They are used for descriptions and predictions of consumers’ or citizens’ behavior. Sociologist Elena ….

Upshot: Egner’s suggestion that a theory of observation should be developed towards a more abstract concept in order to apply it to any autopoietic system is plausible from the point of a general systems theory. However, this strategy of theorizing is not suited to solving epistemological problems in particular because such a broad concept fails to specify constructivism as a strictly observer-related philosophy. Nassehi’s search for a third way between constructivism and realism, in turn, presumes a too narrow and biased (...) concept of constructivism and is therefore not suited to solving the epistemological problem for which constructivism has been developed. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the target article “From Objects to Processes: A Proposal to Rewrite Radical Constructivism” by Siegfried J. Schmidt > Upshot: Radical Constructivism should be strictly process-oriented to avoid hidden ontology. S. J. Schmidt provides such a strict process-orientation from a very philosophical viewpoint that, however, still lacks access to empirical research. The purpose of this commentary is to show a way to apply Schmidt’s philosophical framework to empirical research.

Upshot: Poerksen’s discursive constructivism reconstructs radical constructivist foundations and applies them to several subjects of research in the field of journalism and media studies. The author combines epistemological arguments with practical advice for journalists, which makes the book not only valuable for interested followers of RC in general but also for communication scientists and media practitioners.

Purpose: Explaining the relationship between theory and empirical research within the research process. The main motivation is to show that non-dualizing epistemology and constructivism have approximately the same ideas to explain this relationship. Problem: Josef Mitterer criticizes constructivism as a dualizing epistemology and "overlooks" that non-dualizing philosophy and constructivist perspectives are similar with regard to the relationship between theory and empirical research. Method: (1) Reconstruction of non-dualizing argumentation, (2) non-dualizing implications for the description of the relationship between theory and empirical (...) research, (3) comparison of non-dualizing implications for the relationship between theory and empirical research with constructivist implications for this relationship. Solution: Finding a position on the description of the relationship between theory and empirical research that fits both epistemologies i.e. non-dualizing philosophy and constructivism. If we discard the critical rationalist idea to falsify theory with the help of empirical research (which reflects reality), we better conceive the relationship between theory and empirical research as a permanent and mutual refinement, stabilization and irritation. Implications: With the help of non-dualizing argumentation, constructivists have to clarify their position towards the relationship between theory and empirical research, particularly towards the choice of methods and the interpretation of the results; and non-dualizing epistemology can profit from constructivist second-order argumentation. (shrink)

Purpose: Describing how radical constructivism was introduced to communication science and analyzing why it has not yet become a mainstream endeavour. Situation: Before radical constructivism entered the relevant debates in communication sciences, moderate constructivist positions had already been developed. Problem: Radical constructivists’ argumentation has often been provocative and exaggerating in style, and extreme in its position. This has provoked harsh reactions within the mainstream scientific community. Several argumentative strategies have been used to degrade radical constructivist arguments and their relevance. Solution: (...) Beyond such rhetorical devices, radical constructivism has become established within the field of communication science, although it has not become mainstream. One should probably not even wish to make radical constructivism a mainstream approach in case it loses its sceptical ability for second-order-observation. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ontology, Reality and Construction in Niklas Luhmann’s Theory” by Krzysztof C. Matuszek. Upshot: Matuszek’s article criticizes Luhmann’s systems theory in particular and constructivism in general with respect to philosophical inconsistency caused by some ontological implications of constructivist epistemology. Providing a coherent interpretation of ontology and epistemology is worth the effort in order to solve philosophical problems. However, the question arises of whether philosophical reasoning actually is of any relevance for empirical research. I argue that (...) both Luhmann’s operative constructivism and constructivism in general already comply with Matuszek’s suggestions. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Constructivism as a Key Towards Further Understanding of Communication, Culture and Society” by Raivo Palmaru. Upshot: Palmaru addresses several problems with respect to radical constructivism, in particular the relationship between the micro-level and macro-level of social phenomena, i.e., communication, culture, and society. Related to this, I dispute three of Palmaru’s key claims: the relationship between micro-social and macro-social phenomena is a specific problem of radical constructivism; radical constructivism does not solve the problem of the (...) micro-macro-link; the author’s solution to the respective problem is necessary and sufficient. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ethics: A Radical-constructivist Approach” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: The sharp distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive knowledge provided by Andreas Quale prevents the author from finding well-founded reasons for constructivist ethics.

Upshot: The controversy between realism and constructivism often seems to be a matter of epistemology. However, empirical researchers are not primarily interested in solving philosophical questions but in practicing good research. It would be shortsighted to believe that there is a contradiction between epistemological and empirical questions.

Problem: First-order scientific research is often not aware of the hidden assumptions provided by an epistemological perspective based upon realism. Beyond philosophical considerations about the epistemological foundations, some practical normative implications deriving from them are crucial: in the field of communication and media studies, some scholars criticize media coverage, e.g., on climate change, as biased and distorted from reality. Method: From a constructivist perspective, the article presents a detailed meta-analysis of the course of argumentation provided by two empirical communication studies (...) that follow an objectivist approach. Result: With the help of a second-order research strategy, it is possible to uncover their ontological assumptions and criticize their normative implications. Implications: Social scientists should be careful with normative suggestions for the system under study unless they are applied within these systems themselves. (shrink)

Upshot: New publications about Niklas Luhmann and his theory of social systems address the question of Luhmann’s epistemological standpoints. A publication on the “ontologies of the modern world” hastily describes social conventions and processes of stabilization as modern ontologies and a new handbook on Luhmann’s life, oeuvre and impact underestimates the major contribution of constructivism in Luhmann’s theory. Although the two books are comprehensive and informative, they do not make enough use of the constructivist potential to explain both Luhmann’s theory (...) as founded upon constructivist epistemology and the processes of modernization. (shrink)