This introduction to the basic ideas of structural proof theory contains a thorough discussion and comparison of various types of formalization of first-order logic. Examples are given of several areas of application, namely: the metamathematics of pure first-order logic (intuitionistic as well as classical); the theory of logic programming; category theory; modal logic; linear logic; first-order arithmetic and second-order logic. In each case the aim is to illustrate the methods in relatively simple situations and then apply them elsewhere in much (...) more complex settings. There are numerous exercises throughout the text. In general, the only prerequisite is a standard course in first-order logic, making the book ideal for graduate students and beginning researchers in mathematical logic, theoretical computer science and artificial intelligence. For the new edition, many sections have been rewritten to improve clarity, new sections have been added on cut elimination, and solutions to selected exercises have been included. (shrink)
In this note we shall assume acquaintance with [T4] and the parts of [T1] which deal with intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types. The bibliography just continues the bibliography of [T4].The principal purpose of this note is the discussion of two models for intuitionistic finite type arithmetic with fan functional. The first model is needed to correct an oversight in the proof of Theorem 6 [T4, §5]: the model ECF+as defined there cannot be shown to have the required properties inEL+ (...) QF-AC, the reason being that a change in the definition ofW12alone does not suffice—if one wishes to establish closure under the operations of HAωthe definitions ofW1σfor other σ have to be adopted as well. It is difficult to see how to do this directly in a uniform way — but we succeed via a detour, which is described in §2.For a proper understanding, we should perhaps note already here thaton the assumption of the fan theorem, ECF+as defined in [T4] and the new model of this note coincide ; but inELit is impossible to prove this. (shrink)
The paper deals with two versions of the fragment with unit, tensor, linear implication and storage operator of intuitionistic linear logic. The first version, ILL, appears in a paper by Benton, Bierman, Hyland and de Paiva; the second one, ILL+, is described in this paper. ILL has a contraction rule and an introduction rule !I for the exponential; in ILL+, instead of a contraction rule, multiple occurrences of labels for assumptions are permitted under certain conditions; moreover, there is a different (...) introduction rule for the exponential, !I+, which is closer in spirit to the necessitation rule for the normalizable version of S4 discussed by Prawitz in his monograph “Natural Deduction”.It is relatively easy to adapt Prawitz's treatment of natural deduction for intuitionistic logic to ILL+; in particular one can formulate a notion of strong validity permitting a proof of strong normalization.The conversion rules for ILL explicitly mentioned in the paper by Benton et al. do not suffice for normal forms with subformula property, but we can show that this can be remedied by addition of a special permutation conversion plus some “satellite” permutation conversions.Some discussion of the categorical models which might correspond to ILL+ is given. (shrink)
This paper studies, by way of an example, the intuitionistic propositional connective * defined in the language of second order propositional logic by. In full topological models * is not generally definable, but over Cantor-space and the reals it can be classically shown that; on the other hand, this is false constructively, i.e. a contradiction with Church's thesis is obtained. This is comparable with some well-known results on the completeness of intuitionistic first-order predicate logic.Over [0, 1], the operator * is (...) (constructively and classically) undefinable. We show how to recast this argument in terms of intuitive intuitionistic validity in some parameter. The undefinability argument essentially uses the connectedness of [0, 1]; most of the work of recasting consists in the choice of a suitable intuitionistically meaningful parameter, so as to imitate the effect of connectedness. (shrink)
In this paper we discuss a particular example of the passage from the informal, but rigorous description of a concept to the axiomatic formulation of principles holding for the concept; in particular, we look at the principles of continuity and lawlike choice in the theory of lawless sequences. Our discussion also leads to a better understanding of the rôle of the so-called density axiom for lawless sequences.
The paper discusses the transition from informal concepts to mathematically precise notions; examples are given, and in some detail the case of lawless sequences, a concept of intuitionistic mathematics, is discussed. A final section comments on philosophical discussions concerning intuitionistic logic in connection with a ‘theory of meaning’.
The paper discusses the relationship between normal natural deductions and cutfree proofs in Gentzen (sequent) calculi in the absence of term labeling. For Gentzen calculi this is the usual version; for natural deduction this is the version under the complete discharge convention, where open assumptions are always discharged as soon as possible. The paper supplements work by Mints, Pinto, Dyckhoff, and Schwichtenberg on the labeled calculi.
