A project of the Gandhi Centennial Committee of Southern Illinois University, the book outlines the basic tenets of Gandhian philosophy as interpreted by Western thinkers, deals with problems of American education, and offers some reflec­tions on what kinds of solutions may be posed by educators, primarily at the university level. The Foreword and Epilogue are by two distinguished Indian educators, _K. L. Shrimali_, Vice-chancellor, and _N. A. Nikam_, former Vice-chancellor, University of Mysore.

A hippocampal patient is described who shows preserved item recognition and simple recognition-based recollection but impaired recall and associative recognition. These data and other evidence suggest that contrary to Aggleton & Brown's target article, Papez circuit damage impairs only complex item-item-context recollection. A patient with perirhinal cortex damage and a delayed global memory deficit, apparently inconsistent with A&B's framework, is also described.

Contractualism conceives of firm-stakeholder relations as cooperative schemes for mutual benefit. In essence, contractualism holds that these schemes, as well as the normative principles that guide and constrain them, are ultimately ratified by the consent and endorsement of those subject to them. This paper explores the empirical validity of a contractualist perspective on firm-stakeholder relations. It first develops a typology of firm-stakeholder contracting problems. It subsequently confronts this typology with empirical data collected in an interview study of concrete stakeholder management (...) practices, involving in-depth research interviews with forty-four managers working in the Dutch financial services industry. The findings of this theory-building study suggest that there are limits to the applicability of the contract model in the context of stakeholder management, and that disregarding either the model or its limitations may lead to highly ineffective firm-stakeholder relations. (shrink)

After setting up the classic Platonic doctrine of universals, Zabeeh reviews the Aristotelian and British empiricist attacks on this doctrine, and the doctrine of general ideas. Zabeeh's own "new" look consists in a reworking of many currently familiar ideas to come up with the position that universals are the meanings of general terms and the meanings of general terms are the way in which they are used. While this may do as the start of a semantical theory of universals, it (...) hardly touches the problem of their ontological status. The same basic semantical theory is compatible with realism, conceptualism, or nominalism, as Carnap has shown. Page 33 belongs in place of page 34, page 34 in place of page 32.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The author attacks the authenticity and credibility of the biblical tradition in general, with special emphasis on the New Testament Gospels, arguing from the rational and factual contradictions in the text. Christ is an eschatologically deluded ethical teacher whose real message was some sort of esthetic humanitarianism. Unitarianism represents the faith of the future. The naivete of the author may be a virtue in itself, but not in a field where responsible scholarship is a prerequisite.—E. A. R.

Adherence to a few basic principles of textbook reading compilation have made this one of the more worthwhile introductory philosophy texts. In the first place, the editors have given lengthy and frequently complete texts. Anselm's Proslogium, Descartes' Meditations, Plato's Phaedo, and Kant's Prolegomena are given complete or nearly complete; there is a ninety-one page extract from Locke's Essay, over fifty pages of James and nearly forty pages from Whitehead. This still leaves room for ample primary material by Leibniz, Hume, and (...) Schopenhauer. The plan of the book is to frame the important primary text with intellectually contemporaneous discussion of the problems treated in the primary text, and then to bracket each section with a prologue and epilogue drawn—except in the final section where Plato has the last word—from twentieth-century literature relevant to the issues under discussion in each section. The authors are thus able to provide an historical and thematic introduction to philosophy, which together cannot help but impress the beginning student with the unity of philosophical experience. Obviously no single textbook will ever escape the need for supplementation; this one in particular will require those who would like their students to be exposed to more phenomenology and existentialism, and, to a lesser degree, analytical philosophy, to introduce additional reading. But Epstein and Kennedy have provided the basic skeleton to which may be added as much flesh as the instructor desires.—E. A. R. (shrink)

An exciting attempt to establish and elaborate in some detail a method which will achieve the proper compromise between "scientific precision" and "humanistic significance" in cultural anthropology and the history of ideas. The author begins by distinguishing theoretical from overt behavior; the former is his concern, and is defined to encompass the higher products of a given culture: poetry, painting, politics, and metaphysics are the chief examples utilized. A set of seven linear and bi-polar "axes-of-bias" are then detailed as a (...) schematic tool for arriving at the common denominator which may be said to characterize each of these cultural expressions. Sample axes are the Continuity/discreteness axis-bias, Static/dynamic axis-bias, and Order/disorder axis-bias. In addition, the claim is made that the question of whether or not the works of a given personality coincide with a previously determined syndrome can be significantly decided through a content analysis of his works, which results in a profile drawn from his placement on each of these axes. The title of the book is taken from the fact that Romanticism is the chief phenomenon by which the method is tested. The author is careful to guard himself against claiming "objective truth" for any of his analyses, let alone for any of the syndromes he has detailed; and it is this, namely his heuristic theory of theories, that the philosopher will find most interesting, and, perhaps, most debatable.—E. A. R. (shrink)

A detailed, paragraph by paragraph, interpretation of the De Ente et Essentia. Bobik has supplied his own translation of the text. It is only incidental that his claim to this being the only full-scale commentary in English is negated by the new translation of the Cajetan Commentary ; but the undergraduate and the student who has not yet thoroughly studied the tradition is bound to find Bobik's Interpretation much more approachable than Cajetan's Commentary. Bobik concentrates heavily upon distinguishing and keeping (...) straight the logical and metaphysical themes in Thomas' work and is able to delineate, with more than usual success, Thomas' doctrine of first and second intentions and the always thorny problem of universals. Though his is definitely an interpretive rather than an historical and textual approach, Bobik explicitly rejects such aggiornamentizing as the existential interpretation of Thomas, specifically the reading of esse as "act of existing" rather than as the less theoretically loaded "being." This perhaps accounts for his failure to mention one possible interpretation of the prima via which does not regard the demonstration as limited to a cause of physical motion—as Bobik seems to think. Bobik's efforts may well provoke rather than be provocative for many neo-scholastically oriented philosophers, but there is a good deal of light thrown on Thomas' metaphysics that would be lost if this attitude held sway.—E. A. R. (shrink)

As a patient approaches death, family members often are asked about their loved one’s preferences regarding treatment at the end of life. Advance care directives may provide information for families and surrogate decision makers; however, less than one-third of Americans have completed such documents. As the U.S. population continues to age, many surrogate decision makers likely will rely on other means to discern or interpret a loved one’s preferences. While many surrogates indicate that they have some knowledge of their loved (...) one’s preferences, how surrogates obtain such knowledge is not well understood. Additionally, although research indicates that the emotional burden of end-of-life decision making is diminished when surrogates have knowledge that a loved one’s preferences are honored, it remains unclear how surrogates come to know these preferences were carried out. The current study examined the ways that next of kin knew veterans’ end-of-life preferences, and their ways of knowing whether those preferences were honored in Veteran Affairs Medical Center inpatient settings. (shrink)

This book is a very expensive disappointment. It is a series of edifying discourses on the limits of the knowledge of physics for understanding the universe in all its dimensions. To bring home the point that physics can provide no ultimate metaphysical, theological, moral/ethical, or even cosmological answers to questions which must inevitably be raised, Jaki races up and down the pages of the more reflective and perhaps near-philosophical utterances of famous physicists, chemists, etc. The fruits of his obviously omnivorous (...) reading are a welter of names, quotes, and footnotes served up to the reader en masse in an attempt to establish by authority, apparently, a general position which might or might not have been establishable by analysis and argument. There are some curiosities that may interest the historian of science in the book, but the philosophical pickings are slim.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The topic of this seminar will be the notion of language as it is employed in the philosophy of language. The seminar will be divided into two parts, of somewhat unequal length. The first part will be devoted to the change in the conception of language that marked the transition from structural linguistics to generative linguistics (the so-called "Chomskian revolution"). We will approach this not only as a chapter in the philosophy of language, but also as an important chapter in (...) the philosophy of science, in large part because much of the discussion centers around to what extent, and how, the study of language can be understood as a scientific inquiry, continuous with the other natural sciences. From this discussion, which will be devoted to reading some of the classic literature from the mid-50's to the mid-70's (largely by Chomsky), an articulation of the subject matter of the study of language will emerge, and in particular this will involve an articulation of the relation of syntax, semantics and pragmatics. This will lead us to explore, in the second part of the seminar, the most influential work, that of Grice, especially in "Logic and Conversation" devoted to articulating this distinction. (shrink)

These are the first works of Blondel to be translated into English. Blondel has been called the French Newman; but this is misleading, as Blondel was a disciplined and professional philosopher, while it would not be fair to Newman to judge him exclusively or even largely as a philosopher. In this country Blondel has tended to be overshadowed by Maritain, Gilson, and the neo-Thomists generally, to whose camp Blondel emphatically did not belong. The first of the works contained in this (...) volume is concerned with the question of the possibility of a Christian philosophy, i.e., a philosophy that is Christian in its tendency but philosophical, not theological, in its substance. The second work is Blondel's answer to the specific problem of Modernism which raged in Catholic philosophical and theological circles at the beginning of this century, but its importance may now be gauged equally in terms of its being an attempt to incorporate the core of truth included in historicism and relativism without giving up the objectivity of perspective that has always characterized the perennial philosophy. Dru and Trethowan have provided an excellent general introduction of over one hundred pages which covers the necessary biographical details of Blondel's life, as well as giving the intellectual and cultural setting of his thought. Added to this are briefer historical introductions for each of the works contained herein. A bibliography of Blondel's principal works is included.—E A. R. (shrink)

The five chapters in this volume were originally delivered in lecture form at the University of Genoa and have previously appeared in French, German, and English translations. An appendix, "What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law," has also appeared before in English. The book is basically a digest, with some modifications, of Perelman's earlier work Justice et Raison. The chief modification involves a supposed shift away from positivism toward a greater emphasis on the cognitive status of primary (...) values. Through the mediation of his consideration of the nature of practical reason in the Traité de l'Argumentation, Perelman now wishes to argue that values are subject to dialectical justification. The analysis of justice, thus, need not be restricted to merely formal specifications such as the rule of justice or to such inherently nonuniversalizable and nonanalyzable principles as that of equity. Dialectical justification falls short of demonstration, but only someone still under the spell of Cartesianism would wish to maintain that rationality is adequately summarized in the model provided by mathematics and science. Jurisprudence, therefore deals with judgments that have cognitive and not arbitrary or merely historical value. So much for the scheme of Perelman's argument. What about its execution? It must be said that its substance is slight and the base of discussion extraordinarily narrow. Thus, Perelman says he wishes to avoid the Scylla of nominalism and the Charybdis of realism; but his own analysis winds up squarely in a conventionalism that is only minutely distinguishable from the nominalism he presumably attacks: e.g., "the idea of [practical] reason must not be linked to that of truth", "reason is but an attempt to convince the members of [the universal] audience--whom common sense would define as well-informed and reasonable men". The only defense offered by Perelman for the first statement is a flaunting of the bogey of dogmatism. The vicious circle in the second statement is barred from rising to the level of the fruitful Aristotelian paradox by a peremptory dismissal of natural law: "The theorists of natural law... have not convinced the majority of those philosophers of law who are endowed with critical minds." This kind of "you-don't-belong-to-the-club" argument makes the book practically worthless from a truly dialectical point of view. The only critical sparks generated are in Perelman's discussion of Rawls' theory of "justice as fair play." His points here are well taken. But, as this is the only saving grace in the book--the rest being merely a statement of Perelman's own doxa about justice--it would have been better to leave the whole interred in the journals where it had already been published.--E. A. R. (shrink)

After distinguishing "social philosophy" from "philosophy of social science" on the basis of the former's "more overtly normative" concerns and the latter's primary concern with methodological and confirmation issues in the social sciences, Rudner argues in support of the fully-formalized, axiomatic model of scientific theories and the deductive-nomological model of explanation as paradigms to guide the process of social scientific understanding; though, as Rudner willingly acknowledges, these paradigms hardly characterize the present product of the social sciences. Rudner's primary motivation is (...) the desire to leave open the ideal of the "unity of science." Thus, he argues against such "separatist" approaches as the classical, verstehen theory of Weber, against the more recent wedding of this type of position to ordinary language philosophy in, especially, the work of Winch, and, finally, in the last chapter, against positions which employ teleological and functional analyses. This last chapter fails, mainly because Rudner uses "teleological" in an indiscriminate way, which is not at all characteristic of some of the more recent defenses of teleological explanation. In addition, Rudner ignores the question of the extent to which methodological commitments may reflect underlying ontological commitments, a level of analysis and justification which cannot be bypassed in any consideration of the type of unity envisioned for science.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The five chapters in this volume were originally delivered in lecture form at the University of Genoa and have previously appeared in French, German, and English translations. An appendix, "What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law," has also appeared before in English. The book is basically a digest, with some modifications, of Perelman's earlier work Justice et Raison. The chief modification involves a supposed shift away from positivism toward a greater emphasis on the cognitive status of primary (...) values. Through the mediation of his consideration of the nature of practical reason in the Traité de l'Argumentation, Perelman now wishes to argue that values are subject to dialectical justification. The analysis of justice, thus, need not be restricted to merely formal specifications such as the rule of justice or to such inherently nonuniversalizable and nonanalyzable principles as that of equity. Dialectical justification falls short of demonstration, but only someone still under the spell of Cartesianism would wish to maintain that rationality is adequately summarized in the model provided by mathematics and science. Jurisprudence, therefore deals with judgments that have cognitive and not arbitrary or merely historical value. So much for the scheme of Perelman's argument. What about its execution? It must be said that its substance is slight and the base of discussion extraordinarily narrow. Thus, Perelman says he wishes to avoid the Scylla of nominalism and the Charybdis of realism; but his own analysis winds up squarely in a conventionalism that is only minutely distinguishable from the nominalism he presumably attacks: e.g., "the idea of [practical] reason must not be linked to that of truth", "reason is but an attempt to convince the members of [the universal] audience--whom common sense would define as well-informed and reasonable men". The only defense offered by Perelman for the first statement is a flaunting of the bogey of dogmatism. The vicious circle in the second statement is barred from rising to the level of the fruitful Aristotelian paradox by a peremptory dismissal of natural law: "The theorists of natural law... have not convinced the majority of those philosophers of law who are endowed with critical minds." This kind of "you-don't-belong-to-the-club" argument makes the book practically worthless from a truly dialectical point of view. The only critical sparks generated are in Perelman's discussion of Rawls' theory of "justice as fair play." His points here are well taken. But, as this is the only saving grace in the book--the rest being merely a statement of Perelman's own doxa about justice--it would have been better to leave the whole interred in the journals where it had already been published.--E. A. R. (shrink)

The working text follows the Faucher edition with some variants picked up from the Leonine. The questions cover St. Thomas' location of the virtue of religion as a "potential part of justice" and his consideration of "Religion in Itself" as a virtue. From here St. Thomas moves to a consideration of the internal acts of religion, "Devotion", "Prayer", and "Adoration", which, while they have an external face, are viewed properly as the direct ordering of the mind and heart to God. (...) Next are considered the more external acts of religion, which are ordered to these internal acts: "Sacrifice," "Oblations," "Tithes," "Vows," and "Oaths". Finally, St. Thomas takes up "Adjuring" and the "Use of God's Name in Prayer or Praise". The last article of Q. 91 concludes on the delightful note that "song [should be] used in praising God so that the minds of the fainthearted may be incited to devotion," which, when taken together with other structural and focal hints throughout this treatise, suggests the subtle way in which St. Thomas has incorporated—if the anachronism be excused—all three of the Kierkegaardian "Stages" into the single dialectic of religion. The six appendices are clear, concise, and genuinely useful.—E. A. R. (shrink)

To raise the question of the possibility of a covenantal relation between God and man from the standpoint of cultural theology is another way of asking the critical question, only now, in terms of a particular object, namely, whether thought in the sense of reason is commensurate with the reality that is God. Schleiermacher thought it was, though not in a way which would allow abstract reason, or dialectic, as he called it, to exhaust the intelligibility of its object either (...) in itself or even for man from his finite standpoint. The knowing of God through dialectic must be complemented through the experience of God in feeling. Dialectic without feeling turns in the direction of Hegel's Absolute Idealism or some less sophisticated form of anthropomorphic historicism, while feeling without dialectic becomes pantheistic and mystical in the extreme. Through an examination of Schleiermacher's dialectic Spiegler shows that Schleiermacher's major problem was to preserve the proper tension between God as immanent and God as transcendent. Spiegler thinks that Schleiermacher would have been more successful in this attempt if he had given up the traditional notion of God as absolute. Though he mentions Hartshorne only once and Whitehead not at all, it seems clear that it is a conception of God along the lines developed by these two philosophers that Spiegler thinks would have made Schleiermacher's project of dialectic more consistent with itself. Once the necessary revision has been made in the traditional notion of God's absoluteness, a revitalized cultural theology along the general lines laid down by Schleiermacher could successfully resist being pushed in either the direction of Hegel or the direction of mysticism, and so would not lead to a Feuerbachian-type negative reaction with its consequent theological reaction in the form of Barthian dialectical theology and the doctrine of God as wholly other. Spiegler's presentation of Schleiermacher is for the most part fair, though he does give a rather narrow treatment to the doctrine of feeling: e.g., he hardly touches on the doctrine at all as it receives its pristine formulation in the speeches On Religion. In addition, he tends to dismiss too easily the suggestion that thought may be commensurate with the infinite through the mediation of a symbolics strongly fortified by a doctrine of analogy. But on the whole, the English-speaking student of the history of theology will be grateful to Spiegler for providing this new look at Schleiermacher.--E. A. R. (shrink)

An anthology of shorter texts, chronologically arranged, and designed to exhibit the development and spectrum of opinions concerning the mind-body problem, the problem of the self, and the question of immortality. Any volume of this sort must necessarily exclude some thinkers who may be important, but Flew's failure to include any philosopher after Leibniz from outside the English speaking world seems inexcusable and creates quite an imbalance in the presentation of contemporary thought on these problems. Flew's introduction is critical as (...) well as historical. A selected bibliography, that the beginning student will find useful, is included.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This edition of Ia IIae pp. 49-67 of the Summa is competent, inexpensive, and complete, and so marks a welcome first in editions of this part of the Summa. After a discussion of habits in general, or what in contemporary philosophy of mind would be more familiar under the rubric of dispositions, virtue is located as a specific sort of habit in the soul, i.e., man, considered according to his real, intrinsic principle of activity. Next St. Thomas moves to a (...) general consideration of the "Intellectual Virtues", the "Moral Virtues", the "Cardinal Virtues", and the "Theological Virtues". Finally, St. Thomas runs back over this basic classification by considering "The Cause of Virtue", "The Mean of Virtue", "The Connection of the Virtues", "The Equality of the Virtues", and "The Duration of the Virtues after this Life". This book has obvious historical interest. But it is also important for contemporary discussions in the philosophy of mind. For example, even if we defer to the caveat that the theological points made by St. Thomas may be gratuitous, it is interesting to consider if those contemporary philosophers of mind who display a decided tendency to explain dispositions in terms of overt, occurrent episodes could come anywhere near adequately describing, let alone explaining, the mine of distinctions vis-à-vis just the moral, intellectual, and cardinal virtues, which Aquinas both describes in ordinary language and neatly explains by means of a theoretical framework containing a thoroughly metaphysical doctrine of potentiality.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This book of readings would make a superb ancillary text for an advanced or even graduate course in "existential phenomenology." Twelve of the twenty-two selections have been translated for the first time into English. This includes Sartre's defense of the major theses of Being and Nothingness before the Société française de philosophie and Ric£ur's similar defense of La Philosophie de la Volonté, I before the same body. As with Merleau-Ponty's similar defense, "The Primacy of Perception," also included in this volume, (...) the discussion which followed these defenses is presented. Integral texts in the form of articles rather than extracts from books are presented in most cases, including the first appearance of an essay by Marcel entitled "Desire and Hope." Where this is not done, as is partly the case for Strasser and wholly the case for Scheler, Dufrenne, Wild, and Ingarden, lengthy and context-faithful excerpts are given. There are four sections in the book: I. Existence in the Modalities of Consciousness, II. Existence as Embodied, III. Existence and Value, and IV. Existence and the Human Sciences. Each of these sections is skillfully laid out and effectively introduced. In addition to the philosophers mentioned, work by Buytendijk, May, Schutz, Van Kaam, Berger, Bollnow, Minkowski, Straus, and de Waelhens is included. Husserl is missing, as is Heidegger, but these gaps can be supplemented easily enough.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This is the first of six volumes, the last of which is scheduled for publication in late 1970. Altogether they will comprise "a comprehensive survey of central theological topics conducted by a group of writers in basic sympathy with each other, whose theological views have emerged from a serious and disciplined study of the relevant sources and from an awareness of the problems posed by life and thought in the modern world." The Encyclopedia is being published simultaneously in English, French, (...) German, Dutch, Italian, and Spanish editions and it has been billed as an international project. In actual fact, a German, and particularly, Rahnerian point of view overwhelmingly predominates in this first volume. This may be all to the good but the statistics are nonetheless revealing. Each of the 120 articles and parts of articles is signed, by one or more of a total of ninety different authors. But out of these ninety, fourteen contributors,, account for approximately 42 per cent of the writing. Rahner himself has authored eight articles or parts of articles and ninety-eight columns; i.e., approximately 12 per cent of the total space. In short, this first volume certainly reflects what Karl Rahner is thinking. Whether that is what Catholic theology as a whole is or ought to be thinking is, of course, another question altogether. The more significant articles include those on "Angel" ; "Apocrypha" ; "Apologetics" ; "Baptism" ; "Bible" and "Biblical Exegesis" ; "Bishop" ; "Charity" ; "Christianity" ; "Church" ; "Church and State" ; "Church and World" ; "Church History" ; "Confirmation". Also deserving of mention are philosophical articles by Jörg Splett: "Agnosticism," "Analogy of Being," "Anthropomorphism," "Body," "Categories," "Concept," and "Consciousness." These articles are almost Leibnizian in their clarity and conciseness. They are written from a definite point of view, viz., transcendental Thomism strongly influenced by Heidegger; but they quite ably speak for themselves and their subject matter. The focus of most of the articles is on the current state of discussion in Catholic theology. The attempt to be up to date is reflected on almost every page, with numerous citations from the documents of Vatican II. No attempt has been made to render the articles definitive in terms of detail or scope. Thus the title Encyclopedia is somewhat misleading if it is meant to indicate that the present work is in the same genre as, say, the Hastings' Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics or the Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique. Sacramentum Mundi is more like a contemporary Summa than a multi-dimensional and exhaustive encyclopedia.--E. A. R. (shrink)

This is the second volume in Professor Stone's impressive, jurisprudential trilogy. The three volumes present a progression from a consideration of jurisprudential practice, through a consideration of the theories that have been raised to justify or affect the direction of practice, to an attempt to define the proper range of application for a legal theory —a range which Stone thinks can be specified only by a close interweaving of the resources available from both a legal tradition and, most importantly, the (...) social sciences. After an opening chapter in which he cites the confluence of both the Greek and Hebraic notions of law and justice as the two heterogenous traditions underpinning Western jurisprudential theory, Stone moves on to a systematic exposition and critical review of the major theories of justice: classical natural law, Kantian individualism, hedonistic and social utilitarianism, neo-Hegelian and neo-Kantian social idealism, revived natural law, legal positivism, and pragmatism. The expositions are obviously erudite and exhaustive within their recognized limits. Stone's assessment of each tradition is not always as penetrating and original as one may have liked, but this is in no way to impugn the expository and superb bibliographical merits of this volume.—E. A. R. (shrink)

The papers included are divided into five sections: Psychology and Philosophy of Perception and Discovery, Integrations of Experimental Findings, Theoretical Developments, Experimental Results from Neurophysiology and Psychology Pertinent to Model Building, and Computer Simulations of Complex Models. The last of these sections will probably prove most interesting to the contemporary philosopher of mind. Peirce, Cassirer, and Wittgenstein are the philosophers who make the scene in the first section; inclusion of material from the last of these is no mean editorial feat. (...) The volume aims to be comprehensive rather than intensive and while this makes it ideal for the philosopher, the psychologist may find it thin in spots.—E. A. R. (shrink)

This volume makes available most of the major papers of the "man who may well have been America's outstanding teaching metaphysician during the second quarter of this century." Phelan did indeed have a long list of impressive students to his credit, most of them coming out of the University of Toronto and the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies in Toronto. Included are Phelan's Aquinas Lecture of 1941, "St. Thomas and Analogy," "Being, Order and Knowledge," "The Concept of Beauty in St. (...) Thomas Aquinas," "Justice and Friendship," "Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum," and eight others. The editor has added a bibliography of everything Phelan ever wrote, from books to book reviews to obituaries. Phelan's interests were clearly metaphysical; but his metaphysics was historical and interpretive, not creative.—E. A. R. (shrink)

These Terry Lectures for 1962 develop Polanyi's notion of tacit knowing through three stages: its epistemological analysis and justification, its ontological generalization to a doctrine of emergence, and its social dimension and implications. and may be briefly characterized as follows: Tacit knowledge refers to the set of particulars implicitly grasped in the explicit grasping of a comprehensive entity, the latter being the meaning of the former. Mutually supporting doctrines of epistemological isomorphism and critical realism underlie the argument, but the crucial, (...) unjustified assumption is that tacit "knowing" is a knowing. Why not assimilate it to patterned-governed behavior explicable on an S-R model? Ontologically, the tacit component shows up as the set of particulars with their attendant structural laws which underlie but do not exhaustively define the comprehensive entities of which, due to the mechanism of emergence, they are components. Non-reducibility is evidenced by the dynamic or operational laws which govern the emergent entities, but which do not show up in the lower level account. The qualitative irreducibility of sentience is mentioned but not developed as an argument. In justifying his notion of a mechanism of emergence, Polanyi at first makes some rather obscure references to vitalism, an organismic principle, and élan vital, but then comes out with a more properly metaphysical analysis in terms of the eliciting function of a principle of potentiality. There is a definite Whiteheadian ring to the analysis, but Whitehead is nowhere mentioned. Polanyi's work deserves serious attention, and this compact presentation of some of the essentials of his thought will serve to send more readers on to, or back to, Personal Knowledge.—E. A. R. (shrink)

Because metaphysics aims for absolute generality, its primary job is to tell us what are the fundamental particulars, of which one may say that is ultimately all there is, and yet be assured of an unabridged version of reality. It should be clear that such a search for the fundamental particulars is totally different from the enterprise of determining which particulars are basic from the point of view of particular-identification, which though it has recently been labeled "metaphysics," albeit "descriptive metaphysics," (...) might less confusingly be called "descriptive epistemology.". (shrink)

In terms of the details of Plato's life, the composition and order of the Dialogues and Epistles, and the political and scholastic climate of Plato's Athens and the broader Hellenic culture, this is a daringly imaginative book; critics may find it too imaginative. Ryle argues against the authenticity of all the Epistles, basing his conclusion on a bit of close detective work involving the date of Dionysius I's death and the date of Plato's invitation to Syracuse: Epistle VII is all (...) a bit of baseless Dionist propaganda. Ryle's conjecture that the majority of the Dialogues were designed for public dramatization and open competition, on the model of the Greek tragedies, at local and Olympic games is a distinct possibility. But will we be convinced by the many "straws" that support the hypothesis that the Apology-Crito-Phaedo sequence of Dialogues was written by Plato, not to justify Socrates, but to defend himself against a contemporary charge of defamation? that the Academy was founded in 371, not 387? that the Phaedrus was composed in 361-360, after the Laws? that the Republic was never published in Plato's lifetime? While Ryle vigorously supports all these contentions, inconsistencies or more plausible hypothesis remain. The book is unfortunately completely silent about any of the substantive issues in Plato's philosophy; but perhaps enough has been gained if Plato scholars are sent scurrying back to the ancillary Greek philosophies and histories, not to mention the stylometrists.—E. A. R. (shrink)

William J. Ferrero was born in East Longmeadow, Massachusetts during "the Crash" of 29, and spent his entire life there. Willie, as he is better known, is a devoted member of the town and has a reputation for helping people. Not strange then that he was voted Rotarian of the Year and later named "Citizen of the Year." Organizing youth programs in sports for the young people and creating the Rotary Summer Concerts for seniors are some of his proud accomplishments. (...) Knowing his nature, it is easy to understand why he became so involved with the Tourette Syndrome awareness program. Using Pepper Belle as a vehicle to help children and people was his brain child and it has proven to be very successful. He dedicates this book to those suffering from Tourette Syndrome so their lives may be filled with peace, love and the understanding of those fortunate to be blessed with good health. (shrink)

Most clinicians and researchers are concerned with recent advances in psychiatry. This involves the danger whether something time-tested may get sidelined for extra-scientific reasons. That the pharmaceutical industry and super-specialist researcher may keep churning out new findings to impress audiences is only a partial truth. Research progresses by refutation and self-correction. Acceptance in science is always provisional; changing paradigms, frameworks of enquiry and raising new questions is integral to break through in scientific knowledge. Hence, there is in science a constant (...) concern with the new. Moreover, the number of treatment non- responders to the time-tested swells with time, and researchers feel challenged to find ways and means of resolving their difficulties. Newer challenges need newer strategies. Obsession with the most recent can lead us astray, but a healthy evidence-based acceptance of the new is essential for advancement in psychiatric research. As indeed of research in all fields of medicine. And of science in general. The role of lithium and newer mood stabilizers in bipolar disorders are taken as examples to highlight this point. (shrink)

The catch 22 situation in psychiatry is that for precise diagnostic categories/criteria, we need precise investigative tests, and for precise investigative tests, we need precise diagnostic criteria/categories; and precision in both diagnostics and investigative tests is nonexistent at present. The effort to establish clarity often results in a fresh maze of evidence. In finding the way forward, it is tempting to abandon the scientific method, but that is not possible, since we deal with real human psychopathology, not just concepts to (...) speculate over. Search for clear-cut definitions/diagnostic criteria in psychiatry must be relentless. There is a greater need to be ruthless and blunt in this, rather than being accommodative of diverse opinions. Investigative tests - psychological, serum, CSF, or neuroimaging - are only corroborative at present; they need to become definitive. Medicalisation appears most prominent in psychiatry; so, diagnostic proliferation and fuzziness appear inevitable. And yet, the established diagnostic entities need to forward greater and conclusive precision. Also, the need for clarity and precision must outweigh pandering to and mollifying diverse interests, moreso in the upcoming revision of diagnostic manuals. This is specially because the DSM-5, being an Association manual, may need to accommodate powerful member lobbies; and ICD-11 may similarly need to cater to diverse country lobbies. Finding precise biological correlates of psychiatric phenomena, whether through neuroimaging, molecular neurobiology and/or neurogenomics, is the right way forward. It is in the 1.5-kg structure in the cranium that all secrets of psychiatric conditions lie. Social forces, behavioural modification, psychosocial restructuring, study of intrapsychic processes, and philosophical insights are not to be discounted, but they are supplementary to the primary goal - studying and deciphering those brain processes that result in psychiatric malfunction. Experimental breakthroughs, both in psychiatric aetiology and therapeutics, will come mainly from biology and its adjunct, psychopharmacology; while supplementary and complementary breakthroughs will come from the psychosocial, cognitive and behavioural approaches; the support base will come from phenomenology, epidemiology, nosology and diagnostics; while insights and leads can hopefully come from many fields, especially the psychosocial, the behavioural, the cognitive and the philosophical. Major energies must now be marshalled towards finding biomarkers and deciphering the precise phenotype-genotype-endophenotype axis of psychiatric disorders. Energies also need to be focussed on unravelling those critical processes in the brain that tip the scale towards psychiatric disorders. At how those critical processes are set into motion by forces de novo, in utero, in the genes and their expression, by the environment's psychopathological social forces - stress, peer pressure, poverty, deprivation, alienation, malnutrition, discrimination of various types (caste, gender, race, etc.), mass conflicts (war, terror attacks, etc.), disasters (natural and man-made), religious/ideological fascism - or social institutions like marriage, family, work place, political governance, etc. Ultimately, we must decipher how the brain goes into malfunction when such varied forces impinge on it, which precise cortical areas and neuronal cellular and molecular processes are involved in such malfunction and its manifestation, as also which of these are involved when malfunction ceases and health is restored, and the psychosocial processes and institutions which aid such health restoration, as also those which promote well-being and help in primary prevention. Emphasis on the brain and its intimate neurological and molecular mechanisms will not impinge on, or nullify, importance of the 'mind,' wherein subtle and gross brain functions in the form of behaviour, thought and emotions in all their ramifications will continue to be the focus of psychological, cognitive, sociological, psychopharmacological, behavioural and philosophical research. Progress in brain research must move in tandem with progress in 'mind' research. (shrink)

The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was introduced in 2018 to harmonize data privacy and security laws across the European Union (EU). It applies to any organization collecting personal data in the EU. To date, service-level consent has been used as a proportionate approach for clinical trials, which implement low-risk, routine, service-wide interventions for which individual consent is considered inappropriate. In the context of public health research, GDPR now requires that individuals have the option to choose whether their data may (...) be used for research, which presents a challenge when consent has been given by the clinical service and not by individual service users. We report here on development of a pragmatic opt-out solution to this consent paradox in the context of a partner notification intervention trial in sexual health clinics in the UK. Our approach supports the individual’s right to withhold their data from trial analysis while routinely offering the same care to all patients. (shrink)

Examining those risk and benefit perceptions utilised in the formation of attitudes and opinions about emerging technologies such as nanotechnology can be useful for both industry and policy makers involved in their development, implementation and regulation. A broad range of different socio-psychological and affective factors may influence consumer responses to different applications of nanotechnology, including ethical concerns. A useful approach to identifying relevant consumer concerns and innovation priorities is to develop predictive constructs which can be used to differentiate applications of (...) nanotechnology in a way which is meaningful to consumers. This requires elicitation of attitudinal constructs from consumers, rather than measuring attitudes assumed to be important by the researcher. Psychological factors influencing societal responses to 15 applications of nanotechnology drawn from different application areas were identified using repertory grid method in conjunction with generalised Procrustes analysis. The results suggested that people differentiate nanotechnology applications based on the extent to which they perceive them to be beneficial, useful, necessary and important. The benefits may be offset by perceived risks focusing on fear and ethical concerns. Compared to an earlier expert study on societal acceptance of nanotechnology, consumers emphasised ethical issues compared to experts but had less concern regarding potential physical contact with the product and time to market introduction. Consumers envisaged fewer issues with several applications compared to experts, in particular food applications. (shrink)

The research described here contributes to the extant empirical research on business ethics education by examining outcomes drawn from the literature on positive organizational scholarship (POS). The general research question explored is whether a course on ethical decision-making in business could positively influence students’ confidence in their abilities to handle ethical problems at work (i.e., moral efficacy), boost the relative importance of ethics in their work lives (i.e., moral meaningfulness), and encourage them to be more courageous in raising ethical problems (...) at work even if it is unpopular (i.e., moral courage). Specifically, the study used a rigorous quasi-experimental pretest–posttest research design with a treatment (N = 30) and control group (N = 30) to investigate whether a graduate-level course in business ethics could influence students’ levels of moral efficacy, meaningfulness, and courage. Findings revealed that participants in the business ethics treatment course experienced significant positive increases in each of the three outcome variables as compared to the control group. The largest increase was in moral efficacy, followed by moral courage, and finally, moral meaningfulness. These findings are discussed in the context of the current research on business ethics education and POS. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

Habermas and Nino see human rights not as an external constraint on popular sovereignty, but rather as a key ingredient of true democracy. Yet, Habermas asserts that democratic deliberation involves moral, ethical, pragmatic, and negotiated matters, while Nino reduces democracy to moral deliberation. Habermass theory thus is more complex and takes more seriously the possibility that deliberative democracy may vary across societies. All the same, Habermas excessively limits the extent of legitimate variability inasmuch as he shares with Nino the conviction (...) that moral reasons are universal and ultimately decisive. Habermas and Nino converge, more fundamentally, when they exclude the non-deliberative (and non-dialogic) aspects of the democratic process. It is a mistake to disregard these elements or to characterize them as oblique manifestations of deliberation. By taking these features into account, a picture of democracy gains in plausibility and opens up additional space for diversity in democratic theory and practice. (shrink)

Many adoptees face a number of challenges relating to separation from biological parents during the adoption process, including issues concerning identity, intimacy, attachment, and trust, as well as language and other cultural challenges. One common health challenge faced by adoptees involves lack of access to genetic-relative family health history. Lack of GRFHx represents a disadvantage due to a reduced capacity to identify diseases and recommend appropriate screening for conditions for which the adopted person may be at increased risk. In this (...) article, we draw out common features of traditionally understood “health disparities” in order to identify analogous features in the context of adoptees’ lack of GRFHx. (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to explore the association between internet addiction and problem behaviours on social networking sites using the general strain theory. Design/methodology/approach Using the purposive sampling method, a survey was conducted, which collected data from 414 college students studying in two public universities in South Australia. The Delphi method was used to develop the questionnaire used for the survey. Findings 'Results of this research indicated a significant association between internet addiction and problem behaviours on SNS. Respondents who had (...) engaged in problem behaviours on SNS had high internet addiction test scores. On the basis of this finding, the present research argues that the general strains associated with the suffering of newly emerging challenges such as internet addiction might contribute to victimisation and deviant and problem behaviours on SNS in specific and possibly in cyberspace in general. Research limitations/implications Results of the present study need to be interpreted cautiously due to many limitations it has. This research is a cross-sectional study, which might not adequately explain the associations between internet addiction and problem behaviours on SNS. Longitudinal studies involving larger samples might have added significant value to this study. The present study uses purposive sampling technique, which has limited its generalizability, and its findings may not be generalised to large populations. Originality/value Limited information is available pertaining to the association between problem behaviours on SNS and internet addiction. The present study is a pioneering effort, which argues that rapid popularity of SNS is likely to increase internet addiction and the frustration of not getting proper treatment for their internet addiction might lead to deviant behaviours on SNS. (shrink)

In their rare comments on Existentialism, contemporary British philosophers, with a few notable exceptions, frequently ridicule the use of “nothing” by such writers as Sartre and Heidegger. And when it is discovered that these writers maintain that the contemplation of nothingness gives rise to anguish, this ridicule is expressed even more strongly. What may be taken as a typical example of this tendency are Professor Ayer's remarks in his Horizon articles on Sartre. A characteristic quotation runs as follows: “In particular, (...) Sartre's reasoning on the subject of le néant seems to me exactly on a par with that of the King in Alice through the Looking-Glass … The point is that words like ‘nothing” and ‘nobody” are not used as the names of something insubstantial and mysterious; they are not used to name anything at all”;. (shrink)

Modern medicine has done much in the fields of infectious diseases and emergencies to aid cure. In most other fields, it is mostly control that it aims for, which is another name for palliation. Pharmacology, psychopharmacology included, is mostly directed towards such control and palliation too. The thrust, both of clinicians and research, must now turn decisively towards prevention and cure. Also, longevity with well-being is modern medicine's other big challenge. Advances in vaccines for hypertension, diabetes, cancers etc, deserve attention; (...) as also, the role of meditation, yoga, spirituality etc in preventing disease at various levels. Studies on longevity, life style changes and healthy centenarians deserve special scrutiny to find what aids longevity with wellbeing. A close look at complementary and alternative medicine is needed to find any suitable models they may have, cutting aside their big talk and/or hostility towards mainstream medical care. Medicine is a manifestation of the human eros, and should not become a means of its thanatos. It must realise its true potential, so that eros prevails, and thanatos prevails only ultimately, not prematurely. (shrink)

Biologically, pain is neither intrinsically good nor bad, but is a communication mechanism designed to serve organismal ends. Pain for any given person at any given time should be evaluated on the basis of “success” (or not) in serving those purposes. Yet, the physiological, psychological, and cultural complexity of the experience makes moral consideration of pain complicated. This is especially the case with infants in pain. The competence of the infant as a “decision maker” cannot, of course, be assumed. Even (...) if the child “thinks” about pain, an epistemological barrier exists in that the child cannot clearly communicate about the pain experience. Furthermore, any expressions of pain from the child may be necessary for diagnosis. Just coercion criteria provide a means of evaluating when and to what extent pain in infants should be controlled under the authority of surrogate decision makers. (shrink)

The Periegesis of Pausanias has finally entered the world of serious literature. Long after the way was first shown, the Magnesian has arrived and duly taken his place in the intellectual world of the second century: a pilgrim to the past. Yet he was no bookish, library-bound bore. Recent studies have transformed our opinion of him as a recorder of the sites and treasures of what was, even to him, antiquity, ‘His faithfulness in reporting what he saw has, time and (...) time again, been proven at a large number of sites and could easily be demonstrated at a good many others.’ ‘The very fact that the second-century A.D. traveller Pausanias wrote at such length about the sites and monuments of Greece is itself indicative of his most important attitude towards antiquities. That is, he thought them of sufficient value to be worth recording and thought it worth travelling extensively in mainland Greece over a period of many years to see them for himself.’ And so inevitably, as respect for the author has grown, the desire to lay bare his soul has followed. Critics are unanimous in their view of a man sensitive to the resonance of the ancient and power of the past. On occasion a Herodotean fascination with the mutability of man's lot bubbles to the surface, indeed we may surmise Herodotus to have been an important influence on the Periegesis in several fundamental respects. Above all he was a man of deep learning and keen interest in the past and a faithful recorder of its remains. Archaeologists and art-historians concur. (shrink)

In their rare comments on Existentialism, contemporary British philosophers, with a few notable exceptions, frequently ridicule the use of “nothing” by such writers as Sartre and Heidegger. And when it is discovered that these writers maintain that the contemplation of nothingness gives rise to anguish, this ridicule is expressed even more strongly. What may be taken as a typical example of this tendency are Professor Ayer's remarks in his Horizon articles on Sartre. A characteristic quotation runs as follows: “In particular, (...) Sartre's reasoning on the subject of le néant seems to me exactly on a par with that of the King in Alice through the Looking-Glass … The point is that words like ‘nothing” and ‘nobody” are not used as the names of something insubstantial and mysterious; they are not used to name anything at all”;. (shrink)

A framework to explain item-specific implicit and explicit memory is proposed. It explores the mutual implications of four kinds of processing mechanism that are familiar in the literature. The first kind of mechanisms are those related to memory representation which include the kind of storage processes that subserve the maintenance of different types of information in memory. It is argued that there is very little evidence to suggest that fact and event memory require the postulation of algorithmically distinct kinds of (...) storage mechanism. The second mechanism is the enhanced fluency of activation of representation triggered by the encoding of components of those representations that results from the storage changes mediating memory. It is argued that enhanced fluency underlies all item-specific implicit memory and that the same kind of fluency process is probably involved regardless of the type of memory representation fluently activated. The third type of mechanism is the kind of attribution process that is triggered by fluency and gives rise to aware memory feelings as well as specific perceptual and aesthetic feelings The final mechanism is active search, which is an often present feature of explicit memory, and involves the effortful mediation of the frontal lobes. How the interactions between these different mechanisms accounts for item-specific implicit memory, recognition and recall is discussed, as is the framework's relationship with other current views about the mechanisms underlying memory. The best available methods of measuring enhanced fluency, familiarity, and recollection are reviewed so as to indicate the ways in which the framework may be tested. (shrink)

Many believe that the ethical problems of donation after cardiocirculatory death (DCD) have been "worked out" and that it is unclear why DCD should be resisted. In this paper we will argue that DCD donors may not yet be dead, and therefore that organ donation during DCD may violate the dead donor rule. We first present a description of the process of DCD and the standard ethical rationale for the practice. We then present our concerns with DCD, including the following: (...) irreversibility of absent circulation has not occurred and the many attempts to claim it has have all failed; conflicts of interest at all steps in the DCD process, including the decision to withdraw life support before DCD, are simply unavoidable; potentially harmful premortem interventions to preserve organ utility are not justifiable, even with the help of the principle of double effect; claims that DCD conforms with the intent of the law and current accepted medical standards are misleading and inaccurate; and consensus statements by respected medical groups do not change these arguments due to their low quality including being plagued by conflict of interest. Moreover, some arguments in favor of DCD, while likely true, are "straw-man arguments," such as the great benefit of organ donation. The truth is that honesty and trustworthiness require that we face these problems instead of avoiding them. We believe that DCD is not ethically allowable because it abandons the dead donor rule, has unavoidable conflicts of interests, and implements premortem interventions which can hasten death. These important points have not been, but need to be fully disclosed to the public and incorporated into fully informed consent. These are tall orders, and require open public debate. Until this debate occurs, we call for a moratorium on the practice of DCD. (shrink)

This paper investigates the role of visual experience in Wittgenstein's work. The specific thesis is that visual experience provides not only diverse illustrative examples of what could be an explanation of meaning, but that it also provides a recurrent metaphor for the whole process of meaning and understanding. Wittgenstein uses a great number of visual examples in his texts. Their diversity may be accounted for by the great diversity of ways in which he attempts to describe the relationship between a (...) word and its meaning. The resultant variety of visual examples may be summarised by what I call the Visual Discontinuity Thesis. However, beneath this diversity there lies a thread of continuity. This is provided by the persistent use of visual experience in the description of the word-meaning relation. This use underlies the projection relationship of the Tractatus and the "seeing-as" relationship of the Investigations. This recurrent visual metaphor may be summarised by what I call the Visual Continuity Thesis. This paper presents the latter thesis in the context of a description of the former. (shrink)

Recent data show that human children (up to 8 years old) perform poorly when required to innovate tools. Our tool-rich culture may be more reliant on social learning and more limited by domain-general constraints such as ill-structured problem solving than otherwise thought.