Nowadays there are many spaces of fascination in visual art. Of course, installative space and contextual space have been on the art scene for awhile. However, they are now accompanied by other spaces such as urban space, architectural space, cyberspace, hyperspace, and screen-based space. In this volume, architects, artists, theorists, three symposia and four exhibitions attempt to find answers to questions such as: Could the architectonic study and/or deconstruction of space play a decisive role in the shift of attention to (...) space? Which theoretical factors structure the current experience and meaning of space? What is the role of the aesthetization of the environment on our concept of space? Smooth Space - VCC de Brakke Grond, Amsterdam - is a project at the heart of this publication. Spatial interests range from how the concept of space is redefined and exploited in our current visual culture to how the digital world influences our spatial concepts. Participants in this issue are: Jean Attali, Annette W. Balkema, Andrew Benjamin, Ole Bouman, Bernard Cache, Paul Crowther, Christoph Fink, Hugo Heyrman, Hou Hanru, Rem Koolhaas, Geert Lovink, Karlheinz Lüdeking, Bartomeu Mari, Kas Oosterhuis, Jan van de Pavert, Keiko Sato, Eran Schaerf, Lara Schnitger, Roger Scruton, Martin Seel, Nasrine Seraji, Henk Slager, Sjoerd Soeters, Lars Spuybroek, Ann Van Sevenant, Peter Weibel and Mark Wigley. (shrink)

It is often argued that the existence of qualia -- private mental objects -- shows that physicalism is false. In this paper, I argue that to think in terms of qualia is a misleading way to develop what is in itself a valid intuition about the inability of physicalism to do justice to our conscious experience. I consider arguments by Dennett and Wittgenstein which indicate what is wrong with the notion of qualia, but which by so doing, help us to (...) locate the real problem for physicalism. This is not that there may be mental as well as physical objects of which we are aware, but that the very notion of awareness is itself resistant to physicalist treatment. In the concluding sections, I draw on Wittgenstein's positive account of sensations, to suggest a way in which the apparent chasm separating objective and subjective viewpoints might be bridged in a non-reductive fashion. (shrink)

Svoeobrazie nravstvennykh vozreniĭ K.N. Leontʹeva. Istoki ėticheskikh vzgli︠a︡dov K.N. Leontʹeva ; Fenomen "ėsteticheskogo amoralizma" -- Fenomen ėskhatologicheskoĭ ėtiki. Vizantizm kak nravstvennyĭ ideal ; Pravovoĭ ideal K.N. Leontʹeva v kontekste ėskhatologicheskoĭ ėtiki.

T. 1. Ot antichnoĭ fiziki do Mendeleeva.