ABSTRACTIn a series of articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen and Nick Zangwill argue that, since propositional attitude ascription judgements do not behave like normative judgements in being subject to a priori normative supervenience and the Because Constraint, PAs cannot be constitutively normative.1 I argue that, for a specific version of normativism, according to which PAs are normative commitments, these arguments fail. To this end, I argue that commitments and obligations should be distinguished. Then, I show that the intuitions allegedly governing all normative (...) judgements do not even purport to hold for commitment-attributing judgements.RÉSUMÉDans une série d'articles, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen et Nick Zangwill font valoir que, puisque les jugements d'attribution d'attitude propositionnelle ne se comportent pas comme des jugements normatifs en étant soumis à la survenance normative a priori et à la contrainte du Parce que, les AP ne peuvent être constitutivement normatives. Je soutiens que, pour une version spécifique du normativisme, selon laquelle les AP sont des engagements normatifs, ces arguments échouent. À cette fin, je soutiens d'abord que les engagements et les obligations devraient être séparés. Ensuite, je démontre que les intuitions qui régiraient prétendument tous les jugements normatifs ne prétendent même pas s'appliquer aux jugements attributifs d'un engagement. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have argued that there is a basic problem in the no-guidance argument against content normativism. The problem is that the argument restricts the essential normativity of intentional states to the formation of these states being guided by certain norms. But it is suggested that the essential norm-governedness of intentional states can be equally plausibly construed as the assessability of these states by norms, which does not imply complying with them. Although I concur with the problem diagnosed (...) in the no-guidance argument, I take issue with the alternative conception of normativity which is put forward. In its stead, I argue that considering intentional states as commitments whose discharging requires complying with certain norms is preferable because it both respects the insight provided while remaining unscathed by the problems besetting this conception of normativity. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well explained by this explanatory framework? This article provides a novel response to this enduring objection. First, following Brandom, it is suggested that, to understand the normativity of intentional states, we should countenance and distinguish between two normative categories of commitment and entitlement, only the former of which is argued to be essential (...) for intentional explanations. Conflating these two normative dimensions is noted to be one of the main sources of the objections leveled against the view. Second, it is shown that the committive dimension is rich and flexible enough to accommodate all the apparently problematic cases. (shrink)

In what sense can one claim that intentional explanations are essentially normative, given that people’s actions and thinking are replete with various irrationalities, yet are still pretty well exp...

Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief that explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this article takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental-cum-irreducible norms, which I call the “entitlement norm,” the “fulfillment norm” and the “escapability norm,” and it is (...) shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists. (shrink)

That it can explain the phenomenon of transparency, namely the fact that if you resolve whether p, you have thereby resolved whether to believe that p, was originally put forward as a great virtue of normativist conceptions of belief. However, non-normativists have convincingly shown that the permissive version of the truth norm of belief, which is one of the most plausible and promising versions of it, cannot in fact accommodate this phenomenon. Alarmed by this situation, in this paper I re-assess (...) the transparency phenomenon and its relation to different versions of the truth norm of belief. I argue that, contrary to how it appears, it is not even clear that the most tenable injunctive versions of the truth norm explain this phenomenon. I then argue that the transparency phenomenon consists of two distinct aspects which should be, but have not been, distinguished. What I call the ‘question-shifting’ aspect is explained by the truth norm, irrespective of how it is formulated, while what I call the ‘answer-shifting’ aspect is explanatorily empty and does not require any explanation, be it normative or otherwise. Therefore, understood properly, explaining transparency does remain a strength of normativist accounts of belief, and has no implications for which particular formulation of the truth norm we may adopt. (shrink)

I argue for a commitment-discharging condition of reasoning, according to which to engage in reasoning is to discharge the theoretical and practical commitments one has undertaken. I highlight the ways in which this condition is distinct from other proposals, particularly the Taking Condition, and argue that it can explain certain intuitions about reasoning that otherwise remain elusive. In particular, I argue that the commitment-discharging condition can provide a unified account of attitude-formation and premise-discharging reasoning as well as practical and theoretical (...) reasoning. It also provides a novel way to evade the regress that bedevils many accounts of inference. (shrink)

Much of the discussion on the normativity of belief rests on the presupposition that there is a single fundamental truth norm governing belief that explains all of its normative features. Building on the committive conception of belief proposed by some normativists, this article takes issue with this presupposition. In particular, it is argued that belief, construed as cognitive commitment, is governed by three fundamental-cum-irreducible norms, which I call the “entitlement norm,” the “fulfillment norm” and the “escapability norm,” and it is (...) shown that each of them concerns a particular normative feature of belief. Taken together, these norms can explain all the normative features of belief without leading to implausible consequences. The discussion also shows that the relationship between the truth norm and the evidence norm is more complicated than is usually conceded by normativists. (shrink)

Summary Background The principle of maximization, which roughly means that we should save more lives and more years of life, is usually taken for granted by the health community. This principle is even more forceful in crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, where we have scarce resources which can be allocated only to some patients. However, the standard consequentialist version of this principle can be challenging particularly when we have to reallocate a resource that has already been given to a patient. (...) -/- Methodology Engaging in thought experiments, conceptual analysis, providing counterexamples, and appealing to moral intuitions, we challenge the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle and make a case for adopting an alternative deontological version. -/- Discussion In certain cases, the standard consequentialist version of the maximization principle is shown to yield intuitively immoral results. The deontological version of this principle is preferable because it can retain the merits of the standard consequentialist version without falling prey to its problems. -/- Conclusion Compared to the standard consequentialist version, the deontological version of the maximization principle can better guide the ethical decisions of the health community, even in cases where we face a scarcity of resources. (shrink)

Order picking, which is collecting a set of products from different locations in a warehouse, has repeatedly been described as one of the most laborious and time-consuming internal logistic processes. Each order is issued to pick some products located at given locations in the warehouse. In this paper, we consider an order picking problem, in which a number of orders with different delivery due dates are going to be retrieved by a limited number of order pickers in multiperiods such that (...) the total tardiness is minimized. The aim is to determine a retrieval plan in terms of order batching and order picker multitrip routing as decision variables. Besides, products are arrived and replenished at the predetermined locations at different periods. Therefore, products sitting in those locations should be delivered soon to provide empty rooms for replenishment. A mixed integer linear programming formulation is proposed for this new problem. The model is optimally solved for small-size problems. For larger instances, grouping metaheuristic algorithms are proposed based on particle swarm optimization and the league championship algorithm that use group-based operators to generate reasonable batches of orders. Improvement heuristics are designed as well. The performance of the MILP formulation and metaheuristic algorithms is analyzed for different problem instances whose designs are based on real data gathered from an auto parts warehouse. Results indicate that our algorithms can stably solve large instances of the problem in a reasonable time. (shrink)

Abraham’s Dilemma is the conjunction of three jointly inconsistent propositions: God’s commands are never morally wrong, God has commanded Abraham to kill his innocent son, and killing innocent people is morally wrong. Drawing on an overlooked point from the Qur’an regarding the content of the command as well as a conceptual analysis of intentional action, this paper proposes a novel solution to the dilemma by discarding proposition in a new way. Current approaches to rejecting proposition tend to appeal to epistemic (...) failure on the side of Abraham. In my approach, which draws on the so-called accordion effect in intentional action, God’s command is interpreted in such a way that God has not commanded Abraham to kill his son nor has Abraham tried to do so, although the challenging and difficult nature of the test and thus Abraham’s status as the ‘father of faith’ are retained. (shrink)

This study examines the sequential and situated organization associated with framing locational formulations by dislocated parties to mobile phone calls for the joint accomplishment of location-related social action. The data come from 22 mundane Farsi mobile phone calls involving location inquiring and/or reporting. The analysis of the data, informed by conversational analysis and Levinson’s conceptual framework of perspective-taking, adds frame of reference to Schegloff’s location, membership, and topic or activity analyses operative in the selection of locational formulations. The trajectory plotted (...) for location-related action indicates the contingent roles which material, linguistic and semiotic resources play in the selection of locational formulations deployed for co-presence purposes. The findings suggest consequentiality of the-relevant-next action for the framing of locational descriptions and provide insight into how conversationalists interact with their physical environment in a wider social context. (shrink)