In 1906, Henry Stephens Salt published a short collection of essays that presented several rhetorically powerful, if formally deficient arguments for the vegetarian position. By interpreting Salt as a moral sentimentalist with ties to Aristotelian virtue ethics, I propose that his aesthetic argument deserves contemporary consideration. First, I connect ethics and aesthetics with the Greek concepts of kalon and kalokagathia that depend equally on beauty and morality before presenting Salt’s assertion: slaughterhouses are disgusting, therefore they should not be promoted. I (...) suggest three areas of development since Salt’s death that could be fruitfully plumbed to rebuild this assertion into a contemporary argument: an updated analysis of factory farm conditions, insights from moral psychologists on the adaptive socio-biological benefits of disgust as a source of cognitive information, and hermeneutical considerations about the role of the audience that allow blameworthiness for slaughterhouse atrocities to be laid upon the meat-eater. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'complex question (CQ)'. The fallacy of the CQ appears in two varieties. The implicit form distracts an interlocutor by assuming the truth of an unproven premise and shifting the focus of the argument in an unfounded direction. While the explicit form collapses two distinct questions into a single question such that a single answer would appear to satisfy both inquiries. The possibility that an undetected CQ might lead (...) a speaker to affirm additional, unspoken premises unintentionally makes this a popular tactic in police interrogations and debate cross‐examinations. Avoiding this rhetorical trap is only possible either by rejecting the question as posed and extemporaneously clarifying the situation on one's own terms or by remaining silent. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy: chronological snobbery (CS). First described by the Christian academic Owen Barfield in the 1920s and later popularized by his friend and colleague C.S. Lewis, the fallacy of CS presupposes that cultural, philosophical, or scientific ideas from later time periods are necessarily superior to those from earlier ages. Grounded on the Enlightenment's concept of “progress”, this informal fallacy stems from the assumption that the ever‐increasing amount of knowledge in society (...) naturally and perpetually replaces all outdated, disproven ideas with updated, better‐justified beliefs, therefore making old ideas incorrect or irrelevant simply because they are old. Essentially the opposite of the appeal to ancient authority, CS relates to guilt by association, hasty generalization, and poisoning the well fallacies whenever it references unrelated false beliefs held by individuals from the originating time period. (shrink)

Some moral sentimentalists say that ethical judgments just are our affective responses to the world and do not necessarily refer to or reflect anything beyond those emotional experiences. Moral sentimentalism tries to take seriously the psychological mechanisms that underwrite our making moral judgments. Moral sentimentalists treat feelings, or affective attitudes, as important components of moral theorizing and decision‐making. Fortunately, moral sentimentalists have a better option for measuring the appropriateness of our ethical feelings. Scottish philosopher Adam Smith's 1759 book The Theory (...) of Moral Sentiments remains a landmark defense of moral sentimentalism. In the 1970s, philosopher Cora Diamond talked about “fellow creature responses” as important starting‐points for thinking about our ethical sentiments regarding animals. Star Wars has shown us a similar kind of picture with a galaxy of different ways in which humans and nonhumans can interact. (shrink)