Abstract:I defend that the distinctive object of our aesthetic evaluation of films is the full emotional experience, taken as a unified whole, that we go through as we watch a film and that I call the viewer's film emotional life. The aesthetic value itself—the positive quality we perceive in the experience of having had a certain film emotional life—is in the significance we experience in that film emotional life insofar as it contributes to the discovery and the exploration of the (...) viewer's human and individual emotional nature. I finally suggest that the explanation of the positive felt quality of such experience is in the progress it represents regarding our resourcefulness as emotional subjects toward the realization of our individual ideal of life. (shrink)

Although much has been written on Descartes’ thought on animals, not so much has originated in, or has taken full account of, Descartes’ views on emotions. I explore here the extent to which the latter can contribute to the debate on whether he embraced, and to which extent, the doctrine of the bête machine. I first try to show that Descartes’ views on emotions can help offer new support to the skeptical position without necessarily creating new tensions with other central (...) aspects of his philosophy. And second, I sketch the type of theory of animal passions which Descartes could have accepted. The general conclusion I draw is not that Descartes did not hold the view of the bête machine but rather that we can find within his thought a solid stream of ideas, which became stronger towards the end of his life, that points in the opposite direction. (shrink)

I argue that our everyday evaluations of architecture are primarily evaluations of spaces and, in particular, of their inhabitability— that is, whether they serve or can serve to the realization of our individual ideal of life. Inhabitability is not only a functional criterion but an aesthetic one as well. It is aesthetic insofar as the evaluations about inhabitability include evaluations about the quality of the experience of actually doing something in —or simply occupying—a particular space. This aesthetic aspect of our (...) everyday evaluations explains, on one hand, the distinctive features of our everyday preferences for some architectonic spaces over others—namely, their very personal nature; their noticeable value in our daily lives; their inseparability from the activities we plan to realize in those spaces; and the importance of the spaces which are contiguous to the one we are evaluating. And on the other, it both reveals architecture’s significance for the quality of our daily life and serves as a guide for us to choose spaces that improve that quality. (shrink)

This paper provides a historical reevaluation of the originality and implications of Avempace's critique of Aristotle's causal explanation of the motion of projectiles. It also offers a serious revision of the place which has usually been assigned to Avempace in the history of science. The views regarding projectiles defended in Avempace's Arabic commentary are in sharp opposition to the anti-Aristotelian Avempace that was known in the Medieval West through Averroes. Avempace's commentary reveals only a moderate critic of Aristotle, a critic (...) who did not, in any case, break with the master, and who, therefore, did not even go as far as Philoponus in creating a new and more profound theory of projectile motion. (shrink)

Film emotions are genuine emotions whose formation and development is affected by conflictive factors. Whereas their arousal, similar to that of real-life emotions, is disproportionately strengthened by the cinematographic medium, their subsequent course is both weakened and interrupted. Their objects, which I view as members of our personal emotional world (not in terms of their supposed fictionality, as often assumed), are also proper intentional objects of emotions: our fear is about the shark on the screen, our pity about the main (...) character. This view allows also for an explanation of two of film emotions’ neglected features: (a) the viewer's emotional attachment and empathy toward film objects and (b) the long-lasting emotional impact films can have on viewers. (shrink)

I defend that Cartesian passions are a function—in fact, the only function—of the mind-body union responsible for guiding us in the pursuit of our (natural) perfection, a perfection that we increase by joining goods that our nature deems to be so. This view is in conflict, on one hand, with those (a majority) who have emphasized either the epistemic or survival role of our passions and, on the other and more precisely, with a recent proposal according to which Cartesian passions (...) should not be even seen as guides for happiness. Against the latter, I will attempt to show that passions perform a guiding function (1) by discriminating what is “important” for us regarding the increase of our natural perfection (which includes informing the soul about the current state of perfection both of the body and of the mind-body union); and (2) by disposing us to act (which includes proposing to the will possible ways of action to increase or maintain our perfection). Our passions are, thus, both informative and motivational. Making explicit their informative role will require, negatively, showing that this does not mean they are reliable and, positively, undertaking a study—largely absent among commentaries—of their specific intentionality. (shrink)

Questo saggio esplora la critica a Marx e al “marxismo” sviluppata da Simone Weil nel corso della sua opera. Vengono identificati tre nuclei principali della critica weiliana al marxismo: la validità del metodo materialistico per lo studio delle scienze sociali; il presunto “messianesimo” di Marx, inteso come la concezione della storia come un progresso intelligente verso il meglio; e l’identificazione del marxismo tout court con una filosofia determinista e meccanicista. Si cerca di definire a quale “Marx” effettivamente sia rivolta la (...) critica di Weil: si sostiene infatti che alcune delle sue argomentazioni siano riferibili alla “vulgata” marxiana, ossia a una lettura semplificata e schematica del marxismo, o alla “tendenza deteriore” del marxismo caratterizzata dall’economicismo e dal meccanicismo, dibattuta anche all’interno della Seconda Internazionale, o a posizioni di Engels e Lenin, o ancora all’operato del PCF o delle organizzazioni operaie, piuttosto che all’effettiva opera di Marx. (shrink)

A study of what Descartes calls émotions in his Passions of the Soul suggests that, rather than just a theory of passions—as Descartes himself explicitly claims to be proposing—he was in practice putting forward a more comprehensive theory of passions-émotions, a unified theory which would be closer to what today should properly be called Descartes’ theory of emotions. I try here to make explicit the grounds of this unity by showing that émotions both fit within the functional account Descartes attributes (...) to what he calls passions; and complement the intentionality of passions by expanding it to new objects. In order to show this I offer also a tentative distinction, functionally and intentionally, between passions and émotions in general, on one hand, and, on the other, between the two apparent types of émotions Descartes refers to in the treatise—interior or internal [intérieure] and intellectual [intellectuelle] émotions. (shrink)

A continuación se plantean las bases epistemológicas de un modelo que busca explicar y guiar el tratamiento informativo de los conflictos en la prensa. El aporte teórico parte del discurso; desde el lenguaje y hacia el lenguaje. Se recomienda el estudio de las estrategias lingüístico-comunicativas q..

I argue in this paper that Descartes's goal with his doctrine of the continuous recreation of the world is to offer a unified and ultimate causal explanation for the possibility of motion and duration in the world, the permanence of created things, and the continuation of their motion and duration. This unified explanation seems to be the only one which, according to Descartes, satisfies the two basic requirements any ultímate cause should meet: the cause must be active and not being (...) in motion itself. God's recreations of the world is Descartes's solution to this search. I also show in this article, on the one hand, that this doctrine successfully overcomes, in particular, the four major conflicts which threaten its consistency, and, on the other, the new meaning which the laws of nature acquire under the doctrine of the continuous recreation of the world. /// En este artículo defiendo que la pretensión principal de Descartes al proponer la doctrina de la recreación continua del mundo es encontrar una explicación unificada y última de la posibilidad de movimiento y duración en el mundo, de la permanencia de las cosas creadas y de la continuación del movimiento. Esta explicación unificada es la única que, según Descartes, satisface los dos requisitos que parece buscar en la explicación causal última del movimiento: la causa debe ser activa y no debe estar ella misma en movimiento. Las recreaciones del mundo constituyen esa causa. Por una parte, también muestro cómo esta solución supera, en concreto, los cuatro conflictos mayores que amenazan su consistencia, y, por otra, el nuevo significado que las leyes de la naturaleza adquieren en consonancia con esta doctrina de la recreación continua del mundo. (shrink)

In van Benthem (2008), van Benthem proposes a dynamic consequence relation defined as${\psi _1}, \ldots,{\psi _n}{ \models ^d}\phi \,{\rm{iff}}{ \models ^{pa}}[{\psi _1}] \ldots [{\psi _n}]\phi,$where the latter denotes consequence in public announcement logic, a dynamic epistemic logic. In this paper we investigate the structural properties of a conditional dynamic consequence relation$\models _{\rm{\Gamma }}^d$extending van Benthem’s proposal. It takes into account a set of background conditions Γ, inspired by Makinson (2003) wherein Makinson calls this reasoning ‘modulo’ a set Γ. In the (...) presence of common knowledge, conditional dynamic consequence is definable from (unconditional) dynamic consequence. An open question is whether dynamic consequence is compact. We further investigate a dynamic consequence relation for soft instead of hard announcements. Surprisingly, it shares many properties with (hard) dynamic consequence. Dynamic consequence relations provide a novel perspective on reasoning about protocols in multi-agent systems. (shrink)

O grupo Maternar é uma experiência de atividade curricular em comunidade (ACC) que visa desenvolver atividades em saúde materno-infantil e tem tido como principal campo de atuação a Maternidade Climério de Oliveira, maternidade-escola da UFBA. A cada semestre estudantes, uma monitora, residentes, té.

Jean-Claude Forquin é professor da UFR de Psychologie, Sociologie et Sciences de l'Education da Universidade de Rouen, na França, e desde a década de 70, tem elaborado uma série de escritos sobre educação. Seu livro Escola e Cultura é uma versão abreviada de sua tese de doutorado de estado em Letras e Ciências Humanas, defendida em 1987, na Universidade de Ciências Humanas de Estrasburgo, cujo título é Le débat sur l 'école et la culture chez les théoriciens et sociologues de (...) l'education en Grande-Bretagne (1960-1985). A problemática central desta obra é discutir o que a escola deve ensinar, que cultura ela deve transmitir, quais conteúdos devem fazer parte do currículo escolar. O autor preocupa-se com estas questões porque considera que o fator essencial da crise da educação, desde os anos 60, é a crise na sua função específica de transmissão cultural - os professores não têm mais certeza do que devem ensinar para seus alunos. Por isso, ele defende que a teoria da educação, além de examinar as relações entre a escola e fatores externos a ela como o contexto econômico, político-administrativo, deve deter-se mais na análise interna desta instituição social, dos conteúdos e saberes escolares. (shrink)