Mary Astell is a fascinating seventeenth‐century figure whose work admits of many interpretations. One feature of her work that has received little attention is her focus on bad custom. This is surprising; Astell clearly regards bad custom as exerting a kind of epistemic power over agents, particularly women, in a way that limits their intellectual capacities. This article aims to link two contemporary sociopolitical/social‐epistemological projects by showing how a seventeenth‐century thinker anticipated these projects. Astell's account of bad custom shows that (...) she was attuned to the kinds of institutional or structural explanations theorized by Sally Haslanger, and that she acknowledges that bad custom—as an institutional or structural explanation—is intimately linked with epistemic injustice, albeit a kind not yet captured by contemporary social epistemologists. I call this form of epistemic injustice found in Astell epistemic internalization injustice. I argue that the epistemic significance of Astell's notion of bad custom is that it enables us to understand how bad custom conditions human relations in such a way as to result in epistemic injustice. Through coming to understand her notion of bad custom, we can expand our understanding of social epistemic phenomena like epistemic injustice. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

The Football Association has been under pressure to allow girls to play in mixed teams since 1978, following 12-year old Theresa Bennett’s application to play with boys in a local league. In 1991, over a decade after Bennett’s legal challenge, the FA agreed to remove its ban on mixed football and introduced Rule C4 in order to permit males and females to play together in competitive matches under the age of 11. More recently, following a campaign by parents, coaches, local (...) Members of Parliament and the Women’s Sport Foundation, the FA agreed to trial mixed football for the under-12 to under-15 age categories in order to establish, among other things, the risk of injury to players in sex-integrated competitions. A series of exponential changes ensued: between 2010 and 2014, the age at which mixed football was permitted increased from U11 to U16. In 2015, the FA announced the decision to raise the age limit on mixed football from U16 to U18 for the forthcoming 2015–2016 season. We critically examine th... (shrink)

Decades ago, in his foundational essay on the early days of the AIDS crisis, medical historian Charles Rosenberg wrote, “epidemics start at a moment in time, proceed on a stage limited in space and duration, following a plot line of increasing revelatory tension, move to a crisis of individual and collective character, then drift toward closure.” In the course of epidemics, societies grappled with sudden and unexpected mortality and also returned to fundamental questions about core social values. “Epidemics,” Rosenberg wrote, (...) “have always provided occasion for retrospective moral judgment”. Following Rosenberg’s observations, this essay places COVID-19 in the context of epidemic history to examine common issues faced during health crises—moral, political, social, and individual. Each disease crisis unfolds in its own time and place. Yet, despite specific contexts, we can see patterns and recurring concerns in the history of pandemics: pandemics and disease crises in the past, along with public health responses to them, have had implications for civil liberties and government authority; disease crises have acted as a sort of stress test on society, revealing, amplifying or widening existing social fissures and health disparities; pandemics have forced people to cope with uncertain knowledge about the origin and nature of disease, the best sources of therapies, and what the future will hold after the crisis. While historians are not prognosticators, understanding past experience offers new perspectives for the present. The essay concludes by identifying aspects of history relevant to the road ahead. (shrink)

This paper offers a realist critique of socialresearch on health inequalities. A conspectus of thefield of health inequalities research identifies twomain research approaches: the positivist quantitativesurvey and the interpretivist qualitative `casestudy'. We argue that both approaches suffer fromserious philosophical limitations. We suggest that aturn to realism offers a productive `third way' bothfor the development of health inequality research inparticular and for the social scientific understandingof the complexities of the social world in general.

Methodological strategies for the identification and synthesis of ‘evidence’ to support decision‐making in relation to complex healthcare systems and practices This paper addresses the limitations of current methods supporting ‘evidence‐based health‐care’ in relation to complex aspects of care, including those questions that are best supported by descriptive or non‐empirical evidence. The paper identifies some new methods, which may be useful in aiding the synthesis of data in these areas. The methods detailed are broadly divided into those that facilitate the identification (...) of evidence and those that enable the interpretation of the data retrieved. To illustrate some of the issues involved, reference is made to a multimethod review recently completed by the authors, which aimed to identify factors that promote continuity in the transition from child to adult health and social care. It is argued that as healthcare organisations are becoming increasingly preoccupied with the evidence base of practice, such methods may help ensure that aspects of care and approaches that are outside the dominant pharmaco‐medical domain maintain a prominent position on the healthcare agenda while remaining open to external scrutiny. Healthcare professionals who use such approaches need to know their relative utility and benefits to inform clinical decisions, so as to ensure that best practice is observed. (shrink)

Marie de Gournay and Anton Wilhelm Amo, though thinking and writing in different social contexts, each offer an account of prejudice which bears a deep philosophical resonance to that of the other. This resonance is striking and mutually illuminating: Gournay and Amo develop a view of prejudice as a kind of epistemic and moral viciousness that damages both the prejudicial person and their socio-epistemic neighbors. Their accounts highlight how agents are rightly held responsible for prejudice, as it is the agents' (...) epistemic negligence and moral failure that allows prejudice to take hold. As such, their view offers a balance between a critical examination of individuals and an acknowledgement of the deep sociality that pervades the epistemic domain. (shrink)

The question of Russell’s engagement with feminist ideas of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century is helpfully illuminated, I argue, by comparison to some of his feminist contemporaries—namely, Victoria Claflin Woodhull (1838–1927) and Emma Goldman (1869–1940). Like Woodhull and Goldman, Russell argues for women’s right to vote, a new sexual ethic, and a significant revision to marriage. These are paradigmatic feminist projects, and so would seem to suggest that Russell, particularly within Marriage and Morals, has significant philosophical overlap with (...) some of the feminist philosophers of his time. His similarities with feminist thinkers and activists Woodhull and Goldman on the classical feminist concerns of sex, suffrage, and marriage suggest that Russell’s views may yet find a place in the history of feminism, even if he does not. (shrink)

An accessible introduction to care ethics.

Women thinking and writing about friendship in the early modern period were indebted to traditional interest in this topic dating back to Plato and Aristotle. This tradition was deeply misogynistic: real friendship was often claimed to be beyond the grasp of women. However, some women philosophers—most notably Marie le Jars de Gournay, Mary Astell, and Gabrielle Suchon—wrote about friendship in ways that both emerge from the history of Western philosophy and yet resist this inegalitarian framework. This chapter explores the views (...) of these three philosophers: for each, real friendship represents a means to obtain a different kind of meaningful freedom. For Gournay, friendship is a means to epistemic freedom and epistemic justice; for Astell, friendship is a means to moral freedom and relational autonomy, and for Suchon, friendship provides support that facilitates political freedom—freedom from institutional commitments or constraints. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Madeleine de Scudéry (1607–1701) is best remembered as a novelist rather than as a philosopher, but she is both a gifted literary figure and an overlooked philosopher. These roles are, at least in her case, inseparable. Through her dialogues, Scudéry offers an account of the conversation that is at once a rhetorical social art as well as a substantive philosophical phenomenon and socio-political practice with feminist effects. According to Scudéry, how one converses and what one converses about provides new (...) knowledge and ways of thinking as well as the potential to reshape our social and political relations. Scudérian conversation is not only a means to acquire and practice rhetoric – an art characterized by gendered hierarchy –but also a means of teaching women that equality in historically gendered domains is possible. Ultimately, Scudérian conversation is a kind of feminist praxis that flies under the radar in virtue of appearing to be merely a social art. (shrink)

Madeleine de Scudéry is best remembered as a novelist rather than as a philosopher, but she is both a gifted literary figure and an overlooked philosopher. These roles are, at least in...