Currently, testimony is studied extensively in Anglo-American philosophy. However, most of this work is done from a justificationist perspective in which philosophers try to justify our reliance on testimony in some way. I agree with Popper that justificationism is radically mistaken. Thus, I construct an account of how we respond to testimony that in no way attempts to justify our reliance on it. This account is not a straightforward exegesis of Popper, as he never tackled testimony systematically. It makes use, (...) however, of several of Popper's key insights and incorporates them into a viable theory of testimony. Key Words: testimony • anti-justificationism • social epistemology • situational analysis • defeasibility. (shrink)

Bartley’s pancritical rationalism is seen by some as being a refinement of Popper’s critical rationalism. I contest this view and argue that pancritical rationalism is obtained from critical rationalism by removing some of its most important and useful features. The remainder consists of a restatement of some of Popper’s key ideas and an interpretation of others that I attempt to show is not entirely faithful to what Popper says.

Building upon aspects of Isreal Scheffler's philosophy, this essay takes up the search for forms of education that will lead to increased participation in a universal conversation in the making. In particular, it looks at how the rational passions may either enhance or impede the possibility of intelligible discourse between opponents. On the impediment side, the phenomenon of 'communicative isolation' is investigated, along with the nature of arrogant perception and the problematic role played by negative rational passions. The conclusion reached (...) is one that advocates the cultivation of 'objective-subjectivity' – a practice that combines reflexivity and precise self-awareness with the conscious exercise of positive rational passions. (shrink)