Pierre Manent is one of France's leading political philosophers. This first English translation of his profound and strikingly original book La loi naturelle et les droits de l'homme is a reflection on the central question of the Western political tradition. In six chapters, developed from the prestigious Étienne Gilson lectures at the Institut Catholique de Paris, and in a related appendix, Manent contemplates the steady displacement of the natural law by the modern conception of human rights. He aims to (...) restore the grammar of moral and political action, and thus the possibility of an authentically political order that is fully compatible with liberty rightly understood. Manent boldly confronts the prejudices and dogmas of those who have repudiated the classical and (especially) Christian notion of "liberty under law" and in the process shows how groundless many contemporary appeals to human rights turn out to be. Manent denies that we can generate obligations from a condition of what Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau call the "state of nature," where human beings are absolutely free, with no obligations to others. In his view, our ever-more-imperial affirmation of human rights needs to be reintegrated into what he calls an "archic" understanding of human and political existence, where law and obligation are inherent in liberty and meaningful human action. Otherwise we are bound to act thoughtlessly and in an increasingly arbitrary or willful manner. Natural Law and Human Rights will engage students and scholars of politics, philosophy, and religion, and will captivate sophisticated readers who are interested in the question of how we might reconfigure our knowledge of, and talk with one another about, politics. (shrink)

Few men of modern times have influenced the study of the medieval past as profoundly as Professor Etienne Gilson. By the encyclopaedic range of his writings, teaching, lectures, and personal contacts, by his sensitive vision of Christian culture, present and past, and by the brave new ventures on which he embarked, he, as few others, is responsible for the strength and diversity of medieval studies in North America and Europe. In recognition of his achievement and to continue his work, (...) the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies commissioned an annual lecture to develop areas of his interest and expertise. Since 1979, there have been twenty four lectures given by senior medievalists. Among the distinguished contributors to the series are fellows of the Institute, past and present, Leonard E. Boyle, Jocelyn Hillgarth, Edouard Jeauneau, James K. McConica, M. Michèle Mulchahey, Joseph Owens, Walter H. Principe, James P. Reilly, Brian Stock, Edward A. Synan, and James A. Weispheipl, as well as such eminent scholars from Canada, Europe, and the United States, as Marcia Colish, Giles Constable, William J. Courtenay, Paul Dutton, Mark D. Jordan, F. Donald Logan, Karl F. Morrison, John D. North, Francis Oakley, Jaroslav Pelikan, Otto Hermann Pesch, Kenneth Schmitz, and John F. Wippel. To mark the thirtieth anniversary of Gilson's death and seventy-five years of scholarly publishing at the Institute, we are reprinting the nine Gilson lectures devoted to Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

In the half century since its first publication in English, this small book has become a classic of medieval theology. Directing his attention to 'perhaps the most neglected aspect' of Cistercian mysticism, the great French medievalist and philosopher Etienne Gilson directs attention to 'that part of Bernard's] theology on which his mysticism rests', his 'systematics'. Cistercian Publications brings this important book back into print in celebration of the nine-hundredth anniversary of the birth of Saint Bernard, hoping that new generations (...) of scholars will find it food for thought and further research. (shrink)

"Étienne Gilson: His Idea of Beauty and Art”: Two books of Étienne Gilson are especially important in the area of aesthetics: Painting and Reality and The Arts of the Beautiful. In my essay I discuss Gilson’s idea of beauty and his idea of art. To some degree, É. Gilson follows traditional Thomistic point of view, i.e., he claims that the beautiful is that which pleases when seen, or that which consists of integrity, proportion and clarity. He (...) gives, however, a new interpretation of clarity which, for him, means not only physical lucidity, but also a metaphysical radiation and spiritualization of what is material. As for art, É. Gilson is of an opinion that it enjoys a strong metaphysical status, since the existence of the work of art comes from the artist himself. Finally, I explain why É. Gilson’s views are open to further discussion, both metaphysical and theological. (shrink)

La philosophie de l'art d'Étienne Gilson n'accorde aucune place au roman. Après avoir dégagé les raisons de ce rejet et en avoir dévoilé les présupposés, nous montrons que le roman a droit de cité dans la sphère des arts majeurs, et ce même à partir des principes de la théorie de Gilson.Gilson's philosophy of art leaves no room to the novel. First, we elucidate his reasons to do so, then we disclose their presuppositions, and finally we show (...) that the novel should be considered as a major form of art even on Gilson's grounds. (shrink)

The author identifies and discusses the most important elements of Étienne Gilson’s thought which emanate out of his articulation and defense of the Western Creed. To the question: why Gilson, why now?, the author offers a following answer: because we need to champion the Western Creed, defend philosophical realism, rightly interpret the history of philosophy, correctly comprehend Christian philosophy, and show that modernist and postmodernist systems are arbitrary. The author maintains that Gilson delivers us with the realist (...) philosophy of the human person, shows us the undeniable advantages of philosophical realism, and formulates an original notion of Christian philosophy which appreciates that genuine philosophy is non-systematic in its nature, and that it can expose the failure of modernist philosophies that strive to be systems. (shrink)

The underlying skepticism of ancient Greek culture made it unreceptive of philosophy. It was the Catholic Church that embraced philosophy. Still, Étienne Gilson reminds us in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages that some early Christians rejected philosophy. Their rejection was based on fideism: the view that faith alone provides knowledge. Philosophy is unnecessary and dangerous, fideists argue, because (1) anything known by reason can be better known by faith, and (2) reason, on account of the sin of (...) pride, seeks to replace faith. To support this twofold claim, fideists, like Tertullian and Tatian, quote St. Paul. However, a judicious interpretation of St. Paul’s remarks show that he does not object to philosophy per se but to erroneous philosophy. This interpretation is reinforced by St. Paul’s own background in philosophy and by his willingness to engage intellectuals critical of Christianity in the public square. The challenge of fideism brings up the interesting question: what would Jesus himself say about the discipline of philosophy? Could it be that Jesus himself was a philosopher (as George Bush once declared)? As the fullness of wisdom and intelligence, Jesus certainly understood philosophy, although not in the conventional sense. But surely, interpreting his life through the lens of fideism is unconvincing. Instead, an appreciation of his innate philosophical skills serves better to understand important elements of his mission. His perfect grasp of how grace perfects nature includes a philosophy of the human person. This philosophy grounded in common-sense analysis of human experience enables Jesus to be a profound moral philosopher. Specifically, he is able to explain the principles of personal actualization. Relying on ordinary experience, where good philosophy must start, he narrates moral lessons—parables—that illumine difficulties regarding moral responsibility and virtue. These parables are accessible but profound, showing how moral understanding must transcend Pharisaical legalism. Additionally, Jesus’ native philosophical power shows in his ability to explain away doctrinal confusions and to expose sophistical traps set by his enemies. If fideism is unconvincing, and if the great examples of the Patristics, the Apostles, and Jesus himself show an affinity for philosophy, then it is necessary to conclude that Christianity is a rational religion. Accordingly, the history of Christian culture is arguably an adventure in faith and reason. Since God is truth and the author of all truths, there is nothing in reality that is incompatible with Christian teaching. As John Paul II explains effectively in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, Christianity is a religion that is rational and can defend itself. This ability to marshal a defense makes Christianity a religion for all seasons. (shrink)

The underlying skepticism of ancient Greek culture made it unreceptive of philosophy. It was the Catholic Church that embraced philosophy. Still, Étienne Gilson reminds us in Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages that some early Christians rejected philosophy. Their rejection was based on fideism: the view that faith alone provides knowledge. Philosophy is unnecessary and dangerous, fideists argue, because (1) anything known by reason can be better known by faith, and (2) reason, on account of the sin of (...) pride, seeks to replace faith. To support this twofold claim, fideists, like Tertullian and Tatian, quote St. Paul. However, a judicious interpretation of St. Paul’s remarks shows that he does not object to philosophy per se but to erroneous philosophy. This interpretation is reinforced by St. Paul’s own background in philosophy and by his willingness to engage intellectuals critical of Christianity in the public square. The challenge of fideism brings up the interesting question: what would Jesus himself say about the discipline of philosophy? Could it be that Jesus himself was a philosopher (as George Bush once declared)? As the fullness of wisdom and intelligence, Jesus certainly understood philosophy, although not in the conventional sense. But surely, interpreting his life through the lens of fideism is unconvincing. Instead, an appreciation of his innate philosophical skills serves better to understand important elements of his mission. His perfect grasp of how grace perfects nature includes a philosophy of the human person. This philosophy grounded in common-sense analysis of human experience enables Jesus to be a profound moral philosopher. Specifically, he is able to explain the principles of personal actualization. Relying on ordinary experience, where good philosophy must start, he narrates moral lessons—parables—that illumine difficulties regarding moral responsibility and virtue. These parables are accessible but profound, showing how moral understanding must transcend Pharisaical legalism. Additionally, Jesus’ native philosophical power shows in his ability to explain away doctrinal confusions and to expose sophistical traps set by his enemies. If fideism is unconvincing, and if the great examples of the Patristics, the Apostles, and Jesus himself show an affinity for philosophy, then it is necessary to conclude that Christianity is a rational religion. Accordingly, the history of Christian culture is arguably an adventure in faith and reason. Since God is truth and the author of all truths, there is nothing in reality that is incompatible with Christian teaching. As John Paul II explains effectively in the encyclical, Fides et Ratio, Christianity is a religion that is rational and can defend itself. This ability to marshal a defense makes Christianity a religion for all seasons. (shrink)

The members of the Medieval Academy of America are happy to be holding this year's annual meeting — its sixtieth and a kind of Golden Anniversary — at the University of Indiana in Bloomington. Although this is the first time the Academy has met in this university, relations between the two institutions have been personal and warm. Four years ago your Talbot Donaldson was the Academy's President, and a beloved one he was to be sure. In the tradition of institutional (...) and personal friendship, it seems fitting that my address today should focus on a remarkable event that took place in 1940 when Etienne Gilson, a Corresponding Fellow of the Academy since its second annual meeting in 1927, delivered here, under the auspices of the Mahlon Powell Foundation, his memorable lectures on God and Philosophy. (shrink)

Etienne Gilson was a strong promoter of the notion of a ‘Christian philosophy’. He viewed it as a type of historical practice whereby Christian thinkers are spurred by revelation to develop philosophical positions congruent with revelation, but which are defensible by reason alone. This paper reviews Gilson's notion of Christian philosophy and argues that the philosophical position of Bernard Lonergan is one example of such a practice.

Gilson became familiar with American academic life and language during the summer of 1926 when he first visited the United States and taught two summer courses at the University of Virginia. His international renown as well as his popularity at the University of Virginia resulted in a second visit in 1937 to present the Richard Lectures on Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages, which focused on the challenging theme of attempting to bring faith and knowledge into an organic (...) unity. His dissection of three main philosophical traditions in the Middle Ages constituted an important step in Gilson reaching a satisfactory understanding of the relationship between philosophy and theology within the thought of Saint Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

: In this paper, the author will demarcate three main stages of the development of Étienne Gilson’s doctrine on Christian philosophy through an examination of some of Gilson’s key works, treated in chronological order. Thus, he proceeds to explicate how Gilson’s doctrine developed from its gestational stage in the 1920s through the first Christian philosophy debate of the 1930s, into its 2nd stage of birth and infancy from the 1930s through the early 1950s, ending with the 3rd (...) stage of maturity in the later 1950s and 1960s. Furthermore, he notes that implicit throughout those three stages are notions of Christian philosophy as existing in two modes: one as the philosophical component present within theology and the second properly speaking outside of theology though by no means outside of the influence of Christianity. Additionally, Gilson’s influence upon St. John Paul II’s treatment of Christian philosophy in Fides et Ratio is addressed. The paper culminates in showing how Gilson’s mature doctrine on Christian philosophy is relevant as a guide for doing Christian philosophy in this Third Christian Millennium. (shrink)

A warm portrait of Gilson as historian, educator, and Thomist drawn from his own writings and lectures. The selection is well made and includes several pieces previously unpublished in English; Pegis contributes an introduction in which he explores Gilson's attitude toward Christian philosophy and the Middle Ages.--R. F. T.

Several recent works in history and philosophy of science have re-evaluated the alleged opposition between the theses put forth by logical empiricists such as Carnap and the so-called "post-positivists", such as Kuhn. Although the latter came to be viewed as having seriously challenged the logical positivist views of science, recent authors maintain that some of the most notable theses of the Kuhnian view of science have striking similarities with some aspects of Carnap's philosophy. Against that reading, Oliveira and Psillos argue (...) that within Carnap's philosophy there is no place for the Kuhnian theses of incommensurability, holism, and theory-ladenness of observations. This paper presents each of those readings and argues that Carnap and Kuhn have non-opposing views on holism, incommensurability, the theory-ladenness of observations, and scientific revolutions. We note at the very end - without dwelling on the point, however - that they come apart on other matters, such as their views on metaphysics and on the context of discovery/justification distinction. (shrink)

The article starts with stating the fact that today there is an increasing recognition of difficulties with Darwinism accompanied by vigorous responses on the part of Darwin’s defenders; among the instances of challenge to the dominant theory, one can find a book of Gilson, From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again, and those behind the Intelligent Design movement. Inrelating the book of Gilson to the ID proponents, the author concludes that, while in some ways they are on the (...) same side in opposing the anti-creation thrust of Darwinism, Gilson is neutral on the validity or truth of Darwin’s biological hypothesis. Gilson, however, whose book preceded the ID movement by some twenty years, seeks to analyze Darwinism from the perspective of the classical philosophy of nature. He well understands that, according to modern scientific method, final causes are excluded from consideration, but he calls for a biophilosophy which will be open to the reality of human experience as Aristotle was and recognize that teleology is present in nature. According to him, even if teleology seems to be a contestable explanation, chance as understood by Darwinists is the pure absence of explanation. (shrink)