To introduce this collection of research studies, which stem from the pro grams conducted by The World Phenomenology Institute, we need say a few words about our aims and work. This will bring to light the significance of the present volume. The phenomenological philosophy is an unprejudiced study of experience in its entire range: experience being understood as yielding objects. Experi ence, moreover, is approached in a specific way, such a way that it legitima tizes itself naturally in immediate (...) evidence. As such it offers a unique ground for philosophical inquiry. Its basic condition, however, is to legitimize its validity. In this way it allows a dialogue to unfold among various philosophies of different methodologies and persuasions, so that their basic assumptions and conceptions may be investigated in an objective fashion. That is, instead of comparing concepts, we may go below their differences to seek together what they are meant to grasp. We may in this way come to the things them selves, which are the common objective of all philosophy, or what the great Chinese philosopher Wang Yang Ming called "the investigation of things". It is in this spirit that the Institute's programs include a "cross-cultural" dialogue meant to bring about a profound communication among philosophers in their deepest concerns. Rising above artificial cultural confinements, such dialogues bring scholars, thinkers and human beings together toward a truly human community of minds. Our Institute unfolds one consistent academic program. (shrink)

It is generally acknowledged that there were two schisms in the early history of the phenomenological movement. The first, the Great Phenomenological Schism, started between 1905 and 1913, as many of his younger contemporaries, for example Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, rejected Husserl’s transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive psychology of the Logical Investigations into the transcendental idealism of Ideas I. The second, the Phenomenological-Existential Schism, happened between 1927 and 1933, as it emerged that with Being (...) and Time Heidegger’s philosophy had moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness toward an ontological analytic of human existence as the way to an interpretation of the question of the meaning of Being. This paper is about neither the first schism per se nor the second schism per se but about the relationship between the two. It suggests that the first schism anticipated the second and the second recapitulated the first, so that, although the first could have occurred without the second, the second would not have happened as it did without the first. It also indicates that the second schism lies temporally much closer to the first schism than has been hitherto appreciated. Above all, the paper seeks an answer to this question: How do the Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism illuminate one another philosophically? (shrink)

Through mystery, literature reveals to us the Great Unknown. While we are absorbed by the matters at hand with the present enactment of our life, groping for clues to handle them, it is through literature that we discover the hidden strings underlying their networks. Hence our fascination with literature. But there is more. The creative act of the human being, its proper focus, holds the key to the Sezam of life: to the great metaphysical/ontopoietic questions which literature may disclose. First, (...) it leads us to the sublimal grounds of transformation in the human soul, source of the specifically human significance of life (Analecta Husserliana, Volume III, XIX, XXIII, XXVII) Second, it leads us to the unveiling of the hidden workings of life in the twilight of knowing in a dialectic between The Visible and the Invisible, (Volume LXXV, 2002, Analecta Husserliana) down to the ontopoietic truth. (Volume LXXVI, 2002, Analecta Husserliana) This prying into the unknown which provokes the human being as he or she attempts to conquer, step by step, a space of existence, finds its culmination in the phenomenon of mystery as the subject of the present collection. Its formulation brings us to the greatest question of all: the enigmatic solidarity -in-distinctiveness of human cognition and existence. Papers are written by: Tony E. Afejuku, Gary Backhaus, Paul G. Beidler, Matthew J. Duffy, Raffaela Giovagnoli, Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, Matti Itkonen, Lawrence Kimmel, Catherine Malloy, Vladimir L. Marchenkov, Nancy Mardas, Howard Pearce, Bernadette Prochaska, Victor Gerald Rivas, M.J. Sahlani, Dennis Skocz, Jadwiga S. Smith, Mara Stafecka, Max Statkiewicz, Mariola Sulkowska, Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, Leon U. Weinman, Tim Weiss. (shrink)

The history of the early phenomenological movement involves a tale of two schisms. The Great Phenomenological Schism originated between 1905 and 1913, as many of his contemporaries, for example, Pfänder, Scheler, Reinach, Stein, and Ingarden, rejected Husserl’s transformation of phenomenology from the descriptive psychology of his Logical Investigations into the transcendental idealism of his Ideas I. The Phenomenological-Existential Schism started between 1927 and 1933, as with Being and Time Heidegger moved away from Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology of consciousness (...) toward an ontological analytic of existence. Yet these schisms were not unrelated developments. Closely following the documentary evidence to determine the exemplary nature of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s move into transcendental idealism, this essay establishes the inextricable linkage between the Great Phenomenological Schism and the Phenomenological-Existential Schism. (shrink)

This collection presents the broadest range of experiences faced during the Schism, center and periphery, clerical and lay, male and female, Christian and Muslim, theology, including exegesis of Scripture, diplomacy, French literature, reform, art, and finance.

The Sāṃkhya Kārikā’s “mahat-buddhi” appears to be riddled with obscurity. Standard realist interpreters struggle to explain its cumbersome, textually unsupported bivalence, namely, how the mahat-buddhi can represent both a cosmological entity and a psychological capacity. Idealist readings, meanwhile, neglect the historically deep ontological meaning of this tattva by reducing it to a power of the transcendental ego. This paper moves beyond the impasse of the realism-idealism framework for interpreting the Sāṃkhya Kārikā and examines the mahat-buddhi through the existential phenomenology of (...) José Ortega y Gasset. It begins by re-framing classical Sāṃkhya metaphysics as an existential phenomenology of life, whereby life—as lived reality, not an external physical world or a field of mental experience—conveys the meaning of vyaktaprakṛti. From this, the paper then argues that the mahat-buddhi represents “the great awakening of life,” which is characterized by 5 key features: (1) purposive procreativity; (2) a power of illuminating discernment; (3) a principle of disclosure; (4) an existentially unitary, concentrated vitality; and (5) a capacity to take other-beings-as. (shrink)

Max van Manen offers an extensive exploration of phenomenological traditions and methods for the human sciences. It is his first comprehensive statement of phenomenological thought and research in over a decade. Phenomenology of practice refers to the meaning and practice of phenomenology in professional contexts such as psychology, education, and health care, as well as to the practice of phenomenological methods in contexts of everyday living. Van Manen presents a detailed description of key phenomenological ideas as (...) they have evolved over the past century; he then thoughtfully works through the methodological issues of phenomenological reflection, empirical methods, and writing that a phenomenology of practice offers to the researcher. Van Manen’s comprehensive work will be of great interest to all concerned with the interrelationship between being and acting in human sciences research and in everyday life. (shrink)

First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition of (...) Husserl, Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s contribution is decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one’s situation and experience within the world. Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty’s discursive Table of Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive Translator’s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of Merleau-Ponty’s references to now available English translations. Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty_ _by Claude Lefort. Translated by Donald A. Landes. (shrink)

De nouveaux thèmes théologiques apparaissent dans le décor des églises byzantines vers le milieu du 11e siècle. Ils sont nés d'un programme spécifique probablement lié au schisme de 1054. L'A. étudie les thèmes liturgiques centraux de l'Eglise orthodoxe de cette époque en prêtant une attention particulière au symbolisme des thèmes et à la date de leur émergence au sein du décor de l'église comme par exemple la communion des apôtres, les évêques officiant, le Christ comme Grand Prêtre consacrant l'Eglise ou (...) encore le Christ Prêtre. Ce programme iconographique a déterminé pour des siècles la structure et le contenu du décor de l'Eglise byzantine. Il ne s'agissait pas simplement d'illustrer des sujets polémiques mais de tenter de créer une nouvelle imagerie reflétant une nouvelle conscience de l'Eglise orthodoxe séparée de l'Occident latin. (shrink)

Phenomenology: The Basics is a concise and engaging introduction to one of the dominant philosophical movements of the 20th century. This lively and lucid book provides an introduction to the essential phenomenological concepts that are crucial for understanding great thinkers such as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. Written by a leading expert in the field, Dan Zahavi examines and explains key questions such as: - What is a phenomenological analysis? - What are the methodological foundations of phenomenology? - What (...) does phenomenology have to say about embodiment and intersubjectivity? - How is phenomenology distinguished from, and related to, other fields in philosophy? - How do ideas from classic phenomenology relate to ongoing debates in psychology and qualitative research? With a glossary of key terms and suggestions for further reading, the book considers key philosophical arguments around phenomenology, making this an ideal starting point for anyone seeking a concise and accessible introduction to the rich and complex study of phenomenology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Acosta, José de (1539–1600) Alberdi, Juan Bautista (1810–84) Bello, Andrés (1781–1865) Bilbao, Francisco (1823–65) Bolkvar, Simón (1783–1830) Casas, Bartolomé de las (1484–1566) Caso, Antonio (1883–1946) Cruz, Sor Juana Inés de la (1651–95) da Costa, Newton Carneiro Affonso (b. 1929) Dussel, Enrique (b. 1934) Frondizi, Risieri (1910–83) Gaos, José (1900–69) González Prada, Manuel (1848–1918) Gracia, Jorge J. E. (b. 1942) Haya de la Torre, Victor Raúl (1895–1979) Hostos, Eugenio Marka de (1839–1903) Ingenieros, José (1877–1925) Korn, Alejandro (...) (1860–1936) Lastarria, José Victorino (1817–88) Lemos, Miguel (1854–1917) Mariátegui, José Carlos (1895–1930) Martk, José (1853–95) Méndez Sierra, Justo (1848–1912) Mora, José Maria Luis (1794–1850) Miró Quesada, Francisco (b. 1918) Rabossi, Eduardo (1930–2005) Ramos, Samuel (1897–1959) Rodó, José Enrique (1872–1917) Romero, Francisco (1891–1962) Sahagún, Fray Bernardino de (1499–1590) Salazar Bondy, Augusto (1925–74) Sarmiento, Domingo Faustino (1811–88) Ofelia Schutte (b. 1945) Sepslveda, Juan Ginés de (ca. 1494–1573) Torretti, Roberto (b. 1930) Vasconcelos, José (1882–1959) Vaz Ferreira, Carlos (1872–1958) Villoro, Luis (b. 1922) Vitoria, Francisco de (ca. 1483–1546) Zea Aguilar, Leopoldo (1912–2004) Acknowledgment Further Reading. (shrink)

The turn of the twentieth century witnessed the birth of two distinct philosophical schools in Europe: analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The history of 20th-century philosophy is often written as an account of the development of one or both of these schools, as well as their overt or covert mutual hostility. What is often left out of this history, however, is the relationship between the two European schools and a third significant philosophical event: the birth and development of pragmatism, the indigenous (...) philosophical movement of the United States. Through a careful analysis of seminal figures and central texts, this book explores the mutual intellectual influences, convergences, and differences between these three revolutionary philosophical traditions. The essays in this volume aim to show the central role that pragmatism played in the development of philosophical thought at the turn of the twentieth century, widen our understanding of a seminal point in the history of philosophy, and shed light on the ways in which these three schools of thought continue to shape the theoretical agenda of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This book describes and analyzes the levels of experience that long-distance running produces. It looks at the kinds of experiences caused by long-distance running, the dimensions contained in these experiences, and their effects on the subjective life-world and well-being of an individual. Taking a philosophical approach, the analysis presented in this book is founded on Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body and Martin Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Running is a versatile form of physical exercise which does not reveal all of its (...) dimensions at once. These dimensions escape the eye and are not revealed to the runner conceptually, but rather as sensations and emotions. Instead of concentrating on conceptual analysis, this book explores the emotions and experiences and examines the meaning that running has in runners' lives. Using the participative method, in which the author is both the research subject and the researcher, the book contributes to the philosophy of physical exercise. The research made by Koski is exceptional, and not only because of the topic itself, which also is out of the ordinary. Koski has been fortunate to discover a topic which offers immensely great opportunities to explore and present basic human philosophical themes in a new, fascinating conceptual environment. Emeritus Prof. Lauri Routila I don't know of anyone who has done this in English, certainly not to your depth. -- This project in unique, wonderful, and important Amby Burfoot. (shrink)

The concept of memory has always been a crucial topic in philosophical discourse. This book re-traces the thought of major philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Paul Ricoeur, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, William James, José Luis Borges and Sigmund Freud to provide an in-depth exploration around several aspects of this timely issue. How is a memory formed? How can we bring into existence what has sunk into oblivion? What is the role of our instincts and inner drives in the constitution of (...) memory? What is the connection between memory and forgetfulness, as well as that between mercy and remembrance? Focusing on these fundamental questions, the author presents a rich interconnection of concepts and ideas that build a significant work on the great theme of memory"--Front cover flap. (shrink)

Although this conference, held at Oxford on September 6–7, 1993, did not completely fulfil the ambitions of its subtitle, it nonetheless provided a stimulating forum for the presentation and exchange of ideas on various topics arising from Hegel’s Phenomenology. In the first paper, “Rupture, Closure, and Dialectic,” Joseph Flay dealt with the Phenomenology in its role as an introduction or beginning to the system. David Duquette then discussed the master/slave dialectic and the political significance of Hegel’s concept of recognition in (...) the Phenomenology. Following this, Jay Bernstein focussed on Hegel’s treatment of conscience and guilt, and related this to his views of ethical action, arguing that Hegel leaves room for moral autonomy and hence tragic suffering even within his conception of Sittlichkeit. In the fourth paper, “The Presence of Aristotle in Hegel’s Phenomenology,” Nicholas Walker analyzed the relation between Hegel and Aristotle, and the complexities of the latter’s influence on the Phenomenology. H.S. Harris then offered a sketch of his own view of the Phenomenology in “Let’s Not ‘Leave out the Ethical’: A ‘Conscientious’ Response to S.K.”, starting from a discussion of Hegel’s theory of truth and how this shapes the structure of this work. Finally, in “The ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ and Conscious Unhappiness,” Simon Jarvis examined Adorno’s critique of Hegel, and emphasized the continuing importance and value of this critique for any truly living contemporary Hegelianism. (shrink)

Although this conference, held at Oxford on September 6–7, 1993, did not completely fulfil the ambitions of its subtitle, it nonetheless provided a stimulating forum for the presentation and exchange of ideas on various topics arising from Hegel’s Phenomenology. In the first paper, “Rupture, Closure, and Dialectic,” Joseph Flay dealt with the Phenomenology in its role as an introduction or beginning to the system. David Duquette then discussed the master/slave dialectic and the political significance of Hegel’s concept of recognition in (...) the Phenomenology. Following this, Jay Bernstein focussed on Hegel’s treatment of conscience and guilt, and related this to his views of ethical action, arguing that Hegel leaves room for moral autonomy and hence tragic suffering even within his conception of Sittlichkeit. In the fourth paper, “The Presence of Aristotle in Hegel’s Phenomenology,” Nicholas Walker analyzed the relation between Hegel and Aristotle, and the complexities of the latter’s influence on the Phenomenology. H.S. Harris then offered a sketch of his own view of the Phenomenology in “Let’s Not ‘Leave out the Ethical’: A ‘Conscientious’ Response to S.K.”, starting from a discussion of Hegel’s theory of truth and how this shapes the structure of this work. Finally, in “The ‘Unhappy Consciousness’ and Conscious Unhappiness,” Simon Jarvis examined Adorno’s critique of Hegel, and emphasized the continuing importance and value of this critique for any truly living contemporary Hegelianism. (shrink)

This book brings phenomenology, the main player in the continental tradition of philosophy, to bioethics. Medical science and emerging technologies are examined as endeavours that bring enormous possibilities in relieving human suffering but also great risks in transforming our fundamental life views.

G. W. F. Hegel's first masterpiece, the Phenomenology of Spirit, is one of the great works of philosophy. It remains, however, one of the most challenging and mysterious books ever written. Michael Inwood presents this central work to the modern reader in an intelligible and accurate new translation. This translation attempts to convey, as accurately as possible, the subtle nuances of the original German text. Inwood also provides a detailed commentary that explains what Hegel is saying at each stage of (...) his argument and also discusses the philosophical issues it raises. This volume will therefore prove invaluable to those who want to get to grips with Hegel's thought processes and to follow his complex argument. (shrink)

The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Mindfulness brings together two schools of thought and practice that - despite rarely being examined jointly - provide an incredibly fruitful way for exploring thinking, the mind, and the nature and practice of mindfulness. Applying the concepts and methods of phenomenology, an international team of contributors explore mindfulness from a variety of different viewpoints and traditions. The handbook's thirty-four chapters are divided into seven clear parts: Mindfulness in the Western Traditions Mindfulness in the Eastern (...) Traditions Mindfulness, Ethics and Well-Being Mindfulness, Time and Attention Mindfulness and Embodiment Applications: Mindfulness in Life Conclusion: Mindfulness and Phenomenology? Within these sections, a rich array of topics and themes are explored, ranging from Stoicism and the origins of mindfulness in Buddhism and eastern thought to meditation, self-awareness, the body and embodiment, and critiques of mindfulness. Additionally, the book delves into the ways the ideas of leading phenomenological thinkers, including Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, can contribute to understanding the relationship between phenomenology and mindfulness. A valuable resource for those researching phenomenology and applications of phenomenology, this handbook will also be of great interest to students and practitioners of mindfulness in areas such as counseling and psychotherapy. (shrink)

In its central use “phenomenology” names a movement in twentieth century philosophy. A second use of “phenomenology” common in contemporary philosophy names a property of some mental states, the property they have if and only if there is something it is like to be in them. Thus, it is sometimes said that emotional states have a phenomenology while belief states do not. For example, while there is something it is like to be angry, there is nothing it is like to (...) believe that Paris is in France. Although the two uses of “phenomenology” are related, it is the first which is the current topic. Accordingly, “phenomenological” refers to a way of doing philosophy that is more or less closely related to the corresponding movement. Phenomenology utilizes a distinctive method to study the structural features of experience and of things as experienced. It is primarily a descriptive discipline and is undertaken in a way that is largely independent of scientific, including causal, explanations and accounts of the nature of experience. Topics discussed within the phenomenological tradition include the nature of intentionality, perception, time-consciousness, self-consciousness, awareness of the body and consciousness of others. Phenomenology is to be distinguished from phenomenalism, a position in epistemology which implies that all statements about physical objects are synonymous with statements about persons having certain sensations or sense-data. George Berkeley was a phenomenalist but not a phenomenologist. -/- Although elements of the twentieth century phenomenological movement can be found in earlier philosophers—such as David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Franz Brentano—phenomenology as a philosophical movement really began with the work of Edmund Husserl. Following Husserl, phenomenology was adapted, broadened and extended by, amongst others, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida. Phenomenology has, at one time or another, been aligned with Kantian and post-Kantian transcendental philosophy, existentialism and the philosophy of mind and psychology. -/- This article introduces some of the central aspects of the phenomenological method and also concrete phenomenological analyses of some of the topics that have greatly exercised phenomenologists. (shrink)

This is a (likely incomplete) transcendental phenomenology of professional failure. You can read it, if you like. Or don't.

Macann guides the student through the major texts of the four great thinkers of the phenomenological movement.

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory (...) – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others. (shrink)

The Phenomenology of Spirit is both one of Hegel's most widely read books and one of his most obscure. The book is the most detailed commentary on Hegel's work available. It develops an independent philosophical account of the general theory of knowledge, culture, and history presented in the Phenomenology. In a clear and straightforward style, Terry Pinkard reconstructs Hegel's theoretical philosophy and shows its connection to ethical and political theory. He sets the work in a historical context and shows the (...) contemporary relevance of Hegel's thought for European and Anglo-American philosophers. The principal audience for the book is teachers and students of philosophy, but the great interest in Hegel's work and the clarity of Pinkard's exposition ensure that historians of ideas, political scientists, and literary theorists will also read it. (shrink)

Phenomenology, perhaps more than any other single movement in philosophy, has been key in bringing emotions to the foreground of philosophical consideration. This is in large part due to the ways in which emotions, according to phenomenological analyses, are revealing of basic structures of human existence. Indeed, it is partly and, according to some phenomenologists, even primarily through our emotions that the world is disclosed to us, that we become present to and make sense of ourselves, and that we (...) relate to and engage with others. A phenomenological study of emotions is thus meant not only to help us to understand ourselves, but also to allow us to see and to make sense of the meaningfulness of our worldly and social existence.Within the last few decades, the emotions have re-emerged more generally as a topic of great philosophical interest and importance. Philosophers, along with psychologists, cognitive scientists, and neuroscientists have engaged in inter- and intra-disciplina .. (shrink)

Phenomenology and the Creative Process explpores the subject of creativity from a vast range of perspectives. While the emphasis is placed on fundamental ideas taken from phenomenological philosophy and its precursors, the book also engages with related issues from the fields of psychology, physics, narrative studies, art, literature, cognitive science and neuroscience. Author Steven L. Bindeman's objective is to employ an analysis of creativity from the dual perspectives of "identity" and "difference," in order to develop a pluralistic and open-ended (...) understanding of the creative process. His central position is that while creativity can and should be studied as a physical, measurable phenomenon, we need to integrate quantitative studies with a phenomenological perspective that enables us to appreciate the distinctive experiential features of creative activities in order to fully appreciate the complex nature of the creative process. Bindeman's approach is important in that it recognizes the value of phenomenological studies without being afraid to draw insights from other fields of inquiry. This book thus offers unique analysis of creative individuals and works, applying insights from phenomenological philosophers to enrich our understanding of the creative processes of great artists, philosophers, and scientists. (shrink)

The article maintains that chronic fatigue syndrome can be properly understood only by taking an integrated perspective in which evolutionary, developmental and ecological aspects are considered. The integrative approach, supplemented by a complexity theory and psychoneuroimmunological research, is capable of explaining why there are so few structural aberrations to be found in chronic fatigue syndrome and why specific treatment is so difficult to establish. A major outcome of the investigation, that all individuals with chronic fatigue syndrome are diseased in their (...) own way, emphasises the need to study the development of personalised life histories. It also highlights an ethical dimension; personalised disease defies essentialist thinking on patient management. Another major outcome, which follows from the developmental systems perspective, is the dissolution of ontological mind-body dualism. This in turn allows for a methodological complementation of the biological and phenomenological approaches to knowledge. New research strategies that may help to resolve chronic fatigue syndrome, grounded in the revised perspective on individual development, are suggested. (shrink)

Heideggerian existential phenomenology remains largely ignored by Latin American feminists due to their preference for more Marxist and Sartrean philosophies. But its influence on Latin American feminism can be felt through the work of thinkers such as Beauvoir and Irigaray, who have had a great impact on Latin American feminists’ involvement in political movements and developmentof theories. The aim of this essay is to discuss ways in which Latin American and U.S. Latina feminists have been influenced by phenomenology’s commitment to (...) lived experience, but have yet to embrace existential phenomenology in an explicit manner. (shrink)

Philosophy has been always received or bypassed for its resonance or aloofness with the spirit of the time. Should not philosophy/phenomenology of life be expected to do more to ascertain its validity? Should it not pass the pragmatic test, that is to respond directly to the life-concerns of its time? What is the role of the philosopher and philosophy today? Due to the ever-advancing scientific, technological, social and cultural changes that are shaping human life and the life-world-in-transformation, we are desperately (...) seeking a measure to estimate life's unfolding, a compass to stir the course between Scylla and Charibda to maintain human-hood and creative insight for laying the cornerstones for the unforeseeable unfolding of life dynamisms. It is this challenge which philosophy/phenomenology of life meets with underlying ontopoietic unraveling of the hidden logoic concatenations of beingness-in-becoming. The present collection of essays offers contributions to answer this challenge by focusing upon measure, sharing-in-life, intersubjectivity and communication, societal equilibrium, education, and more. It will be of great interest to those working in the fields of Phenomenology, Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and Contemporary Philosophy. (shrink)

Two disciplines have greatly contributed to a new understanding of phantasy and imagination in contemporary thought: phenomenology and psychoanalysis. These two different approaches to Phantasie developed almost simultaneously at the beginning of the twentieth century. The examination of Phantasie can focus on the concrete form of the phantasm as a unique object formation—or better, as scene. The attention can also be directed to the style of imagining as specific intentionality. Whereas the second line of research has been extensively studied in (...) the context of phenomenological investigation, psychoanalytical inquiry has greatly contributed to the understanding of the phantasm as scene. In the present paper, the author primarily examines the notion of phantasy from a phenomenological perspective. More specifically, the author intends to show the inner tensions between the concept of pure phantasy as intentional act and the manner of appearance of unclear phantasy. If we consider the essential traits of the appearances of unclear phantasies, the unclear phantasies cannot be considered as quasi-perceptions of a fictional object, since no intentional object constitutes itself in this confused dimension. (shrink)

Approaching God explores the ways in which phenomenology, metaphysics and theological enquiry can throw light upon each other. This is a matter of great interest and importance to the future of philosophical theology and the philosophy of religion. What, if anything, has philosophical reflection about God to contribute to Christian theology? And if indeed philosophy plays a positive role in theological reflection—what kind of philosophy? The first-person philosophical perspective of phenomenology or the objective philosophical perspective of metaphysics? Masterson devotes three (...) chapters to, respectively, phenomenological, metaphysical, and theological approaches to God. Each are seen as animated by a first principle from which a comprehensive account of everything is said to follow—‘Human Consciousness' in the case of phenomenology; ‘Being' in the case of metaphysics; and ‘God' in the case of theology. Although philosophers and theologians such as Ricoeur, Levinas, Kearney, Caputo, and Barth are considered briefly, Approaching God essentially provides a dialogue about theological and theistic issues between the phenomenological approach of the leading French Christian phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion and the realist metaphysical approach of Aquinas. Masterson maintains that all three approaches are needed in trying to speak appropriately about God—they are irreducible but complementary. (shrink)

Phenomenological research is of great value to clinicians, policy makers, and ordinary persons because of its distinctive emphasis on making human behavior and experience intelligible with reference to the point of view of the actor. Unfortunately, the phenomenological tradition is not readily accessible to readers who are unfamiliar with it. This article discusses specific ways that researchers within this tradition can reach more of the readers who might benefit from their findings without compromising the integrity of their scholarship.

This contribution aims to be a concrete proof of how fertile, rich and innovative dialogue and confrontation between transcendental phenomenology and naturalising sciences can be. Through the phenomenological-transcendental analysis of the neurodegenerative pathology of dementia, an attempt will be made to propose, within the debate on the possible naturalisation of phenomenology, the perspective of an actual mutual enlightenment, as proposed by Gallagher. Not a naturalisation of consciousness in the sense of a reduction to neural process, but a pluralisation of (...) the valid and rigorous perspectives through which it can be investigated. The phenomenological-transcendental eidetic study of dementia thus becomes complementary to the neurobiological one, revealing what the subject feels ‘from within’, his losses, but also what persists in the patient until the most advanced stages. Such a study, in synergy with the biological one, would greatly help in the holistic understanding of dementia in this particular case and, in general, of consciousness phenomena. (shrink)

The phenomenological method has been fruitfully used to study the experience of illness in recent years. However, the role of illness is not merely that of a passive object for phenomenological scrutiny. I propose that illness, and pathology more generally, can be developed into a phenomenological method in their own right. I claim that studying cases of pathology, breakdown, and illness offer illumination not only of these experiences, but also of normal function and the tacit background that (...) underpins it. In particular, I claim that the study of embodiment can be greatly enhanced, and indeed would be incomplete, without attending to bodily breakdown and what I term bodily doubt. I offer an analogy between illness and Husserl’s epoché, suggesting that both are a source of distancing, and therefore motivate a reflective stance. (shrink)

Solitons, i.e. solitary localized waves with particle-like behaviour, and multi-solitons occur virtually everywhere. There is a good reason for that in that there is a solid, albeit somewhat heuristic argument which says that for wave-like phenomena the 'soliton approximation' is the next one after the linear one. It is also not too difficult via some searching in the voluminous literature - many hundreds of papers on solitons each year - to write down a long list of equations which admit soliton (...) solutions and which model phenomena ranging over all the physical, biological, chemical and geological sciences as well as engineering. Yet, when lecturing on (mathematical) aspects of solitons I have found it not so easy to go beyond listing these equations. Largely because of lack of a book like this, which discusses where and how solitons arise, how they behave, whether or not they are stable and in what sense, which discusses approximate solitons and solitons in multidimensional spaces (which in a first simple natural formulation cannot exist), which discusses soliton (computer) experiments; all this for a wide range of phenomena especially in connection with solid state physics. There is a great deal of analytic material as well as there is especially a considerable collection of challenges for theoretical understanding. A great deal of the material covered in this book has not appeared in the monographic literature before. The phenomenology of solitons is very rich indeed. (shrink)

Heideggerian existential phenomenology remains largely ignored by Latin American feminists due to their preference for more Marxist and Sartrean philosophies. But its influence on Latin American feminism can be felt through the work of thinkers such as Beauvoir and Irigaray, who have had a great impact on Latin American feminists’ involvement in political movements and developmentof theories. The aim of this essay is to discuss ways in which Latin American and U.S. Latina feminists have been influenced by phenomenology’s commitment to (...) lived experience, but have yet to embrace existential phenomenology in an explicit manner. (shrink)

The Matrix raises several familiar philosophical problems in such new ways that students all over the country are assigning it to their philosophy professors. In so doing, they have offered us a great opportunity to illustrate some of the basic insights of existential phenomenology. The Matrix might seem to renew Descartes’s worry that, since all we ever experience are our own inner mental states, we might, for all we could tell, be living in an illusion created by a malicious demon. (...) In that case, most of our beliefs about reality would be false. But there is a way of understanding The Matrix that denies the mediation of mental states and shows those living in the Matrix to be in direct touch with Matrix reality. The Matrix world is public and objective, not a private subjective dream. Still, there is clearly a sense in which the Matrix world, while not merely mental, is not real either. There is after all a demon—the AI intelligences and their computer—that has in some sense fooled all those who accept the reality of the Matrix world. Thus, the film’s account of our situation is even more disturbing than Descartes’s claim that we are each confined to our own mind. The Matrix world is a vivid illustration of Descartes’s additional prescient claim that we could never be in direct touch with the real world because we are all what we would now call brains in vats. (shrink)