The value problem of knowledge is one of the prominent problems that philosophical accounts of knowledge are expected to solve. According to the credit solution, a well-known solution to this problem, knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief because the former is creditable to a subject’s cognitive competence. But what is “credit value”? How does it connect to the already existing distinctions between values? The purpose of the present paper is to answer these questions. Its (...) most important conclusion is that credit value is not—contrary to what the upholders of the credit solution have frequently claimed—final value. (shrink)

A satisfying theory of knowledge has to explain why knowledge seems to be better than mere true belief. In this paper, I try to show that the best reliabilist explanation (ERA+) is still not able to solve this problem. According to an already elaborated answer (ERA), it is better to possess knowledge that p because this makes likely that one’s future belief of a similar kind will also be true. I begin with a metaphysical comment which gives birth to (...) ERA +, a better formulation of ERA. Then, I raise two objections against ERA+. The first objection shows that the truth of the reliabilist answer requires the conception of a specific theory of instrumental value. In the second objection, I present an example in order to show that ERA+ actually fails to explain why it is better to possess knowledge than a mere true belief. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a “value turn” in epistemology. We intuitively think of knowledge as having a value, a value that mere true belief does not have, and it has been held to be a condition of adequacy on theories of knowledge that they be able to explain why. Unfortunately, for most theories their explanations suffer from the “swamping problem” because what has to be added to turn true belief into knowledge has value (...) only instrumentally to truth; for example, we take being justified to be valuable, but only because being justified is our way of trying to believe what is true and only what is true, and it follows from this that for a belief already granted as true, no extra value is added by the fact that it is justified as well. So, the task is to solve the value problem while avoiding the swamping problem. I will argue that, in fact, the value turn leaves epistemological theorizing much as it was. My reasoning goes briefly as follows: on the usual interpretation of the value problem, the demand it places on theories of knowledge is internally incoherent and hence implausible as a condition of their adequacy. It is a condition of adequacy nonetheless that the theory avoid the swamping problem if we really do have the intuition supposed. I will then use a thought-experiment to consider different kinds of knowledge and argue that, with the exception of a priori knowledge, there is no such intuition. With this exception, there is no swamping problem either, and hence theories cannot be ruled inadmissible on the grounds that the knowledge-making features they propose fail to have a non-instrumental value. My conclusion is that it is only whatever has to be added to true a priori belief in order to turn it into knowledge that has to have a non-instrumental value, that is to say, only a priori knowledge that has a value problem. But this problem is easily solved. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Barry Allen’s non-adaptive theory of knowledge as introduced in Knowledge and Civilization fails to assign a proper value to knowledge. In defending this view, I first briefly spell out Allen’s evolutionary standpoint by contrasting it with classical pragmatism’s adaptive perspective and then contend that his view is ultimately unable to offer a practical reason for the preferability of knowledge from the standpoint of actual cognitive agents.

Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar (...) kind in the future. I argue that this proposal confronts significant internal problems and implicitly invokes higher-level epistemic conditions that run against the spirit of externalism. (shrink)

We value possessing knowledge more than true belief. Both someone with knowledge and someone with a true belief possess the correct answer to a question. Why is knowledge more valuable than true belief if both contain the correct answer? I examine the philosophy of American pragmatist John Dewey and then I offer a novel solution to this question often called the value problem of knowledge. I present and explicate (my interpretation of) Dewey’s pragmatic theory of inquiry. Dewey (...) values competent inquiry and claims it is a knowledge-forming process, and I argue that it is competently conducting inquiry that explains why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Knowledge is always the result of a process of competent inquiry (itself valuable) whereas belief can but need not be the result of inquiry. I end by considering and replying to reasonable objections to my pragmatic solution. (shrink)

In The Transmission of Knowledge (2021), Greco departs significantly from his earlier view of all knowledge as an individual achievement of the knower, allowing that in some testimonial knowledge cases (cases of “transmission”), a hearer’s believing truly will be due to competent joint agency, between herself and the speaker. Greco argues that the new, hybrid view of knowledge as individual or joint achievement is still sufficiently unified and – importantly – still provides a satisfying answer to the value (...) class='Hi'>problem for knowledge. I will raise some worries for this latter claim. I begin by raising worries about Greco’s earlier answer to the value problem: that knowledge is distinctively valuable as an (individual’s) achievement. I then argue that these worries are not allayed by expanding the account of knowledge to include joint achievements and indeed are perhaps aggravated by this new move. (shrink)

Those philosophical issues that are of the most vivid contemporary significance usually exhibit two striking characteristics. First, there is a widely-shared conviction as to the proper solution of the problem at issue. But, secondly, this conviction cannot be justified and elaborated. A certain general answer to the difficulty is felt to be correct. But this answer cannot be made logically and empirically reasonable. So inquiry, deprived of any basic doctrine that can give it impetus and direction, dwells morbidly upon (...) the same questions: it digs its foundation deeper and deeper, but it seems never to feel sufficiently secure to start work on a super-structure. The terms in which the problem is conceived are, by continuing analysis, rendered ever more subtle; but the hypotheses that might satisfy the conditions posed by the problem, though everywhere implied and frequently adumbrated, are never systematically developed. (shrink)

We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution.

Duncan Pritchard (2008, 2009, 2010, forthcoming) has argued for an elegant solution to what have been called the value problems for knowledge at the forefront of recent literature on epistemic value. As Pritchard sees it, these problems dissolve once it is recognized that that it is understanding-why, not knowledge, that bears the distinctive epistemic value often (mistakenly) attributed to knowledge. A key element of Pritchard’s revisionist argument is the claim that understanding-why always involves what he calls strong (...) cognitive achievement—viz., cognitive achievement that consists always in either (i) the overcoming of a significant obstacle or (ii) the exercise of a significant level of cognitive ability. After outlining Pritchard’s argument, we show (contra Pritchard) that understanding-why does not essentially involve strong cognitive achievement. Interestingly, in the cases in which understanding-why is distinctively valuable, it is (we argue) only because there is sufficiently rich objectual understanding in the background. If that’s right, then a plausible revisionist solution to the value problems must be sensitive to different kinds of understanding and what makes them valuable, respectively. (shrink)

Stuart Russell defines the value alignment problem as follows: How can we build autonomous systems with values that “are aligned with those of the human race”? In this article I outline some distinctions that are useful for understanding the value alignment problem and then propose a solution: I argue that the methods currently applied by computer scientists for embedding moral values in autonomous systems can be improved by representing moral principles as conceptual spaces, i.e. as Voronoi (...) tessellations of morally similar choice situations located in a multidimensional geometric space. The advantage of my preferred geometric approach is that it can be implemented without specifying any utility function ex ante. (shrink)

The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. The problem arises for reliabilism in particular, i.e., the externalist view that knowledge amounts to reliably acquired true belief. Goldman and Olsson argue that knowledge, in this sense, is more valuable than mere true belief due to the higher likelihood of future true beliefs (produced by the same reliable process) in the case of knowledge. They maintain that (...) their solution works given four empirical assumptions, which they claim hold “normally.” However, they do not show that their assumptions are externalistically acceptable; nor do they provide detailed evidence for their normality claim. We address these remaining gaps in Goldman and Olsson’s solution in a constructive spirit. In particular, we suggest an externalist interpretation of the assumptions such that they essentially spell out what it means for a broad range of organisms capable of belief-like representations to be epistemically adapted to their environment. Our investigation also sheds light on the circumstances in which the assumptions fail to hold and knowledge therefore fails to have extra value in Goldman and Olsson’s sense. The upshot is a deeper understanding of their solution as a contribution to naturalized epistemology and a strengthened case for its empirical validity. (shrink)

In his article 'Rejection' (1996), Timothy Smiley had shown how a logical system allowing rules of rejection could provide a categorical axiomatization of the classical propositional calculus. This paper shows how rules of rejection, when placed in a multiple conclusion setting, can also provide categorical axiomatizations of a range of non-classical calculi which permit truth-value gaps, among them the calculus in Smiley's own 'Sense without denotation' (1960).

This article tackles one of the most burning issues discussed by adherents of the dynamically developing movement in ethics which bears on political and legal philosophy, that is value-pluralism. In particular, the article is devoted to an investigation into the highly controversial issue of the relationship between pluralism and liberalism, based upon the three crucial, divergent approaches represented by Isaiah Berlin and his two main opponents, John Gray and George Crowder. The analysis leads to the conclusion that the two (...) concepts in question are neither mutually exclusive nor logically connected, but actually overlapping, which signifies the existence of a loose, de facto connection between them. Such a final thesis proves to be consistent with the position of Isaiah Berlin, and contrary to the final statements endorsed by his critics, John Gray and George Crowder. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Signaling Games and Repeated Play The True Belief Game as a Signaling Game Nash Equilibria and ESS in the True‐Belief Signaling Game The Value of Knowledge Appendix Acknowledgments References.

The relationship between willingness to pay to reduce the probability of an adverse event and the degree of risk aversion is ambiguous. The ambiguity arises because paying for protection worsens the outcome in the event the adverse event occurs, which influences the expected marginal utility of wealth. Using the concept of downside risk aversion or prudence, we characterize the marginal WTP to reduce the probability of the adverse event as the product of WTP in the case of risk neutrality and (...) an adjustment factor. For the univariate case, the adjustment factor depends on risk aversion and prudence with respect to wealth. For the bivariate case, the adjustment factor depends on risk aversion and cross-prudence in wealth. (shrink)

Risk is inherent to many, if not all, transformative decisions. The risk of regret, of turning into a person you presently consider to be morally objectionable, or of value change are all risks of choosing to transform. This aspect of transformative decision-making has thus far been ignored, but carries important consequences to those wishing to defend decision theory from the challenge posed by transformative decision-making. I contend that a problem lies in a common method used to cardinalise utilities (...) – the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM) method – which measures an agent's utility function over sure outcomes. I argue that the risks involved in transformative experiences are constitutively valuable, and hence their value cannot be accurately measured by the vNM method. In Section 1, I outline what transformative experiences are and the problem they pose to decision theory. In Section 2, I outline Pettigrew's (2019, Choosing for Changing Selves) decision-theoretic response, and in Section 3, I present the case for thinking that risks can carry value. In Section 4, I argue for the claim that at least some transformative experiences involve constitutive risk. I argue that this causes a problem for decision-theoretic responses within the vNM framework in Section 5. (shrink)

This paper tries to clarify the logical structure of the relationship between labor values and prices from an axiomatic perspective. The famous “transformation problem” is interpreted as an impossibility result for a specific interpretation of value theory based on specific assumptions and definitions. A comprehensive review of recent literature is provided, which shows that there are various theoretically relevant and logically consistent alternative interpretations based on different assumptions and definitions.

After sketching my own solution to the Value of Knowledge Problem, which argues for a deontological understanding of justification and understands the value of knowing interesting propositions by the value we place on believing as we ought to believe, I discuss Alvin Goldman's and Erik Olsson's recent attempts to explain the value of knowledge within the framework of their reliabilist epistemology.

This first part of this chapter presents the virtue-reliabilist answer to the classical value problems of knowledge. According to this solution, the reason why knowledge is a better cognitive state than what falls short of it —viz. mere true and true+Gettierized beliefs— is as follows: when a subject knows, she deserves credit for her true belief. The second part of this chapter is devoted to showing that this solution cannot be extended to solve the " new " value (...) problem, that is to say, the problem of explaining why some higher form of knowledge — what Sosa calls full knowledge— is better than some lower form of knowledge, viz. Sosa's animal knowledge. The basic problem for Sosa is that, when a subject fully knows, it is not necessarily the case that she deserves more credit than when she merely has animal knowledge. (shrink)

Non-classical science gives a very specific answer to the question of scientific errors and their epistemological value. But for all the specificity of this answer, it casts light on a problem that remains with us century after century, the historically constant problem of truth and error—one of the most fundamental problems of knowledge. At first sight, these two poles have always stood opposite each other, like good and evil, beauty and ugliness. But moral and aesthetic theories have (...) long since left behind this initial conception, and shown that the two polar concepts are in fact inseparable. As regards truth and error, their indivisibility has only become apparent in the context of non-classical science. Truth has ceased to be the absolute contradiction of error. Contemporary science finds it to be something relative, inseparable from its opposite pole. But the non-classical, retrospective approach, a re-evaluation of the past of science in the light of its present, and indeed even more in the light of its prognosis, its future, allows one to see that scientific truths that are adequate for the object of knowledge always reflect only one side of the objective world, a world which has an infinite number of sides. The irreversible process that leads from relative error to relative truth has an absolute character: an irreversible process of generalization, concretization and complication of a Weltanschauung that more accurately reflects the infinite complexity of life. (shrink)

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than (...) knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem. (shrink)

According to the achievement account of the value of knowledge, knowledge is finally valuable because it is a species of a finally valuable genus, achievement. The achievement account is said to solve Pritchard's tertiary value problem, the problem of showing that knowledge enjoys a different kind of value than mere true belief. This paper argues, first, that AA fails to solve TVP, and, second, that Pritchard's motivations for TVP are inadequate. They do, however, motivate a (...) weaker value problem, one that can be solved by showing that knowledge is weakly superior to mere true belief. Finally, third, we argue that knowledge does enjoy this form of weak superiority. Since this argument rests on AA's key species-genus claim, AA can retain the upper hand in the debate. (shrink)

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than (...) knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem. (shrink)

Population ageing is a fact of all advanced economies. Fewer people are born all the while current members live longer. The support which old people have come to depend on, for example through elderly care and pensions, thus becomes increasingly expensive. This accentuates an assurance problem. Although it has been and still is the case that the young are willing to support the currently old, this support is not unconditional. In return they trust that coming generations will support them (...) one day. Historically pro-old welfare state institutions (e.g., pension systems) have offered individuals this assurance: their claim on future generation to support them has been credible simply by positive economic and demographic development. Economic growth has been a blessing for the cooperation between generations necessary to realise old age support. This paper describes this assurance problem in simple game theoretical terms, argues that it has been neglected in historically prominent justifications of pro-old welfare state institutions, and discusses what can be done to preserve trust in times of population ageing and weak economic growth. (shrink)

The value problem in epistemology is rooted in a commonsense intuition to the effect that knowledge is more valuable than true belief. Call this the “guiding intuition.” The guiding intuition generates a problem in light of two additional considerations. The first is that knowledge is (roughly) justified or warranted true belief.[1] The second is that on certain popular accounts of justification or warrant (e.g. reliabilism), its value is apparently instrumental to and hence derivative from the (...) class='Hi'>value of true belief.[2] But if knowledge is justified true belief and the value of justification is derivative from that of true belief, how is it that knowledge is more valuable than true belief? (shrink)

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than (...) knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem. (shrink)

Whereas most previous and later discussions of Marx’s transformation of values into prices of production have focused on his mathematical procedure, Henryk Grossman addressed the logic of its place in the structure ofCapital. On this basis he criticised underconsumptionist and disproportionality theorists of economic crises for inappropriately basing their accounts on the level of analysis of the value schemas in the second volume ofCapital. Such a criticism cannot be made of Grossman’s and Marx’s explanation of systemic crises in terms (...) of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Grossman’s article still provides insights into Marx’s analysis of capitalism and his theory of economic crises, unsurpassed in the subsequent literature. (shrink)

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than (...) knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem. (shrink)

The value of knowledge has always been a central topic within epistemology. Going all the way back to Plato’s Meno, philosophers have asked, why is knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? Interest in this question has grown in recent years, with theorists proposing a range of answers. But some reject the premise of the question and claim that the value of knowledge is ‘swamped’ by the value of true belief. And others argue that statuses other than (...) knowledge, such as justification or understanding, are distinctively valuable. We will call the general question of why knowledge is valuable the value problem. (shrink)