Partial functions can be easily represented in set theory as certain sets of ordered pairs. However, classical set theory provides no special machinery for reasoning about partial functions. For instance, there is no direct way of handling the application of a function to an argument outside its domain as in partial logic. There is also no utilization of lambda-notation and sorts or types as in type theory. This paper introduces a version of von-Neumann-Bernays-Gödel set theory for (...) reasoning about sets, proper classes, and partial functions represented as classes of ordered pairs. The underlying logic of the system is a partial first-order logic, so class-valued terms may be nondenoting. Functions can be specified using lambda-notation, and reasoning about the application of functions to arguments is facilitated using sorts similar to those employed in the logic of the IMPS Interactive Mathematical Proof System. The set theory is intended to serve as a foundation for mechanized mathematics systems. (shrink)

Set theory is the branch of mathematics concerned with the general properties of aggregates of points, numbers, or arbitrary elements. It was created in the late nineteenth century, mainly by Georg Cantor. After the discovery of certain contradictions euphemistically called paradoxes, it was reduced to axiomatic form in the early twentieth century, mainly by Ernst Zermelo and Abraham Fraenkel. Thereafter it became widely accepted as a framework ‐ or ‘foundation’ ‐ for the development of the other branches of modern, (...) abstract mathematics. Today, its basic notions and notations are widely used even outside mathematics proper. (shrink)

In this contribution, I explore the possibility of characterizing the emergence of time in causal set theory (CST) in terms of the growing block universe (GBU) metaphysics. I show that although GBU seems to be the most intuitive time metaphysics for CST, it leaves us with a number of interpretation problems, independently of which dynamics we choose to favor for the theory —here I shall consider the Classical Sequential Growth and the Covariant model. Discrete general covariance of the (...) CSG dynamics does not allow us to individuate a single history of the universe (defined by a causal history of different causal sets), thereby making the claim that ‘the past exists’ at best problematic. In addition, because the evolution of the universe in CSG dynamics leads to an outward branching causal tree, it becomes impossible to determine a proper ‘line of becoming’, thereby blurring the presentists’ claim that only the present exists. Similarly, the covariant approach runs into the same, if not even more severe problems, since each configuration of the universe would amount to a set of possible causal sets, thereby making the individuation of a single configuration of the universe —and thus the physical interpretation of the theory— implausible. (shrink)

Michael Potter presents a comprehensive new philosophical introduction to set theory. Anyone wishing to work on the logical foundations of mathematics must understand set theory, which lies at its heart. Potter offers a thorough account of cardinal and ordinal arithmetic, and the various axiom candidates. He discusses in detail the project of set-theoretic reduction, which aims to interpret the rest of mathematics in terms of set theory. The key question here is how to deal with the paradoxes (...) that bedevil set theory. Potter offers a strikingly simple version of the most widely accepted response to the paradoxes, which classifies sets by means of a hierarchy of levels. What makes the book unique is that it interweaves a careful presentation of the technical material with a penetrating philosophical critique. Potter does not merely expound the theory dogmatically but at every stage discusses in detail the reasons that can be offered for believing it to be true. Set Theory and its Philosophy is a key text for philosophy, mathematical logic, and computer science. (shrink)

Consistent with Barbey & Sloman (B&S), it is proposed that performance on Bayesian inference tasks is well explained by nested sets theory (NST). However, contrary to those authors' view, it is proposed that NST does better by dispelling with dual-systems assumptions. This article examines why, and sketches out a series of NST's core principles, which were not previously defined.

It is well known that number theory can be interpreted in the usual set theories, e.g. ZF, NF and their extensions. The problem I posed for myself was to see if, conversely, a reasonably strong set theory could be interpreted in number theory. The reason I am interested in this problem is, simply, that number theory is more basic or more concrete than set theory, and hence a more concrete foundation for mathematics. A partial solution (...) to the problem was accomplished by WTN in [2], where it was shown that a predicative set theory could be interpreted in a natural extension of pure number theory, PN, (i.e. classical first-order Peano Arithmetic). In this paper, we go a step further by showing that a reasonably strong fragment of predicative set theory can be interpreted in PN itself. We then make an attempt to show how to develop predicative fragments of mathematics in PN.If one wishes to know what is meant by reasonably strong and fragment please read on. (shrink)

This paper explores agenda-setting theory within digital media. It aims to evaluate changes in these paradigms due to digital platforms and their impact on mass communication theories. The discussion includes a historical overview of agenda-setting theory, grounded in foundational works and expanded by contemporary insights on user agency and information dissemination in the digital age. Using qualitative methods, the study incorporates thematic analysis, content analysis, and interviews with media professionals and users to collect comprehensive data. Key findings indicate (...) that the traditional linear flow of information from media to the public has shifted to a multidirectional exchange influenced by user-generated content and social media dynamics. The study emphasizes the need for scholars to adapt traditional media theories to the participatory nature of modern platforms. This research enhances understanding of current media ecosystems and lays the groundwork for future studies on media influence in complex digital environments. (shrink)

This paper offers an explanation of the maj or traditions in the logical treatment of definite descriptions as reactions to paradoxical naive definite descriptiontheory. The explanation closely parallels that of various set theories as reactions to paradoxical naive set theory. Indeed, naive set theory is derivable from naive definite description theory given an appropriate definition of set abstracts in terms of definite descriptions.

Consider a variant of the usual story about the iterative conception of sets. As usual, at every stage, you find all the (bland) sets of objects which you found earlier. But you also find the result of tapping any earlier-found object with any magic wand (from a given stock of magic wands). -/- By varying the number and behaviour of the wands, we can flesh out this idea in many different ways. This paper's main Theorem is that any loosely constructive (...) way of fleshing out this idea is synonymous with a ZF-like theory. -/- This Theorem has rich applications; it realizes John Conway's (1976) Mathematicians' Liberation Movement; and it connects with a lovely idea due to Alonzo Church (1974). (shrink)

In this paper we review the most common forms of reflection and introduce a new form which we call sharp‐generated reflection. We argue that sharp‐generated reflection is the strongest form of reflection which can be regarded as a natural generalization of the Lévy reflection theorem. As an application we formulate the principle sharp‐maximality with the corresponding hypothesis. The statement is an analogue of the (Inner Model Hypothesis, introduced in ) which is compatible with the existence of large cardinals.

A frege-Russell cardinal number is a maximal class of equinumerous classes. Since anything can be numbered, A frege-Russell cardinal should contain classes whose members are cardinal numbers. This is not possible in standard set theories, Since it entails that some classes are members of members of themselves. However, A consistent set theory can be constructed in which such membership circles are allowed and in which, Consequently, Genuine frege-Russell cardinals can be defined.

This dissertation aims to provide a comprehensive account of set theory with urelements. In Chapter 1, I present mathematical and philosophical motivations for studying urelement set theory and lay out the necessary technical preliminaries. Chapter 2 is devoted to the axiomatization of urelement set theory, where I introduce a hierarchy of axioms and discuss how ZFC with urelements should be axiomatized. The breakdown of this hierarchy of axioms in the absence of the Axiom of Choice is also (...) explored. In Chapter 3, I investigate forcing with urelements and develop a new approach that addresses a drawback of the existing machinery. I demonstrate that forcing can preserve, destroy, and recover the axioms isolated in Chapter 2 and discuss how Boolean ultrapowers can be applied in urelement set theory. Chapter 4 delves into class theory with urelements. I first discuss the issue of axiomatizing urelement class theory and then explore the second-order reflection principle with urelements. In particular, assuming large cardinals, I construct a model of second-order reflection where the principle of limitation of size fails. (shrink)

The paper introduces and utilizes a few new concepts: “nonstandard Peano arithmetic”, “complementary Peano arithmetic”, “Hilbert arithmetic”. They identify the foundations of both mathematics and physics demonstrating the equivalence of the newly introduced Hilbert arithmetic and the separable complex Hilbert space of quantum mechanics in turn underlying physics and all the world. That new both mathematical and physical ground can be recognized as information complemented and generalized by quantum information. A few fundamental mathematical problems of the present such as Fermat’s (...) last theorem, four-color theorem as well as its new-formulated generalization as “four-letter theorem”, Poincaré’s conjecture, “P vs NP” are considered over again, from and within the new-founding conceptual reference frame of information, as illustrations. Simple or crucially simplifying solutions and proofs are demonstrated. The link between the consistent completeness of the system mathematics-physics on the ground of information and all the great mathematical problems of the present (rather than the enumerated ones) is suggested. (shrink)

This two-volume work bridges the gap between introductory expositions of logic or set theory on one hand, and the research literature on the other. It can be used as a text in an advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate course in mathematics, computer science, or philosophy. The volumes are written in a user-friendly conversational lecture style that makes them equally effective for self-study or class use. Volume II, on formal (ZFC) set theory, incorporates a self-contained 'chapter 0' on proof (...) techniques so that it is based on formal logic, in the style of Bourbaki. The emphasis on basic techniques will provide the reader with a solid foundation in set theory and provides a context for the presentation of advanced topics such as absoluteness, relative consistency results, two expositions of Godel's constructible universe, numerous ways of viewing recursion, and a chapter on Cohen forcing. (shrink)

In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways. One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or (...) that neither is. If there is reason to accept the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front. (shrink)

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important particular case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In (...) defense of this claim, I offer evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences. (shrink)

This is an introduction to set theory and logic that starts completely from scratch. The text is accompanied by many methodological remarks and explanations.

This exploration of a notorious mathematical problem is the work of the man who discovered the solution. Written by an award-winning professor at Stanford University, it employs intuitive explanations as well as detailed mathematical proofs in a self-contained treatment. This unique text and reference is suitable for students and professionals. 1966 edition. Copyright renewed 1994.

We investigate the interactions of formula complexity in weak set theories with the axioms available there. In particular, we show that swapping bounded and unbounded quantification preserves formula complexity in presence of the axiom of foundation weakened to an arbitrary set base, while it does not if the axiom of foundation is further weakened to a proper class base. More attention is being paid to the necessary axioms employed in the positive results, than to the combinatorial strength of the positive (...) results themselves. (shrink)

Foundations of Set Theory discusses the reconstruction undergone by set theory in the hands of Brouwer, Russell, and Zermelo. Only in the axiomatic foundations, however, have there been such extensive, almost revolutionary, developments. This book tries to avoid a detailed discussion of those topics which would have required heavy technical machinery, while describing the major results obtained in their treatment if these results could be stated in relatively non-technical terms. This book comprises five chapters and begins with a (...) discussion of the antinomies that led to the reconstruction of set theory as it was known before. It then moves to the axiomatic foundations of set theory, including a discussion of the basic notions of equality and extensionality and axioms of comprehension and infinity. The next chapters discuss type-theoretical approaches, including the ideal calculus, the theory of types, and Quine's mathematical logic and new foundations; intuitionistic conceptions of mathematics and its constructive character; and metamathematical and semantical approaches, such as the Hilbert program. This book will be of interest to mathematicians, logicians, and statisticians. (shrink)

Instead of the half-century old foundational feud between set theory and category theory, this paper argues that they are theories about two different complementary types of universals. The set-theoretic antinomies forced naïve set theory to be reformulated using some iterative notion of a set so that a set would always have higher type or rank than its members. Then the universal u F = {x | F(x)} for a property F(.) could never be self-predicative in the sense (...) of uF ∈ uF. But the mathematical theory of categories, dating from the mid-twentieth century, includes a theory of always-self-predicative universals – which can be seen as forming the “other bookend” to the never-self-predicative universals of set theory. The self-predicative universals of category theory show that the problem in the antinomies was not self-predication per se, but negated self-predication. They also provide a model (in the Platonic Heaven of mathematics) for the self-predicative strand of Plato’s Theory of Forms as well as for the idea of a “concrete universal” in Hegel and similar ideas of paradigmatic exemplars in ordinary thought. (shrink)

This article presents an overview of the basic philosophical motivations for, and some recent work in, modal set theory.

Quasi-set theory by S. French and D. Krause has been so far the most promising attempt of a formal theory of non-individuals. However, due to its sharp bivalent truth valuations, maximally fine-grained binary relations are readily found, in which members of equivalence classes are substitutable for each other in formulas salva veritate. Hence its mentioning and non-mentioning of individuals differs from existing set theory with defined identity merely by the range of nominal definitions. On a semantic level, (...) quasi-set theory does not provide an interpretation with explanatory power of its language terms as non-individuals, and it is not easy to see how such an interpretation can be set up. (shrink)

In quantum logic, introduced by Birkhoff and von Neumann, De Morgan's Laws play an important role in the projection-valued truth value assignment of observational propositions in quantum mechanics. Takeuti's quantum set theory extends this assignment to all the set-theoretical statements on the universe of quantum sets. However, Takeuti's quantum set theory has a problem in that De Morgan's Laws do not hold between universal and existential bounded quantifiers. Here, we solve this problem by introducing a new truth value (...) assignment for bounded quantifiers that satisfies De Morgan's Laws. To justify the new assignment, we prove the Transfer Principle, showing that this assignment of a truth value to every bounded ZFC theorem has a lower bound determined by the commutator, a projection-valued degree of commutativity, of constants in the formula. We study the most general class of truth value assignments and obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for them to satisfy the Transfer Principle, to satisfy De Morgan's Laws, and to satisfy both. For the class of assignments with polynomially definable logical operations, we determine exactly 36 assignments that satisfy the Transfer Principle and exactly 6 assignments that satisfy both the Transfer Principle and De Morgan's Laws. (shrink)

The author's central thesis is that a knowledge of set theory can be put to good use by the linguist interested in the syntax of natural languages. The author first points out the role of set theory in formal science, and then gives a short summary of some of the more important ideas. He then develops certain relations in set theory which are of special importance in the study of languages. A fair number of examples—admittedly in rather (...) trivial form—which occur in the study of language are exhibited to show some of the applications in mind. The last few pages are devoted to a review of how his thesis has fared. Although it may seem obvious to some that set theory is the means par excellence for the formal study of any discipline, many linguists apparently do not yet see this; this book will go some way toward demonstrating this.—P. J. M. (shrink)

We consider the foundational relation between arithmetic and set theory. Our goal is to criticize the construction of standard arithmetic models as providing grounds for arithmetic truth (even in a relative sense). Our method is to emphasize the incomplete picture of both theories and treat models as their syntactical counterparts. Insisting on the incomplete picture will allow us to argue in favor of the revisability of the standard model interpretation. We then show that it is hopeless to expect that (...) the relative grounding provided by a standard interpretation can resist being revisable. We start briefly characterizing the expansion of arithmetic `truth' provided by the interpretation in a set theory. Further, we show that, for every well-founded interpretation of recursive extensions of PA in extensions of ZF, the interpreted version of arithmetic has more theorems than the original. This theorem expansion is not complete however. We continue by defining the coordination problem. The problem can be summarized as follows. We consider two independent communities of mathematicians responsible for deciding over new axioms for ZF and PA. How likely are they to be coordinated regarding PA’s interpretation in ZF? We prove that it is possible to have extensions of PA not interpretable in a given set theory ST. We further show that the probability of a random extension of arithmetic being interpretable in ST is zero. (shrink)

If a˜cardinal κ1, regular in the ground model M, is collapsed in the extension N to a˜cardinal κ0 and its new cofinality, ρ, is less than κ0, then, under some additional assumptions, each cardinal λ>κ1 less than cc/[κ1]<κ1) is collapsed to κ0 as well. If in addition N=M[f], where f : ρ→κ1 is an unbounded mapping, then N is a˜λ=κ0-minimal extension. This and similar results are applied to generalized forcing notions of Bukovský and Namba.