In this paper we will show that for every cutIof any countable nonstandard model$\mathcal {M}$of$\mathrm {I}\Sigma _{1}$, eachI-small$\Sigma _{1}$-elementary submodel of$\mathcal {M}$is of the form of the set of fixed points of some proper initial self-embedding of$\mathcal {M}$iffIis a strong cut of$\mathcal {M}$. Especially, this feature will provide us with some equivalent conditions with the strongness of the standard cut in a given countable model$\mathcal {M}$of$ \mathrm {I}\Sigma _{1} $. In addition, we will find some criteria for extendability (...) of initial self-embeddings of countable nonstandard models of$ \mathrm {I}\Sigma _{1} $to larger models. (shrink)

The Dushnik–Miller Theorem states that every infinite countable linear ordering has a nontrivial self-embedding. We examine computability-theoretical aspects of this classical theorem.

We divide the class of infinite computable trees into three types. For the first and second types, 0' computes a nontrivial self-embedding while for the third type 0'' computes a nontrivial self-embedding. These results are optimal and we obtain partial results concerning the complexity of nontrivial self-embeddings of infinite computable trees considered up to isomorphism. We show that every infinite computable tree must have either an infinite computable chain or an infinite Π01 antichain. This result (...) is optimal and has connections to the program of reverse mathematics. (shrink)

By a classical theorem of Harvey Friedman, every countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of a sufficiently strong fragment of ZF has a proper rank-initial self-embedding j, i.e., j is a self-embedding of $\mathcal {M}$ such that $j[\mathcal {M}]\subsetneq \mathcal {M}$, and the ordinal rank of each member of $j[\mathcal {M}]$ is less than the ordinal rank of each element of $\mathcal {M}\setminus j[\mathcal {M}]$. Here, we investigate the larger family of proper initial-embeddings j of models $\mathcal (...) {M}$ of fragments of set theory, where the image of j is a transitive submodel of $\mathcal {M}$. Our results include the following three theorems. In what follows, $\mathrm {ZF}^-$ is $\mathrm {ZF}$ without the power set axiom; $\mathrm {WO}$ is the axiom stating that every set can be well-ordered; $\mathrm {WF}$ is the well-founded part of $\mathcal {M}$ ; and $\Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $ is the full scheme of dependent choice of length $\alpha $.Theorem A.There is an $\omega $ -standard countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^-+\mathrm {WO}$ that carries no initial self-embedding $j:\mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ other than the identity embedding.Theorem B.Every countable $\omega $ -nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\ \mathrm {ZF}$ is isomorphic to a transitive submodel of the hereditarily countable sets of its own constructible universe $L^{\mathcal {M}}$.Theorem C.The following three conditions are equivalent for a countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {ZF}^{-}+\mathrm {WO}+\forall \alpha \ \Pi ^1_\infty \text{-}\mathrm {DC}_\alpha $. There is a cardinal in $\mathcal {M}$ that is a strict upper bound for the cardinality of each member of $\mathrm {WF}$. $\mathrm {WF}$ satisfies the powerset axiom.For all $n \in \omega $ and for all $b \in M$, there exists a proper initial self-embedding $j: \mathcal {M} \longrightarrow \mathcal {M}$ such that $b \in \mathrm {rng}$ and $j[\mathcal {M}] \prec _n \mathcal {M}$. (shrink)

We solve a longstanding question of Rosenstein, and make progress toward solving a longstanding open problem in the area of computable linear orderings by showing that every computable ƞ-like linear ordering without an infinite strongly ƞ-like interval has a computable copy without nontrivial computable self-embedding. The precise characterization of those computable linear orderings which have computable copies without nontrivial computable self-embedding remains open.

Every transformation monoid comes equipped with a canonical topology, the topology of pointwise convergence. For some structures, the topology of the endomorphism monoid can be reconstructed from its underlying abstract monoid. This phenomenon is called automatic homeomorphicity. In this paper we show that whenever the automorphism group of a countable saturated structure has automatic homeomorphicity and a trivial center, then the monoid of elementary self-embeddings has automatic homeomorphicity, too. As a second result we strengthen a result by Lascar by (...) showing that whenever \ is a countable \-categorical G-finite structure whose automorphism group has a trivial center and if \ is any other countable structure, then every isomorphism between the monoids of elementary self-embeddings is a homeomorphism. (shrink)

You can come to know that you believe that p partly by reflecting on whether p and then judging that p. Call this procedure “the transparency method for belief.” How exactly does the transparency method generate known self-attributions of belief? To answer that question, we cannot interpret the transparency method as involving a transition between the contents p and I believe that p. It is hard to see how some such transition could be warranted. Instead, in this context, one (...) mental action is both a judgment that p and a self-attribution of a belief that p. The notion of embedded mental action is introduced here to explain how this can be so and to provide a full epistemic explanation of the transparency method. That explanation makes sense of first-person authority and immediacy in transparent self-knowledge. In generalized form, it gives sufficient conditions on an attitude’s being known transparently. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the concept of a self-aware agent. In cognitive science agents are seen as embodied and interactively situated in worlds. We analyse the meanings attached to these terms in cognitive science and robotics, proposing a set of conditions for situatedness and embodiment, and examine the claim that internal representational schemas are largely unnecessary for intelligent behaviour in animats. We maintain that current situated and embodied animats cannot be ascribed even minimal self-awareness, and offer a (...) six point definition of embeddedness, constituting minimal conditions for the evolution of a sense of self. This leads to further analysis of the nature of embodiment and situatedness, and a consideration of whether virtual animats in virtual worlds could count as situated and embodied. We propose that self-aware agents must possess complex structures of self-directed goals; multi-modal sensory systems and a rich repertoire of interactions with their worlds. Finally, we argue that embedded agents will possess or evolve local co-ordinate systems, or points of view, relative to their current positions in space and time, and have a capacity to develop an egocentric space. None of these capabilities are possible without powerful internal representational capacities. (shrink)

Online social networking has deeply penetrated university campuses, influencing multiple aspects of student life. Standing from a pedagogical perspective, this study investigates how university students’ OSN engagement affect their learning outcomes. Drawn upon social learning theory, this study proposes that OSN engagement help university students’ establishing the self-efficacy belief, achieving social acceptance and acculturation with environment, and these attributions further lead them to attain positive learning outcomes which are shaped by self-esteem development, satisfaction with university life, and the (...) grade point average based performance. Results from a survey accompanied by focus group discussions support these embedded self-conceptualization and social learning in OSN. This study contributes to the extant research on OSN for learning by highlighting the role of OSN for the whole person development, especially the students’ self-conceptulization and psychological well-beings. The revealed mediating mechanisms also adds values to social learning theory and imply the design foci of e-learning activities and applications. (shrink)

First published in 1996, _The Embedded Self_ was lauded as "a brilliant and long overdue rapprochement between psychoanalysis and family therapy conceived by a practitioner trained and experienced in both modalities of treatment." Mary-Joan Gerson’s integrated presentation of psychodynamic and family systems theory invited therapists of either orientation to learn the tools and techniques of the other, to mutual benefit. Firmly grounded in detailed case presentations, her focus on family therapy examined its history, organizing concepts, and developmental approaches, and addressed (...) practical questions of diagnosis, clinical interaction, and referrals. A dozen years later, the psychoanalytic community is more open to integrating perspectives, and the growth of analysts working with couples and families necessitates an update of the material presented in _The Embedded Self_. Similarly, the family therapy community has deepened its interest in individual dynamics within systemic patterning. From a new and revised perspective on the possibilities of integration, Gerson covers the latest research in neuroscience and the transmission of affect within intimate relationships, with a new chapter on attachment theory and emotionally focused therapy. Sections on narrative therapy and psychoanalytically-oriented family therapy are expanded as well. _The Embedded Self_ was a sterling introduction to family systems theory and therapy, and enhanced the work of analysts and family and couples therapists alike. The second edition proves no different in its context but wider in its scope, further enhancing the work of the family therapist interested in individual dynamics, and preparing the psychodynamically-oriented therapist who seeks to extend her craft from the dyad to the triad, and beyond. (shrink)

When we first anticipated the research project concluded with this special issue, about 8 years ago, it seemed timely and appropriate to investigate the opportunities and the challenges of self-management in mental health care. At the time self-management was well on the rise in general health care, offering both empowerment to patients and efficiency and cost-effectiveness to the health care system. It seemed a most promising approach in an era that celebrates individualistic self-reliance. And we were sure (...) about our insight that self-management in mental health care would deserve comprehensive investigation because “the self” that was supposed to do the management would itself be the core problem in psychiatric... (shrink)

Queen Anne is dead, and it is a fallacy to substitute a definite description for another designator of the same object in stating the content of someone’s propositional attitudes. The fallacy can take subtle forms, as when Godel’s incompleteness theorems are used to argue against mechanistic views of mind. Some instances of the fallacy exemplify a more general logical phenomenon: the set of principles satisfied by one sentential operator can differ from, and even contradict, the set of principles satisfied by (...) another sentential operator coextensive with the first. These notions will be formally defined. The phenomenon will be explored through a series of example, with particular attention to the misapplication of Godel’s results. (shrink)

With this article, I seek to examine Krause’s analysis of the self in Analitische Philosophie, and in particular in Vorlesungen über die Psychische Anthropologie. But I do so through the texts that the Spanish Krausists devoted either to translating or to discussing and disseminating Krause’s ideas in dialogue with the philosophies of the time. In my exposition and examination of the doctrine of the self, I focus on its embedding in a particular existence through embodiment, and argue (...) that these are aspects with which Krausism can still illuminate the debate about human subjectivity. (shrink)

In recent years, political theorists have come to recognize the central role of affect in social and political life. A host of scholars, coming from a number of distinct traditions, have variously drawn our attention to the importance of the emotions to the tradition of the history of political thought, as well as to normative political theory. This attentiveness to affect is often cast as a break with earlier, Enlightenment-inspired liberal approaches towards politics, approaches that marginalized the emotions, dismissing the (...) passions as potentially dangerous, or neglected them altogether. According to the conventional liberal view, emotions are said to have no place in the public sphere, while proceduralist institutions abstract away from citizens’ affective attachments, now cast as private preferences of individuals qua citizens. In this paper we challenge this prevalent view. We argue that no less a liberal theorist than John Rawls is deeply attentive to the place of emotions in his account of liberalism. This may seem counterintuitive given that Rawls' work has been frequently criticized for epitomizing some of the deepest problems of contemporary liberal theory, as a result of the emphasis on rationalism and reasonableness in his account of liberal justice. However, against this prevalent reading, we demonstrate that Rawls is in fact highly concerned with the role of affect and presents us with an account of the embedded liberal subject. By drawing out these dimensions of Rawls' thought, we hope to contribute to upending the conventional view of liberalism as affect-blind in order to encourage a more nuanced reading of the liberal tradition. (shrink)

Concrete is one of the most intelligent and widely utilized man-made materials in the construction industry. Despite this, even high-quality concrete is susceptible to porosity, which reduces its serviceability period. Furthermore, there is an increasing need to increase longevity due to environmental exposure such as soil moisture, corrosive outside elements, or structural defects forming in the surface of concrete. The use of crystalline admixtures in concrete is one of the many approaches to reducing these risks. When crystalline admixtures come into (...) contact with water, they form thin crystals that fill pores, capillaries, and micro fractures, as a result making concrete a self-sealing material. When the concrete has dried, the crystalline particles remain dormant until they come into contact with additional water, which causes them to crystallize once more. This research aims to analyze and compare the material properties of commonly used concrete and concrete where crystalline waterproofing is present. Furthermore, experiments are conducted to evaluate each of the concrete samples: compressive strength, water permeability, and flexure strength. As a result, demonstrating the benefits or negative aspects of the use of crystalline admixture in the early stages of concrete is important. It is not yet defined, whether this is the future of cutting-edge concrete and the impact that it will have in the Albanian building market. (shrink)

Society as the ethical starting point for political inquiry -- The moral relevance of dependence -- Nature and the moral frame of society -- Morality in the order of the will.

Society as the ethical starting point for political inquiry -- The moral relevance of dependence -- Nature and the moral frame of society -- Morality in the order of the will.

The particular design of any technology may have profound social implications. Computing technologies are deeply intermeshed with the activities of daily life, playing an ever more central role in how we work, learn, communicate, socialize, and participate in government. Despite the many ways they have improved life, they cannot be regarded as unambiguously beneficial or even value-neutral. Recent experience shows they can lead to unintended but harmful consequences. Some technologies are thought to threaten democracy through the spread of propaganda on (...) online social networks, or to threaten privacy through the aggregation of datasets that include increasingly personal information, or to threaten justice when machine learning is used in such high-stakes, decision-making contexts as loan application reviews, employment procedures, or parole hearings. It is insufficient to ethically assess technology after it has produced negative social impacts, as has happened, for example, with facial recognition software that discriminates against people of color and with self-driving cars that are unable to cope with pedestrians who jay-walk. Developers of new technologies should aim to identify potential harmful consequences early in the design process and take steps to eliminate or mitigate them. This task is not easy. Designers will often have to negotiate among competing values—for instance, between efficiency and accessibility for a diverse user population, or between maximizing benefits and avoiding harm. There is no simple recipe for identifying and solving ethical problems. -/- Computer science education can help meet these challenges by making ethical reasoning about computing technologies a central element in the curriculum. Students can learn to think not only about what technology they could create, but also whether they should create that technology. Learning to reason this way requires courses unlike those currently standard in computer science curricula. A range of university courses on topics in areas of computing, ethics, society and public policy are emerging to meet this need. Some cover computer science broadly, while others focus on specific problems like privacy and security; typically, these classes exist as stand-alone courses in the computer science curriculum. Others have integrated ethics into the teaching of introductory courses on programming, artificial intelligence, and human-computer interaction. (shrink)

In this new work, political theorist Michael J. Thompson argues that modern societies are witnessing a decline in one of the core building blocks of modernity: the autonomous self. Far from being an illusion of the Enlightenment, Thompson contends that the individual is a defining feature of the project to build a modern democratic culture and polity. One of the central reasons for its demise in recent decades has been the emergence of what he calls the cybernetic society, a (...) cohesive totalization of the social logics of the institutional spheres of economy, culture and polity. These logics have been progressively defined by the imperatives of economic growth and technical-administrative management of labor and consumption, routinizing patterns of life, practices, and consciousness throughout the culture. Evolving out of the neoliberal transformation of economy and society since the 1980s, the cybernetic society has transformed how that the individual is articulated in contemporary society. Thompson examines the various pathologies of the self and consciousness that result from this form of socialization--such as hyper-reification, alienated moral cognition, false consciousness, and the withered ego--in new ways to demonstrate the extent of deformation of modern selfhood. Only with a more robust, more socially embedded concept of autonomy as critical agency can we begin to reconstruct the principles of democratic individuality and community. (shrink)

The concept of negative liberty as non-interference is operative in the concept of a free market and stipulates that market relations remain outside the purview of social control. As a purported self-regulating system, however, the market functions as a system of necessity that facilitates and rules social life. I argue that Isaiah Berlin’s defense of negative liberty leads to a paradox as it entails subjection to the external necessity of a self-regulating market. The argument for the self-defeating (...) nature of negative liberty relies on two philosophical insights that have their roots in G. W. F. Hegel’s theory of self-determination. First, negative liberty fails to account for the inner and outer conditions of freedom and thus reduces to mere whim or arbitrariness, subject to heteronomous forces but masquerading as license. Second, individual freedom is intersubjectively mediated in its deliberative process and framed by social and political institutions in its exercise; thus, free agency must be theorized as embedded agency. I challenge the association of freedom and the market and the automatic and unchallenged implication of deregulation and freedom. Deregulation, rather, leaves the community’s future development to the whims of economic players using a rhetoric of freedom as both lure and principle. (shrink)

A theoretical development is carried to establish fundamental results about rank-initial embeddings and automorphisms of countable non-standard models of set theory, with a keen eye for their sets of fixed points. These results are then combined into a “geometric technique” used to prove several results about countable non-standard models of set theory. In particular, back-and-forth constructions are carried out to establish various generalizations and refinements of Friedman’s theorem on the existence of rank-initial embeddings between countable non-standard models of the fragment (...) \ + \-Separation of \; and Gaifman’s technique of iterated ultrapowers is employed to show that any countable model of \ can be elementarily rank-end-extended to models with well-behaved automorphisms whose sets of fixed points equal the original model. These theoretical developments are then utilized to prove various results relating self-embeddings, automorphisms, their sets of fixed points, strong rank-cuts, and set theories of different strengths. Two examples: The notion of “strong rank-cut” is characterized in terms of the theory \, and in terms of fixed-point sets of self-embeddings. (shrink)

1 INTIMACY Among Descartes's most and consequential achievements has been his of the mental as an independent ontological domain. By taking the mind as a substance, with cognitions as its modes, he accorded them a status as self-standing and determinate on their own, without essential regard to other entities. Only with this metaphysical conception in place, could the idea of solipsism-the idea of an intact ego existing with nothing else in the universe-so much as make sense. And behind that (...) engine have trailed the sorry boxcars of hyperbolic doubt. the mind-body problem, the problem of the external world, the problem of other minds, and so on. -/- Although the assumptions have been under fire, off and on. at least since Hegel-including with renewed intensity in recent years … the Cartesian separation that is still so pervasive as to be almost invisible. In particular, inter-relationist accounts retain a principled distinction between the mental and the corporeal-a distinction that is reflected in contrasts like semantics versus syntax, the space of reasons versus the space of causes, or the intentional versus the physical. (Notice that each of these contrasts can be heard either as higher versus lower’ level" or as inner versus outer 'sphere‘.) The contrary of this separation-or battery of separations-is not inter-relationist holism but something that I would like to call the intimacy of the mind's embodiment and embeddedness in the world. The term 'intimacy' is meant to suggest more than just necessary interrelation or interdependence but a kind of commingling or integralness of mind, body,and world-that is, to undermine their very distinctness. The challenge is as much to spell out what this could mean as to make a case for it. Indeed, no sooner does such a possibility seem intelligible at all, than ways bring out its plausibility and significance turn up everywhere. -/- There is little original in what follows. The strategy will be to bring some well known principles of systems analysis to bear on the mind- body-world 'system' in a way that refocuses questions of division and unity, and then to canvas a selection of investigations and proposals - some fairly recent, others not-in the light of this new focus. The hope is that these superficially disparate ideas, none of them new, will seem to converge around the theme of intimacy in a way that illuminates and supports them all. Sorting and and aligning issues in this manner has sometimes been discussed under titles like 'embedded computation’ and 'situated cognition'. (shrink)

This article aims to discuss conceptual levels of narrative representations of utterances based on reported speech frames employed in presidential speeches. It adopts some assumptions from Chilton’s Deictic Space Theory and Cap’s Proximisation Theory, both primarily used to indicate exclusive reference, a clash of interests and threat-oriented conceptualisation of events. This article, however, extends their scope to include strategies for inclusion and positive image construction and makes a distinction between primary, secondary and tertiary embedding as discursive means that contribute (...) to presentation of self and legitimisation. Data for this research comprise a corpus of 125 presidential speeches divided into three subcorpora: JKC – John Kennedy Corpus, BCC – Bill Clinton Corpus, and BOC – Barrack Obama Corpus. A total of 1251 instances of narrative reports have been analysed to investigate primary and multilevel embedding, which constitute the basis for this study. (shrink)

The existence of a plurality of communities, a diversity of norms, and the ultimate contingency of all decisions in modern societies complicates the task of academics and practitioners who wish to be ethical. In this paper, we envisage and articulate a dialogical, communitarian approach to embedding business ethics that requires business ethicists to more reflexively engage with practitioners in working on and representing the normative criteria that people in organisations use to deal with moral dilemmas in business. We promote (...) the idea that business ethicists should not only cross the divide between normative ethics and empirical research, but also take a step beyond the empirical to become more active change agents. As potential exemplars of this approach in practice, we explore how self-critique and cross-disciplinary collaboration in education and teaching might be used by academics to engage current and future business ethicists, as well as managers, in dialogic partnership. In an organisational context, we also propose a three-part approach to embedding reflexive ethics in practice, through dialogic research, debate, and re-presentation of ideas. We contend that our approach has more efficacy than the traditional grand theories of ethics or more focused theories of business ethics, such as Integrated Social Contract Theory; it has the potential to provide more grounded, and therefore more practical, advice to academics, current and future business ethicists, and business practitioners. (shrink)

We propose a simple notion of "extender" for coding large elementary embeddings of models of set theory. As an application we present a self-contained proof of the theorem by D. Martin and J. Steel that infinitely many Woodin cardinals imply the determinacy of every projective set.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Embedding Creativity in Teaching and LearningHoward Cannatella (bio)IntroductionCreative teaching ranges from the view that creativity is necessary for a changing knowledge economy to a more individualized view that encompasses a person-centered approach. None of these views are advanced in this essay, as I feel that there are important weaknesses in taking either position. Instead, my main purpose is to discuss how certain kinds of creative activity can substantially (...) transform educational practice without necessarily succumbing to any of the above conceptions of creativity. My educational approach to creative activity relates to one aspect of Alasdair Macintyre's, After Virtue; the notion that creativity only flourishes via a devotion to a particular practice.1 For such practice to flourish it has to immerse itself in a type of personal address that revolves and combines in various ways what Maurice Merleau-Ponty refers to as "self-others-things."2Any claim to suggest that education should engage creativity more than it currently does can stir some reasonable criticism, for there are clearly a plethora of other important factors to consider in student learning. Yet, to a degree, the practice of creativity is, I think, being dissipated and weakened, where ambivalence and ill-informed ideas are increasingly obscuring its place. My own thinking on this displacement which has some connections with John White's view and in a different sense with Howard Gardner's, is that if we offer via teaching situations geometrical puzzles, visual problem solving exercises and the like, such exercises although perhaps amusing in themselves are hardly taking up the same refined order of creative display exhibited by those most credited as being creatively talented.3 Indeed, to surmise that creativity is a construal of left hand side verses right hand side brain activity; that one can show different color cards on a monitor or play a short excerpt of Beethoven's Pastoral symphony in order to accelerate student learning are at the very least questionable creative assumptions. In [End Page 59] contrast, what I aim to show from one perspective as a crucial distinction is how creativity is involved in fundamental painstaking ways with the phenomenological. When the landscape of this kind of learning presupposes the opening of oneself to the world, the stretching of a mind, the thickening of one's perceptions, and the discovery of a deeper and richer self through living, one will tend to experience as life enhancing more of nature, previously unfelt and articulated modes of being in the world.Clearly, as a lecturer one has to inspire students. One of the best ways I know of doing this is through satisfying and intensifying students' creative appetite. Although I will not discuss it here there is some evidence to suggest that the need for creativity is biologically, physically, and psychologically an essential part of human nature, necessary for human-reproduction, growth, and cultural striving.4 The lecturer who fails to stimulate students' creativity, their being in the world, may be unwittingly inhibiting their cognitive, emotional, and physical well-being; preventing them from realizing their potential. Indeed, some learning problems can be attributed to the unconscious or deliberate stifling of creativity in student lives. We can see this happening when one feels emotionally or intellectually repressed, unable to express oneself openly, to take delight in what one has achieved, to note one's own unique sensitivity, and to experience personally the many wonders in the world. Although we may not articulate it, without a modicum of creative outlet, life can appear very cruel. Further, some of the benefits of creativity can be seen in studio teaching situations in which, as Charles Bingham and Alexander Sidorkin imply, the dynamics of aesthetic creativity encourage power-sharing and the fostering of non-dominated pedagogical relationships.5 As both Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller realized two centuries ago, creativity has the capacity to foster educationally a particular kind of freedom essential to sustaining an alert, liberal, and questioning mind.6 There is also much empirical evidence, at least in the arts, to show how creative practice can assist the clarification of ideas, advancement in thought, and concentration in learning. The notebooks, papers, and recordings of Mozart... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Embedding Creativity in Teaching and LearningHoward Cannatella (bio)IntroductionCreative teaching ranges from the view that creativity is necessary for a changing knowledge economy to a more individualized view that encompasses a person-centered approach. None of these views are advanced in this essay, as I feel that there are important weaknesses in taking either position. Instead, my main purpose is to discuss how certain kinds of creative activity can substantially (...) transform educational practice without necessarily succumbing to any of the above conceptions of creativity. My educational approach to creative activity relates to one aspect of Alasdair Macintyre's, After Virtue; the notion that creativity only flourishes via a devotion to a particular practice.1 For such practice to flourish it has to immerse itself in a type of personal address that revolves and combines in various ways what Maurice Merleau-Ponty refers to as "self-others-things."2Any claim to suggest that education should engage creativity more than it currently does can stir some reasonable criticism, for there are clearly a plethora of other important factors to consider in student learning. Yet, to a degree, the practice of creativity is, I think, being dissipated and weakened, where ambivalence and ill-informed ideas are increasingly obscuring its place. My own thinking on this displacement which has some connections with John White's view and in a different sense with Howard Gardner's, is that if we offer via teaching situations geometrical puzzles, visual problem solving exercises and the like, such exercises although perhaps amusing in themselves are hardly taking up the same refined order of creative display exhibited by those most credited as being creatively talented.3 Indeed, to surmise that creativity is a construal of left hand side verses right hand side brain activity; that one can show different color cards on a monitor or play a short excerpt of Beethoven's Pastoral symphony in order to accelerate student learning are at the very least questionable creative assumptions. In [End Page 59] contrast, what I aim to show from one perspective as a crucial distinction is how creativity is involved in fundamental painstaking ways with the phenomenological. When the landscape of this kind of learning presupposes the opening of oneself to the world, the stretching of a mind, the thickening of one's perceptions, and the discovery of a deeper and richer self through living, one will tend to experience as life enhancing more of nature, previously unfelt and articulated modes of being in the world.Clearly, as a lecturer one has to inspire students. One of the best ways I know of doing this is through satisfying and intensifying students' creative appetite. Although I will not discuss it here there is some evidence to suggest that the need for creativity is biologically, physically, and psychologically an essential part of human nature, necessary for human-reproduction, growth, and cultural striving.4 The lecturer who fails to stimulate students' creativity, their being in the world, may be unwittingly inhibiting their cognitive, emotional, and physical well-being; preventing them from realizing their potential. Indeed, some learning problems can be attributed to the unconscious or deliberate stifling of creativity in student lives. We can see this happening when one feels emotionally or intellectually repressed, unable to express oneself openly, to take delight in what one has achieved, to note one's own unique sensitivity, and to experience personally the many wonders in the world. Although we may not articulate it, without a modicum of creative outlet, life can appear very cruel. Further, some of the benefits of creativity can be seen in studio teaching situations in which, as Charles Bingham and Alexander Sidorkin imply, the dynamics of aesthetic creativity encourage power-sharing and the fostering of non-dominated pedagogical relationships.5 As both Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller realized two centuries ago, creativity has the capacity to foster educationally a particular kind of freedom essential to sustaining an alert, liberal, and questioning mind.6 There is also much empirical evidence, at least in the arts, to show how creative practice can assist the clarification of ideas, advancement in thought, and concentration in learning. The notebooks, papers, and recordings of Mozart... (shrink)

To measure non-cognitive facets of competence, we developed and tested a new method that we refer to as Embedded Experience Sampling (EES). Domain-specific problem-solving competence is a multi-faceted construct that is not limited to cognitive facets such as domain knowledge or problem-solving strategies but also comprises non-cognitive facets in the sense of domain-specific emotional and motivational dispositions such as interest and self-concept. However, in empirical studies non-cognitive facets are usually either neglected or measured by generalized self-report questionnaires that (...) are detached from the performance assessment. To enable an integrated measurement, we developed the EES method to collect data on non-cognitive facets during scenario-based low-stakes assessments. Test-takers are requested to stop at certain times and spontaneously answer short items (EES items) regarding their actual experience of the problem situation. These EES items are embedded in an EES event that resembles typical social interactions with non-player characters. To evaluate the feasibility and validity of the method, we implemented EES in a series of three studies in the context of commercial vocational education and training (VET): A feasibility study with 77 trainees, a pilot study with 20 trainees, and the main study with 780 trainees who worked on three complex problem scenarios in a computer-based office simulation. In the present paper, we investigate how test-takers perceived the EES events, and whether social desirability biased their answers, and investigate the internal structure of the data and the relationship between EES data and data from several other sources. Interview data and survey data indicated no biases due to social desirability and no additional burden for the test-takers due to the EES events. A correlation analysis following the multitrait-multimethod approach as well as the calibration of a multidimensional model based on Item Response Theory (IRT) also supported the construct validity. Furthermore, EES data shows substantial correlations with test motivation but almost zero correlations with data from generalized retrospective self-report questionnaires on non-cognitive facets. Altogether, EES offers an alternative approach to measuring non-cognitive facets of competence under certain conditions. For instance, EES is also based on self-reporting and thus might not be suitable for high-stakes testing. (shrink)

An increasingly popular solution to the anti-scientific climate rising on social media platforms has been the appeal to more critical thinking from the user's side. In this paper, we zoom in on the ideal of critical thinking and unpack it in order to see, specifically, whether it can provide enough epistemic agency so that users endowed with it can break free from enclosed communities on social media (so called epistemic bubbles). We criticise some assumptions embedded in the ideal of critical (...) thinking online and, instead, we propose that a better way to understand the virtuous behaviour at hand is as critical engagement, namely a mutual cultivation of critical skills among the members of an epistemic bubble. This mutual cultivation allows members within an epistemic bubble (in contrast, as we will show, with the authority-based models of epistemic echo chambers) to become more autonomous critical thinkers by cultivating self-trust. We use the model of relational autonomy as well as resources from work on epistemic self-trust and epistemic interdependence to develop an explanatory framework, which in turn may ground rules for identifying and creating virtuous epistemic bubbles within the environments of social media platforms. (shrink)

What does it mean to know oneself, and what is the self that one hopes to know? This article outlines the implications of an embodied understanding of persons and some aspects of the “self” that are generally ignored when thinking about our selves. The Cartesian model of body–soul dualism reinforces the idea that there is within us a soul, or self, or mind that is our hidden, inner, and real self. Thus, the path to self-knowledge (...) is introspection. The alternative view is that persons are embodied, embedded, and at times extended. This article emphasizes the bodily, active, contextual, relational, often simulated, and sometimes extended nature of the selves that we are, and that we hope to know. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue for an embodied, embedded approach to predictive processing and thus align the framework with situated cognition. The recent popularity of theories conceiving of the brain as a predictive organ has given rise to two broad camps in the literature that I call free energy enactivism and cognitivist predictive processing. The two approaches vary in scope and methodology. The scope of cognitivist predictive processing is narrow and restricts cognition to brain processes and structures; it does not (...) consider the body-beyond-brain and the environment as constituents of cognitive processes. Free energy enactivism, on the other hand, includes all self-organizing systems that minimize free energy and thus does not offer any unique explanations for more complex cognitive phenomena that are unique to human cognition. Furthermore, because of its strong commitment to the mind-life continuity thesis, it does not provide an explanation of what distinguishes more sophisticated cognitive systems from simple systems. The account that I develop in this paper rejects both of these radical extremes. Instead, I propose a compromise that highlights the necessary components of predictive processing by making use of a mechanistic methodology of explanation. The starting point of the argument in this paper is that despite the interchangeable use of the terms, prediction error minimization and the free energy principle are not identical. But this distinction does not need to disrupt the status quo of the literature if we consider an alternative approach: Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing. EEPP accommodates the free energy principle, as argued for by free energy enactivism, but it also allows for mental representations in its explanation of cognition. Furthermore, EEPP explains how prediction error minimization is realized but, unlike cognitivist PP, it allocates a constitutive role to the body in cognition. Despite highlighting concerns regarding cognitivist PP, I do not wish to discredit the role of the neural domain or representations as free energy enactivism does. Neural structures and processes undeniably contribute to the minimization of prediction error but the role of the body is equally important. On my account, prediction error minimization and free energy minimization are deeply dependent on the body of an agent, such that the body-beyond-brain plays a constitutive role in cognitive processing. I suggest that the body plays three constitutive roles in prediction error minimization: The body regulates cognitive activity, ensuring that cognition and action are intricately linked. The body acts as distributor in the sense that it carries some of the cognitive load by fulfilling the function of minimizing prediction error. Finally, the body serves to constrain the information that is processed by an agent. In fulfilling these three roles, the agent and environment enter into a bidirectional relation through influencing and modeling the structure of the other. This connects EEPP to the free energy principle because the whole embodied agent minimizes free energy in virtue of being a model of its econiche. This grants the body a constitutive role as part of the collection of mechanisms that minimize prediction error and free energy. The body can only fulfill its role when embedded in an environment, of which it is a model. In this sense, EEPP offers the most promising alternative to cognitivist predictive processing and free energy enactivism. (shrink)

Narrative views of the self argue that we constitute our self in self-narratives. Embodied views hold that our self is shaped through embodied experiences. In that case, what is the relation between embodiment and narrativity in the process of self-constitution? The question demands a clear definition of embodiment, but existing studies remains unclear on this point (section 2). We offer a correction to this situation by drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the body that highlights its (...) habituality. On this account, the body has an inherent tendency to cultivate an organization of habits through its history of engagement with the world (section 3). Next, we explore its role in narrative self-constitution by distinguishing between two aspects of the narrative self, the narrated I and the narrating I (section 4). We argue on phenomenological grounds that self-narratives are informed by bodily perspectives in both respects. Furthermore, a focus on the habituality of the body allows for a better explanation of self-constitution than those based on implicit self-narratives (section 5). For these phenomenological and theoretical reasons, we conclude that narrative self-constitution is an embodied and embedded practice (section 6). (shrink)

The literature on self-driving cars and ethics continues to grow. Yet much of it focuses on ethical complexities emerging from an individual vehicle. That is an important but insufficient step towards determining how the technology will impact human lives and society more generally. What must complement ongoing discussions is a broader, system level of analysis that engages with the interactions and effects that these cars will have on one another and on the socio-technical systems in which they are embedded. (...) To bring the conversation of self-driving cars to the system level, we make use of two traffic scenarios which highlight some of the complexities that designers, policymakers, and others should consider related to the technology. We then describe three approaches that could be used to address such complexities and their associated shortcomings. We conclude by bringing attention to the “Moral Responsibility for Computing Artifacts: The Rules”, a framework that can provide insight into how to approach ethical issues related to self-driving cars. (shrink)

Our universe, science reveals, began in utter simplicity, then evolved into burgeoning complexity. Starting with subatomic particles, dissimilar entities formed associations—binding, bonding, growing, branching, catalyzing, cooperating—as “self” joined “other” following universal laws with names such as gravity, chemical attraction, and natural selection. Ultimately life arose in a world of dynamic organic chemistry, and complexity exploded with wondrous new potential. Fast forward to human evolution, and a tension that had existed for billions of years now played out in an unprecedented (...) arena of conscious calculation and cultural diversity. Cooperation interleaving with competition; intimacy oscillating with integrity—we dwell in a world where yin meets yang in human affairs on many levels. In The Fractal Self, John Culliney and David Jones uncover surprising intersections between science and philosophy. Connecting evidence from evolutionary science with early insights of Daoist and Buddhist thinkers, among others, they maintain that sagely behavior, envisioned in these ancient traditions, represents a pinnacle of human achievement emerging out of our evolutionary heritage. They identify an archetype, “the fractal self,” a person in any walk of life who cultivates a cooperative spirit. A fractal self is a sage in training, who joins others in common cause, leads from within, and achieves personal satisfaction in coordinating smooth performance of the group, team, or institution in which he or she is embedded. Fractal selves commonly operate with dedication and compassionate practice in the service of human society or in conserving our planet. But the competitive side of human nature is susceptible to greed and aggression. Self-aggrandizement, dictatorial power, and ego-driven enforcement of will are the goals of those following a self-serving path—individuals the authors identify as antisages. Terrorist leaders are an especially murderous breed, but aggrandizers can be found throughout business, religion, educational institutions, and governments. Humanity has reached an existential tipping point: will the horizon already in view expand with cooperative progress toward godlike emergent opportunities or contract in the thrall of corrupt oligarchs and tribal animosities? We have brought ourselves to a chaotic edge between immense promise and existential danger and are even now making our greatest choice. (shrink)

This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self- consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the (...) class='Hi'>self. First, we develop a distinction between abstract and contextualized actions and intentions by drawing on evidence from studies of rehabilitation after brain damage, and we introduce the notion of intentional attitude. Second, we discuss several interesting conclusions drawn from theoretically and experimentally abstract approaches. These conclusions raise some important issues about both the nature of the self and reflexive consciousness. At the same time they indicate the serious limita- tions concerning what we can claim about self and self-consciousness within such abstract frameworks. Such limitations motivate the question of whether it is possible to capture a sense of self that is more embedded in contextualized actions. Specifically, our concern is to focus on first-person approaches. We identify two forms of self-consciousness, eco- logical self-awareness and embedded reflection, that (1) function within the kinds of contextualized activity we have indicated, and (2) can be the basis for a theoretical account of the self. Both forms of self-consciousness are closely tied to action and promise to provide a less abstract basis for developing a theoretical approach to the self. (shrink)

An English double-embedded relative clause from which the middle verb is omitted can often be processed more easily than its grammatical counterpart, a phenomenon known as the grammaticality illusion. This effect has been found to be reversed in German, suggesting that the illusion is language specific rather than a consequence of universal working memory constraints. We present results from three self-paced reading experiments which show that Dutch native speakers also do not show the grammaticality illusion in Dutch, whereas both (...) German and Dutch native speakers do show the illusion when reading English sentences. These findings provide evidence against working memory constraints as an explanation for the observed effect in English. We propose an alternative account based on the statistical patterns of the languages involved. In support of this alternative, a single recurrent neural network model that is trained on both Dutch and English sentences is shown to predict the cross-linguistic difference in the grammaticality effect. (shrink)

This paper suggests that certain traditional ways of analysing the self start off in situations that are abstract or detached from normal experience, and that the conclusions reached in such approaches are, as a result, inexact or mistaken. The paper raises the question of whether there are more contextualized forms of self-consciousness than those usually appealed to in philosophical or psychological analyses, and whether they can be the basis for a more adequate theoretical approach to the self. (...) First, we develop a distinction between abstract and contextualized actions and intentions by drawing on evidence from studies of rehabilitation after brain damage, and we introduce the notion of intentional attitude. Second, we discuss several interesting conclusions drawn from theoretically and experimentally abstract approaches. These conclusions raise some important issues about both the nature of the self and reflexive consciousness. At the same time they indicate the serious limitations concerning what we can claim about self and self-consciousness within such abstract frameworks. Such limitations motivate the question of whether it is possible to capture a sense of self that is more embedded in contextualized actions. Specifically, our concern is to focus on first-person approaches. We identify two forms of self-consciousness, ecological self-awareness and embedded reflection, that function within the kinds of contextualized activity we have indicated, and can be the basis for a theoretical account of the self. Both forms of self-consciousness are closely tied to action and promise to provide a less abstract basis for developing a theoretical approach to the self. (shrink)

The paper studies two fundamentally different forms in which the concept of care makes its comeback in twentieth-century thought. We make use of a distinction made by Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that the ancient and medieval ‘ascetic’ ideal of self-enhancement through practice has re-emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the form of a rehabilitation of the Hellenistic notion of self-care (epimeleia heautou) in Michel Foucault’s late ethics. Sloterdijk contrasts this return of self-care with Martin (...) Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world as ‘total care’ (Sorge), an utterly ‘secularized’ understanding of the human being as irreducibly world-embedded that rejects the classical ascetic ideal of world-secession. We examine further the historical roots and emergence of these contrasting contemporary reappropriations of care in the Western tradition of thought and show them to be rooted in two different ontologies and ethics of the self as either world-secluded or world-immersed, autonomous or constitutively relational. The historical point of divergence of these two approaches to care, we argue, can be found in the Christian transformation of Hellenistic ethics. (shrink)

The concept of the self is embedded in a web of relationships of other concepts and phenomena such as consciousness, self-consciousness, personal identity and the mind–body problem. The article follows the ontological and epistemological roles of the concept of selfconsciousness and the structural co-implication of consciousness and self-consciousness from Descartes and Locke to Kant and Sartre while delineating its subject matter from related inquiries into the relationship between the mind and the body, personal identity, and the question (...) whether consciousness is an irreducible reality sui generis or essentially a neurobiological entity. Over the course of its history, the modern self turns out to become an ever more elusive phenomenon, while its roles as a bearer of individual responsibility and as a subject of reflective endorsement of the truth become ever more pronounced. (shrink)

In what they call their “manual of the sanities”—a positive psychology handbook describing contemporary research on strengths of character—Christopher Peterson and Martin Seligman argue that “there is no true disadvantage of having too much self-control.” This claim is widely endorsed in the research literature. I argue that it is false. My argument proceeds in three parts. First, I identify conceptual confusion in the definition of self-control, specifically as it pertains to the claim that you cannot be too (...) class='Hi'>self-controlled. Second, I consider disadvantages to having too much self-control, several of which point to the value of acting spontaneously from time to time, in a pointedly uncontrolled way. Third, I raise worries about the social and political values embedded in the science of self-control. Self-control as it is understood in the positive psychology literature benefits some people more than others, depending, for example, on their race and their socio-economic status. I conclude by briefly outlining an empirical framework for understanding self-control in traditional virtue theoretic terms as something that admits of deficiencies and excesses. (shrink)

Sunaisthesis is a generally overlooked or misconstrued concept central to Aristotle’s philosophy of friendship, and therefore to his entire ethical and politicalproject. As opposed to Stoic uses that presuppose ethical self-relation, in Aristotle’s coinage, sunaisthesis indicates the genesis of a self-relation mediated through the friend. Both the “merged selves” and the “mirrored selves” approaches to Aristotelian friendship distort this peculiar mediation. Through a close reading of relevant texts, I show that sunaisthesis provides the missing link between the De (...) Anima’s non-reflexive perceiving self and Aristotle’s requirement of a robustly reflexive yet socially inculcated ethical self. Sunaisthesis accounts for ethical responsibility while reinforcing rather than denying our embodied and socially embedded nature. (shrink)

I claim that in order to pass the Turing Test over any period of extended time, it will necessary to embed the entity into society. This chapter discusses why this is, and how it might be brought about. I start by arguing that intelligence is better characterised by tests of social interaction, especially in open-ended and extended situations. I then argue that learning is an essential component of intelligence and hence that a universal intelligence is impossible. These two arguments support (...) the relevance of Turing Test as a particular but appropriate test of interactive intelligence. I look to the human case to argue that individual intelligence utilises society to a considerable extent for its development. Taking a lead from the human case I outline how a socially embedded artificial intelligence might be brought about in terms of four aspects: free-will, emotion, empathy and self-modelling. In each case I try to specify what social ‘hooks’ might be required in order for the full ability to develop during a considerable period of in situ acculturation. The chapter ends by speculating what it might be like to live with the result. (shrink)