Plotinus’s debt to the Stoic thought is well documented. Not only was this debt a function of the general intellectual atmosphere in which Plotinus worked, but the philosopher frequently adopted and modified Stoic positions consciously and carefully. The concept of oikeiôsis / οἰκείωσις plays an important role in Stoic thought. Indeed, some scholars assert that it provides the very foundations for Stoic ethics and political philosophy. In the present study, we will exam Plotinus’ use of this important concept. It shall (...) become clear that, on account of the great differences between Neoplatonic and Stoic metaphysics, Plotinus employs the notion of oikeiôsis in manners that are very distinct from the ways in which it was deployed by various Stoic thinkers. Nevertheless, it shall also become evident that Plotinus’ appropriation of the concept of oikeiôsis accorded him a conceptual tool by which to better think problems concerning the nature of the self. (shrink)

‘Universal benevolence’ may be defined as the goal of promoting the welfare of every individual, however remote, to the best of one’s ability. Currently, the commonest model of universal benevolence is that of ‘impartiality,’ the notion promoted by Peter Singer, Roderick Firth, and others, that every individual (including oneself) is of equal intrinsic worth. This paper contends that the impartialist model is seriously flawed. Specifically, it is demonstrated that impartialist accounts of benevolence (1) attempt to draw positive moral conclusions from (...) negative premises, (2) draw actual conclusions from merely counterfactual premises, (3) fail to live up to stated claims of naturalism, and (4) give no compelling account of moral motivation. By contrast, I propose an alternate model of universal benevolence, grounded in the Stoic, cosmopolitan theory of oikeiôsis, i.e. ‘appropriation.’ Such a model, in contradistinction to impartiality, would see benevolence as the positive identification between moral agent and moral patient, rather than a charitable sacrifice of oneself for a distinct but equal other. An ethics of oikeiôsis has the further benefit of avoiding each of the four abovementioned conceptual pitfalls common to impartialist theories. (shrink)

This paper explores the relation of Foucault’s notion of counter-conduct to the Stoic notion of oikeiosis. Initially, oikeisosis is set against Platonic homoiosis, specifically as discussed in the Alcibiades, which provides what Foucault calls the “Platonic model” of conduct. The paper examines what Foucault means by “care of the self” and points to its difference from the Delphic maxim “know yourself” that centered on a principle of homoiosis, or ethical transcendence. Noting how the problematic of care of the self leads (...) to what Foucault calls “the government of conduct,” the paper considers the possibility of “counter-conduct.” Given that Foucault has argued that the autonomy of conduct has been rendered invisible through its “juridification,” this paper proceeds with a genealogy of the codification of morals in natural law theory. This culminates with the sixteenth century return to Stoicism in the person of Grotius. Showing that a certain conception of counter-conduct present in Gerson is transformed in natural law theory into a juridical grounding of the government of conduct, this paper draws out the immanent relation of conduct and counter-conduct in the notion of appropriation. Arguing that Grotius has fundamentally misunderstood the concept of oikeiosis, which he takes from Cicero and which subtends his theory of appropriation, this paper suggests that a return to the early Stoic formulation of oikeiosis allows for a rethinking of the problem of the government of conduct. A certain moralization of action, irreducible to codification that is present in early Stoic thought provides a model of “counter-conduct.” Ultimately, “care of the self,” as it is given in Stoic philosophy, relates the subject of action to the principle of ethical immanence that grounds Foucault’s critique of the subject. (shrink)

For thirty years now there has been considerable debate concerning the foundations of modern natural law theory, with Richard Tuck emphasising the role self-preservation plays in anchoring Grotius's system and his critics pointing to the contribution of a principle of sociability. With reference to recent contributions in the literature on Stoicism from Julia Annas, A. A. Long and Tad Brennan, I argue that Grotius's use of the outline of Stoic ethics from Book III of Cicero's De finibus is crucial for (...) understanding the nature of his argument. Drawing on Cicero's presentation of the Stoics' oikeiosis helps Grotius to generate an argument which issues not in any demand for altruism, charity or mutual aid, but rather for organising justice around very strong protections for private property. The argument remains one about human sociability, however, and ought not to be mistaken for an account of self-interest, nor for a doctrine with substantially Epicurean roots. (shrink)

This second volume in the series "Studies in Hellenistic Civilization", published for the Danish Research Council for the Humanities, offers a comprehensive analysis of the Stoic theory of Oikeiosis.

Partindo da tese de Pembroke, segundo a qual a doutrina da oikeiosis é umapeça essencial da filosofia estóica, procuramos demonstrar que é justamenteessa doutrina, que assegura a perfeita coesão entre Física e Ética na Escolaestóica. Para os estóicos, virtude é viver segundo a Natureza, ela será odesenvolvimento de um dom natural, a oikeiosis, a capacidade de todo servivo de reconhecer a si mesmo e aquilo que lhe é apropriado. Conciliando asinterpretações de Pohlenz e de White,entendemos com Chrysippo que as duas (...) naturezas se completam e que aordem racional é interior e exterior ao homem. Não há portanto contradiçãoentre naturalismo e racionalismo no Estoicismo.Partant de la thèse de Pembroke, selon laquelle la doctrine de l’oikeiosis estune pièce maîtresse de la philosophie stoïcienne, nous essayons de montrerque c’est justement cette doctrine qui assure la parfaite cohésion entrePhysique et Ethique dans l’Ecole stoïcienne. Pour les stoïciens, la vertu c’estvivre selon la Nature, elle sera le devéloppement d’un don naturel, l’oikeiosis,la capacité qu’a tout être vivant de se reconnaître et de reconnaître ce que luiest approprié. Conciliant les interprétations de Pohlenz et de White,, nous comprennons avec Chrysippe que lesdeux natures se complètent et que l’ordre rationnel est intérieur et extérieurà l’homme. Il n’y a donc pas de contradiction entre naturalisme etrationnalisme dans le Stoïcisme. (shrink)

This paper shows the ways in which Kant’s notions of the feeling of life and the feeling of the promotion of life may be influenced by Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis, respectively. Accordingly, getting a clear picture of Epicurus’ theory of pleasure and the Stoic notion of oikeiôsis will help us (i) understand why Kant introduces these notions in the third Critique and (ii) why he identifies aesthetic pleasure with the feeling of the promotion of (...) life. As I will demonstrate, the feeling of life allows us to be conscious of the harmonious interaction of our faculties with each other while the feeling of the promotion of life allows us to be aware of the harmonious relationship between our faculties and nature. Hence, the feeling of the promotion of life indicates the well-being of the subject in its relation to its environment. (shrink)

Journal Name: Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print.

_ Source: _Volume 63, Issue 3, pp 293 - 350 It is widely agreed that there is a gap between the personal and the social ethics of the Stoics due to the difficulty of harmonizing personal and social _oikeiōsis_. By reconstructing Epictetus’ theory of _oikeiōsis_, this paper aims to show that, in his ethics, there is no such gap, and this for two reasons: first, his account of social _oikeiōsis_ is not meant to ground his social ethics; second, his theory (...) of personal _oikeiōsis_ is a philosophical construct designed to provide a naturalistic justification to the utopian social project of the cosmopolis rather than to ground his personal ethics. (shrink)

Este trabajo muestra cómo una deconstrucción del cuerpo propio, desde la centralidad del tacto como autoafección (haptocentrismo), debe ser completada por una deconstrucción del aptocentrismo, es decir, de la comprensión del cuerpo propio como cuerpo del cual hago uso. Tanto el haptocentrismo como el aptocentrismo postulan al cuerpo propio como aquello que puede ser eminentemente apropiado por el viviente, una apropiación conceptualizada por el estoicismo como oikeiosis. En un recorrido que va desde el estoicismo hasta Michel Henry, pasando por Condillac, (...) Maine de Biran, Rosmini, Husserl, Bergson, Marcel y Merleau-Ponty, podrá advertirse cómo estas argumentaciones están motivadas por dicha necesidad de apropiación del cuerpo y, por tanto, cómo la autoafección debe comprenderse dentro del esquema de la autoapropiación del viviente. Este paradigma de la autoapropiación encuentra, sin embargo, su lugar aporético en el cuerpo propio, el cual no puede ser nunca apropiado del todo y se presenta como el lugar de la resistencia y de la expropiación. (shrink)

En este libro se reconstruye el modelo de fundamentación ética naturalista que el estoicismo desa¬r¬rolló a partir de la noción clave de la oikeiosis. Lo sorprendente de este modelo con¬sis¬te en el hecho de que, a pesar de orientarse a partir de la noción de autoconservación, los estoicos no desarrollaron una ética de la supervivencia ni asumieron ninguna otra variante habitual del egoísmo moral, sino que elaboraron, por el contrario, una ética de marcado contenido social, que adquiere in¬clu¬so un carácter (...) decididamente universalista y cosmopolita. A través de un estudio detallado de los textos estoicos más relevantes y en diálogo con las voces contemporáneas que lideran el estudio de esta escuela helenística, el autor analiza las diferentes fases del proceso de modulación de los impulsos naturales que se da en el ser humano con el surgimiento de la razón, y explica en qué sentido el logro de la virtud equivale para un estoico a una “vida en conformidad con naturaleza”. This book makes a critical examination of the Stoic theory of oikeiosis offering a systematic reconstruction of the natural basis of morality within this philosophical school. What is striking about this theory is the fact that, despite being guided by the notion of self-preservation, the Stoics did not develop an ethics of survival or assume any other variant of the usual ethical egoism but rather developed a model of ethics replete with social content, which takes on a decidedly universal and cosmopolitan character. Through a detailed study of classical sources and in dialogue with leading contemporary scholars in the field of Stoic studies, the author accounts for the different stages of the process of modulation of natural impulses that occurs in human beings with the emergence of reason, and also explains in what sense the attainment of virtue is for a Stoic equivalent to a “life in accordance with nature”. (shrink)

The Neo-Confucian notion of wan wu yi ti 万物一体 and Stoic oikeiôsis both come up with a motivational basis for the expansion of concern, but one of the toughest problems in them is how to elaborate on selfhood and self–other relation in moral development. This paper takes a comparative view of Hierocles’ fragments and a few other relevant Stoic texts and Wang Yang-ming’s Inquiry on the Great Learning, and argues that doing so helps eliminate some confusions concerning selfhood and self–other (...) relation. My claim is that the concept of the Stoic oikeiôsis and the concept of Wang’s ‘wan wu yi ti’ have different ideas on selfhood and the self–other relation while showing similarities in basing the ideal of self-development on the original unity between self and world. (shrink)

It is customary to identify transcendental philosophy as the distinctive and original invention of Immanuel Kant. Certainly this was a view that Kant himself did much to encourage. But this chapter argues that traces of the transcendental strategy can be found already among the ancients. One such ancient precedent is associated with the Stoic doctrine of oikeiosis. It is argued that oikeiosis is best understood as a form of normative orientation associated with 'being at home ' in one's body and (...) environment, and that it involves a distinctive form of ontological self-consciousness. This chapter assesses the merits of Stoic claims that oikeiosis figures as a condition on the possibility of desire, pleasure, and even perception, and the chapter considers the case for describing these arguments as examples of transcendental investigation. (shrink)

Some interpreters associate Smith with the Stoics. My aim in this paper is to discuss this position in relation with one principal aspect of this view, adopted by most of these authors, according to which the Smith’s concept of self-love is narrowly linked to the Stoic notion of oikeiosis. I intend here to demonstrate that Smithian self-love, as seen through the lens of the Stoics themselves, is instead supportive of an Epicurean interpretation of Smith, taken from Mandeville, in spite of (...) his Stoic narrative and his apparent rejection of the system of the author of the Fable of Bees. So it is possible to classify Smith as a ‘voluntarist’ in contrast to the ‘realism’ predominant in his time. (shrink)

Seneca asserts in Letter 121 that we mature by exercising self-care as we pass through successive psychosomatic “constitutions.” These are babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus). The self-care described by Seneca is 'self-affiliation' (oikeiōsis, conciliatio) the linchpin of the Stoic ethical system, which defines living well as living in harmony with nature, posits that altruism develops from self-interest, and allows that pleasure and pain are indicators of well-being while denying that happiness consists in pleasure and (...) that pain is misery. Augustine divides the narrative of his own development into the stages of babyhood (infantia), childhood (pueritia), adolescence (adulescentia), and young adulthood (iuventus) in the Confessions, a text wherein he claims familiarity with more than a few works of Seneca (Conf. 5.6.11). Furthermore, he had access to Stoic accounts of affiliation not only in Seneca’s Letter 121, but also in Cicero’s On Goals, and in non-extant sources of Stoic ethical theory. After pointing out that Augustine endorsed the notion of self-affiliation outside of the Confessions, I raise the question of whether he also makes the notion of affiliation thematic in his philosophical autobiography. I argue that he does indeed present himself and some of his primary relationships – with his mother and his long-term girlfriend – in terms of personal and social oikeiōsis. In addition, his self-critiques in the early books of the Confessions can be more fully understood if compared to Stoic developmental theory. He depicts himself as failing to progress intellectually, socially, and morally: although he passed through the successive constitutions, becoming physically larger and cognitively capable, he did not mature correctly by the standards of his Stoic sources. (shrink)

L’idée d’appropriation (oikeiōsis) constitue un concept fondamental de l’éthique stoïcienne. On en souligne l’efficacité polémique dans la controverse opposant les Stoïciens aux Épicuriens sur la fin (telos) naturelle ainsi que la portée théorique dans l’explication du développement moral et social de l’homme. Outre les difficultés rencontrées pour cerner les contours et la consistance théoriques de l’appropriation, son statut est également fortement débattu : s’agit-il d’une invention stoïcienne ou bien en trouve-t-on l’équivalent ou les linéaments dans la philosophie péripatéticienne ? (...) Tout en rappelant les incertitudes entourant la généalogie de cette idée, on entreprendra de se tourner vers le traitement philosophique du propre (oikeion) dans certains textes d’Aristote et de Platon, pour voir s’il contient des déterminations pertinentes pour comprendre l’appropriation. Cet examen sera l’occasion de s’interroger sur ce qui a pu passer du propre à l’appropriation et sur les difficultés auxquelles s’expose la confrontation de deux notions au statut conceptuel inégal. (shrink)