One of the prestige of young people’s identity today is through fashion. Fashion has even become a “religion” that binds the identity of the individual who wears it. The Sneaker, a form of fashion, also has a big role; even now, it has become a commodity and prestige with a fetish nuance. Therefore, this study aims to identify how the sneaker fetish becomes a space for simulating the lives of young people in Indonesia. Furthermore, this study also examines the problem (...) of the representation of youth-lifestyle simulations in Indonesia. This research uses a qualitative case study approach to play on Jean Baudrillard’s approach to simulacra and hyperreality, which also discusses David Chaney’s approach to fashion. Data collection was obtained from audience studies by examining tagging on social media, Instagram, from July 2022 to October 2022. The results of the study show that the sneaker trend does not only act as a complement to appearances, more than that, but it can also display the personal identity of the wearer. A sneaker community also facilitates the lifestyle of young people towards sneakers. Finally, the community shifted the concept of young people towards sneaker consumption to be more consumptive than before. On the other hand, young people do not realize that what they have done is a hyperreality that tries to identify itself with the best possible image and continues to shape it through massive consumption activities. This is where the sneaker concept shifts from a “community” to a “commodity”. (shrink)

The article presents grounds for defining the fetish of artificial intelligence (AI). We highlight the fundamental differences of AI from all earlier technological advances, as they are primarily related to its introduction into the human cognitive sphere and generating fundamentally new uncontrollable consequences for society. We provide solid evidence that the leaders of the globalist project are the main beneficiaries of the AI fetish. This is clearly manifested in the works of philosophers who are close to major technology corporations and (...) their mega-projects. We suggest considering the problem of how to use the capabilities of AI to overcome the growing international conflicts and the global crisis. The focus is on the problem of agency, which solution from the standpoint of an anthropomorphic approach to AI is fraught with serious negative consequences. Endowing AI with agency, responsibility is implicitly removed from the person who uses the technology, and the established legislative practice is also destroyed. We present AI as an agent endowed with a set of invariant generalized qualities that is similar to natural subjects. These qualities include: the ability to deliberation, reflexivity, communication and elements of sociability. Such a representation of AI as an agent (pseudo-subject) is consistent with the principle of distributed control in biology and psychology, which was called the principle of a dual subject. In combination with the systems of principles and ontologies specified in the concept of post-nonclassical cybernetics of self-developing environments, this will allow the use of AI as a means of social innovation, while maintaining control over AI technologies. This will also help to pose and solve the problem of integrating formations of artificial and natural intelligence while maintaining the basic qualities of carriers of natural intelligence. (shrink)

The article presents grounds for defining the fetish of artificial intelligence (AI). We highlight the fundamental differences of AI from all earlier technological advances, as they are primarily related to its introduction into the human cognitive sphere and generating fundamentally new uncontrollable consequences for society. We provide solid evidence that the leaders of the globalist project are the main beneficiaries of the AI fetish. This is clearly manifested in the works of philosophers who are close to major technology corporations and (...) their mega-projects. We suggest considering the problem of how to use the capabilities of AI to overcome the growing international conflicts and the global crisis. The focus is on the problem of agency, which solution from the standpoint of an anthropomorphic approach to AI is fraught with serious negative consequences. Endowing AI with agency, responsibility is implicitly removed from the person who uses the technology, and the established legislative practice is also destroyed. We present AI as an agent endowed with a set of invariant generalized qualities that is similar to natural subjects. These qualities include: the ability to deliberation, reflexivity, communication and elements of sociability. Such a representation of AI as an agent (pseudo-subject) is consistent with the principle of distributed control in biology and psychology, which was called the principle of a dual subject. In combination with the systems of principles and ontologies specified in the concept of post-nonclassical cybernetics of self-developing environments, this will allow the use of AI as a means of social innovation, while maintaining control over AI technologies. This will also help to pose and solve the problem of integrating formations of artificial and natural intelligence while maintaining the basic qualities of carriers of natural intelligence. (shrink)

In her essay, “After de Brosses” (2017), Rosalind C. Morris briefly considers the historical importance of the concept of the fetish on the relatively recent movements of new materialism, but she does not engage with Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology. This essay addresses this gap and focuses on the influence of the fetish on Speculative Realism and Object-Oriented Ontology by focusing on Graham Harman’s conception of objects and Quentin Meillassoux’s theory of arche-fossils. In short, I am offering a posthumanist theorization (...) of the fetish in order to argue that Object-Oriented Ontology can be considered, at points, to be a fetish-oriented ontology and that this notion of the fetish allows us to think about philosophical considerations of objects in a new light. (shrink)

By most accounts Deleuze's engagement with Marx begins with the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia he co-authored with Félix Guattari. However, Deleuze's Difference and Repetition alludes to a connection between Deleuze's critique of common sense and Marx's theory of fetishism, suggesting a connection between the critique of the image of thought and the critique of capital. By tracing this connection from its emergence in the early texts on noology, or the image of thought, to the development in the critique (...) of state thought in A Thousand Plateaus, it can be argued that what initially appears as an entirely infra-philosophical problem, concerned with the presuppositions of philosophy, is not only a political problem as well, but ultimately bears on the very nature of the conjunction between thought and politics, making possible a re-examination of what is meant by revolutionary thought. It is a transition from noology to noopolitics. In the end it can be argued that revolutionary thought is no longer an eschatology, attempting to discern the signs of the future revolution in the present, but a thought oriented towards everything that exceeds the fetish of society, towards the virtual relations and micropolitical transformations that constitute society but exceed its representation. (shrink)

For over two and a half millennia human beings have attempted to invent strategies to “discover” the truth of time, to determine whether time is infinite, whether eternity is the infinite duration of a continuous present, or whether it too rises and falls with the cycles of universal creation and destruction. _Time-Fetishes_ recounts the history of a tradition that runs counter to the dominant tradition in Western metaphysics, which has sought to purify eternity of its temporal character. From the pre-Socratics (...) to Ovid and Plotinus, and from Shakespeare to Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, _Time-Fetishes_ traces the secret tradition of the idea of eternal recurrence and situates it as the grounding thought of Western philosophy and literature. The thinkers in this counter-history of the eternal return lingered long enough on the question of time to learn how to resist separating eternity from time, and how to reflect on the possible identity of time and eternity as a way of resisting all prior metaphysical determinations. Drawing out the implications of Nietzsche’s reinvention of the doctrine of return, Lukacher ranges across a broad spectrum of ancient and modern thinkers. Shakespeare’s role in this history as the “poet of time” is particularly significant, for not only does Shakespeare reactivate the pre-Christian arguments of eternal return, he regards them, and all arguments and images concerning the essence of time and Being, from an inimitably ironic perspective. As he makes transitions from literature to philosophy and psychoanalysis, Lukacher displays a theoretical imagination and historical vision that bring to the forefront a host of pre- and post-Christian texts in order to decipher in them an encounter with the thought of eternal recurrence that has been too long buried under layers of rigid metaphysical interpretation. (shrink)

The old idea of the masterpiece, the bane of artists throughout the century that is now drawing to a close, is barely recognizable any more. For the general public, this idea remains a facile cliché that is always ready when needed to put an end to a serious discourse on art. Only the label, not the idea itself, was left when artists came to the point of holding masterpieces responsible for the tenacious survival of outdated artistic ideals. The idea of (...) perfected art has become so far removed from the object of its incarnation that we have long been forced to seek the masterpiece by other names. On the other hand, the term masterpiece lends itself to cut-rate uses in which the Utopian content is but a dim gleam. The avantgarde, in search of a scapegoat, decries favored artistic objects as false idols or as fetishes of art. The Mona Lisa, which did not achieve the status of a universal idol until the nineteenth century, thus became the prime target of ill humor: was it not the very epitome of society's trivialization (and mystification) of art? (shrink)

Not long after his arrival in the south-central highlands of Papua New Guinea, the British missionary John Henry Holmes was awoken in the early hours of the morning by a strange cry that issued, it...

Bruno Latour equates criticism with an iconoclastic urge that is underpinned by the project of modernity. Latour's attack on iconoclastic criticism is therefore closely linked to his rejection of the modern framework. This paper examines Latour's analysis of modernity and the ways in which he connects criticism to the project of modernity. Through our analysis of Latour's reading of an episode from U.R. Anantha Murthy's novel Bharathipura, we argue that critique is actually an integral part of a truly democratic knowledge-making (...) process as well as politics. (shrink)

Final Crisis was an event comic produced by DC Comics in 2008 and written by Grant Morrison. In the story, the villain Darkseid takes over the minds of a majority of the Earth's population, including many of its superheroes. Wonder Woman is a notable exception. When one digs into the history of Wonder Woman, though, it isn't difficult to see from where Morrison is coming. This chapter examines a term Zizek uses alongside his discussion of fetishes, the "symptom". In everyday (...) use, it is easy to confuse what Zizek calls a symptom. If Morrison finds the concept of Wonder Woman to be bogus in light of the kinky sexuality associated with her origin, one could see his portrayal of Wonder Woman in Final Crisis as an attempt to bring to light the repressed truth underneath the surface of her image as a feminist icon. (shrink)

This article examines what happens when local gender rights activism is taken up by international allies and appropriators, using case studies of activism in Saudi Arabia and India. The relationship between local and transnational activists is shaped by histories of Euro-Americans writing about the gendered organisation of Eastern societies. In an economic system where nongovernmental activist groups compete for donor support, political causes are commodities with value, and value is generated through representations (e.g. of patriarchal oppression). These representations of the (...) sexuality and gender organisation of other societies are fetishes in the Marxian sense, essential to the commodity-cause that generates value in circulation. These representations gain value through the accretion of cultural images and texts that adhere to the cause, e.g. the stereotype of the violent brown man and oppressed woman. Such images in the cultural repository allow transnational consumers to make sense of issues they are called to support. But such images also reify stereotypes that activists seek to undermine, even at the same time that these representations generate an international audience. We analyse this process and identify strategies for how transnational allies can show solidarity without overshadowing or devaluing the voices of local activists, with primary focus on the case of activism against male guardianship laws in Saudi Arabia. (shrink)

Recently Slavoj Žižek has critiqued certain "feminist" readings of Lacan's feminine structure of desire, including Julia Kristeva, for postulating a feminine discourse which is supposedly beyond the phallic economy. This paper defends Kristeva's position, both by noting how Žižek Hegelian ontology prevents him from utilizing the resources of sexual difference and by clarifying Kristeva's double account of maternity. One consequence of this investigation is that a Kristevean theory of desire will provide one with a new form of political intervention by (...) isolating sites of resistence that Žižek disavows. Another consequence is a refiguration of "feminist" psychoanalytic practice. (shrink)

Recently Slavoj Žižek has critiqued certain "feminist" readings of Lacan's feminine structure of desire, including Julia Kristeva, for postulating a feminine discourse which is supposedly beyond the phallic economy. This paper defends Kristeva's position, both by noting how Žižek Hegelian ontology prevents him from utilizing the resources of sexual difference and by clarifying Kristeva's double account of maternity. One consequence of this investigation is that a Kristevean theory of desire will provide one with a new form of political intervention by (...) isolating sites of resistence that Žižek disavows. Another consequence is a refiguration of "feminist" psychoanalytic practice. (shrink)

Call the ethos understanding rightness in terms of spiritual purity and piety, and wrongness in terms of corruption and sacrilege, the “fetish ethic.” Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues suggest that this ethos is particularly salient to political conservatives and non-liberal cultures around the globe. In this essay, I point to numerous examples of moral fetishism in mainstream academic ethics. Once we see how deeply “infected” our ethical reasoning is by fetishistic intuitions, we can respond by 1) repudiating the fetishistic impulse, (...) by 2) “sublimating” our fetishism into liberal rationales, or by 3) accepting the fetishism on its own terms. Of these options, I argue that sublimating our fetishism is not advisable, and that embracing our ethical fetishism isn’t as obviously misguided as some suggest. (shrink)

As he makes transitions from literature to philosophy and psychoanalysis, Lukacher displays a theoretical imagination and historical vision that bring to the ...

‘Do you have a computer at home? Are you online?’ When such questions are asked today, various things are taken for granted. It is likely that most people reading this article will answer yes to the first question. What is understood by ‘computer’ here is probably the desktop; typically this will incorporate the box housing the processor and drives, a keyboard and a screen.

Algorithms are powerful because we invest in them the power to do things. With such promise, they can transform the ordinary, say snapshots along a robotic vacuum cleaner’s route, into something much more, such as a clean home. Echoing David Graeber’s revision of fetishism, we argue that this easy slip from technical capabilities to broader claims betrays not the “magic” of algorithms but rather the dynamics of their exchange. Fetishes are not indicators of false thinking, but social contracts in material (...) form. They mediate emerging distributions of power often too nascent, too slippery or too disconcerting to directly acknowledge. Drawing primarily on 2016 ethnographic research with computer vision professionals, we show how faith in what algorithms can do shapes the social encounters and exchanges of their production. By analyzing algorithms through the lens of fetishism, we can see the social and economic investment in some people’s labor over others. We also see everyday opportunities for social creativity and change. We conclude that what is problematic about algorithms is not their fetishization but instead their stabilization into full-fledged gods and demons – the more deserving objects of critique. (shrink)

‘Do you have a computer at home? Are you online?’ When such questions are asked today, various things are taken for granted. It is likely that most people reading this article will answer yes to the first question. What is understood by ‘computer’ here is probably the desktop; typically this will incorporate the box housing the processor and drives, a keyboard and a screen.

Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith’s The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute (...) a kind of fetishism to good moral agents. I argue that there are alternative models of moral motivation available to Externalists, in particular a model according to which a good moral agent is one who is effectively regulated by a second order desire to desire to do what is right. (shrink)

Internalism says that if an agent judges that it is right for her to φ, then she is motivated to φ. The disagreement between Internalists and Externalists runs deep, and it lingers even in the face of clever intuition pumps. An argument in Michael Smith's The Moral Problem seeks some leverage against Externalism from a point within normative theory. Smith argues by dilemma: Externalists either fail to explain why motivation tracks moral judgment in a good moral agent or they attribute (...) a kind of fetishism to good moral agents. I argue that there are alternative models of moral motivation available to Externalists, in particular a model according to which a good moral agent is one who is effectively regulated by a second order desire to desire to do what is right. (shrink)

Building on Pietz’s speculation about the construction of a “history of the fetish’ that might be related to, yet stand apart from the fetish as a historical construct, this paper asks if there might be novel yet unmarked contemporary fetish-formations. Taking the later chapters of Pietz’s volume, which focuses on capital and techno-political infrastructures, this essay suggests that non-fungible tokens, or “NFTs,” might be thought of as failed fetishes, objects that work to occlude the material infrastructure that supports blockchain, yet (...) do not cohere because due to contemporary technology, they lack the sensuous materiality required by Pietz’s phenomenologically-shaped understanding of Marxism. Regardless of the correctness of this speculative claim about NFTs, this discussion suggests that Pietz’s original, groundbreaking argument on the fetish still has relevance to, and a great deal of creative promise for, analysis in the current day. (shrink)

This article explores the financialisation of the world’s most important commodity, oil. It argues that much of the literature on the financialisation of commodities tends to adopt a dualistic approach to financial markets and physical producers, where financial and non-financial activities are assumed to be externally-related and counterposed to one another. The article locates the roots of this analytical separation in a mistaken acceptance of the fetish character of interest-bearing capital (IBC) – a view that the exchange of loanable sums (...) of capital represents a relationship between money-capitalists rather than a relationship to the moment of production. Against such dichotomous readings, the article argues that the financialisation of oil needs to be understood as part of the reworking of ownership and control across the oil commodity circuit, expressed through the combined centralisation and concentration of capital over the money, productive and commercial moments. This argument is demonstrated through an original empirical investigation of the US oil industry, including 20 years of weekly trading data on the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and a detailed study of more than 160 oil and energy-related firms in the US. By mapping the structural weight and connections between different capitalist actors involved in accumulation across the oil sector, we gain a better understanding of the ultimate dynamics (and beneficiaries) of the carbon economy. (shrink)

The certification-based Fair Trade initiative has been steadily growing during the last two decades. While many scholars have analyzed its main characteristics and developments, only a few have assessed it against a concept of justice. And those exceptional cases have only focused on distributive justice, proving unable to grasp the important ethical elements that Fair Trade integrates in its project. In reaction to this, this article intends to critically examine what the Fair Trade movement proposes to be ‘fair’ by resorting (...) to the thought of the French philosopher Emmanuel Lévinas. To accomplish this goal, a new understanding of his conception of justice is presented, one that seeks to overcome the limitations that the two most common interpretations in the literature suffer. The idea of Lévinas’ ‘dialectics of justice’ is used to discuss Fair Trade’s relation of alterity, its appropriation of the notion of ‘face’ and its commitment to and responsibility for marginalized producers and workers. This analysis shows that Fair Trade operates with what could be described as a fetishized understanding of Levinasian ethics that justifies a deeply unjust praxis. (shrink)

Most discussions of racial fetish center on the question of whether it is caused by negative racial stereotypes. In this paper I adopt a different strategy, one that begins with the experiences of those targeted by racial fetish rather than those who possess it; that is, I shift focus away from the origins of racial fetishes to their effects as a social phenomenon in a racially stratified world. I examine the case of preferences for Asian women, also known as ‘yellow (...) fever’, to argue against the claim that racial fetishes are unobjectionable if they are merely based on personal or aesthetic preference rather than racial stereotypes. I contend that even if this were so, yellow fever would still be morally objectionable because of the disproportionate psychological burdens it places on Asian and Asian-American women, along with the role it plays in a pernicious system of racial social meanings. (shrink)

This article discusses how the way in which post-Enlightenment humans tend to relate to material objects is a fundamental aspect of modern capitalism. The difficulties that conventional academic disciplines have in grasping the societal and political aspect of ‘technology’ stem from the predominant Cartesian paradigm that distinguishes the domain of material objects from that of social relations of exchange. This Cartesian paradigm has constrained the Marxian analysis of capital accumulation from extending the concept of fetishism to the domain of technology. (...) Both Marxian and mainstream thought represent technological objects as empowered by their intrinsic properties, which derive from human ingenuity and tend to progress over time. To transcend this paradigm will be possible only through the kind of post-Cartesian perspective on material artefacts that has been championed by Bruno Latour. However, Latour’s own neglect of technological systems as social strategies of exploitation reflects his lack of concern with global inequalities. (shrink)

Abstract It would be puzzling if the morally best agents were not so good after all. Yet one prominent account of the morally best agents ascribes to them the exact motivational defect that has famously been called a “fetish.” The supposed defect is a desire to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto . If the morally best agents really are driven by this de dicto desire, and if this de dicto desire is really a fetish, then (...) the morally best agents are moral fetishists. This is puzzling. I resolve the puzzle by showing that on a proper understanding of the interaction between de dicto and de re moral motivation, it is not only not fetishistic, but quite possibly desirable, to be motivated by a de dicto desire to do the right thing. My argument relies partly on an appeal to a non-buck-passing account of moral rightness, according to which rightness is itself an additional reason-giving property over and above the right-making properties of an action. If this account of moral rightness is correct, then we would expect the morally best agents to exhibit de dicto moral motivation. However, since their de dicto desire acts in concert with de re desires, there is no reason to consider it a fetish. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-19 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9825-z Authors Vanessa Carbonell, Philosophy Department, University of Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210374, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

(2009). Fantasies and Fetishes: The Erotic Imagination and the Problem of Embodiment. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology: Vol. 40, Tradition, Art & Sexuality, pp. 66-82.

This short article lays the foundation for a theory of migratorial disobedience and explains how pro-border advocates fetishize immigration law.

As theorists and critics, we should welcome books that call us to question the ideas and ideals that motivate our scholarship and, more specifically, the way we employ foundational concepts in the study of rhetoric and philosophy. Ralph Cintron’s Democracy as Fetish is one such book. Cintron takes on one of the field’s most important grounding concepts—democracy—and asks that we think it anew. The goal is not to abandon or abolish democracy but rather to consider its premises and rethink the (...) assumption that we know what it means.Cintron is an ideal docent for this rethinking, and in his care readers are guided through a consideration of what democracy means and how it might mean otherwise.... (shrink)

Rosoff and Schneiderman's essay “Irrational Exuberance: Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation as Fetish” (2017) raises an issue first posed by the then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, Alan Greenspan...

Today, money takes an important role in our life, which is accompanied by a special mental phenomenon, i.e., fetish of money. Generally, this phenomenon occurs in modern society characterized by the money economy system. And this paper tries to give a systematic argument of fetish of money in order to uncover the ontological ground of it. It will be clarified in three parts. First, the reason why money and fetish of money are historically inevitable in history will be listed out (...) and analyzed, through the discussion about the separation of individuality from sociality. Second, the ontological ground of fetish of money will be demonstratedbased on the argument of individual freedom in the way which history is considered identical with logic. This part will involve the analyses of the relationship between money and positive individual freedom, of the relationship between fetish of money and abstract individual freedom, and of mysteriousness of money and religiousness of fetish of money. Finally, there is an attempt to answer the question whether it is possible to overcome fetish of money. (shrink)

Constellations, Volume 29, Issue 2, Page 146-160, June 2022.

(2011). Beyond Myths, Fetishes, and Checklists: Discovering Diversity's Place in Education, Evaluation, and Accountability. Educational Studies: Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 3-25.

Discussions on the Anthropocene as the geology of mankind imply the question whether globalized technology such as energy technologies or A.I. ought to be first and foremost conceptualized as a strategy of the human in relation to nature or as a strategy of some humans over others. I argue that both positions are mirrored in the philosophy and sociology of technology through the concepts of technology as an extension and as a fetish. The extension concept understands technology as an extension (...) of the human body and its capabilities, resulting in a local ‘inward’ perspective. The fetish concept offers a contrary ‘outward’ perspective by drawing attention to the global socio-material context of modern technology. Despite their differences, I argue that both concepts share an underlying operation principle of technology as functional simplification. Technology always involves a functional simplification of physical as well as social causality. Sociologists and philosophers of technology would do well not to give primacy to the former as it leads to the belief in technology as a universal tool that neglects how technology is not embedded in but consists of (unequal) social arrangements. (shrink)

Is it appropriate to blame people unequally if the only difference between them was a matter of luck? Suppose Alice would drive recklessly if she could, Belen drove recklessly but didn’t harm anyone, and Cleo drove recklessly and killed a child. Luck-advocates emphasize that in real life we do blame such agents very unequally. Luck-skeptics counter that people aren’t responsible for factors beyond their control, or beyond their quality of will. I’ll defend a somewhat reconciliatory view. I’ll concede to the (...) skeptics that these agents are equally culpable. Nonetheless, I’ll suggest with the luck-advocates that it’s fitting to blame them unequally. That’s because their culpability is unequally significant for us: Cleo’s culpability concerns us more than Belen’s, and Belen’s more than Alice’s—just like the fault of a close aggressor concerns us more than that of an aggressor far off in place and time. And it’s fitting for us to respond with more blame to faults that concern us more. Indeed, blaming people simply in proportion to their culpability manifests a form of fetishism, or problematic mere-matter-of-principle concern. So while many skeptical tenets may hold, in substance the luck-advocates are right. (shrink)